Roman Troop Deployment in AD60 / 61 in Britannia

[Theoderic]

Due to the Tacitus and Dio texts being a trifle ambiguous at times often assumptions are made regarding troop numbers, associations and their consequent movements from place to place.

Tacitus remarks that at the beginning of the rebellion some forts are attacked and in a different tome he remarks that most forts are bypassed. Both these statements may be true and may not necessarily contradict each other.

So if we assume (never a good starting place) that there were a number of forts that were manned can we work out how many men were in these forts during the period AD60 /61?

If we then assume that there were the four full "made up" Legions we can use the resultant figures of the complement of men in the forts to understand who was where and why?

For example we know that Exeter was probably occupied by the Second Legion, but it has been identified as "small fort" with room for 2,500 Legionaries. We also know that Topsham was built - how many soldiers would it have taken to garrison this port or would this have been the responsibility of the Classis Britannica?

We also know that Usk was garrisoned by the Twentieth as part of the force keeping the Silures "bottled up" and we also know that the Fourteenth had recently moved out of the forts from Watling Street into Wroxeter. How many men were required to man the forts on Watling Street?

This is important so that we understand if the Romans were spread thinly on the ground or were they in fact thick on the ground?

[66kbm]

I would not call Exeter a "small fort"... :mad: . It was a Legionary Fortress that actually could accomodate a "complete" legion, though not auxhilaries. The second were spread out all over the South West, Cornwall, Devon ,Dorset, Somerset, in fact they were so "disperesed" they no longer were a fighting force that we could call a Legion. A possible reason why they didn't join Paulinus for the big battle as discussed on another thread.
In Devon and Cornwall alone there are at least 11 military "instalations" i shall call them, that all were occupied at the same time. By what units, no one knows for sure.
Kevin

[Vindex]

We also know that Usk was garrisoned by the Twentieth as part of the force keeping the Silures "bottled up" ...

I was under the impression it would be more accurate to say that it is suspected that elements of the XX VV were at Usk and it's force was more than likely cavalry than infantry.

If you have a source for the more definite statement you have made I'd be keen to share it.

[Nathan Ross]

We also know that Usk was garrisoned by the Twentieth as part of the force keeping the Silures "bottled up" and we also know that the Fourteenth had recently moved out of the forts from Watling Street into Wroxeter. How many men were required to man the forts on Watling Street?

The smaller forts along the lines of communication were probably garrisoned by auxiliaries - this was the general rule in later eras anyway. Unfortunately we don't know for sure how many auxiliary units formed the initial garrison of Britain, not their identity beyond a few reasonable guesses.

As for the legions - permanent fortresses had not really been established by this date, so we shouldn't imagine any one legion necessarily staying put for long. As Kevin says, the second could have been split up into detachments all over the south west, centred on Exeter and Gloucester, but at least some of them were at Alchester at around the same period.

Wroxeter appears to have been the base of the fourteenth for some time, but there are a couple of inscriptions to soldiers of the twentieth there as well, one with a first-century dating (the soldier was from Pollentia in Italy, and the legion has no cognomen) - so we could assume that the twentieth, either a detachment or the full legion, were there too, maybe during the period of Paulinus and Agricola's expeditions into Wales. Early inscriptions to men of the twentieth also turn up at Gloucester and Bath.

So we should best see this period as being fairly fluid in terms of deployment - legions and vexillations moving around the country, possibly sharing forts at times, swapping them at others. It's impossible for us to build up a clearer picture, I think.

[Theoderic]

Hi Vindex

I don't know if these are any help, might be a bit vague..

USK: (BURRIUM)

http://www.museumwales.ac.uk/en/rhagor/article/1961/
http://www.coflein.gov.uk/en/site/93470/...'BURRIUM'/

Then there was always Monmouth just up the road......

http://www.southwalesargus.co.uk/news/83..._Monmouth/

All around AD50 / AD55.

Exeter too around AD50 / AD55.

Clyro too around AD50 / AD55

It seems that there were a lot of troops holding down the borders of the Province at this time containing the Silures and the Ordovices......

[Theoderic]

Hi Nathan

My theory is (and I admit that I could be widely "off beam") that in AD60 / AD61 that what you say is quite fair.

Men being moved all over the place and a fluid "front line" up the West of the Country from Exeter and beyond to Cirencester, Gloucester, Monmouth, Usk, Clyro, Wroxeter, the last piece to be completed was the removal of Anglesey as a supply base for the Ordovices.

This was the miltary zone. The West of the Province was still a problem and was being held down by a number of garrisons, the Second, the Twentieth and the Fourteenth Battle Group.

The North itself was also being watched (the Brigantes) by part of the Ninth with the rest of the Ninth to monitor the Midlands and the East.

No doubt there were other forts around the country being occupied by auxilliaries but not too many as the Romans were fairly comfortable with the South East, the Mid South and the Midlands. Watling street possibly had token garrisons.

My point is that the Romans were stretched to the limit anyway but starting to burst at the seams if an uprising occurred.

They had little spare capacity (perhaps half a Legion) which if it was destroyed meant that any uprising had to be dealt with by the Battle Group (the Fourteenth).

If this was not the case SP could have sent messengers to the Ninth the Twentieth and the Second and completely annihalated any uprising.

Why we don't read about the Twentieth as being with SP in Anglesey is because they simply had to hold down the borders.

It is interesting to note that Tacitus comments that in London, SP only had a small army and mindful of what happened to the Ninth decided to withdraw.

Even at the battle with Boudica he has only around 10,000 men and some of these are made up from the Twentieth and local Auxilliaries. Where was the rest of his army? I find it hard to think that he would not have wanted many more if he could have got them...

The fact that even after the defeat of Boudica, Tacitus implies that the tribes did not lay down their arms and that once SP was replaced virtually 10 years was spent "Romanising the South" and building the trust with the Brythons.

This shows that without extra forces the expansion could not continue until the Province had been subjugated not with force but with charm and prosperity for the local aristocracy.

[66kbm]

You seem to have forgotten someone.....XIIII
Even Nathan mentioned them, Wroxeter...not the IX who were further north and to the east.
Kevin

[Theoderic]

OOPS....

Thank you Kevin...

Battle Group should have read Fouteenth not the Ninth!!!!

Changed now...

[Theoderic]

Hi Kevin

Do you by any chance have a list of these forts and estimated dates of occupation that you could share please?

[Theoderic]

Kevin wrote:


I would not call Exeter a "small fort"...

You are of course correct. I had come across an article recently stating that the AD55 Fortress started life as a "small fort" (2500 capacity) but I cannot find it any more - so perhaps I was mistaken.

I do think however that the abundance of forts did mean that a lot of the force was distributed across the country and it was perhaps (as you infer) impossible to bring them together quickly to become a fighting force of any size.

[Theoderic]

The Procurator only sent 200 soldiers to Colchester when they asked for re-inforcements.

Was this another indicator that the Roman military machine was stretched to breaking point or was this a complete under estimation of the situation?

Or was it simply that that was the only force that the Procurator had at his command that he could spare?

Any thoughts?

[Nathan Ross]

Troops were commonly detached from military units in a province to act as bodyguards (singulares) and assistants (beneficiarii) to officials. Pliny (Letters, XXXII) mentions ten soldiers and two troopers under a centurion sent as beneficiarii 'from the troops under my command' to join Gabius Bassus, equestrian praefect of the Pontic shore.

The procurator of Britain was a fairly high position in the equestrian cursus, and Catus would have had a larger force of men available to him, as he was involved in surveying, assessing and tax collection in a newly-conquered province. There may also have been a number of stationarii in London, detached to guard the river crossing and grain supplies.

These soldiers would probably have come from various units, both legionary and auxiliary. The Vindolanda tablets mentions auxiliaries sent from the north of Britain to serve as beneficiarii in London.

Tacitus mentions that the 200 men sent to Colchester were 'without their proper arms', which suggests that they had been serving Catus in a paramilitary role (probably as guards to tax collectors etc) and lacked their full equipment. This does not, I would say, suggest any particular deficiency in the garrison of Britain. Catus was not expecting to fight a war, and the bulk of the combat troops were under Paulinus' command in the west.

This does raise another minor question though - to what extent did Paulinus and Catus have separate spheres of authority? The procurator usually worked directly with the governor, but in the case of Britain at this point Catus appears to have had a significant amount of executive power over the province and the neighbouring client states. Possibly the governor had effectively delegated control over the demilitarised zone to the procurator, so as to concentrate on the front line areas to the west. This may have meant that Paulinus' knowledge of the south-east of the province would have been very limited...

[Theoderic]

Nathan Wrote:

This does raise another minor question though - to what extent did Paulinus and Catus have separate spheres of authority? The procurator usually worked directly with the governor, but in the case of Britain at this point Catus appears to have had a significant amount of executive power over the province and the neighbouring client states. Possibly the governor had effectively delegated control over the demilitarised zone to the procurator, so as to concentrate on the front line areas to the west. This may have meant that Paulinus' knowledge of the south-east of the province would have been very limited...

Nathan as ever you raise some interesting points:

The feeling that you get from the texts is that Seutonius Paulinus was a very able general (vying with Corbulo) and also a cautious man in his generalship. He seems to have had little time for the locals (but great respect for the Roman citizen) and we are led to believe that he had little time for fiscal policies which is one of the reasons (if not the main one) that he is removed due to his slaughter of the valuable merchandise.

It may well be as you say that he left the financial remit to the Procurator and concentrated his forces on the West.

This seems such a stark contrast to Scapula in AD47, which implies that Scapula understood the risk of leaving his back unguarded but that SP was totally unaware of any build up of resentment or indeed re-arming.

In fact the situation was far more risky as more of the province was now garrisoned and another ally had just been lost.

I find it difficult to understand why Catus had so little regard for the locals to only send 200 ill equipped soldiers when the inhabitants of Colchester were so concerned to ask for reinforcements. Even more so as there were many veterans based there.

If as you say the troops were sent in a purely policing exercise again no one seems to have been aware of the arms build up but instead of increasing civil disobedience and resentment.

It is known that Nero was short of funds, that Seneca called in his loans, that Catus called in the money given by Claudius and also any other wealth on offer including the Iceni's.

The Political power was with him and the split between the two arms of the Administration may well have been encouraged by Rome to ensure that one side kept an eye on the other and to prevent the rise of a Usurper (which was prevalent in Britain later).

So there are always the haunting questions:

"Why did SP leave himself so exposed to an attack from the rear?"

"Why didn't the Romans pickup on the rearmament or the increased resentment?"

"Why didn't Catus inform the Ninth or SP of the problems in the South?"

"Who organised the planned uprising and how?"

[Nathan Ross]

So there are always the haunting questions

Ah yes. But in trying to answer them we enter a murky world of speculation and intrigue! mile:

Roman governors and procurators were supposed to work together, but as the governor was a senator and the procurator an equestrian reporting directly to the emperor (and on occasion acting against the governor on imperial orders - the procurator Minucius Italus may even have executed his boss in Asia!), there was necessarily the potential for tension between them.

Events in Britain - the rapid flight of Catus during the uprising, and Paulinus carrying the can for what happened - might suggest that all was not perfect harmony between the two men. We might even suspect that for some reason (personal corruption and enrichment, political expediency?) Catus was not keeping Paulinus fully informed of events in Icenia and elsewhere.

Rome at this time was on the cusp of political upheaval: the faction based around Seneca and Afranius Burrus were still in power at Nero's court, but very soon afterwards they would be replaced by the rising power of Ofenius Tigellinus. We know that matters in Britain were of great interest to the political players of the day. Did Catus and Paulinus represent rival factions at court? Could they have been actively intriguing against each other, on the orders of their patrons back in Rome?

Unfortunately it's impossible to say more about the allegiances of either man. Paulinus later turns up as a partisan of Otho, the man who executed Tigellinus - plus he disappears from view during that man's praetorian praefecture. So Paulinus would be the more obvious Senecan candidate. As for Catus, we hear no more about him: he was presumably 'retired' after the British disaster, but if he was indeed a client of Tigellinus he may have had powerful friends in Rome who could have shielded him from blame...

Could Catus have been actively attempting to provoke trouble in Britain, either as a way of wrecking Paulinus's reputation, or of undermining Seneca by seizing his loans to the Iceni for the imperial fisc? hock: If so, he clearly got more than he'd bargained for, and made a run for it...

But at this point we should probably leave the path of speculation before it heads off into fictional territory! :wink:

We can't know whether Paulinus and Catus were working together on fleecing the natives, or against each other; whether Catus was an incompetent administrator who didn't recognise the danger signs, or a man either devious or corrupt with his own agenda. The fact that an imperial mission was sent to Britain to investigate what had happened, though, implies that there were grave doubts in Rome about what had been going on in the province.

But I do think Catus would have warned Paulinus when the signs of impending full-scale revolt became too clear to safely ignore. By this point, however, it was too late to avert the disaster.

[Theoderic]

Nathan wrote:

The fact that an imperial mission was sent to Britain to investigate what had happened, though, implies that there were grave doubts in Rome about what had been going on in the province.

I had the impression / understanding that the imperial mission was sent because of the slaughter of the Brythons by Seutonius Paulinus and the loss of valuable slaves and destruction of the economy because of this.

Was it more complex than this?