Cannae - why bother with the cavalry?

[grainger]

Hi all

I've been thinking about the deployment at Cannae, and I've thought up a possible Roman strategy that I've never seen discussed (brought to you by The Wonder of Hindsight). So, either I've thought of something clever or, more likely, it's so stupid no-one even bothers to address it! I suspect it's the latter, but I'd just like to understand why the following strategy is never discussed.

Before I start, I should stress that I realise the Romans were probably always going to do a standard battle plan, and weren't likely to pull of something surprising. However, I don't think this plan involves that much deviation from their standard strategy... or does it?

Looking at the setup of the battle, when the Romans deployed, they didn't have room for a standard battle array, and had to pack their troops in close, and much deeper than usual. They put the cavalry on the flanks. When the battle started, their cavalry was defeated, allowing Hannibal's cavalry to circle round and hasten their defeat.

Let's take a step back, and look at the deployment. The Romans knew the Cannae plain was good terrain for cavalry to operate, and presumably they knew that Hannibal had superior cavalry. From my reading, they hoped/expected to win the battle before his cavalry could defeat theirs. Well, my question is, why bother with their own cavalry at all?

The plain stretched from hills on one flank to a river on the other, and they had far more troops than they could actually bring to bear on the enemy. Instead of using a standard set-up, with cavalry on the flanks, why not stretch the infantry from the hills to the river? The flanks are covered, the troops have room to fight, and they've probably still got a deep formation, just not the impractical crush they ended up with.

The Carthaginian cavalry isn't going to be effective against a wall of heavy infantry, and although Hannibal's "feigned retreat" plan might work in the centre, its effectiveness would be lessened, as his flanking troops would be fighting at their front. Also, there'd be pressure all along his line.

By the way, I'm not saying this would necessarily result in a Roman victory, just less of a defeat. Hannibal's troops were overall better quality, if outnumbered. But this plan could bring more of the Roman numerical advantage to bear, and allow their manipular tactics to be used more freely.

So if the Romans on the day had the imagination to try the above, would it be viable? Or is there some obvious flaw in the above plan? As I mentioned above, I'm not saying it would definitely work, just that I've never seen it discussed.
Possible objections to this plan I can think of (assuming the Romans considered the idea):

1. The Romans didn't have the numbers to deploy that wide and still anchor their flanks (I'd say - but why not deploy wider than they did, even if this is true)?
   [li] The Romans didn't have the tactical flexibility to deploy that wide (I don't think so, but perhaps there's a technical reason why the marching columns couldn't deploy easily in this way).
   
2. The flanks wouldn't be secure enough (surely at least the river flank would be, and thus they could forgo cavalry there).
   
3. The Carthaginian cavalry could still defeat the infantry on the Roman flanks (unlikely, I think)
   
4. Hannibal would just change his tactics accordingly (he probably would want to, but how much time would he have to enact this, and anyway, how worse could they be defeated than how it turned out?)
   

Anyway, I welcome any thought on this!

[Macedon]

This is a scenario that I have explored and "simulated" in the past. In my opinion, such a formation would have ensured Carthaginian victory, although such a one would be more limited than the disaster they finally suffered.

1. Cavalry in ancient battles has the predominant role to check the activity of enemy cavalry. An all-infantry formation would have enabled the Carthaginians to, without fear, attack with their cavalry while holding back their infantry. Cavalry at the time predominately used missiles and it would be impossible for the Romans to do anything else than stand and bear the shower of enemy javelins behind the safety of their shieldwalls (the basic formation to counter such cavalry attacks) or risk a forward advance, in which some parts of their long phalanx would suffer more than others and thus run the risk of losing cohesion, being thrown into disorder or hold the rest of the phalanx back.

2. Covering the whole battle-field with infantry does not really ensure the flanks, which can only be protected by cavalry and light infantry. Unless the edge of it is an extreme feature (a wall, a deep gorge etc), a forest, a slope, a swamp is not as linear or absolute and thus, as the Roman line would advance, it would have to march by pockets of open land that would facilitate enemy flank attacks. Without cavalry, these would be preoccupied by enemy horsemen and skirmishers and thus Roman flanks would not be secure. These would have been attacked by Roman skirmishers and cavalry waiting in reserve, but without FIRST attacking them (as it was standard tactics, this is why cavalry battle mostly commenced before the infantry clash in the space in between the lines), they would be unable to protect their footmen's flanks, as the Roman phalanx would advance further than these pockets where the cavary-skirmisher battle would be taking place and thus expose flanks and rear.

3. Finally, once the Roman foot came close to the Carthaginian infantry, the wings overextending the Carthaginian phalanx would be unable to participate in the battle, because they would not be able to turn, as they would be threatened by the enemy cavalry and skirmishers who would have retreated (a fighting retreat-normal cavalry tactics) behind Hannibal's infantry line, effectively protecting it.

In all, a relatively thin, as thin as the Carthaginians if not thinner, Roman line that had managed to advance the miles to reach a fresh enemy under constant harassment from the enemy cavalry would now have to fight against it without being able to even use their numerical superiority.

In my opinion, the Romans should have arrayed in two lines, the rear line being tasked to turn about should the Carthaginian cavalry prevail as it did. Yet, the reason why the Romans lost was not actually their tactics rather than the fact that their eagerness drove them into Hannibal's trap, who correctly expected the Romans to precipitously pursue his retreating/fleeing center. Had the Romans retained their line and had they not wrongly followed this planned flight, they would most probably have been able to withstand the pressure of the enemy horse and retreat in relative safety, avoiding this total disaster.

[grainger]

Very interesting response - thanks. That all makes sense to me, and now I understand why no-one addresses a "no cavalry" plan. I knew that cavalry were essential for protecting the flanks on an open plain, but I'd overlooked the ramifications of not having cavalry even when the flanks are somewhat protected by terrain. They are more reliable on the flanks than a terrain feature, also warn off the enemy cavalry, and allow the Roman line to maintain its cohesion. It all seems obvious now you've pointed it out!

[Macedon]

Glad to have been of assistance. I know that many have thought of alternative formations for this and other battles, but it is usually very rare to "officially" propose one, as there is little point for such speculation in a historical non-fiction book or article. Such discussions mainly take place in more informal places like our beloved forum mile: .

[grainger]

True, but in the books I've read, I've never seen it explained why the Romans pretty much had to use their cavalry in this specific battle. I understood why cavalry were vital in general, but not in this specific battle (e.g. covering the long advance, and the flanks still needing protection). So it's not so much about a book putting forward an alternative strategy, than explaining why the Romans did what they did. For example, Adrian Goldsworthy's book on this battle goes into a lot of detail, and is generally excellent, but I was still left wondering about the cavalry question. That said, I haven't found any discussion on this topic online, so I fully accept that maybe I'm the only one who didn't get it!

[Timianus]

Hi all
Before I start, I should stress that I realise the Romans were probably always going to do a standard battle plan, and weren't likely to pull of something surprising. However, I don't think this plan involves that much deviation from their standard strategy... or does it?

You are leaving out the human/emotional factor: you had two quarreling consuls who were alternating command of the army each day(which I am sure was great for discipline and unit cohesion) with the largest army Rome had ever assembled in one place. You had a pissed off Senate, and allies who were threatening to leave. The pressure was on for whomever was in command to bring a quick, decisive victory. The army itself was recovering from humiliating defeats and unpopular guerrilla warfare tactics. Also have to consider the Roman "macho" mindset. And again, Rome had never before fielded so many legions. All of these factors combined to produce the "perfect storm" for disaster.

This is all pure speculation, but my own personal belief is that regardless of the the initial set-up, once the Cathaginian center began to fall back, nothing was going to stop the overconfident "get 'em" mentality that led the Romans to their demise. With all the history and emotions that must have been present that day, the Romans were going to rush the center regardless. While a different formation at set-up may have helped mitigate their losses, I don't think it would have mattered at the end of the day.

Hannibal is correctly viewed as being a tactical genius but, IMHO, he won at Cannae because he knew and exploited the psychology of Rome. ..but, I'm just an armchair historian, so take that for what its worth.

[Mark Hygate]

I'll also throw in another, quite possible and simple reason why the Roman deployment was as it was...

The Romans deployed their armies with legions in the centre and cavalry on the wings.

Nothing more and nothing less. Unless you have a confident and experienced commander, whose troops have equal confidence in him, then you don't muck about with the 'plan'.

The Carthaginians had Hannibal - the Romans had a whole succession of generals (let alone in this case a combined army with both Consuls vying for ascendancy) who weren't Hannibal.

I don't entirely agree with Macedon's analysis, but it is not wrong per se. There's no reason the river couldn't have been used to secure at least one flank, as has been done in many battles, provided it was a full and meaningful barrier. Placing all the cavalry on the open flank, perhaps reinforced by velites and perhaps also some of the 'spare' troops that occupied such depth (due to the restricted deployment space), could possibly have blunted the Carthaginian cavalry (who I don't believe would have fared as well against formed infantry) and given time for the legions to have won in the 'centre'.

But that didn't happen, because the Roman army deployed and fought as it 'normally' does, didn't have anyone to think or plan anything different or clever - and Hannibal exploited that.

The simplest answer may be the correct one. :wink:

[Macedon]

In my opinion, it is not a good approach to easily dismiss the choices of the ancients, even of those we do not appreciate as much as a Scipio. The Ofanto could not have been used as a barrier for many reasons. It is a rather small river, with a low flow and the battle took place in summer, so most probably, the river was everywhere very easily fordable. It also is a classic Mediterranean river, Short and meandering, so it creates pockets that would cause problems should the Roman phalanx try to advance with its right wing resting on it.

I also have to point out the fact that the Romans did not deploy in their regular fashion. Their battle-plan was adapted to fit the situation and this proves that they did try to improvise. They did not fight in three lines as they usually did but in a single deep phalanx. The tactical reason for such a choice is usually that the enemy is considered superior in cavalry and/or light infantry and added depth facilitates a quick advance because it decreases the risk of losing cohesion and order during the charge (that is the approach to the enemy). It is logical that the Romans expected the Carthaginians to place their confidence in their cavalry as they had done before and therefore wished to decide the battle by a quick infantry clash, afraid that the enemy would try the exact opposite, that is to delay the infantry clash as long as possible. Therefore, their greatest fear being that they might lose their cavalry support before their infantry had won the day, they allocated extra depth to the legions which allowed them to rush towards the enemy with a higher probability of retaining their ranks. Hannibal of course expected that and used a counter-plan, which was not something new, he already had defeated the Romans in exact the same manner before, but as already and correctly mentioned by others than me here, he exploited the Roman psychology. Instead of delaying the infantry clash, he drew the Romans into a sham victory. The reason why he did so was that should the Romans despair too soon -Hannibal could have made sure that his infantry had ample space to retreat or could even make for the hills- they would have themselves retreated with losses that would not have been catalytic and at the time, a war of attrition was not to his advantage. So, he needed to pin the Romans, which was only possible with risking it all by allowing his infantry to engage the Romans.

[grainger]

Thanks, guys (I've only just seen these replies) - all interesting food for thought.

[Mrbsct]

Cavalry is vital in Ancient armies for screening, skirmish and pursuit. If you don't have cavalry to guard flanks the rearguard can get encircled. Its like Caesar should have ditched his cavalry at Pharspalus.

[Sardaukar]

Romans in Cannae deployed according to their doctrine. Doctrine is basically "how army is supposed to fight". Trying something that was not in doctrine would require lot of training pre-battle, otherwise it'd just drive army into confusion. It'd also require more experience among troops and especially bond and trust between troops and commander, usually created by succesful battles.

So, Scipio Africanus with his army could probably have pulled out something different, but consuls in Cannae didn't have the familiarity, ability or trust of the troops to try something out of doctrine.

[antiochus]

Sardaukar wrote:
Romans in Cannae deployed according to their doctrine. Doctrine is basically "how army is supposed to fight".

What is your definition of the Roman cavalry doctrine?

Steven

[Timianus]

I'll also throw in another, quite possible and simple reason why the Roman deployment was as it was...

The Romans deployed their armies with legions in the centre and cavalry on the wings.

Nothing more and nothing less.

Yes, it is interesting that when describing the battles against the Welsh, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle states that the Welsh arranged themselves "in the roman order" with cavalry on the wings, infantry in the center, and archers behind. This does seem to have been the "default" formation throughout the ages.

[d.carmichael]

What if the romans detached a small force from the rear defend the flank from calvary using the roman calvary as a screen to hide them? The Carthaginian Calvary would then be more easily defeated and when hannibals trap is sprung and enveloping the romans those men with remaining calvary can hit the flanking carthagians from the side/rear while they attack the main roman body as its being surrounded. Would this be too complicated for their standard fighting order to pull off given the commanders they had?

[Bryan]

Macedon wrote:
I also have to point out the fact that the Romans did not deploy in their regular fashion. Their battle-plan was adapted to fit the situation and this proves that they did try to improvise. They did not fight in three lines as they usually did but in a single deep phalanx.

What is the source for this?

Macedon wrote:
The Ofanto could not have been used as a barrier for many reasons. It is a rather small river, with a low flow and the battle took place in summer, so most probably, the river was everywhere very easily fordable.

"When the battle shout was raised the auxiliaries ran forward, and the battle began with the light infantry. Then the Gauls and Spaniards on the left engaged the Roman cavalry on the right; the battle was not at all like a cavalry fight, for there was no room for maneuvering, the river on the one side and the infantry on the other hemming them in, compelled them to fight face to face." (Liv Hist of Rome, Book 22.47)

Is this translation accurate? If so, it seems the river was an effective obstacle.