I need references to the distances at which javelins were first thrown, probably at the begining of a conflict; the longer the distance the better.
I am amusing myself by attempting to introduce historically accurate javelin throwing at SCA events, particularly, Pennsic XXXX. I am meeting a great deal of resistance to the idea of throwing over 30 to 50 feet ( with or without accuracy ), and i need historical facts to throw at them to "prove" that javelins were thrown farther than the minimal distances that they use.
You guys came up with some sterling answers to the last question regarding the original
Greek of the Diodorus quote regarding Gaulish Javelins and i have no doubt that excellent answers regarding this question will be forthcoming.
"Thanks" in advance,
I'm not aware of any ancient references to specific range, but a check of modern Olympic and other competition records show that javelins have often been thrown out to a distance of 90 meters (and once to just over 100m) without the use of the throwing thongs used by ancient psiloi/peltasts. If we consider the thong more of an aid to accuracy (providing rifling-type spin) than reach, perhaps 90 meters would then be a maximum, with 60 meters or so maybe being attempted more regularly. If so, 30-50 feet (well below 20 meters) would truly be 'point-blank' range rather than the distance at which javelins were "first thrown."
It\'s only by appreciating accurate accounts of real combat past and present that we can begin to approach the Greek hoplite\'s hard-won awareness of war\'s potential merits and ultimate limitations.
Aren't modern javelins made of aluminium and specifically designed to optimise range over penetration? One would think that a Greek javelin made of timber and optimised for combat, not competition, would have a significantly shorter range.
Edit: according to this http://www.nemethjavelins.hu/javelins
men's modern javelins weigh 800g and women's are 600g. How heavy are Greek reconstructions (combat, not olympic)?
Certainly, comparisons between modern competition javelins and ancient weapons will have to be approximate. However, the ancient version had centuries of development designed to optimise its range/lethality without concern for the sort of sporting balance and safety factors that affect the modern version. Modern sports javelins are quite large (2.6-2.7m and at least 800 grams) and might well have always had less range than ancient ones for this reason. Noteably, competition results show that the last javelin redesign by the IAAF (in 1986) reduced range by nearly 20 meters (from a maximum 104.80m with the older model to just 85.74m as the best throw with the new one in 1987). I also suspect that the spin imparted by a throwing thong, while most improving accuracy, probably improved range as well. Still, the 90m upside I suggested is only meant as a 'best guess' and there's no reason that someone out there can't come up with a better number using a different method of comparison.
It\'s only by appreciating accurate accounts of real combat past and present that we can begin to approach the Greek hoplite\'s hard-won awareness of war\'s potential merits and ultimate limitations.
Someplace I once came across a study of special olympians throwing the javelin from wheelchairs. This was interesting because it limits the throw to force generated by the upper body as might be predominant when men were close together with a very limited lead up before a throw. Recall as well that men fighting onboard ships were expected to be a ble to throw effectively when sitting or kneeling.
Paul M. Bardunias
MODERATOR: [url:2dqwu8yc]http://www.romanarmytalk.com/rat/viewtopic.php?t=4100[/url]
A Spartan, being asked a question, answered "No." And when the questioner said, "You lie," the Spartan said, "You see, then, that it is stupid of you to ask questions to which you already know the answer!"
It would be very interesting to compare such 'sitting' throws to the more conventional 'running' toss. I tend to picture most Greek javelinmen operating either in front of their phalanx in pre-battle skirmishing or on the flanks during the main battle. In either case, 'loose' order could have given them a chance to make a running throws. Clearly, that wouldn't work aboard ship and something like the sitting throw would have been necessary. Also, data on sitting throws might give a clue as to how reduced a cavalryman's javelin throw might have been compared to that of foot skirmishers. I've always thought that this lesser range plus the size of their horses as targets must have put mounted troops at considerable disadvantage against peltasts (let alone foot archers).
It\'s only by appreciating accurate accounts of real combat past and present that we can begin to approach the Greek hoplite\'s hard-won awareness of war\'s potential merits and ultimate limitations.
Not suprisingly we are thinking alike. Here's the reference and the most pertinant info:
KINEMATIC ANALYSIS OF JAVELIN THROW PERFORMED BY
WHEELCHAIR ATHLETES OF DIFFERENT FUNCTIONAL
CLASSES
Chow et al. Journal of Sports Science and Medicine (2003) 2, 36-46
[attachment=808]Wheelchairthrows.JPG[/attachment]
Paul M. Bardunias
MODERATOR: [url:2dqwu8yc]http://www.romanarmytalk.com/rat/viewtopic.php?t=4100[/url]
A Spartan, being asked a question, answered "No." And when the questioner said, "You lie," the Spartan said, "You see, then, that it is stupid of you to ask questions to which you already know the answer!"
Very interesting! Having read your earlier comment, I searched the net a bit for some record wheelchair throws and dug up a few (made later than the article above) that reached into the mid and even upper 30m range. Even so, it sure looks like you cut the distance down by two-thirds or more when legs aren't in the equation. I think that applying this to cavalry suggests why it was so important for ancient horsemen to have hamippoi or some other type of screening light infantry along. In the case of 'shock' cavalry like the Macedonian Companions, the requirement would seem to be greater still. Alexander's Agrianian peltasts or others of their ilk thus must have been a very vital part of the arms mix in any action where he anticipated that his cavalry would have to face missle-armed footmen.
It\'s only by appreciating accurate accounts of real combat past and present that we can begin to approach the Greek hoplite\'s hard-won awareness of war\'s potential merits and ultimate limitations.
I admit to not having a good grasp on how horsemen threw javelins, but this brings up many problems for them. For an ideal throwing distance you'd want your horse moving fast and directly at the foe, but the problem arises in how long it takes to recover and turn your mount. An archer can turn as in a caracole and shoot when perpendicular to the battle line, but this would not be best for a javelineer. Once you throw, if it takes too long to turn your mount you get dangerously close to the infantry.
It is an interesting conundrum in that a force of infantry javelineers in opened order with space to move can out throw cavalry considerably. But in that spacing, if the cavalry press home they will go Albuera on the infantry. The solution, one that arises over and over is a few ranks of heavy spearmen in front of the loosely ordered missile troops. The Fulcum was this and probably the early greek proto-phalanx as well.
I am always struck my how afraid of hoplites cavalry are in this period. If there ranges were this meagre, it makes sense. A man can accelerate faster than a horse, so if you have to throw, turn, and accelerate away, all within 30m or so, you can be caught by infantry.
Paul M. Bardunias
MODERATOR: [url:2dqwu8yc]http://www.romanarmytalk.com/rat/viewtopic.php?t=4100[/url]
A Spartan, being asked a question, answered "No." And when the questioner said, "You lie," the Spartan said, "You see, then, that it is stupid of you to ask questions to which you already know the answer!"
I've been struggling of late with just how horsemen operated on 4th century B.C. Greek battlefields and have come to the preliminary conclusion that light infantry support was critical to cavalry success. Aside from practical considerations, such as the range issues we've been discussing and the relative ease of hitting a horse with a weapon versus a smaller human target, there are some direct indications in the literature as well. The most notable of these is Diodorus (15.85.3-5) in his lengthy description of Mantinea II (362 B.C.):
"At first they engaged in a cavalry battle on the flanks in which they outbid each other in keen rivalry. Now as the Athenian horse attacked the Theban they suffered defeat not so much because of the quality of their mounts nor yet on the score of the riders' courage or experience in horsemanship, for in none of these departments was the Athenian cavalry deficient; but it was in the numbers and equipment of the light-armed troops and in their technical skill that they were far inferior to their opponents. Indeed they had only a few javelin-throwers, whereas the Thebans had three times as many slingers and javelin-throwers sent them from the regions about Thessaly. These people practised from boyhood assiduously this type of fighting and consequently were wont to exercise great weight in battles because of their experience in handling these missiles. Consequently the Athenians, who were continually being wounded by the light-armed and were harried to exhaustion by the opponents who confronted them, all turned and fled."
This was probably always the dynamic present in Greek cavalry actions, though relative balance in light-armed forces usually rendered it more or less invisible in its lesser importance to reaching a final decision. As a result, our sources seldom give us any depth of detail on how such things worked on the battlefield; in this sense, Diodorus' account of Mantinea II is as much a key to understanding cavalry actions as Thucydides' account of Mantinea I (418 B.C.) has been to understanding the details of hoplite warfare. It certainly helps to make sense of other major battles where details regarding cavalry can be explained only by requiring a light-armed infantry victory as prerequisite for subsequent mounted success. A example of this is Crocus Plain (353 B.C.). Here, the Phocians had only 500 cavalrymen against Philip II of Macedonia's 3,000 horsemen of the highest quality. Yet the fight seems to ahave been drawn out for quite a while before Philip's Thessalian light cavalry was able to finally chase off the handful of opposing horsemen and turn the Phocian left flank (the right was anchored on the sea, thus all the light-armed action took place on the landward side). Given Philip's huge (6-to-1) advantage in cavalry strength, this only makes sense when we realise that the light infantry was somewhat better balanced (probably a less than 2-to-1 edge for the Macedonians). Thus, it took a long time for these opposing light footmen to reach a conclusion, and only when their screening skirmishers had cleared the way could the Thessalian riders then bring their numbers decisively to bear. (Interestingly, the Macedonian companion horse never seems to have been able to get into the battle in any significant way at all.) Just as at Mantinea II, this action features an unusual aspect (extremely unbalanced cavalry forces here instead of the extremely unbalanced light infantry forces in that earlier battle) which allows us a vital glimpse of the foot skirmisher dynamic that was probably always present in cavalry actions, but rarely so well exposed to our observation.
It\'s only by appreciating accurate accounts of real combat past and present that we can begin to approach the Greek hoplite\'s hard-won awareness of war\'s potential merits and ultimate limitations.
Quote:...Diodorus' account of Mantinea II is as much a key to understanding cavalry actions as Thucydides' account of Mantinea I (418 B.C.) has been to understanding the details of hoplite warfare.
Hi Fred.
Except that Diodorus seems to have a distinct predilection for describing two battles within a battle when it comes to cavalry. Mantinea II appears more a combined arms effort. The cavalry of the Thebans seem intent on flanking and enveloping the "Allies" and I'd think that the cavalry engagements and infantry engagements followed upon one another rather that the diparate actions that Diodorus' method seems to present. The role of the hamippoi is well described though. The Allied left (the Athenians) clearly lacked in this regard whereas the Theban cavalry are well supported by hamippoi. The classical period does not see this combined arms (cavalry and lights intermixed) or, if it did, it is not described.
Alexander III always utilised this combination in his set pieces and it is highly likely that this was a feature of his father's arrays. Most often we have the javellin men and the Agrianians posted along with the Companion Cavalry and they will have adopted the role of hamippoi inserting thenmselves amongst the engaged cavalry.
Alexander's generals - the Diadochoi - did likelwise though it is not always as well attested (Diod 19.27.5; 29.6; 40.2; 30.4)
Quote:...A example of this is Crocus Plain (353 B.C.). Here, the Phocians had only 500 cavalrymen against Philip II of Macedonia's 3,000 horsemen of the highest quality. Yet the fight seems to ahave been drawn out for quite a while before Philip's Thessalian light cavalry was able to finally chase off the handful of opposing horsemen
That's possible but there is little in Diodorus' description that could substantiate a description of "quite a while". Diodorus says the battle was "severe" and, I suppose this makes a change from "hot", but he spares his usual "after many had fallen on both sides" or "the battle was long in the balance".
Well, Diodorus' language (i.e. "severe" surely referring to the main phalanx action which, if anything, lagged the start of the light-armed skirmishing off the flank) is what it is and we just have to make do as best we can with it, taking him at his word unless having reasonable evidence to the contrary. I guess "quite a while" is in the eye (or ear) of the beholder. For me in this case, it's something well past the immediate 'walk-over' that a 6-to-1 manpower edge with the best horsemen in Greece should have provided Philip.
I agree with you very much that all the battle's action (mounted and afoot alike) was unfolding at the same time and not in isolated sequence as Diodorus would imply. However, that his descriptions can get repetitious is understandable. Having tried to describe some 250 engagements myself to date and still counting, I fully appreciate the difficulty of avoiding too much repetition - and my list is pretty puny by the standard of Diodorus' massive output. Really though, ancient Greek warfare must actually have been quite repetitious in fact, there only being a modest number of variations on the theme of rather standardized phalanx combat.
Given the apparent limitations we've been considering here of cavalry against better-ranging light infantry, I think it likely that the need to screen the horsemen and their valuable/vulnerable mounts was always a practical necessity and didn't suddenly appear in the mid-4th century. It seems that the topic of light infantry was generally left unexplored in favor of concentrating on hoplite action by most authors of the 5th century; thus, it's only rare events, such as at Spartolus (429 B.C.) where unusual circumstances (hoplites defeated by cavalry with light infantry after the main heavy infantry battle was over) tht give us a glimpse at the presence and actual importance of foot skirmishers cooperating with horsemen in that earlier era.
It\'s only by appreciating accurate accounts of real combat past and present that we can begin to approach the Greek hoplite\'s hard-won awareness of war\'s potential merits and ultimate limitations.
Quote:Well, Diodorus' language (i.e. "severe" surely referring to the main phalanx action which, if anything, lagged the start of the light-armed skirmishing off the flank) is what it is and we just have to make do as best we can with it, taking him at his word unless having reasonable evidence to the contrary.
I take the point about the number of descriptions and Diodorus’ words. It is pertinent though that Diodorus, as he so often does with decisive or “climactic” battles, does not default to his regular descriptors. Chaeronea, for example, sees three of those usual suspects (battle “was hotly contested”; “many fell on both sides” “the struggle permitted hopes of victory to both”). Here the Thessalians were more numerous (and valiant) and Philip won after a “severe” battle.
The adjective for the battle, iskhuras, is rendered as “severe” but might just as easily be rendered as “violent” or “sharp”. That might suggest that the rout set in fairly quickly – certainly it was complete given the casualties. In fact, at 16.31.3, it is used to describe the battle in which the Phocians were defeated by the Boeotians who “far outnumbered them”. Again, the import is of a sharp encounter in which larger numbers result in a reasonably quick (“sharp”) victory. Pausanias (10.2.5) relates that the Phocians killed their own general during this battle due to “his lack of enterprise and inexperience as a general”. Seems he stuffed-up "severely".
The strategy and the tactics used in this battle elude us. Clearly the Phocians were operating with the expected support of the Athenian forces under Chares and Philip seems to have acted swiftly to force an engagement on his terms rather than the Phocian’s.
Quote:Given the apparent limitations we've been considering here of cavalry against better-ranging light infantry, I think it likely that the need to screen the horsemen and their valuable/vulnerable mounts was always a practical necessity and didn't suddenly appear in the mid-4th century. It seems that the topic of light infantry was generally left unexplored in favor of concentrating on hoplite action by most authors of the 5th century...
Light troops might well have "protected" valuable and vulnerable cavalry mounts. They may have done this as part of that skirmishing and after. The focus on hoplite action cannot explain all the lack of such notifications though. For whilst there is no doubt that light infantry was employed in the classical era – referred to as either peltasts or psiloi – their tactical role is rarely that of hamippoi or of troops engaged to fight along with cavalry. Thucydides refers to these troops on several occasions but, aside from Spartolus (an exception), they seem not to take an integrated role. The Syracusans marshal their entire forces against the Athenians at 6.67. Here (67.2) the cavalry is “placed in the right point of the battle, being in all no less than a thousand two hundred, and with them the javelin-men”. One expects that the javelin men were used in conjunction with the cavalry but we are not told that only that
Quote:First, the stone-throwers, slingers, and archers of either army began skirmishing, and routed or were routed by one another, as might be expected between light troops […] The Athenians did not pursue far, being held in check by the numerous and undefeated Syracusan horse, who attacked and drove back any of their heavy infantry whom they saw pursuing in advance of the rest…
Similar is reported for Delium where the Boeotians had “10,000 light troops, 1,000 cavalry and 500 peltasts” divided between their wings. Neither seems to take any part in the battle until the end when the cavalry surprise and pursue the Athenians.
The difference with “Mantinea II” and the reflection of Philip II via his son is that we have “light” troops dedicated to operate with the cavalry. It is a combination rather than light troops sallying out and, having done their thing, retiring.
Interesting that at Delium – as Diodorus at Mantinea II later – Thucydides remarks on the absence of Athenian light troops. Some seem not to learn?
Some excellent points! I don't think that 'severe', 'violent', or 'sharp' would necessarily mean 'short', being references in all cases to intensity rather than duration. That having been said, however, I agree very much that this could not have been a battle that went on for hours with a lot of back and forth by the phalanxes before somebody broke. Indeed, any action that is particularly intense (as 'severe' or its synomyms would imply) must by necessity be somewhat brief if for no other reason than that a very high level of exertion can't long be sustained. I think that the most logical interpretation here (though certainly not the only one by any means) in light of all the elements and circumstances present is that the Thessalian/Macedonian light foot was able to use a near 2-to-1 manpower advantage to clear the opposing foot skirmishers screening the Phocian left side. At that point, Philip's allied cavalry from the Thessalian League swept away the few Phocian horsemen present and allowed his heavy infantry to turn that flank, the victorious riders then moving to cut off the enemy's path of retreat (leading to the unusually high number of surrenders reported after this battle, 3,000, this resulting from troops being isolated rather than simply pursued). This probably played out fairly quickly, but not nearly as fast as the huge mounted advantage would have permitted without light infantry opposition. That Philip's own elite Companion cavalry (probably posted closer to its own heavy infantry) gets no mention may be significant as well, it very likely not having been able to penetrate the opposing foot screen as quickly as the Thessalians had done.
Onomarchus, the Phocian commander, was, in fact, rather highly regarded as a tactician (though he got a lot of bad press by folks like Pausanius for his raiding of the sacred precinct at Delphi). In fact, he had brilliantly led his troops to three victories in the preceeding year (354 B.C.), twice against Philip and the third over the Boeotians at Hermeum. In those actions he had his own allied Thessalian cavalry (provided by Pherae), which was vital to make up for the small size of his native Phocian horse. That he lacked those allied horsemen at Crocus Plain is apparently attributable to Philip's genius at mobility. Onomarchus was marching to relieve Pherae, where he would have met up with that city's cavalry, but had swung seaward to also hook up with Chares and his ship-borne force of mercenaries. Philip was able to catch him in route, separated from both his allies (the Pheraeans' horse and mercenary infantry being yet at home and Chares men still offshore) to force a battle on highly unfavorable terms for the Phocian (just as you suggest). Hammond (Philip of Macedon 1994, p. 47) very reasonably opines that he did this by means of a surprise night march. All the same, there was almost always a certain degree of mutual consent to phalanx battles (one could nearly always withdraw faster than an opponent could pursue unless totally bereft of covering light forces - something we very often see in post-battle retreats). This was certainly true here; moreover, Philip would have been at risk of having Chares land in his rear (and be reinforced by Pherae) had he chose to give chase. Indeed, he seems to have wisely ignored a opportunity to march on Phocis in the immediate aftermath of his victory at Crocus Plain for this very reason. Therefore, Onomarchus must have seen a chance for victory here, which could only have come had his light footmen kept the much more numerous enemy cavalry at bay while he carried the heavy infantry battle to success against Philip (as he had done two times the summer before). Here he fatally miscalculated, most likely in my opinion due to a combined underestimatation of the ability of the Thessalian horse and Philip's infantry (newly revamped to address the causes of those earlier defeats).
There are at least two versions of how Onomarchus died, with the one that seems more likely to me being that of Diodorus that he (along with a good many of his men) drowned trying to get to some of the allied Athenian ships that had pulled up close offshore. Chares, in fact, doesn't seem to have been able to get his men into the fight (supporting the idea that Onomarchus was caught by a surprise mobilitzation). As things turned out, this was a lucky break for the Athenian, who not only avoided the slaughter that befell his ally but was shortly thereafter able to land with a still intact force and deal a defeat to Philip's subordinate Adaios in a modest battle near Pherae's port of Pagasae (above Crocus Plain).
I think that the element of light infantry support for cavalry was always present in the classical period (indeed, this could well have been a tradition dating back to the days of chariots, which had teams of light infantry attached). The differences that we see in our scanty sources could thus reflect two different methods of integrating these troop types: (1) separate bodies of cavalry and light foot operating in cooperation or (2) horsemen and light infantrymen mixed more intimately together ("intermingled" per Xenophon 7.5.24). Both techniques likely existed side by side, with the choice of which was used varying by traditional from one army to the next. Certainly, Mantinea II might well reflect both methods being employed at the same time on opposite sides, with the Boeotians mixing the two troop types together and the Athenians having them cooperate as separate units (while Xenophon's account leaves out mention of the Athenians' light foot, Diodorus makes it clear that it was there, just in inferior numbers [only a third the strength of the oppositon]). As for Delium (424 B.C.), this was a case of ravines on both ends of the battlefield restricting the use of light forces by either side. If the Boeotians were prone to mix their light foot and horsemen in a single formation, then there's no reason not to assume that they did that here, with it being a mixed team of fleet fighters (both mounted and afoot) that swept around the Athenian right to take it in the rear. Along these same lines, the army of Syracuse could have used either method (intermingling or coordination) in 415 B.C. My only thought on why one would chose one technique over the other is that allied light infantry might have been easier to use as a separate body, while one's own native horsemen and psiloi/peltasts could easily train together for an intermingled appraoch.
It\'s only by appreciating accurate accounts of real combat past and present that we can begin to approach the Greek hoplite\'s hard-won awareness of war\'s potential merits and ultimate limitations.
