The Abandonment of the Pilum for the Hasta - Why ?

[Virilis]

Salve!

This question may be too simplistic, but, what the heck!

Could it be a factor considering the transformation of the roman army (also Pilum & Gladius) that by the 2th century A.D the roman empire had reached it´s largest proportions and somehow the original fervour of the legions had died out gradually by the following decades.

I mean that from then on the legions focused mainly on quarding the frontiers of the empire and gradually the high-point impetus of the expansion and that also had some effects on the army and it`s socio/political culture of making war?

Is it possible that the style of fighting with, Pila, Gladius and Scutum required a specific cultural / social / historical context to come out?
Could it be that this kind of warfare (which started at republican rome) is not so much a technological issue than a cultural phenomena?

Regards, (hope that I didn`t make a fool out of myself :oops: ....)

[Nathan Ross]

Ok, here's a theory, based on Robert's first post above:

This relies on the idea that the adversaries of Roman armies in the later centuries were more often mounted than previously. One thing that the cavalry posseses is much greater speed on the battlefield than an infantryman, thus a cavalry charge is capable of closing with an infantry line much more quickly. While infantry battles of the earlier period were often fought as lengthy pilum duels, until one side or the other closed with the sword, the cavalry would be more likely (excepting Parthian archers and suchlike) to close as soon as possible - the amount of time, therefore, between a cavalryman reaching pilum range and said horseman getting within infantry-killing range was very much reduced. The number of pila a soldier was capable of hurling at charging cavalry, unless he was provided with a hydraulic throwing arm, would be very few indeed - within a minute or less, he would facing charging horsemen armed only with a (short) sword.

So, what to do? How about this - arm the front two ranks of the battle line with spears instead. The spearmen are then able to keep the cavalry at bay, while the rear ranks proceed to pelt them with missiles - the old heavy pila would lack the range to clear the spearmen in front, but lighter pila or javelins, or later plumbata, would do the job admirably. This creates a combination defensive/offensive battle line - and when the impetus of the cavalry charge has been broken, the infantry can move in with spears and spathae or, as at Emesa, send lightly-armed troops (Palestinian clubman, in that example) out between the ranks to attack the milling horsemen.

In time, of course, the numbers of spearmen are increased as the Roman cavalry themselves become the 'offensive' arm on the battlefield, the infantry acting only to block the opposing horsemen.

Well - it's a theory, all ready to be knocked flat! :wink:

[Theodosius the Great]

Could it be a factor considering the transformation of the roman army (also Pilum & Gladius) that by the 2th century A.D the roman empire had reached it´s largest proportions and somehow the original fervour of the legions had died out gradually by the following decades.

I mean that from then on the legions focused mainly on quarding the frontiers of the empire and gradually the high-point impetus of the expansion and that also had some effects on the army and it`s socio/political culture of making war?

This is a bit of a digression, but ...

I don't think this is a factor in the change of equipment. The main problem with the legions (and the Empire) in the late 2nd century was plague. This was a particularly difficult period to keep legions up to strength.

However, the political will for major expansion was still present as late as the reign of Marcus Aurelius. I read that expansion was the purpose behind his raising of two new legions. Had he lived to carry out his ambitions I think it would've been great for the Empire.

I think the Romans should have taken all of modern Germany, Poland, and the Carpathian Mountains. That would've made a much more securer border because you have a much shorter frontier plus the Mountains which have only a few passes or gaps that need to be blocked and guarded by relatively few troops. The problem of course is that the Romans would've needed time to assimilate the new peoples brought into the Empire so that you don't get revolts springing up from behind the new frontier.

Oh the other hand, they wouldn't need as many troops to guard the border, but they would probably need a bigger fleet to partrol the Baltic Sea.

[Flavius Promotus]

Vexillations became the norm, I think from the Late 3rd c. onwards. I should read a bit about that, but that seems to have happened during Diocletian's or Constantine's army reforms.

Er... Robert, this was already the case by the mid 3rd century - at the latest! :wink:

When the 'Gallic' empire broke away from the 'main' empire, several vexillations of the Rhenish and British legions were cut off from their mother legions for (I think) over a decade, because they had served in the Balkans when Postumus rebelled!
In the meantime, they became temporarily quasi indipendent sub-legions.
There is a famous inscription from Sirmium [?] which mentiones Gallienus and vexillationes of the British and Rhenish legions together with their auxiliary units.

The old helmet (Niedermörmter) on the other hand was already in disrepute (because it was too large and encumbering) even before Septimus Severus attacked Persia, which we know from Julius Africanus.

Ooops, don't know this source :oops: Is it from the Historia Augusta ?

I think the Romans should have taken all of modern Germany, Poland, and the Carpathian Mountains. That would've made a much more securer border because you have a much shorter frontier plus the Mountains which have only a few passes or gaps that need to be blocked and guarded by relatively few troops.

Warning - warning - warning ! Collision risk between different schools of thought !
Although mountain passes can be defended relatively easily, we have a lot of examples where it dit not work - think of the Allamans and Iuthungians repeatedly crossing the Alps in the 260s and 270s ! Dacia, too, was not a safe haven in the 3rd century, either, although the greater part of this province was guarded by mountains. Then we have the battles at the pear tree pass in the late 4th century - and neither Maximus nor Ingenius managed to stop Theodosius there...

However, a huge river can be very efficiently guarded with warships (unless it's winter and the frost pins down the fleets in their harbours).

Just my two Antoniniani
Florian

[Praefectusclassis]

Warning - warning - warning ! Collision risk between different schools of thought !

And not just in strategic terms, there's also the question whether the romans ever looked for rational, defensible borders in the same way we would when looking at a map.

[Robert Vermaat]

Could it be a factor considering the transformation of the roman army (also Pilum & Gladius) that by the 2th century A.D the roman empire had reached it´s largest proportions and somehow the original fervour of the legions had died out gradually by the following decades.

That's what later commentators blamed for the downfall of Rome (and the rise of Christianity, and the rising number of barbarians in the ranks). From what I've read, this was never the case - the legions still won and lost battles as they used to.

I mean that from then on the legions focused mainly on quarding the frontiers of the empire and gradually the high-point impetus of the expansion and that also had some effects on the army and it`s socio/political culture of making war?

This would be more a reaction to developments across the border. Look at the dacian wars. Even when the Romans armies were considered to be at their zenith at that time, it took years and years to conquer the area. Apparently the enemy became more and more organised, which we see reflected in developments such as the 'super-tribes' loike the Franks, which essentially was a conglomerate of former smaller tribes. Such enemies made qonquest much harder. Combine that with ecenomic difficulties, and the it's clear that more conquest would be out of the question. The Empire reached its natural limits.

Is it possible that the style of fighting with, Pila, Gladius and Scutum required a specific cultural / social / historical context to come out?
Could it be that this kind of warfare (which started at republican rome) is not so much a technological issue than a cultural phenomena?

How so? Tactics can be learned by any people, at any time, can't it?

This relies on the idea that the adversaries of Roman armies in the later centuries were more often mounted than previously. One thing that the cavalry posseses is much greater speed on the battlefield than an infantryman, thus a cavalry charge is capable of closing with an infantry line much more quickly. While infantry battles of the earlier period were often fought as lengthy pilum duels, until one side or the other closed with the sword, the cavalry would be more likely (excepting Parthian archers and suchlike) to close as soon as possible - the amount of time, therefore, between a cavalryman reaching pilum range and said horseman getting within infantry-killing range was very much reduced. The number of pila a soldier was capable of hurling at charging cavalry, unless he was provided with a hydraulic throwing arm, would be very few indeed - within a minute or less, he would facing charging horsemen armed only with a (short) sword.

If I read this right, I agree - it would be the reason why Arrian changed his tactics to a phalanx-like formation, using hastae (or pila in the role of hastae). The main difference between Parthian and Sassanid cavalry is that the Parthian relied more on horse archers, while the Sassanids relied more on close-quarters heavy armoured cavalry. Which supports our point.

So, what to do? How about this - arm the front two ranks of the battle line with spears instead. The spearmen are then able to keep the cavalry at bay, while the rear ranks proceed to pelt them with missiles - the old heavy pila would lack the range to clear the spearmen in front, but lighter pila or javelins, or later plumbata, would do the job admirably.

Which is what Arrian did against the Alans (first two lines (acies) with the hasta, second two lines throwing, last 4 lines supporting with missiles), and what Wheeler describes as an older tactic that became more used from the 2nd c. onwards, culminating the the fulcum of Maurice/Maurikios. Pila ar e not that short, but hastae are indeed longer and better qualified for the anti-cavalry job. The drive towards more missiles (and a constant rate of fire) woud tie in with that.

This creates a combination defensive/offensive battle line - and when the impetus of the cavalry charge has been broken, the infantry can move in with spears and spathae or, as at Emesa, send lightly-armed troops (Palestinian clubman, in that example) out between the ranks to attack the milling horsemen. In time, of course, the numbers of spearmen are increased as the Roman cavalry themselves become the 'offensive' arm on the battlefield, the infantry acting only to block the opposing horsemen.

Sounds like it, indeed. The testudo (not the siege version) becoming the fulcum, supported by lighter troops.

This is a bit of a digression, but ...

A bit? It's more like a 'Whait If' scenario!!

I don't think this is a factor in the change of equipment. The main problem with the legions (and the Empire) in the late 2nd century was plague. This was a particularly difficult period to keep legions up to strength.

I agree that keeping units up to strenght was a major problem. But plague occurred throughout the history of the Empire.

However, the political will for major expansion was still present as late as the reign of Marcus Aurelius. I read that expansion was the purpose behind his raising of two new legions. Had he lived to carry out his ambitions I think it would've been great for the Empire.

Well, later Emperors also created new units, I don't think that's a reason to assume they're after expansion of the borders. And some did, look at Justinian for instance, he occupied the Crimea, Africa, Italy and parts of Spain! The biggest problem with expansion though is holding on to it.

I think the Romans should have taken all of modern Germany, Poland, and the Carpathian Mountains. That would've made a much more securer border because you have a much shorter frontier plus the Mountains which have only a few passes or gaps that need to be blocked and guarded by relatively few troops. The problem of course is that the Romans would've needed time to assimilate the new peoples brought into the Empire so that you don't get revolts springing up from behind the new frontier.

natural borders aren't necessarily more secure borders. The mountain passes of the High Alps, the Cottian Alps or the Pyrennees were no more secure than the Rhine frontier..

Oh the other hand, they wouldn't need as many troops to guard the border, but they would probably need a bigger fleet to partrol the Baltic Sea.

And the North Sea!!

[Theodosius the Great]

If fighting off cavalry-based armies is the culprit behind the shift in equipment, can anyone think of an advantage the oval shaped concave shields have over the traditional cylindrical-shaped scuta ?

Maybe the former covers more of the shoulders and facial areas against downward attacks from a cavalryman ?

Although mountain passes can be defended relatively easily, we have a lot of examples where it dit not work

Aren't the Carpathians a more formidable barrier than the Alps or the Pyrennees ? If not, at least they're farther away from Italy.

Well, later Emperors also created new units, I don't think that's a reason to assume they're after expansion of the borders.

I think there's literary evidence that hints at Marcus Aurelius wanting to expand into the territories of the Marcomanni. Besides, Septimius Severus raised three new legions and expanded the Eastern frontier.

The mountain passes of the High Alps, the Cottian Alps or the Pyrennees were no more secure than the Rhine frontier..

I think blocking the Carpathian Mountain passes would've stopped tribes like the Alans and Huns since they had cavalry-based armies.

Theodosius the Great wrote:
This is a bit of a digression, but ...

A bit? It's more like a 'Whait If' scenario!!

Quite right. My apologies. And there's an active thread to discuss these

[Nathan Ross]

Vortigern Studies wrote:

The old helmet (Niedermörmter) on the other hand was already in disrepute (because it was too large and encumbering) even before Septimus Severus attacked Persia, which we know from Julius Africanus.

Can I second Florian's request for more details on that?

- Nathan

[Robert Vermaat]

Vortigern Studies wrote:

The old helmet (Niedermörmter) on the other hand was already in disrepute (because it was too large and encumbering) even before Septimus Severus attacked Persia, which we know from Julius Africanus.

Can I second Florian's request for more details on that?

Sure,it's from Roman Frontier Studies 1995: Why the Romans can't defeat the Parthians: Julius Africanus and the strategy of magic (E L Wheeler), pp. 575-9, which I have i pdf thanks to Ross Cowan.

Julius Africanus seems to have written before Severus' campaign against the Persians in 231. (Not Septimus Severus of course, that was a bad mistake on my part :oops: ). Africanus criticizes Roman helmet, which

offers not enough protection against sling-shots, provide too little room for breathing and vision, and by extending down to the shoulder blades, they restrict the movement of the head. Thus in battle the Roman soldier not only suffers injury from sling-shots, but he cannot see incoming missiles or, if he does, the helmet cutting around his neck inhibits turning the head and dodging the projectiles.

(Cest. fr. 1.1.50-52, 78-80).

[Nathan Ross]

Thanks Robert - very interesting quote. I found a note on Wikipedia, derived from where I don't know, that Julius Africanus may have served with Septimius Severus during the war with Osrhoene in 195, so wondered if perhaps he was writing from personal experience!

I don't know if too much should be derived from the quote in terms of the older helmets actually being discarded by soldiers of this period, however - fragments of 'Neiderbeiber' helmets found at Dura would indicate that heavy headgear was still being worn a good twenty or thirty years later. It does, perhaps, suggest a reason for the (later) introduction of the lighter 'Persian style' (?) segmented and ridge helmets though.

[Virilis]

Interesting!

Perhaps the reason for late roman helmets to have neck-quards attached by leather straps and hinges is just this reason, freedom of movement looking up and down?

For example Niederbieber-type helmets have very deep bowls at the neck
and this may have indeed restricted the movement of the head, particularly with infantry...

BTW, has anyone opinion about my previous theory that this latest helmet find may actually have it`s huge nasal quard in the right place? Maybe the bowl was made of two parts ON TOP OF EACH OTHER. This would explain also the strange neck-quard; maybe it is the only surviving part of the lower bowl??

Regards,

[Flavius Promotus]

Hey Robert,

thank you !

[Mithras]

Julius Africanus seems to have written before Severus' campaign against the Persians in 231. (Not Septimus Severus of course, that was a bad mistake on my part :oops: ). Africanus criticizes Roman helmet, which

offers not enough protection against sling-shots, provide too little room for breathing and vision, and by extending down to the shoulder blades, they restrict the movement of the head. Thus in battle the Roman soldier not only suffers injury from sling-shots, but he cannot see incoming missiles or, if he does, the helmet cutting around his neck inhibits turning the head and dodging the projectiles.

(Cest. fr. 1.1.50-52, 78-80).

Fascinating - just because its just what us 3rdC guys think too. Not sure about the sling shot though, I would have thought that a Heddernhein was proof against any arrows or slingstones.

[Goffredo]

Remember the early monteformio helmets (no neck guards) and the relatively slow growth of the neck guards. If a protection theory has to work then it has to explain why helmet designs evolved the way they did (e.g. neck guards) in a world that was full of slingers, missiles and long sword celts and gauls, and cavalry (remember Hannibal cavalry superiority and roman experience in asia minor). What made 3rd-4th century AD fighting so different? I think it is relatively small scale actions!

I don't believe the sling-shot theory unless it means that in large scale formations the roman soldier had better protection while in small scale actions he was more exposed to missiles. Could that be true? We know people huddle for protection. In large and deep formations you are at least protected from the back while in smaller formarions longer range missiles can come in from all directions.

The changes in fighting techniques such as infantry versus cavalry is plausible, but then did the mid-third century Goths really have large amounts of cavalry? Or do we conclude that the sassanian theater set the trend and started changes everywhere? Unlikely as I think romans handled eastern theater well enough. I think the danube theater was were the changes occured. In any case I tend to think economic and fashion is the simplest explanation. Over engineered and expensive armor just died out.

In any case I am just thinking

[Marcus Mummius]

I don't think that if you are in formation you can really dodge incoming missiles. You just have to hope they don't hit you and that the centurio or optio sees the incoming missiles and orders to hold up the shields. And the number one rule when under missile fire is NOT to look up to see if missiles are coming your way! So a helmet that restricts the soldiers to look up isn't that bad IMHO...