Yet another question regarding javelins

[Paralus]

...I think that the most logical interpretation here (though certainly not the only one by any means) in light of all the elements and circumstances present is that the Thessalian/Macedonian light foot was able to use a near 2-to-1 manpower advantage to clear the opposing foot skirmishers screening the Phocian left side. At that point, Philip's allied cavalry from the Thessalian League swept away the few Phocian horsemen present and allowed his heavy infantry to turn that flank, the victorious riders then moving to cut off the enemy's path of retreat (leading to the unusually high number of surrenders reported after this battle, 3,000, this resulting from troops being isolated rather than simply pursued).

The source tradition for the battle is wretched. We rely upon Diodorus at his summarising worst with eyes not only for Sicily but also Persia’s problems with the province too far (Egypt). The Phocians’ exploits in Thessaly, the two defeats of Philip and their utter destruction at Crocus Field occupy a paragraph. Diodorus’ description of that battle is formulaic and perfunctory: it occupies two lines and as such nothing definite can be drawn from it. In that vein I’d be most interested in the basis for Philip’s “near 2-to-1 manpower advantage to clear the opposing foot skirmishers”.

What we ostensibly know of the battle comes down to:

• The Phocians mustered some “twenty thousand foot and five hundred horse”
  
• Philip arrayed “more than twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse”
  
• A severe battle took place
  
• Philip won “since the Thessalian cavalry were superior in numbers and valour”
  
• “More than six thousand of the Phocians and mercenaries were slain […] and no less than three thousand were taken captives”
  
  

Ancillary to this we know that Chares just happened to be sailing by with "many" triremes. Nothing indicates a 2-1 advantage in light troops to Philip in any area of the field.

In those actions he [Onomarchus] had his own allied Thessalian cavalry (provided by Pherae), which was vital to make up for the small size of his native Phocian horse. That he lacked those allied horsemen at Crocus Plain is apparently attributable to Philip's genius at mobility. Onomarchus was marching to relieve Pherae, where he would have met up with that city's cavalry, but had swung seaward to also hook up with Chares and his ship-borne force of mercenaries. Philip was able to catch him in route, separated from both his allies (the Pheraeans' horse and mercenary infantry being yet at home and Chares men still offshore) to force a battle on highly unfavorable terms for the Phocian (just as you suggest). Hammond (Philip of Macedon 1994, p. 47) very reasonably opines that he did this by means of a surprise night march.

Catching Onomarchus en route to Pherae would necessitate Philip bypassing Pherae and meeting Onomarchus to the south of the city – likely near to Dimitriada. This would leave a substantial force free in his rear; the force that he had, in fact, taken the field to engage (35.3).

Buckler (Philip II and The Sacred War, Brill 1989), whilst acknowledging that the battlefield is likely beyond positive identification, argues that Philip besieged Pegasae so denying the Athenian fleet an anchorage (even though he counters his own point at p 75 n 36). Having reduced the port he then marched south to meet Onomarchus before he linked with Pherae. This relies upon Diodorus muddling his chronology as severely as his events. Given the perfunctory and seriously abridged state of his account this is entirely possible and somewhat supported by Demosthenes (1.9 and 4.35). Even so, I still have qualms that Philip engaged Onomarchus with an unsubdued Pherae at his back. Perhaps the town was invested?

It's well to note that Hammond's chronology for this war (in the above book) is in error as Buckler succinctly demonstrates (The Actions of Philip II in 347 and 346 B. C.: A Reply to N. G. L. Hammond).

That Philip's own elite Companion cavalry (probably posted closer to its own heavy infantry) gets no mention may be significant as well, it very likely not having been able to penetrate the opposing foot screen as quickly as the Thessalians had done.

Again, this is only supposition and, given the evidence, closer to complete speculation. We’ve no idea of cavalry dispositions: if Diodorus’ source recorded such the epitomiser was far more interested in passing it over than on. It should be noted that the “Companion Cavalry” are never mentioned by Diodorus in book 16. All that can be said is that the addition of the Thessalian cavalry (number unknown) proved decisive – according to Diodorus’ source.

[Old Husker]

Paralus,

I posted a quick reply here, but it seems to have gone electronically astray. I'll will try to reformualte it and try again.

[Old Husker]

Paralus,

Here's a briefer retry: As usual, you've made some excellent points, which I'll try to address. There certainly are limits to doing a reconstruction with only the kind of data available from Diodorus for the engagement at Crocus Plain. Thus, what I've offered employs 'logical projections' drawn from other sources and practical considerations. The light infantry here is calculated as follows: for Phocis, 20% of the infantry total given by Diodorus in line with what appears to be common for Greek armies in this period (up from 10% a century earlier); for Philip, 20% of his Macedonian infantry (the rest being 3,000 'hypaspists' and 9,000 pikemen as projected for this stage of his army's development) 2,000 mercenaries (again 20%, the rest being 8,000 hoplites, including a projected 6,000 of his own and 2,000 from the Thessalian League) and 1,500 'Thessalians' (mostly allies, one for each cavalryman provided by the League). The resulting totals are 7,500 for Philip and 4,000 for Phocis or a little less than 2-to-1 in favor of the former. Note that the heavy infantry numbers used equal the infantry figure provided for Philip by Diodorus, which was noted as being incomplete with the phrase "more than," thus allowing addition of the light infantry cited in the foregoing estimates.

All of the numbers and dispostions I suggested are similarly drawn (heavy infantry complements and types, Thessalian cavalry size, presence and position of Companion horse, etc.) to be consistent with not only Diodorus' numbers (I believe you'll find that I've not violated any of the data on your short list of what we 'know' from Diodorus), but also other sources (some far afield) and common practice from this period. These are, of course, speculative, but there is no other way to do a full reconstruction. It's a 'creative' process for sure, but one I refer to as being based on 'controlled creativity', i.e. using logic and available data from a wide range of sources within the bounds of reasonable speculation. I think that this is really the only way to push the envelope toward deeply investigating the greatest probabilities on such a poorly documented ancient battlefield as Crocus Plain.

As for Pegasae, it appears to have fallen to Philip back in the autumn of 354 and seems to have been the object of Chares' later attack that killed Adiaos. With regard to Chares presence near the battle, Prtitchett discussed this from sources in his The Greek State at War, Part II (p. 81), concluding that the Athenian was assisting Onomarchus at the time and not merely "sailing by" by chance (a rather astounding coincidence if true). I too think that Philip was uncomfortable with an unsubdued Pherae at his back, and he turned against that city rather than march on to Phocis in the battle's aftermath. I agree that it was likely under siege (or fearful of such an investment), which accounts for its inability (or unwillingness) to aid Onomarchus at Crocus Plain.

Sorry that this is a bit briefer than my original attempt at a reply, but I'm happy to discuss anything left out and/or the other projections (on heavy infantry, cavalry, dispositions, etc.) that went into my reconstruction. One great thing about the speculative nature of reconstructions such as I've offered is that they are always subject to revision (sometimes major!) when better logic can be demonstated, thus discussions like this always make them better in the end.

[Paralus]

I’m aware this has drifted from the original subject of the thread so I’ll close somewhat briefly!

All of the numbers and dispostions I suggested are similarly drawn (heavy infantry complements and types, Thessalian cavalry size, presence and position of Companion horse, etc.) to be consistent with not only Diodorus' numbers (I believe you'll find that I've not violated any of the data on your short list of what we 'know' from Diodorus), but also other sources (some far afield) and common practice from this period. These are, of course, speculative, but there is no other way to do a full reconstruction. It's a 'creative' process for sure, but one I refer to as being based on 'controlled creativity', i.e. using logic and available data from a wide range of sources within the bounds of reasonable speculation.

Creative process indeed! There’s no point in really going over that for we have no way of knowing just what forces Philip brought to Thessaly, whether the hypaspists numbered 3,000 at this point or how many mercenaries Philip possessed (Onomarchus certainly had a considerable quantity). I’d only caution that Xenophon notes (6.1.19) that Jason’s Thessalian forces (and allies) numbered “more than eight thousand horsemen, including the allies, his hoplites were reckoned at not fewer than twenty thousand and there were peltasts enough to be set in array against the whole world”. Larissa and others might well have supplied many of Philip’s “hoplites” as well as peltasts.

As for Pegasae, it appears to have fallen to Philip back in the autumn of 354 and seems to have been the object of Chares' later attack that killed Adiaos. With regard to Chares presence near the battle, Prtitchett discussed this from sources in his The Greek State at War, Part II (p. 81), concluding that the Athenian was assisting Onomarchus at the time and not merely "sailing by" by chance (a rather astounding coincidence if true).

There is no doubt that Chares was operating with Onomoarchus under the alliance between Athens and the Phocians.

That Pegasae was in Philip’s hands since 354 cannot be reconciled with other events. It is most unlikely that, even should he have taken it in 354, Philip managed to somehow keep it after two defeats in the field. The Athenians – after Philip’s defeat and retreat to “butt the harder” – could readily have retaken the harbour from a Macedonian garrison sans any support.

Again this is the subject of Diodorus’ muddling of events and chronology. A simple reading of his narrative might have Philip take the harbour three times (as early as 358/7). Demosthenes is clear that the vacillating Athenians were too late in aiding Pegasae and so it fell. That this relates to this campaign is far more likely as the harbour will have been the Athenian base of combined operations and supply against Philip. As it turned out, Philip took the harbour and Chares was reduced to “sailing by” as the slaughter unfolded.

[Old Husker]

Well, for the reconstructionist, the comforting phrase "we have no way of knowing" is not acceptable and we have to try and meet the challenge and find the most reasonable answer we can. That some would be very uncomfortable with that process is quite understandable, being something I encountered often in my days of reconstructing natural history in the process of petroleum exploration. It's really a matter of tolerance for ambiguity, something that varies greatly from person to person according to a combination of nature and life experience (and believe me, you've never seen anyone more uncomfortable with the unknown than a petroleum engineer!). The Macedonian contingent sizes do indeed date from Alexander's early days, but there is no reason to believe that he had made any radical changes in his father's winning formulae by the beginning of the Asian campaign. As for the Thessalians, the assumption here is that they were much reduced since Jason's height a generation earlier and further cut more recently by civil war between Pherae and the Thessalian League, who could not field more than 3,000 or so cavalry combined (in line with Isocrates 8.118 on their native potential and per their apparent contribution of something less than 2,500 horsemen at Mantinea II in 362). The guess here is that these factions could supply maybe only half that number individually. With regard to Thessalian hoplites, I agree that the League supplied some and have proposed 2,000 or 25% of Philip's mercenary total (that total being consistent with what he seems likely to have fielded in the days after absorbing the wealth from Credides three years earlier). Whether any garrison at Pegasae was doomed after Philip's defeats in 354 is subject to debate, given the well documented ability of ports to withstand very long sieges (especially against Greeks far less skilled in that manner of warfare than the Carthaginians and Macedonians of the subject age). Of course, even had the port not fallen to Philip until after Crocus Plain, the connection with Chares attack on Adaios would remain essentially the same.

[Old Husker]

Steven,

Getting back onto the topic you originally opened here, I've finally managed to run down a reference on range for the Greek javelin, which I found in W.K. Pritchett's The Greek State at War, Part V 1991, p. 56). This is H.A. Harris, "Greek Javelin Throwing", in Greece & Rome, Second Series, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March, 1963), pp. 26-36 (Cambridge Univ. Press). Harris provides both historical and his own experimental data on javelin throws with a concentration on the value of the throwing thong or amentum, which he calculates from his own tests will increase the distance of a throw by +25%. He cites what he believes to be the only source evidence on javelin range from Statius (Thebiad, 6.353), which said that the length of the course for the funeral games at Nemea was three times the distance of a bow shot and four times that of a javelin throw ("finem iacet inter untrumque quale quarter iacula spatium, ter harundine vincas"). Citing ancient examples of chariot courses, Harris puts the most likely distance being referred to as 400 yards, which would result in a javelin range of 300 feet (90m). Harris feels that this is reasonable based on an addition of 25% for use of the amentum to a very good (but non-record) javelin throw by a modern athelete of 240 feet. For what it's worth as a separate check, the parallel range for a bow shot of 400 feet (around 120m) falls well within the outer effective range of 150 yards (450 feet, about 135m) claimed for the simple self-bow by Gabriel and Metz (From Sumer to Rome, The Military Capabilities of Ancient Armies, 1991, p. 67)[and, of course, vastly under the 650m maximum range cited as shown by archaeological evidence for the very best composite bows (Anglim et al, Fighting Techniques of the Ancient World 3000 BC - AD 500; Equipment, Combat Skills, and Tactics, 2006, p. 14)].

I personally am comfortable with the 90m limit for the type of small dart used by ancient Greek fighters with an amentum; however, having kicked this around a bit with some others better versed than myself in many aspects of ancient warfare, there remains considerable dissent in that group to so long a range as 90m for the javelin. It was suggested that the 200 foot (around 60m) zone placed in Roman camps between the outer perimeter and the tents as a hedge against missiles hitting the tents (Polybius 6.31.10) might be a better alternative measure of how far a javelin might be thrown. At any rate, this more conservative estimate might give you a rough idea of possible ranges (60-90 for a maximum) that might apply. It would, in fact, be very interesting to turn this question on its head and have your modern javelineers see just how far out they can reach as an experiment (either with amentum or, lacking that, by tacking a calculated 25% per Harris onto their best throws without that device).

[Giannis K. Hoplite]

Today i did some experimenting with the amentum. I used a not so good javelin,that is whith a vety thick and heavy head from Cult of Athena. Real javelins would have much smaller heads and would be by far lighter.
Bowever,i know that without the amentum,or with bad use of it i could throw it at 14 paces at most.
When using the amentum well-that is without wraping it around the shaft and throwing in a way that seemed completely overhand and with my chest looking forward- i could easily reach 19-20 paces repeatedly.

My amentum was about 15cm long. I was tied around 15cm below the center of balance.
It is true that when i twisted the amentum,the javelin was spinning fast,but the flight was so much better when i didn't wrap it around the shaft. The flight was generally smoother and farer. I could also throw more precicely at a steel barrel that i could easily penetrate when i hit it.Though it was very rusty.
My two cents,though i plan to do much more testing and practice. Hopefully with a better javelin.
Khairete
Giannis

[Old Husker]

Hi Giannis,

Very interesting! For what it's worth, while Harris got a +25% increase on his throws by using an amentum, he does cite a couple of older studies that claimed much greater increses (180 to 300%), which he thought very uhlikely to be true. The 180% report was by Juthner in J.H.S. xxvii (1907, p. 258) and the 300% report was ascribed to one General Reffye on assignment for Napoleon Boneparte back in the early 19th century (yielding throws of 80m overall). Your result of around +40% would seem more to confirm Harris' result. Indeed, since his +25% was actually the best of his throws, there's reason to believe that, with enough practice and sufficient attempts, he might have got up to 40% as well.

Harris hypothesized from his experiences that in war the Greek javelin was thrown with a fixed thong to secure increased range, without any twist to add spin; while in sporting events, it was thrown with a free thong to produce spin in order to ensure pitching on the point. (I'm not so sure about the former, since rifling spin seems to help the accuracy of modern weapons of war.) He also relates (without citation) a report on some athletes in Spain using an underarm technique with a turn like that of a discus thrower to range out over 300 feet (90m) without an amentum; however, with little control over direction, the danger posed to spectators caused this method to be banned. The Harris article has some photos at the end that show his javelins up close with both fixed and free thongs, these thongs apparently being much longer than yours at 18 inches (46cm). He also tried an even longer thong of 36 inces (over 90cm), but found that this only cut his range. Duplicating the ancient Greek weapon, which was very slender and as short as 1.1m (compared to the thicker 2.4m sporting models of today) seems to be one of the difficulties in making modern comparisons. Anyway, all the best of luck with your tests - Fred

[Steven M. Peffley]

Again, i go away for ahile and when i look in there's more info to read!
Thanks Fred; the best info yet. For the record, my best throws are with javelins about 75 inches long, .75 inch to 1 inch diameter, weight 1lb to 1.5 lb. these i can throw about
100 feet bare handed. With an amentum ( which i've standardised to 18 inches, including the loop ) i can easily reach 150 feet, and 200 feet for the best throws. I have not tried
trowing at a specific target, but i am able to group these into a square yard if i concentrate. These are also not sport javelins with just a point, but bladed war-heads with a strong central mid-rib.
As to the range, it's pretty much what i guessed at: 100 feet to 150 feet or so.
And, not surprisingly, i'm meeting with great resistance from the SCA. It has come to the "Pass the buck" stage, where each minor functionary passes me off to the next one in line. I am wondering how long it will take to come full circle to the person i started with :roll: I find this minorly annoying, but more an exercise in drollery.
Again, thank you all for the info. Sterling and exceptional all around.

[PMBardunias]

He also relates (without citation) a report on some athletes in Spain using an underarm technique with a turn like that of a discus thrower to range out over 300 feet (90m) without an amentum

I have read that before, but I am very skeptical. I used to throw the javelin as well as the discus and hammer in competion. We screwed around with spinning javelin tosses, but they were a joke. Also, any athlete worth his salt could throw from rotation with sufficient accuracy. I would rather be hit with an errant javelin any day rather than a hammer gone off course.

[Old Husker]

Yes, the fact that Harris had no citation for this claim (not to mention the less than convincing manner of his presentation) definitely makes one take it all with a grain of salt. As for risks, the only casualty claim that I recall actually hearing back in my school days came from one of my coaches, who said that a stray javelin had in the past taken one poor on-looker through the bicep on our field, thus leading to a ban on javelins from the school arsenal. Personally, being an extremely slender and leggy type keen on survival, I always stuck close to the cinder track and tried to keep a healthy distance from my more brawny field-event friends and their potentially lethal shower of frighteningly heavy objects.

[PMBardunias]

One of our discus throwers accidentally hit a long distance runner right between the eyes. Luckily we were inside due to rain so we were using the hard rubber practice discs. He had a bump like a unicorn on his forehead, but probably would not have survived the iron-rimmed variety.

There is a video on youtube of a famous incident at the olympics where a runner was struck in the back by an errant javelin.

[Mattias]

Hi! First time poster.

On the lightinfantry with cavalry subject i would just like to add that this seems very plausible and the very same tactic was used by the Swedish king Gustav Adolf 2 during the 30-year war, but with musket men and light artillery supporting the cavalry. So it seems that it is a viable strategy in all times.

[Octavianus]

Regarding this style of throwing the javelin, it's called Spanish Style, Miguel de la Cuadra has reached 112 m. with it.
More info here http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/F%C3%A9lix_Erausquin in spanish, you can use Google translator...

[sitalkes]

An extract from "The Gods of Battle" - see the book for the references

The javelins were thrown in a very special way that enabled the peltast to throw his javelins further, beyond the usual 35-60m. He held the javelin lightly with his fourth and fifth finger, while the second and third fingers were hooked around a leather loop (vronchos or amentum) that was attached to the javelin. When the javelin was above his head he released it and gave it a final swing with the strap. The theory is that about half the spear’s velocity comes from the final wrist flick and this strap increased the spear’s thrown speed. The spin imparted to it by the final twist made it more accurate.

In practice, experiments suggest:

(a) that in war the Greek javelin was thrown with a fixed thong to secure increased range, without any twist to add spin;
(b) that the athletic javelin was thrown with a free thong primarily to produce spin in order to ensure pitching on the point.

The javelin apparently wasn’t expected to be terribly accurate.

Our only piece of evidence of the degree of accuracy achieved by the Greeks with the thong appears to be the incident recorded by Polybios as proof of the skill of Ptolemy Epiphanes. Once while hunting he hit a bull with a javelin from horseback.

The Olympic record for a javelin thrown without assistance is 104.8m, with a 0.8 kg javelin, but at such a range a javelin is unlikely to be accurate or penetrate armour. In the experiments made by General Reffye for the Emperor Napoleon it was found that a javelin, which could be thrown only 20 metres by hand, could be thrown 80 metres with the amentum. In another experiment an inexperienced thrower increased his throw from 25 to 65 metres. Neither experimenter appears ever to have thrown a javelin himself, with or without a thong. Experiments with a modern javelin showed a 4-6 per cent improvement on average, with the best improvement being +25% and the worst being -16%. It is unlikely it was as efficient as a wooden spear thrower used by other cultures (e.g. the Australian aborigines’ woomera) which allowed a spear to be thrown up to 180m. These throw the spear right from the end and gain maximum leverage. The longest throws in modern competition have been obtained by throwing a javelin underarm like a discus (the “Spanish throw”), but this has been banned, as it is dangerously inaccurate. Harris concludes that the longest throw using ancient methods was about 100m.