01-21-2011, 04:34 AM
I think that the Spartans' decision to join Corinth's lead in declaring war on Athens in 431 B.C. was probably just as strategically important to them as that to secure oil resources was in 2003 to the Americans. Sparta had no navy and, despite the undoubted superiority of its hoplites, had a very modestly sized army relative to the extents of both its home territory and region of hegemonic control. Thus, it could sustain its position only through manpower and naval resources drawn from what we call today the 'Peloponnesian League' (known in its own time more accurately as 'Sparta and it's friends'). Corinth was by far the most important League ally, being the wealthiest state, having the second most powerful army (behind only Sparta's itself), and possessed of the largest fleet (trailing only those of Athens and Corcyra). With Corinth's cooperation vital to maintaing the League and Sparta's security, it's not surprising then that the Corinthian 'tail' could wag the Spartan 'dog' in instigating a war with Athens.
As for the 'Megalopolis model' for Iraq, this falls short for me due to the massive American military base build-up that began the very day Bagdad fell. This activity ultimately established two absolutely giant airbases (the first just north of Bagdad facing nearby Iraq and the second farther north facing nearby Syria, both coupled with similarly oversized bases for land forces) that could have no earthly function with regard to internal Iraqi operations. These were clearly geared to large-scale strategic activities over the closest borders rather than the much smaller tactical operations actually required within Iraq itself. I do believe, however, that the Megalopolis model was one that neocon hawks within and without the administration sold to the American people as cover for their real, much more militant program. Given that any truly democratic Iraq would inevitably be controlled by Shites closely aligned with Iran, this was always a fantasy-based sop to those of a less warlike nature. As it turned out, the real plan of planting a puppet government under pro-American leadership in Bagdad that would allow the U.S. a free hand to use those bases as it pleased quickly sank despite several slap-dash attempts to keep it afloat. Forced by military and political realities in the field and public pressure at home to accept a truly democratic, pro-Iranian Shite take-over of the Iraqi government, the original plot fell apart entirely, leaving the U.S. to muddle its way home in some manner that would save as much face as possible (an activity still in progress).
I think that there is a very good analog for the U.S. attempt at occupying Iraq to be found in the failed attempt of Sparta to control Athens in the immediate aftermath of the Peloponnesian War (late 404-403 B.C.). This called for small Spartan forces backed by mercenaries (the Blackwater etc. of that day) and a sympathetic minority among Athenians (like unto U.S. trained Iraqi forces) to prop up a pro-Spartan puppet government. A resistance movement quickly grew, which couldn't be stamped out despite an attempt to alter the puppet government into a slightly more inclusive form. Sparta's attempt to cope with this situation as it spun out of control into a full blown civil war within the city was hindered by aid to the rebels from Thebes (a role that Iran would play in our modern parallel) and refusal of key allies like Corinth to participate in backing the occupation (much like Germany, France, and others would do to the U.S. in Iraq). In the end, the Spartans cobbled together a 'coalition of the willing' and launched a huge 'surge' of troops into Athens to put down the uprising. However, this campaign proved more a case of propaganda for political consumption at home than a real military solution on the ground (again, much as per the U.S. 'surge,' which was much, much smaller and far less earnest or effective than even the Spartan effort). In the end, despite winning a modest battlefield victory against the insurrection, the Spartans, whose casualties might have actually exceeeded those of the beaten side in that action, negotiated their way out of the occupation. The resolution settled upon left Athens under a limited democracy that included both pro and anti-Spartan factions, this arrangement saved Spartan face, at least in the short run, but rapidly gave rise to a fuller democracy under the much larger anti-Spartan majority that would again go to war against Sparta within just a few years.
As for the 'Megalopolis model' for Iraq, this falls short for me due to the massive American military base build-up that began the very day Bagdad fell. This activity ultimately established two absolutely giant airbases (the first just north of Bagdad facing nearby Iraq and the second farther north facing nearby Syria, both coupled with similarly oversized bases for land forces) that could have no earthly function with regard to internal Iraqi operations. These were clearly geared to large-scale strategic activities over the closest borders rather than the much smaller tactical operations actually required within Iraq itself. I do believe, however, that the Megalopolis model was one that neocon hawks within and without the administration sold to the American people as cover for their real, much more militant program. Given that any truly democratic Iraq would inevitably be controlled by Shites closely aligned with Iran, this was always a fantasy-based sop to those of a less warlike nature. As it turned out, the real plan of planting a puppet government under pro-American leadership in Bagdad that would allow the U.S. a free hand to use those bases as it pleased quickly sank despite several slap-dash attempts to keep it afloat. Forced by military and political realities in the field and public pressure at home to accept a truly democratic, pro-Iranian Shite take-over of the Iraqi government, the original plot fell apart entirely, leaving the U.S. to muddle its way home in some manner that would save as much face as possible (an activity still in progress).
I think that there is a very good analog for the U.S. attempt at occupying Iraq to be found in the failed attempt of Sparta to control Athens in the immediate aftermath of the Peloponnesian War (late 404-403 B.C.). This called for small Spartan forces backed by mercenaries (the Blackwater etc. of that day) and a sympathetic minority among Athenians (like unto U.S. trained Iraqi forces) to prop up a pro-Spartan puppet government. A resistance movement quickly grew, which couldn't be stamped out despite an attempt to alter the puppet government into a slightly more inclusive form. Sparta's attempt to cope with this situation as it spun out of control into a full blown civil war within the city was hindered by aid to the rebels from Thebes (a role that Iran would play in our modern parallel) and refusal of key allies like Corinth to participate in backing the occupation (much like Germany, France, and others would do to the U.S. in Iraq). In the end, the Spartans cobbled together a 'coalition of the willing' and launched a huge 'surge' of troops into Athens to put down the uprising. However, this campaign proved more a case of propaganda for political consumption at home than a real military solution on the ground (again, much as per the U.S. 'surge,' which was much, much smaller and far less earnest or effective than even the Spartan effort). In the end, despite winning a modest battlefield victory against the insurrection, the Spartans, whose casualties might have actually exceeeded those of the beaten side in that action, negotiated their way out of the occupation. The resolution settled upon left Athens under a limited democracy that included both pro and anti-Spartan factions, this arrangement saved Spartan face, at least in the short run, but rapidly gave rise to a fuller democracy under the much larger anti-Spartan majority that would again go to war against Sparta within just a few years.
It\'s only by appreciating accurate accounts of real combat past and present that we can begin to approach the Greek hoplite\'s hard-won awareness of war\'s potential merits and ultimate limitations.
- Fred Eugene Ray (aka "Old Husker")
- Fred Eugene Ray (aka "Old Husker")
