Triple line

[Tarbicus]

but the battle seems to have come about accidently ( a skirmish that escalated..)

Is that the episode of the Roman donkey wandering into the water between the two armies, a punch up ensues, and it just goes downhill from there?

[Paullus Scipio]

Marcus Vibius Maurinus wrote:-

Paullus thank you for the large section of polibius! very interesting reading material!!!

of course these wars were well before Imperial Rome came up so i guess the equipment was totally different indeed...

.......it was Plutarch and Livy that I was quoting, though both owe their accounts to Polybius.....unfortunately Polybius' own account has not come down to us, though I suspect Plutarch's account must follow him almost word for word...
As to equipment, it is hard to say......it was pretty much the same in a general sense - helmet,scutum,gladius,pila...the big difference appears to be body-armour. In early Imperial times, all legionaries ( at least for pitched battles) had full mail or hooped armour, whereas in Polybius' time he describes only the wealthy having mail, the rest having to make do with a 'pectorale' - a small round or square plate that covered the centre of the chest only. Both functioned as heavy infantry.

[L C Cinna]

The problem is that you can never actually compare phalanx to legion by itself as both need support as well and every battle depends on the circumstances. Most things have been pointed out but still a short summary:

we have those 3 main battles which are always taken for comparison:

1st Kynoskephalai: I posted my opinion on page one of this thread. the left wing of the Macedonians was not deployed at all and had not formed a phalanx. even if they had it would be utterly stupid of Philip to charge downhill with half of his army and leave a huge gap in the centre. The Macedonian king made a mistake a complete beginner wouldn't make.

2nd Pydna: The phalanx was successful until the Cavalry and King fled the field leaving them without protection on the flanks...

3rd Magnesia: Although the cavalry was beaten the Phalanx managed to get into a defensive formation which held until broken by their own elephants


So the phalanx was very capable but very dependent. I know this discussion comes up every now and then but in the end the discussion is useless... "what if a phalanx met a roman legion on a flat plain with walls on each side so no one can flank...?" in a battle it's always the combination that decides.

so we know that the phalanx was stronger then the persian infantry, still Alexander wouldn't have won Gaugamela without cavalry and Alexander would have lost for sure if he had left half his army somewhere half a mile up the hill...

[Paullus Scipio]

Tarbicus wrote:-

Is that the episode of the Roman donkey wandering into the water between the two armies, a punch up ensues, and it just goes downhill from there?

Spot on, Jim ! ....for those who want the longer version, the skirmish is described at Livy 44.40 and Plutarch 'Aemilius Paullus' XVIII.1 - including some pretty nasty Thracians armed with 'romphaia' ( big two-handed choppers).Some think the Aemilius Paullus relief shows this incident ( I personally doubt it)

[Paullus Scipio]

Cinna wrote:-

The problem is that you can never actually compare phalanx to legion by itself as both need support as well and every battle depends on the circumstances

...quite right, which is why I said " all things being equal" in my generalisation ( which is no truer than others, but may be useful).

Of course, all things are NEVER equal, and what you say is quite right - each battle is unique in its circumstances, and if you take any battle, and move the time, place and circumstances, the outcome could be very different. For example, our accounts of Pydna concentrate on the struggle between Legion and Phalanx - we are told very little of the fights between cavalry, light troops,Thracians,Velites etc though we know that importantly, the Macedonian cavalry, and Perseus, were driven off the field ( presumably Perseus was with his cavalry guards on the Macedonianright/Roman Left ) All Livy tells us is; " On the right wing, where the battle had begun near the river, the Consul brought up the elephants and the squadrons of the Allies; and from here the flight of the Macedonians first started......The charge of the elephants was followed up by the Allies of the latin status, who drove back the (macedonian) left wing...." and he then goes on to describe the 'breaking up' of the phalanx.
Clearly the Roman victory owed something to being victorious on both flanks, as Cinna says.

[PMBardunias]

It should be remembered too that Polybius was writing afterward with '20-20' hindsight, and seeking a simple 'explanation' of why the Romans seemingly always succeeded.

I think one reason that the greeks and macedonians were incredulous at their defeat by Rome is that to a greek or macedonian the romans were essentially thureophoroi. Sarissaphoroi had been trouncing these for the better part of a century before facing the romans.

It was the tactics and perhaps ust as importantly the fact that the romans were tough resolute SOBs that did in the phalanx. We often focus too much on the weapons system and forget the men.

[MARCvSVIBIvSMAvRINvS]

Ah okay Paullus! i didnt read well....... OOPS...... LOL

though my main interest is the Roman Imperal era, this Republican stuff also is very interestinf to me....... ill be more attentive...... LOL

M.VIB.M.

[Paullus Scipio]

Paul B. wrote:-

I think one reason that the greeks and macedonians were incredulous at their defeat by Rome is that to a greek or macedonian the romans were essentially thureophoroi. Sarissaphoroi had been trouncing these for the better part of a century before facing the romans.

...interesting point, Paul ! One can well imagine Greeks and Makedones thinking this way, and after cynoscephalae putting the defeat down to "It was only because Philip foolishly allowed his army to be split..." ( as has been said above)

We often focus too much on the weapons system and forget the men.

...True, but we must not fall into the trap of thinking that any one group, or nation, have a monopoly on courage or skill that allows them to win all the time, or that 'Romans are better than Greeks'. It comes back to circumstances ( and also perhaps to motivation)..the same group of men who fight bravely one day, can play the coward another day.....nothing in battle is simple ( or can be generalised about too much :wink: )....but certainly the psychological/morale factors are as important, if not more so, than the physical - as Napoleon averred; "In War, morale factors account for three quarters of the whole, material strength accounts for only one quarter."

[Tarbicus]

So the throwing of the standard into the phalanx may have been the spark that eventually burned down preconceptions of the phalanx's invincibility?

[Paullus Scipio]

Possibly, Jim...but ominously, and unlike Cato's son who recovered his sword, we are NOT told that the cohort of Peligni recovered their standard....Livy does not mention the 'standard throwing' but does say the Peligni took a pasting...Plutarch says that despite their desperate courage to retrieve it, they were forced back with heavy casualties.....

[Aryaman2]

Myths in military history related to mechanic determinism are very popular and it seems impossible to unroot despite all the evidence against them. O just read in "Fighting Techniques of the Early Modern World", a book written by various "especialists", that at the battle of Nieuport the Tercios were beaten by firepower like the Macedonian phalanx at Pydna, despite al the mounting evidence against both assertions hock:

[Sardaukar]

Well, I think that Alexander the Great's army might have made mincemeat out of most Roman armies of time Romans engaged Greeks more heavily (depending of circumstances, of course).

I base that to thing that AG's army was basicly combined arms army with having it's shock effect coming mostly from cavalry (I think it might compare well with army Hannibal had). Roman army was usually (if not always) basicly infantry force with augmenting support whose shock effect came from infantry.

[Aryaman2]

However Romans learnt the lesson and used allied cavalry to support his infantry, Numidians at Zama, Aetolians at Cynoscephalos, Pergamum at Magnesia...

[Paullus Scipio]

Inaki wrote:-

However Romans learnt the lesson and used allied cavalry to support his infantry, Numidians at Zama, Aetolians at Cynoscephalos, Pergamum at Magnesia...

...Inaki makes an invaluable point...it was not that defeated Roman generals were "stupid" or didn't understand the principles of warfare, but in some ways being a general is like being a card-player....you can only play the cards you are dealt ! :lol: :lol:
Henry V of England might well have wished his army didn't consist largely of 'yeomen', ill-armoured and badly suffering from dysentery, tired from a long campaign, against a fresh French army which consisted mostly of men-at-arms and professional soldiers, and which outnumbered him...but that was the hand he was dealt at Agincourt....and Alexander might have wished for the fresh, young, idealistic army he had set out with rather than the embittered, cynical veterans longing to return home with their wealth that he had to deal with in India....but Commanders must make the best of what they have, minimising weakness and maximising strength.....that, after all, is the Art of Generalship..... 8) :wink:

[Aryaman2]

but Commanders must make the best of what they have, minimising weakness and maximising strength.....that, after all, is the Art of Generalship..... 8) :wink:

Very true, and some commanders does not receive the glory they deserve just because they were commanding substandard troops, while others receive too much for victories they achieved with clearly superior troops. My favourite example of those cases, De Saxe and Frederic the Great