11-26-2013, 03:58 AM
Tim wrote:
I always assumed that to mean a single horizontal line or "rank" and that there were 3 lines in each maniple (Hastati, Princepes, and triarii)
Macedon and myself are referring to a line being made up of a different troop type. The hastati are one line but could consist of six ranks. In regard to the primary sources, I have found that when some writers describe a line of infantry, it actually can consist of two lines each 5 men deep. Because the troops are of the same type (example scutarii infantry), they are referred to as one line by the primary sources.
Tim wrote:
But, this obviously doesn't account for the view that the triarii were left back to guard the camp. if this were the case, then there would be only 2-line maniples, which still could have been stacked.
I have stated in the Cannae discussion that I believe the triarii are incorporated into the same body or line as the principes. The triarii form the last three ranks of the principes if the legion has a frontage of 200 men wide.
Macedon wrote:
Yes, what you are describing is practically a two "line" formation, one in wedge and one in line. This is what I mean.
Ok, I’m with you now. I wasn’t sure if you had envisaged my Carthaginian deployment as being in two horizontal lines.
Macedon wrote:
I find tactical issues extremely interesting and I am always eager to understand how other same-minded people understand them.
I’m a real nuts and bolts person. I want to examine the smallest component. It’s the small detail that makes the bigger picture. Also I am very interested in understanding command and control.
Macedon wrote:
The normal distance between lines in such multiple line formations is usually described in hundreds of yards and one thing all accounts have in common is that the auxiliary (rear) lines keep their shape and do not just follow the units in front of them, dissolving the integrity of their own lines in the process until they are called upon to reinforce the front either as units or as a whole line (again depends on theories and circumstances).
My research method involves putting such information as found in the military manuals, especially the Byzantium manuals about the distance between lines (100 or 200 feet), and then only use them when I can prove such information relates to the Romans. For example, the distances in Maurice may not be applicable to the Romans and by employing such information, which could appear to be correct, could end up creating a road block.
Macedon wrote:
To me, assuming that the rear line was present and that it had not already dispersed in flight, it would be impossible to effectively destroy the Roman first line, as the men in flight would find refuge in the second line or else the rear line would advance against the maneuvering Africans.
You are very influenced by Maurice and the Byzantine military manuals. They mention the first line being a good distance back and the first line should take refuge with the second line etc. At Zama the principes were in shouting distance of the hastati.
Macedon wrote:
I cannot see them so close to the front line in order to also be trapped by the Africans. Of course, many hypotheses could be voiced as to how things could fare in order for the outcome to be the same, but such action would be so critical that I would have expected some relative mentioning in the accounts.
Now we are back to the translation. If as many tell me, after describing the depth and frontage of the maniple, Polybius also meant the maniples were closer together than normal then your question is answered.
Macedon wrote:
Regarding the triarii, I also believe that they were the 10,000 men tasked with camp guard duty but I have to say that unfortunately they are not positively identified in the sources.
The triarii may not be positively named at Cannae but where they were during the battle can be identified. Again, mathematics combined with the primary sources will show the way. The largest figure given for the Roman army at Cannae is that given by Plutarch at 88,000 men “arrayed for battle.” So Plutarch 88,000 men are those ready to fight. I took my figure for the whole Roman army and by removing the artificers (blacksmiths and carpenters) and by keeping the musicians) you get 88,000 men, but the figure is just a tad rounded. Therefore, I have the triarii standing on the battlefield of Cannae and not in the camp.
Macedon wrote:
As I already said, of course they could fail, but I would have expected some relative action in the accounts, unless there is such and I just do not link it with it as, undoubtedly, I do have strong preconceptions because of my work as I guess you and most others like us do. This is why such discussions can be interesting as they can offer a fresh look into things
At Cannae one has to take into account the punishment melted out on the survivors by being sent to Sicily. This form of punishment did not happen to those who survived the Trebia or Lake Trasimene that is can only signify some act of mass cowardice had occurred. And also cavalrymen are sent in exile to Sicily. We know many of the Roman troops were raw recruits but we don’t know their state of mind. Did the camp rumours talk of the Carthaginian army as being unbeatable and loved by the gods? Was there a defeatist attitude sweeping through the lower ranks? Did this defeatist attitude develop when the Roman commanders refused to challenge Hannibal days before? Were the allied troops wholly committed to the Roman cause? Or did Hannibal’s policy of allowing the allied troops to return home after being captured make it that much easier for the allied legions on the flanks to rout?
Macedon wrote:
It is not just the lack of supporting evidence that troubles me, it is the tactical risk included for Hannibal's Africans as they extend before or behind a fresh, unpinned Roman line, as you describe the action, making it a very dangerous maneuver to have been organized beforehand. It is more a decision I would expect a general to have made as a reaction to exploit an opportunity, rather than a pre-planned one.
I’m a believer of the pre-planned encirclement. As to the dangers of this manoeuvre, I do discuss this very thing, but I have done it in comparison to other outflanking manoeuvres. When I was doing the Great Plains scenario, as the Romans have only the 4000 Celtiberians to encircle, something occurred to me about the formation of the surrounding force. This gave me more insights into how the Africans can extend. I also took the numbers of Caesar’s fourth line and applied the methodology and it worked. So in the book I am presenting something very different about flanking forces and it is to do with their safety.
Macedon wrote:
Yes, this is a key difference between our understandings and the center of my "objections". As I perceive it, the doctrine of the rear lines was to keep their line and NOT follow the hastati in front of them unless ordered to.
You old Byzantine. Had the principes at Cannae did what the principes did at Zama Hannibal’s plan of encirclement at Cannae would have failed.
Macedon wrote:
Keeping in mind that up to that point the hastati were fully victorious in their eyes, I expect the rear line to not have sent many reinforcements to them, so their integrity cannot have suffered much.
My belief is that maniples of principes do not replace individual maniples of hastati. All the maniples of hastati are withdrawn and replaced by all the maniples of principes (which includes the triarii). Therefore, lines replace lines.
Macedon wrote:
If, as you suggest, each unit (of whatever predetermined size) kept a constant distance with the men in front of them, then the shape of the auxiliary line formation would have changed in the same manner the front line did making your suggestion much more probable as parts of the rear would even be as advanced if not more than the wings of the front line.
That is my conclusion. The eight legions in the centre of the Roman line had advanced further in front than the three legions on each flank of the eight legions. I found it interesting that Plutarch talks of the centre retiring and it is those that get surrounded. Now at this point, those eight legions are pushing Hannibal’s main line back (the base of the triangle or as you say the second line), so disengaging will not be easy. Appian has the rout start on the left wing then the right wing and for the eight legions to be surrounded the three legions on either flank of the eight legions that should be protecting the flank of the eight legions have routed leaving the eight legions to fight their way back. With the return of the Carthaginian cavalry, only then is it safe for the African infantry to begin extending. Livy and Polybius report that Servilius commanded the centre and Servilius is mention as being trapped in the pocket.
Macedon wrote:
Yes, I know, I have read many modern descriptions, Daly's included, and most have many obvious problems ranging from a lacking mathematical approach to over-reliance on other people's translations leading to pre- (mis) conceptions.
I read Daly’s book and gave it away. It’s heavily padded and typical of what you get today. When explaining the Servian constitution Daly relies on Ogilvie. When describing the method of line relief, Daly relies on Connelly. There are numerous other examples I could go into but in a nutshell there is nothing original, just a poor use of the primary sources.
Macedon wrote:
The one line scenario is mentioned by a number of scholars as a possibility, although a very few have an approach that is even remotely close to ours.
I must confess I do like reading the one line scenarios. I like to observe the author paint himself into a corner, then have him come up with some irrational concept to get himself out of it. If something does not work for me, rather than bash squares into round holes or flog a dead horse, I go back to the drawing board and start again with a new approach. I do this time and time again until the result I achieve closely conforms to the primary sources.
One ancient author I treat with caution is Polybius. He may have had some Greek military experience but I do not believe he fully understands the Roman system. In fact I am convinced he doesn’t. His comment about Regulus having solved the elephant problem with his deployment but that it overlooked the cavalry problem I believe is Polybius’ personal comment and not taken from a source. When I reconstructed Regulus’ formation of the army being shorter than normal but more maniples deeper, I was very impressed with what I saw. This is a solid square formation that is both offensive and defensive. It can expand out and form into a hollow square with reserves. It fits the same description as given by Crassus at Carrhae.
I find it strange that scholars dealing with Roman politics know Polybius’ description of the Roman constitution is wrong, yet military scholars cannot conceive the idea that Polybius description of the Roman legion could also be at fault.
We live in interesting times.
Steven
I always assumed that to mean a single horizontal line or "rank" and that there were 3 lines in each maniple (Hastati, Princepes, and triarii)
Macedon and myself are referring to a line being made up of a different troop type. The hastati are one line but could consist of six ranks. In regard to the primary sources, I have found that when some writers describe a line of infantry, it actually can consist of two lines each 5 men deep. Because the troops are of the same type (example scutarii infantry), they are referred to as one line by the primary sources.
Tim wrote:
But, this obviously doesn't account for the view that the triarii were left back to guard the camp. if this were the case, then there would be only 2-line maniples, which still could have been stacked.
I have stated in the Cannae discussion that I believe the triarii are incorporated into the same body or line as the principes. The triarii form the last three ranks of the principes if the legion has a frontage of 200 men wide.
Macedon wrote:
Yes, what you are describing is practically a two "line" formation, one in wedge and one in line. This is what I mean.
Ok, I’m with you now. I wasn’t sure if you had envisaged my Carthaginian deployment as being in two horizontal lines.
Macedon wrote:
I find tactical issues extremely interesting and I am always eager to understand how other same-minded people understand them.
I’m a real nuts and bolts person. I want to examine the smallest component. It’s the small detail that makes the bigger picture. Also I am very interested in understanding command and control.
Macedon wrote:
The normal distance between lines in such multiple line formations is usually described in hundreds of yards and one thing all accounts have in common is that the auxiliary (rear) lines keep their shape and do not just follow the units in front of them, dissolving the integrity of their own lines in the process until they are called upon to reinforce the front either as units or as a whole line (again depends on theories and circumstances).
My research method involves putting such information as found in the military manuals, especially the Byzantium manuals about the distance between lines (100 or 200 feet), and then only use them when I can prove such information relates to the Romans. For example, the distances in Maurice may not be applicable to the Romans and by employing such information, which could appear to be correct, could end up creating a road block.
Macedon wrote:
To me, assuming that the rear line was present and that it had not already dispersed in flight, it would be impossible to effectively destroy the Roman first line, as the men in flight would find refuge in the second line or else the rear line would advance against the maneuvering Africans.
You are very influenced by Maurice and the Byzantine military manuals. They mention the first line being a good distance back and the first line should take refuge with the second line etc. At Zama the principes were in shouting distance of the hastati.
Macedon wrote:
I cannot see them so close to the front line in order to also be trapped by the Africans. Of course, many hypotheses could be voiced as to how things could fare in order for the outcome to be the same, but such action would be so critical that I would have expected some relative mentioning in the accounts.
Now we are back to the translation. If as many tell me, after describing the depth and frontage of the maniple, Polybius also meant the maniples were closer together than normal then your question is answered.
Macedon wrote:
Regarding the triarii, I also believe that they were the 10,000 men tasked with camp guard duty but I have to say that unfortunately they are not positively identified in the sources.
The triarii may not be positively named at Cannae but where they were during the battle can be identified. Again, mathematics combined with the primary sources will show the way. The largest figure given for the Roman army at Cannae is that given by Plutarch at 88,000 men “arrayed for battle.” So Plutarch 88,000 men are those ready to fight. I took my figure for the whole Roman army and by removing the artificers (blacksmiths and carpenters) and by keeping the musicians) you get 88,000 men, but the figure is just a tad rounded. Therefore, I have the triarii standing on the battlefield of Cannae and not in the camp.
Macedon wrote:
As I already said, of course they could fail, but I would have expected some relative action in the accounts, unless there is such and I just do not link it with it as, undoubtedly, I do have strong preconceptions because of my work as I guess you and most others like us do. This is why such discussions can be interesting as they can offer a fresh look into things
At Cannae one has to take into account the punishment melted out on the survivors by being sent to Sicily. This form of punishment did not happen to those who survived the Trebia or Lake Trasimene that is can only signify some act of mass cowardice had occurred. And also cavalrymen are sent in exile to Sicily. We know many of the Roman troops were raw recruits but we don’t know their state of mind. Did the camp rumours talk of the Carthaginian army as being unbeatable and loved by the gods? Was there a defeatist attitude sweeping through the lower ranks? Did this defeatist attitude develop when the Roman commanders refused to challenge Hannibal days before? Were the allied troops wholly committed to the Roman cause? Or did Hannibal’s policy of allowing the allied troops to return home after being captured make it that much easier for the allied legions on the flanks to rout?
Macedon wrote:
It is not just the lack of supporting evidence that troubles me, it is the tactical risk included for Hannibal's Africans as they extend before or behind a fresh, unpinned Roman line, as you describe the action, making it a very dangerous maneuver to have been organized beforehand. It is more a decision I would expect a general to have made as a reaction to exploit an opportunity, rather than a pre-planned one.
I’m a believer of the pre-planned encirclement. As to the dangers of this manoeuvre, I do discuss this very thing, but I have done it in comparison to other outflanking manoeuvres. When I was doing the Great Plains scenario, as the Romans have only the 4000 Celtiberians to encircle, something occurred to me about the formation of the surrounding force. This gave me more insights into how the Africans can extend. I also took the numbers of Caesar’s fourth line and applied the methodology and it worked. So in the book I am presenting something very different about flanking forces and it is to do with their safety.
Macedon wrote:
Yes, this is a key difference between our understandings and the center of my "objections". As I perceive it, the doctrine of the rear lines was to keep their line and NOT follow the hastati in front of them unless ordered to.
You old Byzantine. Had the principes at Cannae did what the principes did at Zama Hannibal’s plan of encirclement at Cannae would have failed.
Macedon wrote:
Keeping in mind that up to that point the hastati were fully victorious in their eyes, I expect the rear line to not have sent many reinforcements to them, so their integrity cannot have suffered much.
My belief is that maniples of principes do not replace individual maniples of hastati. All the maniples of hastati are withdrawn and replaced by all the maniples of principes (which includes the triarii). Therefore, lines replace lines.
Macedon wrote:
If, as you suggest, each unit (of whatever predetermined size) kept a constant distance with the men in front of them, then the shape of the auxiliary line formation would have changed in the same manner the front line did making your suggestion much more probable as parts of the rear would even be as advanced if not more than the wings of the front line.
That is my conclusion. The eight legions in the centre of the Roman line had advanced further in front than the three legions on each flank of the eight legions. I found it interesting that Plutarch talks of the centre retiring and it is those that get surrounded. Now at this point, those eight legions are pushing Hannibal’s main line back (the base of the triangle or as you say the second line), so disengaging will not be easy. Appian has the rout start on the left wing then the right wing and for the eight legions to be surrounded the three legions on either flank of the eight legions that should be protecting the flank of the eight legions have routed leaving the eight legions to fight their way back. With the return of the Carthaginian cavalry, only then is it safe for the African infantry to begin extending. Livy and Polybius report that Servilius commanded the centre and Servilius is mention as being trapped in the pocket.
Macedon wrote:
Yes, I know, I have read many modern descriptions, Daly's included, and most have many obvious problems ranging from a lacking mathematical approach to over-reliance on other people's translations leading to pre- (mis) conceptions.
I read Daly’s book and gave it away. It’s heavily padded and typical of what you get today. When explaining the Servian constitution Daly relies on Ogilvie. When describing the method of line relief, Daly relies on Connelly. There are numerous other examples I could go into but in a nutshell there is nothing original, just a poor use of the primary sources.
Macedon wrote:
The one line scenario is mentioned by a number of scholars as a possibility, although a very few have an approach that is even remotely close to ours.
I must confess I do like reading the one line scenarios. I like to observe the author paint himself into a corner, then have him come up with some irrational concept to get himself out of it. If something does not work for me, rather than bash squares into round holes or flog a dead horse, I go back to the drawing board and start again with a new approach. I do this time and time again until the result I achieve closely conforms to the primary sources.
One ancient author I treat with caution is Polybius. He may have had some Greek military experience but I do not believe he fully understands the Roman system. In fact I am convinced he doesn’t. His comment about Regulus having solved the elephant problem with his deployment but that it overlooked the cavalry problem I believe is Polybius’ personal comment and not taken from a source. When I reconstructed Regulus’ formation of the army being shorter than normal but more maniples deeper, I was very impressed with what I saw. This is a solid square formation that is both offensive and defensive. It can expand out and form into a hollow square with reserves. It fits the same description as given by Crassus at Carrhae.
I find it strange that scholars dealing with Roman politics know Polybius’ description of the Roman constitution is wrong, yet military scholars cannot conceive the idea that Polybius description of the Roman legion could also be at fault.
We live in interesting times.
Steven
I can only afford books in the $20-$35CDN price range lol
