\"A War like no other\"; by Victor Davis Hanson

[Ghostmojo]

I have a few books by Hanson - but not this one. He put me off his own approach with his other efforts. I'm certain he is a worthy author and commentator but there is something decidedly odd about a guy who pointedly calls (as he does in one book) the Spartan contingent at Thermopylai as being King Leonidas and his 299 :?

[Old Husker]

I owe much to Victor David Hanson's The Western Way of War in that it joined with Donald Kagan's quartet on the Peloponnesian War to spur my progression from interested oberver to more serious researcher on ancient Greek battle. However, though I've enjoyed many of his other works (nearly all of which I have acquired), his writing can be a bit annoying when his bias toward right-wing military solutions appears in the form of efforts to stretch comparisons between ancient Greek military programs he admires (especially that of Thebes under Epaminondas) and more recent martial efforts by the United States. I'm not saying that he is always wrong, but he does wear his heart on his sleeve a bit overmuch (in my opinion) to the detriment of his narratives. This was most notable in his book The Soul of Battle (a three-part piece with sections on Epaminondas, Sherman, and Patton) that (again, in my opinion) seemed to be a long argument in defense of the concept of preemptive war toward justifying the then current U.S. operation in Iraq. Opinions differ widely on that American venture and I'll not say that Hanson is wrong or right regardless of my own thoughts on that conflict; however, I think it's poor practice to color ones view of history so much to fit current politics (as opposed to a more open opinion piece, something which, to his credit, Hanson has done elsewhere). In contrast, Donald Kagan, who I've heard is quite far out there on the American politcal right (presumeably, rather more so than Victor Hanson), doesn't seem to have injected that leaning into his narratives on the Peloponnesian War (though, perhaps, he did so in such a subtle manner that I simply didn't detect it). Anyway, I still admire Victor Hanson's work and will continue to seek it out, but suggest that it's best to read him with care so as to separate that which is historical from that which is merely his political bias.

[Paralus]

However, though I've enjoyed many of his other works (nearly all of which I have acquired), his writing can be a bit annoying when his bias toward right-wing military solutions appears in the form of efforts to stretch comparisons between ancient Greek military programs he admires (especially that of Thebes under Epaminondas) and more recent martial efforts by the United States [...] I think it's poor practice to color ones view of history so much to fit current politics (as opposed to a more open opinion piece, something which, to his credit, Hanson has done elsewhere). In contrast, Donald Kagan, who I've heard is quite far out there on the American politcal right (presumeably, rather more so than Victor Hanson), doesn't seem to have injected that leaning into his narratives on the Peloponnesian War (though, perhaps, he did so in such a subtle manner that I simply didn't detect it)...

Succintly observed. Hanson's views - akin to cheerleading - are aparrent in his blog. Those views, in a personal sense such as that blog, are fine and he is quite entitled to express them. When, as the Old Husker has observed, they inform his scholarly work they are another matter. Colouring the past to justify present foreign policy is a very fraught exercise. Hanson also displays a tendency to extreme at times. His description of Alexander III as a murdering, alcoholic megolamaniac - whilst fitting the "facts" in the narrowest sense - lacks any nuance. As the perfector of the "western way of war" he seems presented as an example of what can happen when the somewhat unhinged control western states (from memory I think he alludes to Hitler). It's been some time since I read Hanson but if the above is true of Alexander III then Rome would have to be the Factory State of war with a production line of violence and slaughter.

Kagan is indeed "out there" though his work is far more balanced. Again, some time since I last read it, but his "summary" version of the Peloponnesian War left me with the sense that he has an admiration for the imperial Athenian State and, moreover, Pericles. His "biography" of Pericles ("Pericles of Athens and the Birth of Democracy") conveys this somewhat more strongly. At heart fifth century Athenian democracy was fiercely imperialistic - an affliction hardly unknown amongst more modern "democracies". This affliction pervaded Athenian foreign policy in the fourth century as well - at least up to the Persian threat to enter the Aegean in the 350s.

Ironically, the Founding Fathers of the US much debated the forms of their constitution during its conception. Athens, as a model, was abandonned in favour of Republican Rome. Too much direct power in the hands of the "great unwashed" was not appealing to monnied gentry even unto the creation of the Electoral College to provide a barrier between that enfranchised multitude and the direct election of a President.

And so the US modelled itself upon Republican Rome - even down to its architechture. Whilst I don't suggest that the factory state analogy above was also adopted - the US's long abandoned "isolationist" foreign policy speaks against it - the modern fascination with the Washinton/Rome analogy is eerily correct, though not for the immediately aparrent "reasons". Misadventures in Mesopotamia come to mind as do efforts to secure resources (Egypt, for example, before its subsumation).

[Old Husker]

As with Paralus, it's been a while since I read some of the works under discussion here, but my memory of them runs pretty much along the same lines. Donald Kagan is, indeed, a fan of 'imperial' Athens and probably does introduce subtle bias into his narratives as a result. Indeed, most writers likely are guilty of similar 'crimes,' even if committed subconsciously. Still, Victor Hanson's feelings on American foreign/military policies are, it seems to me, much more aggressively pushed in his later works (post 9/11/01), often reaching the point where Paralus' characterization of "cheerleading" is appropriate. Both Alexander III and the Spartans get rough treatment for their shortcomings in a manner that belies the truly complex nature of that man, that society, and the contexts of their times. It's ironic that that several American leaders that are admired by many (likely including Victor Hansen) have, in this age of greater population density and more devastating weapons, killed and displaced many more innocents ('collateral damage' its called these days) than Alexander at his worst, all the while covering their true, selfish motivations with a patina of patriatism and/or crusading idealism that the great Macedonian would have found quite familiar.

The obervations upon Rome making itself into a virtual factory of warfare and destructions and this having parallels with the U.S. in recent decades are not inappropriate. Our president Dwight Eisenhower, a man very familiar with both war and politics, saw dangers in his country following a similar path and warned against the "military-industrial" complex turning us into a virtual factory for conflict. Today, some throw around the term "military-business-poltical complex" to suggest that Eisenhower's fear has come to full realization. If so, I like to think that this phase might have peaked early in the decade just past and that more enlightened times may yet lie ahead. Afterall, Athens seems to have enjoyed at least a brief resurgence of more progressive democracy in the aftermath of its own imperial failures in the Peloponnesian War.

[Paralus]

The obervations upon Rome making itself into a virtual factory of warfare and destructions and this having parallels with the U.S. in recent decades are not inappropriate. Our president Dwight Eisenhower, a man very familiar with both war and politics, saw dangers in his country following a similar path and warned against the "military-industrial" complex turning us into a virtual factory for conflict.

The US, like Rome in Republican times, found itself a taking a more active, if not aggressive, profile in the wider world through a combination of "invitation"/circumstances and the men leading it. The original foreign policy stance was "isolationist" and intervention in the wider (European) world was actively discouraged. Rome was somewhat similar: it saw to its own area of concern in Latium and that gradual expansion and consolidation inevitably saw friction with other neighbours including the Sammnites. Having secured its position it might well have simmered within its bounds for sometime without the incessantly belligerent and childish Greek states tossing invites its way.

The US plugged along consolidating its own identity and position with no great desire to involve itself in the old word belligerence of Europe and its competing colonial states. That began to change toward the end of the 19th century as some decided the US had a role to play in the wider world. Thus we see renewed butting with Spain and not only in the "New World". The "Great White Fleet" was born out of this drive and Roosevelt was its "Pericles".

Afterwards Woodrow Wilson, not content with the US part in WWI, saw himself as the peacemaker in Europe. The Europeans, not so behind closed doors, took him with a pound of salt and several shots of decent whisky. They were, though, the recalcitrant last of a withering group: in thirty years they would be asking for loans to by the salt and whisky.

All of which is to say that Rome found itself in the eastern Mediterranean as much for the invites as the men who would pursue them. The US found itself in the position post WWI as much for the invite as it did those who would take or drive it. That position was doubly re-enforced after WWII when a destitute Europe – and more so England – left a vacuum filled, almost by default as much as policy, by the US. If the bitter pill hadn’t already been swallowed by Britain, it was muzzle loaded down her throat after her last imperial folly: the Suez Cannal.

The "American Century" (or empire of economy and ideology) came about as much by circumstance as deliberate policy. Much as did Rome.

Don’t be too concerned Fred: the “military-industrial” complex is staring at something Britain stared at in 1946: the reservoir of endless money is rapidly evaporating. Circumstance - not controlled by the US - was an enabler over the last 100 years; her other face may now be showing itself. The US needs to pay the rent before much anything else…

[PMBardunias]

I have a sneaking suspicion that many of the entities salivating at the fall of US hegemony in favor of whatever powers come next will enjoy it about as much as Thebes' trade of Spartan for Macedonian masters.

[Gaius Julius Caesar]

I have a sneaking suspicion that many of the entities salivating at the fall of US hegemony in favor of whatever powers come next will enjoy it about as much as Thebes' trade of Spartan for Macedonian masters.

The grass is always greener..... :roll:

I save my breath on that issue these days....

[Ghostmojo]

... Ironically, the Founding Fathers of the US much debated the forms of their constitution during its conception. Athens, as a model, was abandonned in favour of Republican Rome. Too much direct power in the hands of the "great unwashed" was not appealing to monnied gentry even unto the creation of the Electoral College to provide a barrier between that enfranchised multitude and the direct election of a President.

And so the US modelled itself upon Republican Rome - even down to its architechture. Whilst I don't suggest that the factory state analogy above was also adopted - the US's long abandoned "isolationist" foreign policy speaks against it - the modern fascination with the Washinton/Rome analogy is eerily correct, though not for the immediately aparrent "reasons". Misadventures in Mesopotamia come to mind as do efforts to secure resources (Egypt, for example, before its subsumation).

This is something that has long struck me - the obvious metaphoric similarities between Republican/Imperial Rome and Imperial Amerika. I'm not sure if the analogy extends to the British Empire as being the greater ancient Greek diaspora, but it is an interesting thought. As a basically pro-American Brit (who has lived there on two occasions) I couldn't help but observing the essential bread and circuses aspect to American life. This huge powerful nation is so parochial in so many ways. Few if any people I knew had passports or had travelled much. Few cared about the world across the Pacific or the Atlantic. The national and local press and TV was totally inward-looking with little to report from abroad. You had to dig deep to find any external influences - a specialist import shop I used to visit in NYC to get my marmalade, tea and Cadbury's chocolate (never anything from Europe in the supermarkets) - cable TV stations to find British or other programmes etc. etc. Of course there was always the odd exception, like a (ex-CIA) guy I worked with who only listened to the BBC World Service! The yanks are friendly, accommodating, hospitable people who are glad to have you aboard - and awfully surprised when you choose to return home. I visited the Guilford Courthouse Battlefield Park one weekend and having wandered the site, I bought a few books in the visitor centre. I got chatting to the guy behind the till who couldn't accept I was looking forward to returning home (after several months in NC) to the UK. Why? He kept asking? The inference was - isn't everything you could possibly want here? He'd never been any other place of course.

I blame the media. The bread and circuses. Keep them fed and entertained. Keep promoting the USA is best patter. Hopefully they won't be too interested in what we get up to around the planet. Of course other countries and societies are guilty of this - but it is writ large in America. Uncle Sam's comforting embrace is so seductive that many Americans I have met are absolutely genuinely shocked that anybody could think ill of America('s projection of power and self-interest) around the world. They truly believe their government is the good guys sorting out the ills of the world wherever they reach. Speading democracy and the American way. I mean that's surely what everybody wants? What they need? Isn't it?

I have a sneaking suspicion that many of the entities salivating at the fall of US hegemony in favor of whatever powers come next will enjoy it about as much as Thebes' trade of Spartan for Macedonian masters.

A good point, but as with previous policing world powers I would guess the Pax Americana will pass without many tears being shed. The hope is that a more equitable multi-national entente can be established involving North America, Europe and SEAsia/Australasia before the Chinese start to take over. Let's face it, national interests projected across the globe rarely have little to do with the real nation's population's interest (in each case) but more with its own internal powerful elites. Perhaps not the most appropriate place to say it, but I have found the whole Wikileaks situation quite refreshing with so many po-faced national politicians deeply embarrassed at their shameful hypocrisy. We know these buggers are entirely self-interested and lie to us continually every single day. And when they get caught out they naturally want to kill the messenger. Same old story...

[PMBardunias]

I have found the whole Wikileaks situation quite refreshing with so many po-faced national politicians deeply embarrassed at their shameful hypocrisy.

I would simply keep in mind that the only thing worse that world leaders who hypocritically say they don't assasinate and torture, but actually do, is a world led by leaders who do so brazenly and see no reason to deny it. If you "average" the current world standard for philosophical concepts like women's/gay/minority rights or individual enfranchisement in the political process, I think the level would be far below what you are comfortable with. I don't even know any Chinese who would trade US hegemony for one dominated by their current government for example.

[Ghostmojo]

... I don't even know any Chinese who would trade US hegemony for one dominated by their current government for example.

Indeed. China is a thoroughly despicable regime who we seem to have to be nice to. After all, they are bailing out much of the western world's economies. My brother worked there until recently for about five years. He said that at every level imaginable - top to bottom - corruption is a basic fact of life. Things simply don't work without backhanders.

I certainly don't want to see a Chinese-dominated world. I think it unlikely though - their whole (very lengthy) history tells of a culture not generally interested in global mobility. They will establish themselves as the local oriental superpower and control the rest of us through money and trade I suppose - rather than physical presence.

I don't want to see any country or culture dominating the planet. I want to see the United Nations get some teeth and get its act together. Sadly, with China and Russia also aboard that little ship - I can only see stormy waters ahead...

[Old Husker]

Whether one feels that the 'Pax Americana' of the last half of the 20th century was good or bad seems to be to be mostly an issue of where you stand as a person or nation with regard to the policies being promoted by the United States and its hegemonic allies. On the whole, I suspect most Westerners see it in a very favorable light. Really though, it's much like debating the weather - we all have an opinion but there's not much we can do about it. These sorts of 'Great Power' scenarios seem to develop and play out at their own pace on the basis of each hegemon's internal composition and leadership skills along with the frequently fortuitous flow of world events. Paul Kennedy addressed this quite brilliantly back in 1987 with his book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in which he documented the economic and military factors that had buoyed and sunk episodes of world domination from 1500 to present, and would continue to do so into the near future. To the current topic, he noted that the United States was well on its way to economic downfall, largely due to the unsustainable cost of its military system, with the only good news for the Americans being that their main rival, the Soviet Union, was in even worse shape and would fall a bit before them. I'd say that was an amazingly accurate prediction! I think that it would be fascinating for someone to take a similar look at the rise and fall of those ancient powers on which we have sufficient information (Persia, Athens, Sparta, Thebes, Macedonia, Carthage, Rome, etc.). I suspect that they'd find much the same story of rapid rise, peak, and fatal strategic over-reach. The most interesting aspect of all this for me is that Rome's run as a great power was so long, literally centuries in duration. I suspect that what is shaping up to be a shorter span of U.S. domination will be due entirely to the economic discrepencies between the Roman and American imperial systems. Rome made its empire pay, while we have paid to make our empire. As to what will follow, I'm not nearly sharp enough to say, but I suspect that China will remain somewhat isolationist per it's long history and we'll probably shift toward a more balanced approach to affairs in the West, with a cash-strapped U.S. still being the 'big gun' but playing a more cooperative role with with other nations that are now a little closer to being true allies (per the Peloponnesian League) than subject or client states (as in Athens' Delian League).

[Ghostmojo]

A good assessent Fred. What does fill me with hope is entities like this particular forum. Here we all are, spread around the world (mainly English-speaking) with great contributions (at least on the threads I read) from all over North America, Europe and Australasia. We discuss and debate in fine gentlemanly fashion and avoid any obvious drum-beating and flag-waving for our own cultures - possibly because the cultures that actually interest us are in the remote past. Long may that continue. As long as we talk and find common cause, our occidental way is relatively safe. It's the old more jaw-jaw, less war-war! :lol: 8)

[Dithrambus]

A good assessent Fred. What does fill me with hope is entities like this particular forum. Here we all are, spread around the world (mainly English-speaking) with great contributions (at least on the threads I read) from all over North America, Europe and Australasia. We discuss and debate in fine gentlemanly fashion and avoid any obvious drum-beating and flag-waving for our own cultures - possibly because the cultures that actually interest us are in the remote past. Long may that continue. As long as we talk and find common cause, our occidental way is relatively safe. It's the old more jaw-jaw, less war-war! :lol: 8)

Perhaps the world's leaders should join RAT and have their discussions here so that the mods may keep an eye on them.

Seriously though, I find it pleasing to see people from all over the world coming together to share knowledge and common interests in such a peaceful and pleasant manner (most of the time ).

[PMBardunias]

What does fill me with hope is entities like this particular forum. Here we all are, spread around the world (mainly English-speaking) with great contributions (at least on the threads I read) from all over North America, Europe and Australasia. We discuss and debate in fine gentlemanly fashion and avoid any obvious drum-beating and flag-waving for our own cultures - possibly because the cultures that actually interest us are in the remote past. Long may that continue.

But we are all of the same basic culture. For at least as long as there has been a USA, the world's politics have been dominated by policies of european cultures. If the USA steps down as hegemon this may not be the case in what comes next. Not much really changes when you pass the hegemony from Spanish to French to English to American culture. Thus, when we debate as US, Europeans, or non-europeans who have studied in western schools, the extremes of our debate are quite limited. We are also for the most part from similar economic background. Have a sit down with a kid from a Brazilian favela, someone watching Oprah or some other daytime talk show right now, a North Korean general, an internet billionaire, and a few Imams and see what sort of consensus you get. :wink:

This of course assumes that the US will go quietly into parity with other nations. I don't believe that there has ever been a military imbalance of the magnitude of the USA-vs-pretty much everyone else, that did not end in the strong using that power to stave off eclipse. The easiest way to eliminate debt is to nationalize it. Were that to occur, the internal changes in US culture would make this a place I would not want to live.

[Old Husker]

Indeed, those of us participating on RAT are pretty much by definition products of Greco-Roman culture through its modern variants. As a result, we're very much of a similar, 'Western' mindset. Others from non-Western cultures would likely find much to disagree with in our views, just as the Romans found great oppositon to their ideas in places like Palestine back in the day. As for nationalizing debt, it's not much of a solution, since debt really isn't a problem in itself. The issue is credit to pay for things on an on-going basis. When debt gets too large, folks get leary about lending, therefore making credit hard to get and causing real economic difficulties to arise. Nationalizing debt just ends up getting your credit cut off faster and more completely, thus it's counter-productive, since a lack of credit is much worse than massive debt in the first place. As for use of military power in an attempt to hold onto fading prestige, that has apparently been a common historical pattern and the primary one that Paul Kennedy addressed in Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, such foolishness being a basic ingredient of what he termed "strategic overreach." The main effect of such a course in the past seems to have been to hasten a hegemon's demise, draining its last financial resources much like racing a car at high speed, trying to get somewhere on the final few gallons of gasoline with no prospects for a refill. I suspect that this time things will play out somewhat differently, given the unprecidented amount of economic connectivity in today's 'global' marketplace, where a company's nationality is no more than nominal and its actual physical assets and clients are spread worldwide. It's hard to strike out at others when they are, in fact, part of your own multi-national self.