08-07-2015, 01:14 AM
Livy describes what is commonly referred to as the quincunx formation, not Polybius.
While the texts aren't clear or consistent enough to 100% state how it worked or why it was employed, the common ideology behind having a broken line, supported by other lines behind it, is that each unit is independent of each other, and don't need to rely on the line holding completely or collapsing.
Once battles stopped being under an hour in length, it became very important to have the ability to relieve front line troops. The older Greek hoplite phalanx method was insufficient, the traditional 8 deep phalanx had no staying power in a long fight. The Greeks overcame this by adding depth to their phalanx, making it 16, sometimes 32 deep. Meanwhile the Romans went a different direction, taking the lines, keeping them relatively thin in depth (3-6 deep seems to be average during Republican period), while adding different lines. This meant it was not only harder to break through the overall infantry line but that each line not directly in battle was physically safe, outside the danger area of the enemy, allowing them to watch, cheer, but not be overcome by fear or excitement, like those present in whatever battleline was engaged. Once that line was too exhausted, overcome by excessive casualties, or morale was too poor to throw back into battle, units could be relieved by entirely fresh ones. No other nation or city state infantry fighting method allowed for anything similar.
As for the gaps, its generally acknowledged that by the time of the Hellenistic period, all infantry units would have had some sort of gaps separating them from friendly units, in order to keep integrity, prevent bunching or being squeezed, while stationary, marching, or in battle. The ancient Greek hoplites are thought to have fought in a near unbroken line, with minimal gaps separating the city state contingents within a single battle line. The problem with this method is that since it is a single unbroken line, if the line collapses and breaks then the whole line is in jeopardy. In the Roman method, each line fought independently of one another, each maniple (and later cohort) fought independent. A single line could attack, fight, pull back, and be relieved without threatening the integrity of the line. For the more complicated tactics used at battles such as Leutra to have occurred, each polis contingent would have had to be separated from the city state units on their flanks, or else the oblique order echelon tactics couldn't have worked.
The Macedonians and Successor states most likely had gaps between units. The Romans did too. Or else any unit moving forward or backwards, even when locked in arms in combat, would have either become too strung out or too bunched together. The Romans are said by Livy to have used gaps equal in width to the frontage of their maniples (unit type), with maniples of the lines behind them covering those gaps.
One of the most convincing ideas is that when fighting an enemy that fights in a single unbroken line (or with small gaps), that require the line to remain unbroken to keep integrity, the Romans could match the frontage of their enemy while having 2/3 of their overall line infantry not engaged, in separate lines. The gaps between them maniples would be safe from enemy attack because to do so meant breaking men off from the line to attack those gaps, which itself would jeopardize their own line's integrity. Going into the fight, the Romans would be okay with gaps and the issues they caused, while the enemy, almost all of whom fought in continuous lines, would have not been comfortable doing it. This means that the gaps wouldn't be attacked in force, or if they did, the enemy's line would collapse, leading to chaos.
Should the gaps become an issue, the Romans could fix the issue filling the gaps with skirmishers to keep enemy infantry away, peel off line type infantry by having those unoccupied in the rear ranks break off, or to do a more complicated drill maneuver to extend the line by doubling the number and depth of files.
Michael Taylor, a PhD in Roman history, and a poster in this forum, has written some about this topic, as did Ross Cowan (another member) and Adrian Goldsworthy, all of whom think the maniple sized gaps existed in battle. Some other historians think, like P. Connolly, think the gaps were closen prior to making contact. But personally, since units engaged fought for hours and moved forward and backwards for hundreds of meters while directly locked in close combat, so I don't think this would have been possible if the line was continuous.
While the texts aren't clear or consistent enough to 100% state how it worked or why it was employed, the common ideology behind having a broken line, supported by other lines behind it, is that each unit is independent of each other, and don't need to rely on the line holding completely or collapsing.
Once battles stopped being under an hour in length, it became very important to have the ability to relieve front line troops. The older Greek hoplite phalanx method was insufficient, the traditional 8 deep phalanx had no staying power in a long fight. The Greeks overcame this by adding depth to their phalanx, making it 16, sometimes 32 deep. Meanwhile the Romans went a different direction, taking the lines, keeping them relatively thin in depth (3-6 deep seems to be average during Republican period), while adding different lines. This meant it was not only harder to break through the overall infantry line but that each line not directly in battle was physically safe, outside the danger area of the enemy, allowing them to watch, cheer, but not be overcome by fear or excitement, like those present in whatever battleline was engaged. Once that line was too exhausted, overcome by excessive casualties, or morale was too poor to throw back into battle, units could be relieved by entirely fresh ones. No other nation or city state infantry fighting method allowed for anything similar.
As for the gaps, its generally acknowledged that by the time of the Hellenistic period, all infantry units would have had some sort of gaps separating them from friendly units, in order to keep integrity, prevent bunching or being squeezed, while stationary, marching, or in battle. The ancient Greek hoplites are thought to have fought in a near unbroken line, with minimal gaps separating the city state contingents within a single battle line. The problem with this method is that since it is a single unbroken line, if the line collapses and breaks then the whole line is in jeopardy. In the Roman method, each line fought independently of one another, each maniple (and later cohort) fought independent. A single line could attack, fight, pull back, and be relieved without threatening the integrity of the line. For the more complicated tactics used at battles such as Leutra to have occurred, each polis contingent would have had to be separated from the city state units on their flanks, or else the oblique order echelon tactics couldn't have worked.
The Macedonians and Successor states most likely had gaps between units. The Romans did too. Or else any unit moving forward or backwards, even when locked in arms in combat, would have either become too strung out or too bunched together. The Romans are said by Livy to have used gaps equal in width to the frontage of their maniples (unit type), with maniples of the lines behind them covering those gaps.
One of the most convincing ideas is that when fighting an enemy that fights in a single unbroken line (or with small gaps), that require the line to remain unbroken to keep integrity, the Romans could match the frontage of their enemy while having 2/3 of their overall line infantry not engaged, in separate lines. The gaps between them maniples would be safe from enemy attack because to do so meant breaking men off from the line to attack those gaps, which itself would jeopardize their own line's integrity. Going into the fight, the Romans would be okay with gaps and the issues they caused, while the enemy, almost all of whom fought in continuous lines, would have not been comfortable doing it. This means that the gaps wouldn't be attacked in force, or if they did, the enemy's line would collapse, leading to chaos.
Should the gaps become an issue, the Romans could fix the issue filling the gaps with skirmishers to keep enemy infantry away, peel off line type infantry by having those unoccupied in the rear ranks break off, or to do a more complicated drill maneuver to extend the line by doubling the number and depth of files.
Michael Taylor, a PhD in Roman history, and a poster in this forum, has written some about this topic, as did Ross Cowan (another member) and Adrian Goldsworthy, all of whom think the maniple sized gaps existed in battle. Some other historians think, like P. Connolly, think the gaps were closen prior to making contact. But personally, since units engaged fought for hours and moved forward and backwards for hundreds of meters while directly locked in close combat, so I don't think this would have been possible if the line was continuous.
