Quality of Late Roman Legions

[A. Flavius]

Hello all,

I'm sure this topic has been asked elsewhere, but even after searching through the forums I'm afraid I can't find anything. So apologies if I'm repeating a tired point.

Going over some rudimentary battles in Late Roman history (the battles fought by Constantius, Aetius and Stilicho etc) three things become strikingly clear:

1) For some reason, the days when Roman legions could stand up against an enemy several times their number are gone.

2) There are virtually no battles in which Romans fought that they did not rely on barbarian tribes to compliment their legions.

3) The Empire appears to have lost the ability to replace lost legions as it did, for example, during the Second Punic War where Rome seemed to be able to churn out new legions as fast as Hannibal could gobble them up.

So the question in summary is; what happened? When did Rome start playing at a disadvantage? Why are her legions suddenly so ineffective on their own, and therefore having to turn to German tribes for help? Why did the quality of the legions decline so sharply?

This is something that was obviously endemic in the Western Empire, as the Eastern Empire appears to have survived by purging its legions of Germans. Is it true that the induction of Germans into the legions is what brought about their drop in effectiveness?

Was Rome suffering from its own success, and growing fat and lazy on generations of peace, leaving the fighting to barbarians?

Cheers,

Scott.

[Robert Vermaat]

A few short replies before I'll look up what you could not find.

Going over some rudimentary battles in Late Roman history (the battles fought by Constantius, Aetius and Stilicho etc) three things become strikingly clear

What Constantius are you referring to?

1) For some reason, the days when Roman legions could stand up against an enemy several times their number are gone.

Ah, you mean the days of Cannae, Carrhae, the Varus battle and similar striking Roman victories? :wink:
Not laughing at you, but to show it's not as black and white as you seem to think. The Romans of your 'golden days' had their setbacks too, and some more than others.

2) There are virtually no battles in which Romans fought that they did not rely on barbarian tribes to compliment their legions.

That is just absolute rubbish. Relying on foreign recruits is one thing (but Julius Caesar did that, too), whole barbarian tribes?

Please qualify that statement. When - 4th c., 5th c. 6th c.? Where? East or West? Your are generalising to the extreme.

3) The Empire appears to have lost the ability to replace lost legions as it did, for example, during the Second Punic War where Rome seemed to be able to churn out new legions as fast as Hannibal could gobble them up.

O tempora, o mores. Different times, different circumstances. Rome had one major enemy to deal with, and Italy provided enough recruits and civilians to deal with losses. But 600 years or so later, population had dropped whist borders had extended and enemies had evolved into much larger confederations.

Does that had to do with the quality of the Legions? Hardly.

So the question in summary is; what happened? When did Rome start playing at a disadvantage? Why are her legions suddenly so ineffective on their own, and therefore having to turn to German tribes for help? Why did the quality of the legions decline so sharply?

You call that a question in summary? :wink:
1) What happened? See the answer above. It's also called overstretching.
2) When? It mainly happened during the 3rd c. AD, but it was an ongoing process in which both the Romans as well as the outside enemies were involved. Civil wars (not new) did not help either.
3) Why suddenly ineffective? That never happened. Partly answered above - too many and stronger enemies that can't be subdued with a single campaign. A defensive strategy out of necessity that called for more mobile but smaller units.
4) Why a sudden decline? That never happened. Even during the terrible in-fighting of the 3rd c., the army was still effective enough to defeat barbarians. Only in the West during the later 5th c., it became impossible to get enough men together to form a strong Roman army.

This is something that was obviously endemic in the Western Empire, as the Eastern Empire appears to have survived by purging its legions of Germans. Is it true that the induction of Germans into the legions is what brought about their drop in effectiveness?

Simple answer. No.

Was Rome suffering from its own success, and growing fat and lazy on generations of peace, leaving the fighting to barbarians?

Simple answer. No.

[sonic]

A few short replies before I'll look up what you could not find.

1) For some reason, the days when Roman legions could stand up against an enemy several times their number are gone.

Ah, you mean the days of Cannae, Carrhae, the Varus battle and similar striking Roman victories? :wink:
Not laughing at you, but to show it's not as black and white as you seem to think. The Romans of your 'golden days' had their setbacks too, and some more than others.

There is one other aspect to remember: Roman historians of the earlier centuries were prone to exaggerate the numbers of the enemy, so if you read of earlier armies defeating 'millions' of men, it's simply not true. Although later historians also exaggerated, the closeness of the battles and the fact that Roman defeats are described can make it apear that the early legionary was a superman whilst the later legionary could lose to lower numbers.

2) There are virtually no battles in which Romans fought that they did not rely on barbarian tribes to compliment their legions.

That is just absolute rubbish. Relying on foreign recruits is one thing (but Julius Caesar did that, too), whole barbarian tribes?

Please qualify that statement. When - 4th c., 5th c. 6th c.? Where? East or West? Your are generalising to the extreme.

There are virtually no battles after the Romans conquered mainland Italy in the 3rd century BC when they did not rely on 'barbarians'. Africanus/Numidians in the West, many variations (eg Commagene) in the East.

3) The Empire appears to have lost the ability to replace lost legions as it did, for example, during the Second Punic War where Rome seemed to be able to churn out new legions as fast as Hannibal could gobble them up.

O tempora, o mores. Different times, different circumstances. Rome had one major enemy to deal with, and Italy provided enough recruits and civilians to deal with losses. But 600 years or so later, population had dropped whist borders had extended and enemies had evolved into much larger confederations.

Up until the disastrous revolts in the West resulted in fragmented loyalties, the West too could always replace losses. But don't forget that the West actually seem to have lost fewer large scale battles - Adrianople was a defeat of the Eastern army, and numbers were slowly recruited to fill the gaps.

So the question in summary is; what happened? When did Rome start playing at a disadvantage? Why are her legions suddenly so ineffective on their own, and therefore having to turn to German tribes for help? Why did the quality of the legions decline so sharply?

You call that a question in summary? :wink:
1) What happened? See the answer above. It's also called overstretching.
2) When? It mainly happened during the 3rd c. AD, but it was an ongoing process in which both the Romans as well as the outside enemies were involved. Civil wars (not new) did not help either.
3) Why suddenly ineffective? That never happened. Partly answered above - too many and stronger enemies that can't be subdued with a single campaign. A defensive strategy out of necessity that called for more mobile but smaller units.
4) Why a sudden decline? That never happened. Even during the terrible in-fighting of the 3rd c., the army was still effective enough to defeat barbarians. Only in the West during the later 5th c., it became impossible to get enough men together to form a strong Roman army.

On the whole I agree with Vortigern Studies, although my perception of the 'mobility' of the later army may differ from his.

This is something that was obviously endemic in the Western Empire, as the Eastern Empire appears to have survived by purging its legions of Germans. Is it true that the induction of Germans into the legions is what brought about their drop in effectiveness?

Simple answer. No.

I am still of the opinion that the assumption of the recruitment of huge numbers of Germans into the 'Roman Legions' is a misconception; and even if true, why are they less efficient than 'wild' Germans?

Was Rome suffering from its own success, and growing fat and lazy on generations of peace, leaving the fighting to barbarians?

Simple answer. No.

I agree: No!

_______________________________

Ian (Sonic) Hughes

[Robert Vermaat]

On the whole I agree with Vortigern Studies, although my perception of the 'mobility' of the later army may differ from his.

Hold on to your chivvies Ian. :wink: I think of 'Late Roman mobility' mainly in the sense that units of the field army were no longer tied to a single garrison.

[Nicholas Gaukroger]

There is one other aspect to remember: Roman historians of the earlier centuries were prone to exaggerate the numbers of the enemy, so if you read of earlier armies defeating 'millions' of men, it's simply not true. Although later historians also exaggerated, the closeness of the battles and the fact that Roman defeats are described can make it apear that the early legionary was a superman whilst the later legionary could lose to lower numbers.

And so Ian comes close to asking the question that dare not be asked - just how good were the legiones of the early empire? hock:

However, back to the late empire (a designation that always forgets just how long the empire survived in the east) - it is worth noting that the army of the C4th&5thAD won nearly all their battles against the Germans & Goths and, indeed, won many against the Sasanids as well. It actually has a very good record IMO.

[A. Flavius]

Hello all,

What Constantius are you referring to?

Apologies, Constantine the Great and his settlement of the Sarmatians in Thrace, Italy and Macedonia is what I was referring to. However I have yet to find anything suggesting any of these Sarmatians were used in the army, however considering the number supposedly settled (300,000, as Southern and Dixon quote MacMullen) there is a chance some found their way into the legions. But that's neither here nor there, apologies for mentioning him.

The Romans of your 'golden days' had their setbacks too, and some more than others.

I know the Romans of the Republic and Early Empire weren't the invincible killing machines popular history portrays them as. However my point is that they seemed to be able to recover from their defeats far quicker and more effectively then they could later in the history. I don't understand how the Roman Republic in the Second Punic War, with Hannibal marching up and down Italy, was able to raise enough troops for Cannae just from Roman and her Italian Allies, but that Aetius had to make use of Visigoths and Alani to confront Atilla at Chalon when he had the entire Western Empire to call upon.

Relying on foreign recruits is one thing (but Julius Caesar did that, too), whole barbarian tribes?

I did not by any means suppose that 'entire tribes' where co opted into the legions. What I meant was Rome's increased use of federated troops from barbarian tribes settled within the boundaries of the Empire. If it's examples you want;

- Battle of Chalon, 451 AD: Aetius made extensive use of barbarian federates in what appears to have been something of a coalition against Atilla, this includes Visigoths and Alani (conversely Attila seems to have made use of Ostrogoths).

NOTE: Whilst on the topic of Aetius it's not secret he made extensive use of Hunnic federates in his earlier years, most notably when he arrived at Ravenna to support Ioannes, only to find him dead.

Radagaisus, 406 AD: After defeating Radagaisus at Fraesulae, Stilicho (who was himself of Vandal origin) conscripted large numbers of prisoners into his army in order to confront Alaric who was threatening Italy.

Magnentius, Arbogast, Ricimer: All men of high station, be it emperor in Magnentius' case, or magister militum, were Franks.

FOEDERATI

There are numerous cases throughout Roman history where barbarians were allowed to settle in the Empire under number treaty conditions that involved, amongst other things, either maintaining the territory they were settled in, and/or delivering troops when Rome demanded them.

Foederati settlements: Augustus settled Getae in Moesia, Tiberius settled Germans in Gaul, Marcus Aurelius allowed Naristae to settle in Gaul, Valens allowed the Goths to settle in the Danube region on the condition that they eventually become Roman federates.

The point I'm trying to make is that Rome had always accepted outsiders into the Empire and successfully assimilated them, both into their society and into their military. Why is it that suddenly this concept of 'barbarisation' crops up in the Late Empire, beginning some time in the late 3rd Century? And why is it suddenly seen as something that led to a fall in the quality of the Roman military when it had obviously been going on for some time.

Rome had one major enemy to deal with, and Italy provided enough recruits and civilians to deal with losses.

But as Rome expanded so to did her resources. Why wasn't Rome able to make use of a larger empire to beat back larger invaders?

However, back to the late empire (a designation that always forgets just how long the empire survived in the east)

Indeed, the Eastern Roman Empire was able to survive for another thousand years with Goths, Sassanids, Bulgars, Normans and eventually the Turks beating at the gates. However at this early point in the history of the Eastern Empire, a major marker in its survival over the Western Empire appears to have been accredited to Leo I purging the Eastern army of Germans (most notable Aspar). It's clear at this point that the barbarian influence in the army had become not only noticeable but also, at least in the East, perceived as a threat.

I'm trying to figure out;

1) At what point barbarians in the Roman Army (East or West) suddenly became a bad thing (according to Elton, neither Ammianus or Procopius, Maurice or Vegetius, seemed to have complained about the quality of Barbarian troops or their effects on the Roman Army).

2) If barbarians were responsible for the decline of quality in the Roman army, at least in the West.

[geala]

A. Flavius, your assumptions are a bit general, so I can understand the "anger" of the specialists, but I think there is a right core in your questions. I often asked myself the same but I don't have an easy answer.

For me one (of many) possible explanation is the system of the late state and the late military. The dominate was a form of absolute monarchy; such systems lead not necessarily to much interest of the people in the public affairs. The Roman army was an army of professionals since about 100 BC (the repuplic just lived few fifty years still after the terrible -perhaps necessary- decision to abandon the militia system), so use to military things was not common in the population outside the army.

The late Roman soldiers and the late Roman armies were not worse than their early predecessors in my opinion. In the contrary they must have been among the very best of all ancient soldiers. Individually. The quality of an army is not the guarantee for victory however. If such soldiers often fight against each other or must face menaces all over the empire, a professional army of paid soldiers is prone to desaster. If such an army is beaten it is not easy to replace the casualties. Because it is expensive the numbers of soldiers are restricted. It is a similar problem that the Hellenistic kingdom faced in the fight against Rome in the 2nd c. BC.

If you have a population without great interest in the state and you need a great number of soldiers you have to rely on foreigners to form big parts of the army. This must not be a problem. But it could be. At least the system is not very stable. Although I got the feeling that often Germanic barbarians serving for Rome had more interest in the empire than many Roman citizens, in the end there were just not enough people who wished that state to live longer.

Of course add to this losses in population by deseases (in the second half of the 2nd c. AD for example), economic problems, social changes, esp. the loss in urban culture, religious disturbing, a growing feudal and local life style among the leading classes, the great problem of succession to the throne (civil wars!), and and and...

So the quality of the army was not the biggest problem of the late empire in my opinion.

[Nicholas Gaukroger]

The point I'm trying to make is that Rome had always accepted outsiders into the Empire and successfully assimilated them, both into their society and into their military. Why is it that suddenly this concept of 'barbarisation' crops up in the Late Empire, beginning some time in the late 3rd Century? And why is it suddenly seen as something that led to a fall in the quality of the Roman military when it had obviously been going on for some time.

To be honest I think that the "barbariasation" is more in the mind of more modern authors than contemporaries or for those of the latter who do make a point about it they are using it as a way to make a political point against their (or their patron's) enemies rather than it being based in fact.

[Aryaman2]

I think there is some true in the Barbarisation of the Roman Army, but already in the V century, not in the IV, despite a number of High Officers of Barbarian origen. For instance, when Stilicho was murdered his army practically dissolved because it was largely a private army with many Barbarians in it. Remember also the large number of Goths in the Army of Theodosius at the battle of Frigidus.
As for the impact of Barbarians in the Late army, it has been pointed out that Barbarians were in Roman armies in other periods, the difference could be in the proportion, but also in that they were regarded at least as worthy if not more than Roman infantry to the extent that Romans changed to copy Barbarian ways.
An example, earlier Numidians or Germans could be essential for some Roman victories, but Roman infantry was still held the higher estime by his generals, but in the Late Empire we see generals with a barbarian body guard, and we are told that they had preference for such or such Barbarian nation. All that would be very detrimental for the morale of Roman soldiers, and the decline of infantry in the V century is very clear, and later the army of Belisarius is basically a cavalry army whose elite units are Barbarians. That is basically what Ather Ferrill says, and I think in general he has a point.

[Casmin]

Rome had one major enemy to deal with, and Italy provided enough recruits and civilians to deal with losses.

But as Rome expanded so to did her resources. Why wasn't Rome able to make use of a larger empire to beat back larger invaders?

You also have to consider that with a larger empire, aspects like travel and communication were made more difficult. Bigger is not necessarily better in this case. The time it took to gather troops to a trouble spot was obviously crucial. And as Vortigern stated, Rome only had one enemy to deal with during the Punic Wars. The Later Empire had several conglomerate enemies. In addition, the loss of important parts of North Africa to the Vandals was a critical setback. Rome was unable to properly fund the military as before the invasion.

[Theodosius the Great]

but that Aetius had to make use of Visigoths and Alani to confront Atilla at Chalon when he had the entire Western Empire to call upon.

Actually, the Western Empire at the time of Aetius was reduced to just Italy and southern Gaul (i.e. provinces still under direct control). Carthage and Africa were lost under Aetius and Spain was quickly slipping out of his hands. Britain, of course, was abandoned long before.

But as Rome expanded so to did her resources. Why wasn't Rome able to make use of a larger empire to beat back larger invaders?

Simply because it was economically unfeasible. Every place that was worth conquering was already conquered (i.e. profitable territory). All that was left were the wilds of Germany, the remote lands above Hadrian's Wall, and the backwaters of Nubia and Arabia.

They offered few natural resources and/or were inhabited by primitive tribal peoples. To hold all that crap would simply drain the resources of the Empire. The last great conquest was Dacia and Trajan's war more than paid for itself due to the vast gold reserves of that former kingdom.

This is something that was obviously endemic in the Western Empire, as the Eastern Empire appears to have survived by purging its legions of Germans.

It really comes down to geography. The West suffered much more pressure than the East. The latter could and did make long term peace treaties with the Persian Empire. The West couldn't make peace for very long with barbarians who were more treacherous and themselves under pressure from the invading Huns to their Eastern flank. The Eastern Empire also held the most populous and wealthy provinces.

A. Flavius wrote:
Was Rome suffering from its own success, and growing fat and lazy on generations of peace, leaving the fighting to barbarians?

Simple answer. No.

Based on my reading : I think the bulk of native recruitment shifted to the least Romanised parts of the Empire (e.g. Illyricum) and was heavily dependent on sons of legionaries. But, to be fair, conditions changed by the 3rd century or so because the army was seen as far less attractive due to lower pay and without the prospect of plunder coupled with constant warfare.

But don't forget that the West actually seem to have lost fewer large scale battles - Adrianople was a defeat of the Eastern army, and numbers were slowly recruited to fill the gaps.

Right. The Western army, as far as I can tell, was gutted during the Battle of the Frigidus (394 AD).

~Theo

[Nicholas Gaukroger]

I think there is some true in the Barbarisation of the Roman Army, but already in the V century, not in the IV, despite a number of High Officers of Barbarian origen. For instance, when Stilicho was murdered his army practically dissolved because it was largely a private army with many Barbarians in it.

Also this was one of the (few) times when troops of barbarian origin were targeted for political reasons so they deserted to a general - Alaric - who they saw as being able to protect their interests.

Remember also the large number of Goths in the Army of Theodosius at the battle of Frigidus.

Who were, and behaved as, ordinary Roman soldiers - their Gothic origin made no difference here.

[Robert Vermaat]

Hi Scott,

The Romans of your 'golden days' had their setbacks too, and some more than others.

I don't understand how the Roman Republic in the Second Punic War, with Hannibal marching up and down Italy, was able to raise enough troops for Cannae just from Roman and her Italian Allies, but that Aetius had to make use of Visigoths and Alani to confront Atilla at Chalon when he had the entire Western Empire to call upon.

Well, I tried to explain that. Mainly because the Roman state had plenty of recruits to enter the army during the Second Punic War, but no longer during the Late Roman period. That was (it seems) partly due to the constant fighting that seems to have been going on in the West from the mid-4th c. onwards. When barbarians were not raiding the borders the Emperors found time to make war on each other. The Roman army was at its largest (meaning all recruits were spoken for) and the enemy had much larger armies than they did in the past. Romans were able to hire extra men (as had happened in the past) to add extra strenght, but on terms that became gradually more unfavorable to the Romans. Add to that dropping population levels and you have your answer.

- Battle of Chalon, 451 AD: Aetius made extensive use of barbarian federates in what appears to have been something of a coalition against Atilla, this includes Visigoths and Alani (conversely Attila seems to have made use of Ostrogoths).

It seems to have been worse than that, some scholars think that Aetius did not even have a Roman army of moderate strength at his disposal and had to rely on his Germanic federates.

Radagaisus, 406 AD: After defeating Radagaisus at Fraesulae, Stilicho (who was himself of Vandal origin) conscripted large numbers of prisoners into his army in order to confront Alaric who was threatening Italy.

The ones he did not kill or sell as slaves (the pricesof slaves dropped enormously after that victory) he used as extra manpower. With Atilla threatening Italy he needed xtra manpower for this 'inner frontier', whilst the rest of the army was of course still needed to man the borders. To no avail - within months the Rhine frontier was overrun anyway. Manpower shortage due to overextended armies and too many enemies, that's why.

Magnentius, Arbogast, Ricimer: All men of high station, be it emperor in Magnentius' case, or magister militum, were Franks.

That's a very different thing. Men from barbarian or otherwise non-Roman origin or descent had always been abl;e to rise through the ranks. Those men never caused problems for the Roman Empire.

FOEDERATI
[..]
The point I'm trying to make is that Rome had always accepted outsiders into the Empire and successfully assimilated them, both into their society and into their military. Why is it that suddenly this concept of 'barbarisation' crops up in the Late Empire, beginning some time in the late 3rd Century? And why is it suddenly seen as something that led to a fall in the quality of the Roman military when it had obviously been going on for some time.

What is seen as such is not always correct. I don't know who advertises these settlements as cause of a drop in army quality, but not the authoprs of the books that I've read. For one, as we talked about earlier, there is no such drop in quality. Secondly, the settlements that you mention differ hugely - most of the groups involved totally disappear inside Roman society.

Rome had one major enemy to deal with, and Italy provided enough recruits and civilians to deal with losses.

But as Rome expanded so to did her resources. Why wasn't Rome able to make use of a larger empire to beat back larger invaders?

It was, but up to a point. Climate, economy, internal strife, eveolving barbarian society (the 'super-tribes'), it all plays a part.

However, back to the late empire (a designation that always forgets just how long the empire survived in the east)

Indeed, the Eastern Roman Empire was able to survive for another thousand years with Goths, Sassanids, Bulgars, Normans and eventually the Turks beating at the gates. However at this early point in the history of the Eastern Empire, a major marker in its survival over the Western Empire appears to have been accredited to Leo I purging the Eastern army of Germans (most notable Aspar). It's clear at this point that the barbarian influence in the army had become not only noticeable but also, at least in the East, perceived as a threat.

That's an overstatement. The Eastern army was never purged on germans, not even of Goths. You confuse the calls to do so with the reality - the East remained dependent on Goths until the last groups moved westwards. Other factors contributed to the different situation - the 'moat' (Sea of Marmora) that meant that it was very difficult to conquer both halves of the eastern Roman territory at the same time, not to mention it's much higher population (manpower) and economic resources. The Eastern Empire was also able to make use of the warlike Isaurians to replace (some of) the barbarian recruits that the West had to rely on.

I think we might say that the split and following competition with the East also contributed heavily to the fall of the West.

I'm trying to figure out;
1) At what point barbarians in the Roman Army (East or West) suddenly became a bad thing (according to Elton, neither Ammianus or Procopius, Maurice or Vegetius, seemed to have complained about the quality of Barbarian troops or their effects on the Roman Army).

When those barbarians were allowed to settle as independent entities within the Empire, especially when Rome lacked the power to enforce its will on them.

2) If barbarians were responsible for the decline of quality in the Roman army, at least in the West.

No. There was never such a sharp and sudden decline in quality, even in the West. Just overextension and lack of resourcess. That's enough to overwhelm the best army in the end.[/quote]

[Sean Manning]

The Romans of your 'golden days' had their setbacks too, and some more than others.

I know the Romans of the Republic and Early Empire weren't the invincible killing machines popular history portrays them as. However my point is that they seemed to be able to recover from their defeats far quicker and more effectively then they could later in the history. I don't understand how the Roman Republic in the Second Punic War, with Hannibal marching up and down Italy, was able to raise enough troops for Cannae just from Roman and her Italian Allies, but that Aetius had to make use of Visigoths and Alani to confront Atilla at Chalon when he had the entire Western Empire to call upon.

Rome had one major enemy to deal with, and Italy provided enough recruits and civilians to deal with losses.

But as Rome expanded so to did her resources. Why wasn't Rome able to make use of a larger empire to beat back larger invaders?

These questions I can answer: the social basis of the imperial army and the republican army were completely different. The Republican army was a militia which drew on a population willing to make great sacrifices to fight for the state. This was partly because Rome was a republic, and partly because the subject Italians were reasonably well off, had the prospect of citizenship if they were loyal, and scared of the Romans. The cash cost of raising a new army was also relatively light, since citizens provided their own arms and recieved minimal pay.

The army from the 1st century BC on was a professional force, and under the Empire it was reasonably well paid and armed by the state. The government was a dictatorship, so people felt less responsible for the state's well-being. Recruiters came to rely upon districts near the frontier, while in Italy the tradition of military service slowly faded away. Moreover, the Romans encouraged many warlike subjects to de-militarize to discourage revolts. Too, the 3rd century crisis and subsequent troubles reduced the empire's wealth and population and made many people dissatisfied with the government. And as central authority weakened, many possible recruits were kept back by local landowners. You simply can't replace a professional force as quickly and easily as a militia. All in all, the Imperial army was always harder to replace than that of the republic, although emperors did manage to recover from many disasters such as the Teutoberg Wald.

No doubt some of the Roman experts here will disagree with some details, but I think the essence of what I have said is true.

[Hugh Fuller]

1) Epidemics swept the Empire at the end of Trajan's reign, during the reign of Marcus Aurelius, and probably several more times over the next 200 years. This was a price that the Empire paid for the freedom of trade and of travel that so benefitted the Empire otherwise.

2) During the 3rd and 4th Centuries, the Western Empire in particular was bedeviled by an almost constant series of civil wars over the throne that drained both human and fiscal resources that would have been much better utilized in fighting off the incursions from outside the borders.

3) This led to a crushing taxation and military draft situation that lost the Empire a great deal of the loyalty and support of its citizens who saw little real difference between the increasingly sophisticated Teutonics such as the Goths, Franks, Lombards, or Vandals and their own imperial government.

4) The tendency of military leaders to try for the Imperial Purple led to those who held the Purple to profoundly mistrust any military leaders of any ability. The result was that any such leaders were killed, as, for example, Stilicho and Aetius were killed in order to maintain demostrably inept emperors on the throne in Ravenna or in Milan.

5) Finally, the invaders were becoming increasingly sophisticated from their contacts with the Romans and were no longer simply barbarian hordes but were organized forces. Remember that the Alaric and his Goths who sacked Rome in 410 had been hired troops who had not been paid as promised by the Romans and his initial move on Rome was an attempt to extort the promised pay out of the court.