08-10-2015, 03:03 AM
Ah, I think I understand what has confused you...
As I have stated :
'As stated in more ancient posts in similar discussions, I would be interested to see any source even hinting at the use of intervals in the Republican years by the Romans during battle.'
With 'battle' I meant during the engagement of the infantry lines and not battle in general. Pre-battle maneuvers, opening of lanes when disengaged etc are a different matter.
The issue was supposed to have been about gaps between maniples in the Roman army of the Republican years and them being standard tactics for a field battle. The same, though, applies for other field battles. Of course we have very good examples of intervals in lines, but always, these accounts give a very straight reason as to why these intervals were used as a tactic (which I clearly stated in my very first post). Usually they are formed in order to address a specific tactical challenge, be it the ascending of a rugged hill or the charge of chariots or elephants. However, using such intervals in a straightforward, normal engagement of two battle formations on a normal field? That is another issue that has nothing to do with the examples given to us by the sources and quoted here.
You look like you are trying to generalize on a tactic that was just one weapon in the arsenal of ancient commanders and seem to ignore the shortcomings that also come with it. No tactic is the panacea that makes all other tactical options obsolete and sizable intervals in the line is also not a fit tactic for all circumstances, which is why it was not used as such.
In my opinion, we have to be very careful, when we form opinions based on the assumption that the sources do not say, as this is mostly an excuse for not further researching the matter. I do not demand definite proof but I demand thorough study of the sources before stating that the sources are not enough before applying our own subjective rationale. And then I prefer theories that can follow the sources rather than disparage them or use them out of context.
You cannot, for example, state as an argument that battle-lines (and more specifically the Republican Romans) used sizable gaps in their formations as a standard tactic when in hand to hand combat against other infantry lines because Polybius describes a standard Roman formation before battle (he also describes Greek formations before battle that are not close ordered...), because Scipio used intervals to counter Hannibal's elephants at Zama, because Alexander ordered his men to form lanes for the Persian chariots to pass through at Gaugamela, as did the 10,000 at Cunaxa, because Xenophon arrayed his men in speirae when attacking the barbarians uphills, as did Antigonus at Sellasia, because Antiochus III arrayed his phalangites in squares with elephants in the intervals or because Perseus attacked the Romans with only half his phalanx. These were tactics employed for specific reasons, not how these armies actually engaged the enemy infantry in normal situations. And if you are trying to link this with the manipular tactics of the Republican Romans, you would need examples and references that I have not seen, else, why not argue that the sarissophoros phalanx of Alexander also fought with sizable gaps, as portrayed in the tactically abysmal movie of Oliver Stone and supported by examples such as above?
In older discussions, I have often written about the Greek texts and how they portrayed battles with Romans, Polybius being one of those writers who wrote in Greek. Their descriptions are not as 'vague' as some who have read the translations say they are. When they speak of the Roman battle-line, they often say how it fought in phalanx (phallangidon), which as a term, it normally (especially in the eras of the sources in question), means that they fought as a phalanx, in a continuous line. This is usually rendered in English as 'the Roman line / formation etc' and so questions arise that should not have. The very Greek name of a legion in the later Roman years is 'phalanx', like 'the 5th phalanx' when speaking about the 5th legion, which is also indicative. Polybius does not describe the Roman battle-line in hand to hand combat with gaps, so I do not see why I would have to prove that he got it wrong. The same applies to other sources you propose, which I also urge you to re-examine, as for example the battle against Oroeses and the battle of Chaeronea (I presume you mean the one between Sulla and Archelaus?). Maybe, you are the one getting this wrong, trying to use the examples trying to present an order given to form lanes as a standard tactic to engage the enemy infantry line in, which is a very different thing. Remember here, that no one disputes the existence of gaps for a variety of tactical reasons. What I disagree with is their use as a standard tactic against infantry lines in hand to hand combat.
For example, we have Mauricius write that the interval between two infantry lines in parallel formation should be 100-200 feet wide (31.23-62.46 m). This interval helped them to not get crowded together on the march, while being short enough to allow the lines to join for the melee and thus support each other. This coming from a manual of the 6th century based on Roman tradition is very important in order to understand how gaps were used not only in battle but also outside it.
Mauricius, Strategicon (sub nomine Mauricii Imperatoris vel Urbicii), B.12, ch.8.17, p.3, l.1 “τάσσονται δὲ τὰ μέρη τῆς παρατάξεως ἀπὸ ἑκατὸν ἢ διακοσίων ποδῶν ἀλλήλων διακεκριμένως, ἵνα μὴ στενοῦνται ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων ἐν τῷ περιπατεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τῆς συμβολῆς ἑνοῦνται καὶ βοηθοῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς”
Leo VI also advises that the meroi of his mixed formation be arrayed with intervals ranging from 100 to 200 feet (about 30-60 m), so that they would not hinder each other’s movement. However, when it is time to engage the enemy, he orders that they unite so that they can assist one another and all should obey the middle meros, where the bandon of the commander of the line was located
Leo VI Sapiens, Tactica, ch.14, s.65, l.1 “Τάξεις δὲ τὰ μέρη τῆς παρατάξεως ἀπὸ ἑκατὸν ἢ διακοσίων ποδῶν ἀλλήλων διακεκριμένα, ἵνα μὴ στενοχωροῦνται ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων ἐν τῷ περιπατεῖν, ἐν δὲ τῷ καιρῷ τῆς συμβολῆς ἑνοῦνται καὶ βοηθῶσιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ παραγγέλλωνται τῷ μέσῳ μέρει πείθεσθαι, ἔνθα τὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἤ τινος ἑτέρου τεταγμένου ἄρχοντος βάνδον ὀφείλει τάσσεσθαι.”
And in the Sylloge Tacticorum, we are given the info that Intervals between units are formed to serve the following functions: First, they allow the orderly withdrawal of friendly units operating in front. They also are used to transport the injured to the rear, where medics can treat them with safety. Furthermore, the gaps are used by the mandatores to relay orders from and towards the first-rankers, since movement through the lines when the enemy is near is not safe.
Anonyma Tactica Byzantina, Sylloge tacticorum, ch.45, p.19, l.1 “Ἀναγκαῖα δ’ εἰσὶ τὰ διαλείμματα ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς παρατάξεσι. Κενώσαντες γὰρ τὰ βέλη οἱ προκουρσάτωρες διὰ τῶν εἰρημένων διαλειμμάτων ἐπὶ τὴν οὐραγίαν ἀναταράχως ἀποκομίζονται· καὶ οἱ τραυματίαι δὲ διὰ τούτων ἀσφαλῶς παρὰ τῶν καλουμένων δαιποτάτων διαβιβαζόμενοι τοῖς ἰατροῖς ἀποδίδονται· ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ μανδάτωρες διὰ τῶνδε διϊόντες τῶν τόπων τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἡγεμόνων ἐπιταγὰς καὶ παραγγελίας ἐπὶ τοὺς τὴν οὐραγίαν τεταγμένους διαπορθμεύουσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀσφαλὲς τοὺς χρεῖαν ἔχοντας ἐν πολέμου καιρῷ περιϊέναι τὰς τάξεις.”
These (and other) such accounts of the tactical use of gaps are well worth studying by those who try to explore the use of gaps in the line. And will it or not, they have to be taken into account when debating the issue, consist primary sources and, as already stated, within the Roman military tradition. Any theory, in my opinion, should also try to reconcile the manuals too as well as the many descriptions of Romans actually fighting an infantry opponent in continuous lines.
Anyways. I am generally open to theories but in order to really make a serious proposal, one needs to first have researched the available material in depth and then resort to subjective, personal opinion. In all, you are of course welcome to make a point about such gaps and I am following all such discussions with interest in search of new ideas and possibly information I have not encountered (which is a lot... I still am planning of studying dozens of other authors), but from this to jump into how well-known or well-substantiated it is that the ancient battle-lines formed with sizable gaps between units, be it Greeks or Romans, Republicans or Imperials and how such gaps were not vulnerable to attacks from the enemy, there is a long distance.
As I have stated :
'As stated in more ancient posts in similar discussions, I would be interested to see any source even hinting at the use of intervals in the Republican years by the Romans during battle.'
With 'battle' I meant during the engagement of the infantry lines and not battle in general. Pre-battle maneuvers, opening of lanes when disengaged etc are a different matter.
The issue was supposed to have been about gaps between maniples in the Roman army of the Republican years and them being standard tactics for a field battle. The same, though, applies for other field battles. Of course we have very good examples of intervals in lines, but always, these accounts give a very straight reason as to why these intervals were used as a tactic (which I clearly stated in my very first post). Usually they are formed in order to address a specific tactical challenge, be it the ascending of a rugged hill or the charge of chariots or elephants. However, using such intervals in a straightforward, normal engagement of two battle formations on a normal field? That is another issue that has nothing to do with the examples given to us by the sources and quoted here.
You look like you are trying to generalize on a tactic that was just one weapon in the arsenal of ancient commanders and seem to ignore the shortcomings that also come with it. No tactic is the panacea that makes all other tactical options obsolete and sizable intervals in the line is also not a fit tactic for all circumstances, which is why it was not used as such.
In my opinion, we have to be very careful, when we form opinions based on the assumption that the sources do not say, as this is mostly an excuse for not further researching the matter. I do not demand definite proof but I demand thorough study of the sources before stating that the sources are not enough before applying our own subjective rationale. And then I prefer theories that can follow the sources rather than disparage them or use them out of context.
You cannot, for example, state as an argument that battle-lines (and more specifically the Republican Romans) used sizable gaps in their formations as a standard tactic when in hand to hand combat against other infantry lines because Polybius describes a standard Roman formation before battle (he also describes Greek formations before battle that are not close ordered...), because Scipio used intervals to counter Hannibal's elephants at Zama, because Alexander ordered his men to form lanes for the Persian chariots to pass through at Gaugamela, as did the 10,000 at Cunaxa, because Xenophon arrayed his men in speirae when attacking the barbarians uphills, as did Antigonus at Sellasia, because Antiochus III arrayed his phalangites in squares with elephants in the intervals or because Perseus attacked the Romans with only half his phalanx. These were tactics employed for specific reasons, not how these armies actually engaged the enemy infantry in normal situations. And if you are trying to link this with the manipular tactics of the Republican Romans, you would need examples and references that I have not seen, else, why not argue that the sarissophoros phalanx of Alexander also fought with sizable gaps, as portrayed in the tactically abysmal movie of Oliver Stone and supported by examples such as above?
In older discussions, I have often written about the Greek texts and how they portrayed battles with Romans, Polybius being one of those writers who wrote in Greek. Their descriptions are not as 'vague' as some who have read the translations say they are. When they speak of the Roman battle-line, they often say how it fought in phalanx (phallangidon), which as a term, it normally (especially in the eras of the sources in question), means that they fought as a phalanx, in a continuous line. This is usually rendered in English as 'the Roman line / formation etc' and so questions arise that should not have. The very Greek name of a legion in the later Roman years is 'phalanx', like 'the 5th phalanx' when speaking about the 5th legion, which is also indicative. Polybius does not describe the Roman battle-line in hand to hand combat with gaps, so I do not see why I would have to prove that he got it wrong. The same applies to other sources you propose, which I also urge you to re-examine, as for example the battle against Oroeses and the battle of Chaeronea (I presume you mean the one between Sulla and Archelaus?). Maybe, you are the one getting this wrong, trying to use the examples trying to present an order given to form lanes as a standard tactic to engage the enemy infantry line in, which is a very different thing. Remember here, that no one disputes the existence of gaps for a variety of tactical reasons. What I disagree with is their use as a standard tactic against infantry lines in hand to hand combat.
For example, we have Mauricius write that the interval between two infantry lines in parallel formation should be 100-200 feet wide (31.23-62.46 m). This interval helped them to not get crowded together on the march, while being short enough to allow the lines to join for the melee and thus support each other. This coming from a manual of the 6th century based on Roman tradition is very important in order to understand how gaps were used not only in battle but also outside it.
Mauricius, Strategicon (sub nomine Mauricii Imperatoris vel Urbicii), B.12, ch.8.17, p.3, l.1 “τάσσονται δὲ τὰ μέρη τῆς παρατάξεως ἀπὸ ἑκατὸν ἢ διακοσίων ποδῶν ἀλλήλων διακεκριμένως, ἵνα μὴ στενοῦνται ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων ἐν τῷ περιπατεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τῆς συμβολῆς ἑνοῦνται καὶ βοηθοῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς”
Leo VI also advises that the meroi of his mixed formation be arrayed with intervals ranging from 100 to 200 feet (about 30-60 m), so that they would not hinder each other’s movement. However, when it is time to engage the enemy, he orders that they unite so that they can assist one another and all should obey the middle meros, where the bandon of the commander of the line was located
Leo VI Sapiens, Tactica, ch.14, s.65, l.1 “Τάξεις δὲ τὰ μέρη τῆς παρατάξεως ἀπὸ ἑκατὸν ἢ διακοσίων ποδῶν ἀλλήλων διακεκριμένα, ἵνα μὴ στενοχωροῦνται ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων ἐν τῷ περιπατεῖν, ἐν δὲ τῷ καιρῷ τῆς συμβολῆς ἑνοῦνται καὶ βοηθῶσιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ παραγγέλλωνται τῷ μέσῳ μέρει πείθεσθαι, ἔνθα τὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἤ τινος ἑτέρου τεταγμένου ἄρχοντος βάνδον ὀφείλει τάσσεσθαι.”
And in the Sylloge Tacticorum, we are given the info that Intervals between units are formed to serve the following functions: First, they allow the orderly withdrawal of friendly units operating in front. They also are used to transport the injured to the rear, where medics can treat them with safety. Furthermore, the gaps are used by the mandatores to relay orders from and towards the first-rankers, since movement through the lines when the enemy is near is not safe.
Anonyma Tactica Byzantina, Sylloge tacticorum, ch.45, p.19, l.1 “Ἀναγκαῖα δ’ εἰσὶ τὰ διαλείμματα ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς παρατάξεσι. Κενώσαντες γὰρ τὰ βέλη οἱ προκουρσάτωρες διὰ τῶν εἰρημένων διαλειμμάτων ἐπὶ τὴν οὐραγίαν ἀναταράχως ἀποκομίζονται· καὶ οἱ τραυματίαι δὲ διὰ τούτων ἀσφαλῶς παρὰ τῶν καλουμένων δαιποτάτων διαβιβαζόμενοι τοῖς ἰατροῖς ἀποδίδονται· ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ μανδάτωρες διὰ τῶνδε διϊόντες τῶν τόπων τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἡγεμόνων ἐπιταγὰς καὶ παραγγελίας ἐπὶ τοὺς τὴν οὐραγίαν τεταγμένους διαπορθμεύουσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀσφαλὲς τοὺς χρεῖαν ἔχοντας ἐν πολέμου καιρῷ περιϊέναι τὰς τάξεις.”
These (and other) such accounts of the tactical use of gaps are well worth studying by those who try to explore the use of gaps in the line. And will it or not, they have to be taken into account when debating the issue, consist primary sources and, as already stated, within the Roman military tradition. Any theory, in my opinion, should also try to reconcile the manuals too as well as the many descriptions of Romans actually fighting an infantry opponent in continuous lines.
Anyways. I am generally open to theories but in order to really make a serious proposal, one needs to first have researched the available material in depth and then resort to subjective, personal opinion. In all, you are of course welcome to make a point about such gaps and I am following all such discussions with interest in search of new ideas and possibly information I have not encountered (which is a lot... I still am planning of studying dozens of other authors), but from this to jump into how well-known or well-substantiated it is that the ancient battle-lines formed with sizable gaps between units, be it Greeks or Romans, Republicans or Imperials and how such gaps were not vulnerable to attacks from the enemy, there is a long distance.
