Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.

[MonsGraupius]

The standard Roman response when attacked was to get behind a secure wall.

That would be the standard response when defeated. Paulinus had yet to be attacked.

Sorry, I seem to recall, that the Romans built an encampment wherever they stopped. Even at Mons Graupius, there is mention of spending the night in a camp ... this must be another of those "Tacitus lies"?

And clearly, Tacitus lied about defeating the Caledonians and the Antonine wall is what ... a long duck pond or the line of forts at the Antonine wall, are they holiday villas?

And, as for all those forts and encampments through Britain and the empire ... are you suggesting they are not forts? Clearly we have to rewrite all Roman history and archaeological interpretation to ensure it fits the "fact" that Romans only had their walls when they were attacked.

the Thames offered a line that could be easily secured by a very small number of troops.

There were multiple fords of the Thames in the vicinity of London, from Cliffe in Kent up to Lambeth and Brentford, and all were well known to the Britons. Holding the river as a defensive line would have required a large army broken up into many small detachments.

No there were not. The Thames was extremely difficult to cross to such an extent the Anglo Saxons specifically tell us that Wallingford was the lowest crossing point. However, having studied the hydrology of thames, probably in more detail than anyone else, I can say that is not strictly true. It may have been the only reasonably reliable crossing point, but the Thames could be crossed in other places, but there are only a handful of sites up to Goring where there is any historical evidence for their use. London bridge is one of the few and this is typical of large rivers, that they often have a place where the river can be crossed "where the tide meets the river".

To give you an example, there is a possible crossing point at Vauxhall. This was crossed by someone a few years ago ... but that is someone well over six foot. He also waited till a very low tide and a very low river. He also had hydrological maps of the crossing, so knew where to go. I checked, and the "route", of the lowest water is not at all "as the crow flies", but instead goes a long way down river. All that would be needed to stop anyone crossing in force, is a few stakes in the water and at the exit, and a small force ... and it would be extremely easy to slow down the crossing so that the small window of lowest tide was missed.

no sane General abandons their supply line

Indeed he does not. And as many of us have said, Paulinus's supply lines led north and west, towards his legion fortresses at Usk and Exeter, his campaign base at Wroxeter and the rest of his army in north Wales.

His supply lines, with the north up in revolt, can only be from the south. A supply line comes through land that is controlled by the Romans. That is how the Romans worked. That is what a supply line is. If the supply line is to the north, then you are saying the Romans controlled the country to the north ... which might be problematic, given what happened to the ninth and St.Albans.

That secure base is the SE of England.

There were no Roman fortresses in south east England. There were very few troops either. Unless Paulinus was intending to evacuate his army and flee to Gaul the only effect of going that way would be to surrender the province to the enemy and lose all contact with his main army and supplies.

"There were no Roman fortresses in south east England." ... which proves that Romans only had fortresses where they had friends? Or are you saying the Roman fortresses were used as brothels and for entertainment of their friends in the north?

So, the whole of the SE, is an area friendly to the Romans, where it was incredibly easy to raise troops in support of the Romans, from the Belgae elite (as in those Belgae who came from Gaul about 150BC), who were just as much an enemy of the Britons as the Romans, which is why they didn't need fortresses in the SE.

he is in a perfect sandwich between the Welsh Iceni and Belgae... IT IS TOTAL MADNESS!

The Welsh who?

And weren't the Belgae Roman allies a minute ago?

I never suggested the Belgae were allies.

any sane general knows that Boudica will almost be expecting that and almost certainly be waiting in Ambush. That is totally dumb!!!

But the sane general also has scouts to determine the position and movements of the enemy, who he knows are moving slower than he is, and who he also knows cannot leap fifty miles across country to fall unexpectedly upon his line of march!

That would work, if the Romans controlled the area. But they did not. You only send out patrols to maintain control, not to gain to control of an area. When Paulinus gets to London, we are told that he cannot hold it as a "seat of war". That means he does not have control over the area around London, nor does London have the defences necessary to patrol the area around London to keep that control.

Paulinus when he gets to London, finds he needs to move to a secure defensive location where he is able to control the area around and his logistic supply lines. With the SE being friendly, if he cannot control the area of London, with the ninth defeated and confined to their camp (so unable to control the area), it is clear that Paulinus cannot control any of the country to the north of London. He therefore has no supply lines through this area, he cannot send out Scouts without them likely being taken. He cannot send out messages northwards, he cannot contact his army. ... unless he sends messages westward behind the barrier of the Thames and then up the east side of the Severn toward where his army is leaving Wales and coming south.

At that point is army also knows that north of London is no longer in Roman control. So, again, they have to pretty insane to walk into the area they do not control, without their calvary support, without the ability to know what is happening, and without secure supply lines.

---

What the MonsGraupius hypothesis fails to recognise is that the established Roman response to a revolt was not to retire behind a line of defence but to march out with the forces available and and challenge the rebels in order to attempt to scotch the revolt before it gained momentum. 

Which they did. The ninth went out challenged the Iceni and got massacred. Are you suggesting the standard response after being massacred is to "march out with the forces available and and challenge the rebels" ... could you explain why the ninth, who still had forces in their camp, didn't adopt your supposed "it can't be denied response?"

Any course such as that proposed would have been seen as a sign of weakness and serve only to encourage the rebels. 

I'd have thought what happened to Colchester wasn't seen as a weakness? What happened to the Ninth wasn't seen as a weakness. I see the mistake of those in Colchester! They should have: "march[ed] out with the forces available and and challenge the rebels in order to attempt to scotch the revolt before it gained momentum." That would have shown the Iceni who was boss.

We know from Suetonius' reprisals after the revolt had been put down that there were tribes that had not joined the rebels but had been wavering in their loyalty.  Had Boudica been seen to be in the ascendancy and Suetonius cowering in the south-west (as it would have been portrayed), these tribes would almost certainly have joined her. 

He set up the SE as his base for war. He still had considerable forces, and very quickly secured the SE, and almost certainly the West. Then, when he (and not Boudica, and certainly not you) thought he had made the necessary preparations and HE was ready, he did "march out with the forces available and and challenge the rebels in order to attempt to scotch the revolt before it gained momentum."

War is not a two hour session on Rome Total war. It is a long drawn out affair taking months. And, it is certainly not a mad dash up the M1.

Suetonius would have been acutely aware that, in that event, there was a danger that the whole area north of the Thames would be lost to Rome

As soon as the Ninth, London and St.Albans were lost it was already lost to Rome. You are stating what happened. You cannot argue that Paulinus didn't do something because the area that was lost might be lost.

and that, if the Welsh tribes joined in, as they were likely to do, his army in North Wales would have been cut off and he would have been completely isolated. 

I suppose you think, they could all get on their mobile phones and post on Icenibook of the riot, they then drove down to the local "pet holiday home" with all their cattle and paid them to look after them, they then drove to where the big meet up had been posted of "Riots-R-Us.com" and there took out their Britbay purchased weapons and chariots and could slaughter the Romans.

Or, perhaps it took months to gather an iron-age army, because iron-age people didn't have mobile phones, couldn't just drop their farms and take to the hills, probably needed to make the weapons & carts to travel all that way, they needed time to gather the food that could be kept for the months of campaign, they didn't have icenibook, to talk through the politics, to work out who was paying for it all, etc.

Hence the necessity of placing himself in a position to call the army down to reinforce him as quickly as possible, while still being able to monitor the actions of the enemy.

Gulliblus ... you have been ordered by the Big Boss to get on your horse, and to ride through the midst of all those iceni killing any Roman that moves to meet the army hundreds of miles away ... although to be fair, we don't know if they are still there, and ... if you make it there, you are to tell them that Paulinus is going to make the same stupid journey, through the same area where the locals have all been forewarned by you that Paulinus is coming up ... oh and by the way, if they torture you, don't tell them that Paulinus is just behind you ... as it will be pretty obvious anyway that the idiot is galloping to his death. And, when Paulinus gets there ... oops he too doesn't know there's an army still there.

Let me talk to the big boss ... Gulliblus, the order now, is for you to ride up to the army, find out if there is any army still left in Wales, having alerted everyone to your journney, you are to ride back the same path, so you can join us to ride back with us up the same road into the ambush that they will obviously have for us.

Gulliblus? Gulliblus ... you don't have the message ... YOU'RE HEADING THE WRONG WAY, THE ARMY IS NORTH!

Anyone who has taken the trouble to read through this thread (something of a task, I must admit) will know that neither I nor anyone else here has proposed 'the mad dash up the M1/6'.  The furthest north anyone has suggested is the site at Church Stowe favoured by John.  I have suggested a strategic withdrawal of 25 miles to St Albans and then a further withdrawal of 16 miles west along Akeman Street to Tring.  If a further withdrawal yet were necessary, I have suggested that it could have been less than 25 miles in the direction of Alchester.  By no stretch of the imagination can this be characterised as a 'mad dash up the M1/6'.

Paulinus went south.

[Nathan Ross]

... are you suggesting they are not forts? Clearly we have to rewrite all Roman history...

Building a fortification as a supply base or to camp while on the march is quite different to 'getting behind a secure wall' when attacked.

Suetonius Paulinus did not build or seek a fort from which to fight his battle. He fought in the open, as most Roman commanders did in this period. No 'rewriting of history' is required.

having studied the hydrology of thames, probably in more detail than anyone else

Then you will know all about the ancient ford at Cliffe, the ford at Lambeth, and the ford at Brentford (where the water was only 3 feet deep at ebb tide as late as 1695)?

The Thames in the Roman period was probably 10-15 feet shallower than it is today.

with the north up in revolt

The revolt was in East Anglia, not the north.

"There were no Roman fortresses in south east England." ... which proves that Romans only had fortresses where they had friends?

This is surely not a matter of controversy. There were no Roman fortresses in the area of southeast England at this point. What that might or might not prove is up to you.

I never suggested the Belgae were allies.

"the friendly pro-roman Belgae tribes" suggests allies, no?

they have to pretty insane to walk into the area they do not control, without their calvary support, without the ability to know what is happening, and without secure supply lines.

Walking into areas they do not control is what armies commonly do in wartime. Paulinus had cavalry support, he had scouts, and nothing (aside from your own inventions) suggests that he was cut off from his supply lines.

I'm not sure, by the way, if all the bizarre stuff about duck ponds, mobile phones etc is simply intended to be funny - sometimes these things do not come across all that well in this medium!

[MonsGraupius]

... are you suggesting they are not forts? Clearly we have to rewrite all Roman history...

Building a fortification as a supply base or to camp while on the march is quite different to 'getting behind a secure wall' when attacked.

Suetonius Paulinus did not build or seek a fort from which to fight his battle. He fought in the open, as most Roman commanders did in this period. No 'rewriting of history' is required.

The Romans were engineers who used engineering to create one of the most effective armies in the ancient world. A defensive line, massively increases the defensive as well as offensive ability of a force, and there is no doubt, if anyone looks at the Roman world, that they were positively obsessed with walls and walled forts.

So, to suggest that the Romans, being obsessed with walls, then ignored their obsession with attacked by a force so superior that they had to give up London, is really quite ridiculous.

Paulinus is clearly in a defensive position when he gets to London. He is clearly not in a position to attack, he does not have the numbers and he has no secure base from which to plan and launch an attack as he cannot hold London. THAT IS A DEFENSIVE POSITION.

If, as you appear to be saying, the Roman tactic in that defensive position is not to seek the benefit of a line of defence aka wall, then are you suggesting that walls are offensive ... if so, what is the comment "Romans fight in the open"?

Or, are we back to the idea that Forts & walls are just luxury villas ... with no offensive or defensive military purpose?

having studied the hydrology of thames, probably in more detail than anyone else

Then you will know all about the ancient ford at Cliffe, the ford at Lambeth, and the ford at Brentford (where the water was only 3 feet deep at ebb tide as late as 1695)?

The Thames in the Roman period was probably 10-15 feet shallower than it is today.

Cliffehistory: "It should be pointed out that during the Roman period the River Thames was at least 9 feet lower than it is today" ... and it should be pointed out, that basic hydrology means the river level is set not by the sea level, but by the flow and sediment coming down the river. The result is that the river, in the tidal part, is not that different than it is today. It would have been slightly wider in the centre of London, so slightly shallower, but whilst that does improve fordability, it doesn't change it much. And, given the Thames is almost impossible to cross, except at very low tides and very low flows, it would still be extremely difficult to cross in the Roman period.

The ford at the House of Parliament is likewise an extremely difficult crossing, attempted once in modern times, again at very low flow and very low tide ... with the result the noble lord attempting it had to swim. It is one of the handful of sites, that might have been crossable at some low tides and low rivers ... and again easily defended with a small force.

Brentford is a ford on the river Brent. I could find no credible evidence of a ford across the Thames there. [Addendum: however, I think there is one suggestion it was a really muddy horrible place to cross ... it's not out of the question, but the evidence is slim]

What you must also be aware of, is that when people refer to a "ford" they also mean a shallow or fast section of river. So, for example when they dredged the "fords" of the Clyde, what they meant is they dredged the shallow bits of the river. However, only a few of these have any evidence that they were habitually used to cross the Clyde.

There is another potential fording site at Chertsey, which has some credibility as the site chosen by Caesar to cross the Thames, but above that the nature of the Thames seems to change as there are almost no records of any fords above that despite the size of the river getting smaller. Then you get to Goring and from there to Oxford there are plenty of likely fording sites.

So, as I said, there are only a handful of fording sites up to Goring. Each of these is extremely easy to defend, because most are tidal and only crossable for a short time at the lowest tides and at the lowest river flows. Being difficult, there is only a small path across the wide river, and it is extremely easy to block off that path ... and with a very short time to make it across, a small force can easily hold back any attackers until the river is again uncrossable.

with the north up in revolt

The revolt was in East Anglia, not the north.

Sorry I though St.Albans was North of London ...Cerialis set out from his base in Lindum Colonia .. I recollect his camp was north of London (but I cannot find that now)

I never suggested the Belgae were allies.

"the friendly pro-roman Belgae tribes" suggests allies, no?

I'm not sure where we got mixed up. The Brigantes, Welsh and Iceni would have had his northern troops in a British Sandwich. When they moved east into England. We know the Iceni were revolting and were taking or about to control the land north of London. We know the Brigates and Welsh had no love of the Romans and strong enough to take them on. And we know the other tribes didn't give a lot of resistance to conquest. So, when we look at where the army ends up, it is with a "horse shoe" of strong roman-disliking tribes, with the only exit being straight down the middle of the country toward somewhere between Gloucester and Oxford.

However, if we look at a Roman road map of Britain, we find that the roads when going south either head to Cirencester or to London. And, as London and its surround were controlled by Icenis shortly after Paulinus leaves, that means the army can only get to Paulinus by road if it heads to Cirencester.

The Belgae I refer to are the Gauls who invaded Britain around 150BC and who both caesar and Tacitus refer to. There is plenty of historical evidence for these Gauls in the "SE" of England. They were an elite, who clearly took over much of the SE, so it is reasonable to suppose that the area to the South of the Thames was controlled by the Gallic elite.

they have to pretty insane to walk into the area they do not control, without their calvary support, without the ability to know what is happening, and without secure supply lines.

Walking into areas they do not control is what armies commonly do in wartime. Paulinus had cavalry support, he had scouts, and nothing (aside from your own inventions) suggests that he was cut off from his supply lines.

I'm not sure, by the way, if all the bizarre stuff about duck ponds, mobile phones etc is simply intended to be funny - sometimes these things do not come across all that well in this medium!

"Walking into areas they do not control is what armies commonly do in wartime." ... when they are attacking. When they have had time to prepare. When they have a "base" from which to fight the war. But Paulinus had none of this.

By the time he got to London, he didn't even know if his own army had also been attacked and wiped out. He was alone with the Iceni hoards a matter of days away. There was no time to fortify London, all he could do is to evacuate Londoners across the Thames and retreat with them and use the Thames defensive line to hold back the Iceni with his small force, until the bulk of his army arrived.

If he didn't hold them at the Thames ... they would swarm across the Thames and drive him down to the south coast and across the Channel. And, if he headed north ... for a start, his mad dash down to London, meant he had no time or resources to secure control over this route to his army. With the ninth and St.Albans falling we can be sure that Boudica would quite capable of intercepting any messengers between Paulinus and his army using the same route Paulinus took ... because this exactly where Boudica would have placed some forces, to block the roads, and having defeated the ninth, we have to assume she was now in control over the countryside north of London. If Paulinus attempted to retrace his route, without the infantry to take on defended positions, it would be extremely easy to halt cavalry with a few stakes and so he would be trotting into an ambush ... at best, he would end up stuck in his encampment like the ninth ... surrounded, with supply lines cut and with Boudica able to cross the Thames with ease and the whole of Britain lost.

[Nathan Ross]

given the Thames is almost impossible to cross... I could find no credible evidence of a ford across the Thames there...

You will see from the source I linked that the Thames is (or was) far from 'impossible to cross'. The ford at Cliffe, or another nearby, was known to the Britons (according to Dio) and was used by Caesar, the one at Lambeth might have been dificult to cross but was certainly not impassable, and in 1016 Canute was apparently twice driven back across the Thames at Brentford, it seems (Anglo Saxon Chronicle).

Whether you choose to believe these sources or not, you must surely concede that the Thames could not have been considered an impassable barrier, and even if Paulinus was inclined to surrender the entire province north of the river to the enemy and retreat to the coast he could not have done so with any safety.

Were he looking for a defensible position he would have headed for the nearest high ground, rather than split his army up trying to defend river crossings.

Which is almost certainly what he did...

I though St.Albans was North of London

I believe you wrote of *the* north, not just a northerly direction.

The attack on St Albans occurs chronologically after Paulinus's retreat from London, and so can neither have caused it nor influenced his strategic thinking at that point. 

I'm not sure where we got mixed up.

Apparently you wrote Belgae when you meant Brigantes.

The Brigantes, however, were not in revolt against Rome at this point. The tribes of north Wales had just been crushed by a Roman campaign and were in no condition to rise in revolt imminently.

The attitude of the Belgae to the Romans at this time is unknown. The Regii (probably) of the Silchester area were perhaps allies. The Catavellauni of St Albans were certainly pro-Roman, as the town had been made a Roman municipium. If Paulinus was looking for friends in the area, he would have headed for St Albans.

By the time he got to London, he didn't even know if his own army had also been attacked and wiped out. He was alone...

He had his troops with him. Tacitus tells us he marched to London 'with wonderful resolution', thinking he might 'choose it as a seat of war'.

his mad dash down to London

There was no 'mad dash' either to or from London. Surely we have at least established that by now!

[Nathan Ross]

Having spent some time analysing the Tring area and having visited, I have moved my preferred site to Pitstone Hill

Meanwhile, on the subject of Pitstone Hill, I came across this sketch map I'd drawn a couple of years ago when we were discussing this before. It shows my suggested 'reversed' position, with the 'defile closed by a wood at the rear' being actually opposite the Roman lines... (which is probably far too convoluted, really!).

I've tried to add the woodland areas that seem to have been there in the past. Your idea, Deryk, I think swaps the two sides around in about the same area.

   

[MonsGraupius]

given the Thames is almost impossible to cross... I could find no credible evidence of a ford across the Thames there...

You will see from the source I linked that the Thames is (or was) far from 'impossible to cross'. The ford at Cliffe, or another nearby, was known to the Britons (according to Dio) and was used by Caesar, the one at Lambeth might have been dificult to cross but was certainly not impassable, and in 1016 Canute was apparently twice driven back across the Thames at Brentford, it seems (Anglo Saxon Chronicle).

Whether you choose to believe these sources or not, you must surely concede that the Thames could not have been considered an impassable barrier, and even if Paulinus was inclined to surrender the entire province north of the river to the enemy and retreat to the coast he could not have done so with any safety.

Were he looking for a defensible position he would have headed for the nearest high ground, rather than split his army up trying to defend river crossings.

Which is almost certainly what he did...

Sorry, what you are tapping into is the heated "debate" that went on for years of people arguing where Caesar crossed of the Thames. I had to go through it all, checking what every one of these numerous suggestions were saying to find out not whether it was where Caesar crossed, but whether there was any credibility to any crossing point at all. I can't say I was impressed. Some were based on no more than "the boatman says its quite shallow here", not even one known crossing, no historical evidence.

Unfortunately, the standard of early writing on this subject, was of the form: "I've been told by the boatman it's shallow here" which them was written up as: "This is where Dio Cassius refers to Caesar crossing the Thames".

If you discount all the crossings for which there is no historical accounts, that leaves a handful of sites which may have been crossing points. London bridge is well known, you mention the ford at the Houses of Parliament, I mentioned Vauxhall, you mention Brentford and I also mentioned Chertsey (where the London fire brigade kindly retrieved my depth measuring equipment which became detached and started floating down the Thames). For info, there was zero evidence of a ford, but its still possible.

"Whether you choose to believe these sources or not, you must surely concede that the Thames could not have been considered an impassable barrier" I have studied the subject in great detail and at length with the Thames as a special study area, so I don't think you will get a better opinion on the subject of fording the Thames.

I have said that there were a handful of difficult to cross fording sites which were easy to defend using a small force and the combination of the extreme difficulty of crossing the Thames and the small force made it all but impassable to large armies.

I though St.Albans was North of London

I believe you wrote of *the* north, not just a northerly direction.

The attack on St Albans occurs chronologically after Paulinus's retreat from London, and so can neither have caused it nor influenced his strategic thinking at that point. 

Paulinus army when it exits Wales is stuck in the north with hostile tribes to the west, east and the Brigantes to the north. The Road to London is overrun by the Iceni. The Welsh tribes would likely have followed the army out. The Brigantes may have started preparing for war, and not on the Roman side.

The army in the north is caught in a British sandwich with the potential to be attacked by the three most aggressive British tribes. It may not all have ben revolting ... but the North was in the middle of the revolt. And the armies only chance of survival was to head south ... keeping away from the Iceni who had already mobilised.

I'm not sure where we got mixed up.

Apparently you wrote Belgae when you meant Brigantes.

The Brigantes, however, were not in revolt against Rome at this point.

But they were not exactly friendly to Rome, and they were quite capable of taking the opportunity to mobilise and push them out of the north.

The tribes of north Wales had just been crushed by a Roman campaign and were in no condition to rise in revolt imminently.

Not on their own ... but if they could negotiate with the Brigantes and Iceni to co-operate, and if they have time to mobilise more forces, then they had the opportunity to wipe out the Romans.

So, the army sitting in the North having escape Wales, has three enemies:
1. The Iceni, who are already mobilised and have tasted blood.
2. The Northern Welsh tribes, who were mobilised, but had been beaten ... but on home soil, where they could quickly regroup and re-enforce
3. The Brigantes, who probably had no particular love for the Iceni and Welsh, but who would love to have got rid of the Romans and again become top dog in the North.

Fortunately the roads out of North Wales tend to go east so, that having escaped Wales, an army heading due south is then protected by the mountains ... then further south by the Severn and border hills. So, heading down toward Gloucester and then Cirencester, means the army is protected from all the tribes who are most capable of going to battle with them.

The attitude of the Belgae to the Romans at this time is unknown. The Regii (probably) of the Silchester area were perhaps allies. The Catavellauni of St Albans were certainly pro-Roman, as the town had been made a Roman municipium. If Paulinus was looking for friends in the area, he would have headed for St Albans.

By the time he got to London, he didn't even know if his own army had also been attacked and wiped out. He was alone...

He had his troops with him. Tacitus tells us he marched to London 'with wonderful resolution', thinking he might 'choose it as a seat of war'.

He (i.e. the force he took to London) was alone. Given what happened to St.Albans and the Ninth, and the way people would be streaming into London to get to safety on the other side of the Thames, there would have been chaos on the roads, ... wagon loads of people with all the valuables ... with no Romans to keep order. It doesn't take a genius to work out what the lowest life of the Britons would be doing. It was a thieves and highwayman's dream come true ... whether you were Iceni or not.

As Paulinus gets to London with "wonderful resolution" ... or as we might say it: without time to stop, he's not exactly going to inspire the Britons out Robbing the Romans from desisting. He's the Roman authority fleeing to London with the Iceni about to swarm all over it.

A "seat for war" is a defensible position with secure supply lines. We are told London was not suitable, because there is a swarm of Iceni, about to arrive (in a few days).

So, where does he choose as his "seat of war" if not London? Colchester? No! Up Ermine street to Lindum where the Ninth came from ... unlikely and far too close to Iceni lands. Up Watling street to Deva? Why? Why not St.Albans, of it not, why Deva? Not exactly my favourite choice for a battle against the Iceni.

Which basically leaves either a retreat to Dover ... or making Calleva his seat of war. From Calleva, Paulinus can easily keep supplied the defensive line of the Thames to the east, and he has the ridgeway hills as well us the (boggy) upper Thames to the west forming defensive lines to Cirencester/Gloucester and he has relatively easy access to ports on the south coast as well as Gloucester and even up the Thames.

The Severn-Thames narrowing, now has the same strategic benefit as the Clyde-Forth narrowing of the Antonine wall or the Solway firth-Tyne Narrowing of Hadrians wall. Anyone who cannot see that the Thames-Severn narrowing is exactly where Romans set up their "seat for war", is really as blind as an Olm.

The Severn estuary and river form a barrier on his west to S.Wales, effectively cutting the S.Wales tribes out the war. The Iceni can now only attack Paulinus in force by crossing the upper Thames above Goring ... which puts an army at Calleva just in the right position to stop them. This is the same as Bar Hill and the other Agricolan forts on the Antonine wall. We even have the wall, in the form of the Thames and ridgeway hills or upper Thames.

his mad dash down to London

There was no 'mad dash' either to or from London. Surely we have at least established that by now!

Ok, he galloped with "wonderful resolution" ... which as it normally takes an army up to a week to move camp (as historical accounts testify), we can assume cavalry can do 30 miles a day .... but only with light packs and fresh horses. His infantry might do 15 miles a day on roads, but their luggage train would take 2-3 days to do that. They could ditch the luggage train, but only when moving through friendly area they controlled. So, it would actually be quicker for the infantry to ditch their luggage train and go via Cirencester & Calleva where they could arrange supplies and then to London, rather than go directly to London through territory overrun by the Iceni. Because to go through enemy territory they have to have nightly camps, they have no secure supplies, so have to take it all with them.

But ... to London ... and ... having galloped with "wonderful resolution" ... he presumably exhausted all his horses, and is now in London ... with the whole populace hitching up every available horse and cart piled full of everything they own to escape the Iceni. So, no fresh horses there! So how does he gallop with "wonderful resolution" back north, through the Revolting British barricades now blocking every main roads, where the Brits are stopping all the fleeing Romans and politely asked them to forgo all their valuables and any virginity.

Even if Paulinus was going to join up ... let's say to Venonae (between Coventry and Leicester)... with another "wonderful resolution" ... gallop ... wouldn't he have gone to the nearest secure settlement of Calleva first to get fresh horses and supplies? Then he would have headed to Cirencester and then north to Venonae?

Of course, by the time he gets to Venonae, Boudica will have crossed the Thames, Calleva will be burning like St.Albans. The Iceni will have Paulinus stuck in the centre of England in a town almost as far away as you can get from any port ... not even near a major river!

So, if he did go to Venonae, he is not going to choose that for his "seat of war". Instead does he head for London ... No. Lindum ... No. Cirencester ... not bad, but a long way from the Iceni ... which really only leaves a journey back to Calleva

[Nathan Ross]

I have studied the subject in great detail... I don't think you will get a better opinion on the subject of fording the Thames.

As you have already said that you do not believe the level of the Thames to have changed considerably since ancient times, and Mortimer Wheeler (and others) claim it has dropped by up to 15 feet, an idea supported by the many details in our sources of people fording the river at various places, you must forgive me if I prefer Wheeler's opinions on the subject to yours!

Anyway, this business of defending the Thames is completely immaterial, it turns out (see below).

The Road to London is overrun by the Iceni. The Welsh tribes would likely have followed the army out. The Brigantes may have started preparing for war, and not on the Roman side.

This is entirely imaginary. The Iceni were in the vicinity of Colchester, possibly moving as far north-west as Godmanchester. The Welsh tribes were defeated and Paulinus was in the process of garrisoning their territories.

The Brigates were ruled by Cartimandua, a Roman client queen who had only a few years previously been restored to her throne by Roman troops. She was not about to revolt, and it took another 8-9 years for anyone to try and overthrow her.

So, where does he choose as his "seat of war" if not London? ... Up Watling street to Deva? Why? Why not St.Albans, of it not, why Deva? Not exactly my favourite choice for a battle against the Iceni.

I don't understand what you're trying to say here. Nobody is suggesting he retreated to Chester (which did not exist at this point anyway). St Albans, on the other hand, would make an excellent place to resupply and wait for reinforcements, and is close to the strategically favourable high ground of the Chilterns.

There must be some reason why Tacitus mentions St Albans, an otherwise undistinguished town of Romanised Britons which archaeology shows to have been at worst only slightly damaged  in the revolt.

making Calleva his seat of war.

Aha! You are, of course, not the first to suggest Silchester or the vicinity in connection with the revolt - the 'western route' has been discussed many many times on this thread.

But why would Paulinus bother crossing south of the Thames or trying to hold it as a barrier? If he's going west then he needs only march... west. Along the Portway, over the river at Staines. Very easy, no controversy.

...we can assume cavalry can do 30 miles a day .... but only with light packs and fresh horses. His infantry might do 15 miles a day on roads, but their luggage train would take 2-3 days to do that... having galloped with "wonderful resolution" ... he presumably exhausted all his horses, and is now in London ... 

Saints Preserve Us!

We have also, of course, discussed marching speeds and routes and supplies and baggage trains and so on over and over again on this thread. Needless to say, Roman baggage (or 'luggage' if you prefer) does not move at 5 miles a day...

However, I am afraid that at this point, after over twelve years of discussion, I am not in the slightest bit willing to debate the inane and ludicrous idea of Paulinus galloping down to London AGAIN!

[MonsGraupius]

I have studied the subject in great detail... I don't think you will get a better opinion on the subject of fording the Thames.

As you have already said that you do not believe the level of the Thames to have changed considerably since ancient times, and Mortimer Wheeler (and others) claim it has dropped by up to 15 feet, an idea supported by the many details in our sources of people fording the river at various places, you must forgive me if I prefer Wheeler's opinions on the subject to yours!

Anyway, this business of defending the Thames is completely immaterial, it turns out (see below).

The land mass of the south of England has been sinking by about 1.5mm to 2mm per year. Which means at the time of Boudica, the sea level would be about 3m lower than it is today. Unfortunately for your and Wheeler's argument, the simple fact of hydrology, means that the river bed would have been 3m lower, the Thames valley being formed from the deposit of Thames gravels into the valley as the sea level rose from the ice-age interglacial maximum when the sea level was perhaps 50m lower. (Or it was at Rome).

So, although the top of the water was 3m lower, the bottom of the water, within the infilling river, was also 3m lower, so the river level, for someone crossing the river, would be the same.

Now, having run a hydrological scale model of rivers, where I've repeated the sequence and ... well it is fairly standard hydrology, the simple fact is that rivers adjust to the changes in the sea level and they adjust in known ways and if Wheeler had known anything about the hydrology of the Thames, he would not have made such silly mistake.

The Road to London is overrun by the Iceni. The Welsh tribes would likely have followed the army out. The Brigantes may have started preparing for war, and not on the Roman side.

This is entirely imaginary. The Iceni were in the vicinity of Colchester, possibly moving as far north-west as Godmanchester. The Welsh tribes were defeated and Paulinus was in the process of garrisoning their territories.

With what ... with the army that was already outnumbered massively by the Iceni? So you're claiming that his army stopped on the way back, built some garrisons, dropped off some of their number and then are we back to: "galloped down to London"?

The Brigates were ruled by Cartimandua, a Roman client queen who had only a few years previously been restored to her throne by Roman troops. She was not about to revolt, and it took another 8-9 years for anyone to try and overthrow her.

So, you are saying that after Boudica is flogged, her children raped, her lands stolen from her and the queen of the iceni treated like dirt, that Queen Cartimandua, is going to side with the Romans? Or let the Romans flog Boudica, rape her children, turf her out of her kingdom ... and somehow when they come to Cartimandua they are going to do what? Treat her with respect, abide by agreements with her, not rape her children?

Queen Cartimandua is going to see what happened to Queen Boudica, and do what?

So, where does he choose as his "seat of war" if not London? ... Up Watling street to Deva? Why? Why not St.Albans, of it not, why Deva? Not exactly my favourite choice for a battle against the Iceni.

I don't understand what you're trying to say here. Nobody is suggesting he retreated to Chester (which did not exist at this point anyway). St Albans, on the other hand, would make an excellent place to resupply and wait for reinforcements, and is close to the strategically favourable high ground of the Chilterns.

So, if he could have chosen St.Albans he would ... which means he couldn't. Which means that St.Albans was already threatened at the time Paulinus was in London. It was too late to save St.Albans, even before Paulinus left London!!

There must be some reason why Tacitus mentions St Albans, an otherwise undistinguished town of Romanised Britons which archaeology shows to have been at worst only slightly damaged  in the revolt.

The highest ranking Roman cities were colonia of which there was Camulodunum (Colchester), around 49 AD followed by Lindum (Lincoln) and Glevum (Gloucester) by the end of the first century. The second rank were municipium of which St.Albans was the only one. So, technically St.Albans was more important than London.

Boudica thrashes the ninth and then heads toward London. Suetonius takes all he can south abandoning London. Boudica arrives with an army ready to do battle and instead has to content herself with sacking London and then being just a couple of days away, St.Albans.

making Calleva his seat of war.

Aha! You are, of course, not the first to suggest Silchester or the vicinity in connection with the revolt - the 'western route' has been discussed many many times on this thread.

But why would Paulinus bother crossing south of the Thames or trying to hold it as a barrier? If he's going west then he needs only march... west. Along the Portway, over the river at Staines. Very easy, no controversy.

"But why would Paulinus bother crossing south of the Thames or trying to hold it as a barrier?"

I am TOTALLY dumbfounded that you ask such a question. It is as crazy as asking "Why would the Romans hold a turf ditch and bank they call the Antonine wall", or "why would they hold a stone wall called hadrian's wall?" Indeed, why would they bother to garrison a wall around a town .. what is the point? Why would the Romans bother with barriers? ... why would they waste their time building a turf wall across the country ... according to you it's totally ridiculous because you suppose that the Romans just don't bother with barriers ... it never occurs to them to use a barrier as a form of defence ... they just build walls to be pretty?

Come on! Asking why the Romans would go behind a defensive line, at a time when they are under attack is not a sensible question.

...we can assume cavalry can do 30 miles a day .... but only with light packs and fresh horses. His infantry might do 15 miles a day on roads, but their luggage train would take 2-3 days to do that... having galloped with "wonderful resolution" ... he presumably exhausted all his horses, and is now in London ... 

Saints Preserve Us!

We have also, of course, discussed marching speeds and routes and supplies and baggage trains and so on over and over again on this thread. Needless to say, Roman baggage (or 'luggage' if you prefer) does not move at 5 miles a day...

Sorry, that is what it does. It takes 2 to 3 days to move a camp. That is what the historical evidence of those who were involved moving camps using horse drawn carts shows. If that is not what you think ... then you are wrong.

However, I am afraid that at this point, after over twelve years of discussion, I am not in the slightest bit willing to debate the inane and ludicrous idea of Paulinus galloping down to London AGAIN!

The simple fact is that Suetonius went south from London. There is no doubt about that. The Thames-Seven line is the same defensive strategy as the Clyde-Forth line is the same defensive strategy as the Solway firth - Tyne line. It is the standard approach of the Romans in that period in Britain. To use a defensive line across the country from one river system to another. Making use of valleys like the Thames, or Kelvin on the Antonine wall, or the S.Tyne along Hadrians wall.

Whether you like it or not, it is the standard practice in Britain, very well attested and there is no doubt that Suetonius would have also used the same strategy of a defensive line from Thames to Severn. To argue otherwise, is to argue against all the historical facts of the Roman walls in Britain.

[Nathan Ross]

if Wheeler had known anything about the hydrology of the Thames, he would not have made such silly mistake.

Sadly I do not know enough about either your methodology or his to determine whose the silly mistake(s) might be.

Suffice to say that the Museum of London Archaeology has a 2020 article on its website stating that "around AD100, high tide [in the Thames] was around three metres lower than it is today", which suggests at least some contrary views may exist. And the historical accounts of people fording the lower Thames at various points suggests that these views may well be correct.

With what ... with the army that was already outnumbered massively by the Iceni?

No, with the remainder of his army in North Wales. Unless you believe that he brought his entire army south to London with him?

So, you are saying that... somehow when they come to Cartimandua they are going to do what? Treat her with respect, abide by agreements with her, not rape her children?

That is apparently exactly what happened, as far as we know, yes.

I am TOTALLY dumbfounded that you ask such a question... Asking why the Romans would go behind a defensive line, at a time when they are under attack is not a sensible question.

It's really not so dumbfounding. I only asked why he would waste time withdrawing south of the river and trying to guard and hold various fords, bridges etc when he is intending to march to Calleva. There is, after all, a very good straight road that would take him directly there from London, and it leads west via Staines, not south across the Thames.

It takes 2 to 3 days to move a camp... using horse drawn carts...

You are suggesting that it took the Roman army 2-3 days to break camp?

Why would they be using 'horse drawn carts'?

The simple fact is that Suetonius went south from London. There is no doubt about that.

No, the simple fact is that he did not! And there is no doubt about that either!

(You see, anyone can do this...)

The only 'simple fact' is that there are no simple facts. And twelve years of discussion have shown that there is considerable doubt about everything.

[kavan]

Has anyone 'dug' any of the tumuli at Pitstone Hill?

[MonsGraupius]

if Wheeler had known anything about the hydrology of the Thames, he would not have made such silly mistake.

Sadly I do not know enough about either your methodology or his to determine whose the silly mistake(s) might be.

It's not "my methodology" it is standard hydrology which if you had read any standard hydrology text book, or indeed thought about it, you would understand it pretty obvious. A River in the glacial period when the sea is lower, cuts down creating a valley. In Rome that valley is about 50m deep. Along the Thames, that valley is cutting into previous gravels, which due to a longer term uplift in the area creates the world famous series of gravel terraces which were so important in developing geology as a subject.

As the sea level rises, the river ... and this is not going to surprise anyone ... brings down sediments in the form of gravels and they keep filling up the valley until there is a standard river valley, with a standard river and a standard depth, leading all the way to the sea. That is taught as O-level geography ... it is available all over the internet for anyone who wants to look at river formation. It is hardly difficult to find!

The Pool of London is a well known feature, and it is so called, because this is the highest point to which large ocean going boats have been able to make their way up the Thames, because the shallow water at London Bridge, prevented large boats from going further. That geography has not changed for centuries. That means that the Thames from London Bridge down has not been crossable. Given we know that the Thames has been infilling since the interglacial from an initial extremely deep valley perhaps 50m below the current one, it is extremely unlikely that the Thames below London bridge was shallower in the past.

Suffice to say that the Museum of London Archaeology has a 2020 article on its website stating that "around AD100, high tide [in the Thames] was around three metres lower than it is today", which suggests at least some contrary views may exist. And the historical accounts of people fording the lower Thames at various points suggests that these views may well be correct.

You clearly did not read my reply. Where I explained that the sea level was three meters lower, but that the river bed was also three meters lower.

With what ... with the army that was already outnumbered massively by the Iceni?

No, with the remainder of his army in North Wales. Unless you believe that he brought his entire army south to London with him?

Given your faillure to grasp even the simple fact that the river bed changes was the sea level changes, I've no idea whether you are reading any of what I write. I've no idea what you are trying to say above.

So, you are saying that... somehow when they come to Cartimandua they are going to do what? Treat her with respect, abide by agreements with her, not rape her children?

That is apparently exactly what happened, as far as we know, yes.

So, you agree that the Brigantes Queen, seeing what the Romans did to Boudica, is going to see that she cannot trust the Romans and must resist them. So you agree the Brigantes, are likely to have seen the defeat of the ninth as an opportunity to push the Romans out of Britain.

I am TOTALLY dumbfounded that you ask such a question... Asking why the Romans would go behind a defensive line, at a time when they are under attack is not a sensible question.

It's really not so dumbfounding. I only asked why he would waste time withdrawing south of the river and trying to guard and hold various fords, bridges etc when he is intending to march to Calleva. There is, after all, a very good straight road that would take him directly there from London, and it leads west via Staines, not south across the Thames.

Why did the ninth "withdraw to the encampment". Why would Suetonius who is in London, about to be overrun by the Iceni, with no defences around London, withdraw behind the natural defence provided by the Thames?

We are talking about the same Romans, who built walls everywhere and particularly across the country from river to river, not just once, but numerous times?

It takes 2 to 3 days to move a camp... using horse drawn carts...

You are suggesting that it took the Roman army 2-3 days to break camp?

Why would they be using 'horse drawn carts'?

No, it takes 2-3 days to move camp. But I don't want to go off at a tangent, as the key point is that Suetonius, like all Romans, would under threat from Boudica have sought the strongest defensive position behind the Thames. And that therefore his "seat for war" ... which he must have held some considerable time given the comment about "put off more delay" in the text ... must have been south of the Thames (St.Albans being the only real possibility north).

The simple fact is that Suetonius went south from London. There is no doubt about that.

No, the simple fact is that he did not!
And there is no doubt about that either!

(You see, anyone can do this...)

The only 'simple fact' is that there are no simple facts. And twelve years of discussion have shown that there is considerable doubt about everything.

And your argument is that the Romans never built walls ... because what you are saying, is that the Romans saw no strategic value is a line of defence from Thames to Severn. Which means you are saying the walls do not exist. That is how daft your argument is ... all the history of Roman Britain is filled with walls: forts with walls, and walls with walls. Yet, in this moment when Suetonius is about to be overrun in London by Boudica .. suddenly the rest of Roman history in Britain ... is wrong ... because rather than using the standard tactic of the Roman wall ... Suetonius gallops off toward St.Albans, where the Iceni are heading ... to join his army, cut off from all supplies in the middle of England where there is no decent defences at all.

[Nathan Ross]

Has anyone 'dug' any of the tumuli at Pitstone Hill?

I don't think so - but most of the stuff around there seems to be prehistoric / Bronze Age.

There are some great pictures of the surrounding area in this walking blog though - certainly a dramatic spot!

[Renatus]

The problem with this discussion is that we have two fundamentally differing and incompatible interpretations of the evidence.  I set out below what I believe to be MonsGraupius' position, which I have culled from his various posts.  I offer it without comment and, as it has been gathered piecemeal, there may be omissions or errors.  If I am mistaken on any point, I will no doubt be corrected.

Upon hearing of the threat to Colchester (or, perhaps, the fall of the colony and the defeat of Cerialis.  I am not sure of this.), Suetonius withdrew his campaigning army from North Wales and set off with it down Watling Street to London.  As his cavalry moved faster than the infantry, which was also encumbered by a full baggage train, he travelled with the cavalry ahead of the infantry.  In the meantime, Boudica and her forces, having sacked Colchester, had spread across the country and had attacked St. Albans, after which she advanced on London.  Suetoonius and his cavalry passed through the enemy surrounding St. Albans and arrived in London first.  His infantry, with the enemy occupying the country ahead of it, diverted down the Fosse Way to Cirencester, then branched off to Calleva and thence to London.  Suetonius, having decided that he could not make London his seat of battle, withdrew south of the Thames to Calleva, detaching contingents to guard the various crossing points across the Thames.  He then waited several months and then, with a force of about 10,000 men (I am not sure how many he would have had when he first withdrew), he crossed the Thames to confront the rebels.  There was an earlier suggestion that Boudica may have crossed the Thames, possibly at Oxford, so that the final battle may have taken place south of the river, but I don't think that that was persisted with.

I think that that is a fair summary.

[Nathan Ross]

You clearly did not read my reply. Where I explained that the sea level was three meters lower, but that the river bed was also three meters lower.

Don't worry, I get the picture. I merely suggested that when other experts in the field draw different conclusions (eg MOLA's claim that the Thames was indeed a lot shallower in the 1st century) then you cannot really maintain yourself as the sole and final authority, and your own theories as the last word on the subject.

But let's move on...

So you agree the Brigantes, are likely to have seen the defeat of the ninth as an opportunity to push the Romans out of Britain.

Obviously I do not agree, as that is the opposite of what I wrote above.

Why did the ninth "withdraw to the encampment".

Because they had just been defeated?

No, it takes 2-3 days to move camp.

Just to be clear here - are you suggesting that while Roman infantry could march 15 miles a day, they would then have to wait for two days for their baggage to catch up with them, before making camp? What would they be doing for those days? Where would they be sleeping in the meantime?

You'll be aware that most other people believe Roman soldiers carried much of their kit and put the rest on baggage mules, and could therefore move considerably faster than you are claiming? I mean, this is not a wildly outlandish idea or anything...

And your argument is that the Romans never built walls ...

SIGH!

OK, let's try and reframe this a bit. If you can restrain your urge to make bizarre non sequiturs and so on:

As you believe that Suetonius Paulinus probably withdrew west from London to Silchester (not, as I say, a madly unusual idea), where do you think he fought the final battle? (the actual subject of this thread...)

[EDIT - after reading Michael's post above I see that you did suggest a general location here: https://www.romanarmytalk.com/rat/thread...#pid352739. Perhaps it would be more useful if we could get back to that?]

[MonsGraupius]

So you agree the Brigantes, are likely to have seen the defeat of the ninth as an opportunity to push the Romans out of Britain.

Obviously I do not agree, as that is the opposite of what I wrote above.

Then it is hard to know what you are saying. The Romans, who had very little respect of women, treated the British QUEEN boudica with brutality ignored agreements etc., and you are arguing that it would make the British QUEEN of the Brigantes more pro-Roman.

I cannot fathom how you would come to that view.

Why did the ninth "withdraw to the encampment".

Because they had just been defeated?

They were still an operational force, the infantry were defeated, the Cavalry raced for the security of the wall, as all Romans do when they cannot win ... they were the cavalry, which is what everyone maintains was with Suetonius. The two groups are in almost the same position, except the Ninth had the security of their camp (built by their infantry, because cavalry are too good for hard graft), and likewise Suetonius has his cavalry, who are likewise looking for a good place to hide.

EVEN if we just look at this as a standard military operation. Suetonius is going to do the standard thing and find a secure site for the night. You cannot argue against that ... because that is the assumption of every Romanist ... Romans, when facing attack by the energy, as Suetonius clearly was, slept in secure camps. So, WHERE IS YOUR CAMP? Where is even the slightest evidence of any encampments between London and the army in Wales?

You have absolutely NOTHING! You have no place for Suetonius ... and the only secure "camp" is going to be to use the Thames as a defensive line, and to retire behind that.

Then having retired behind the Thames and blocked all the fords, Suetonius is now in an area free from the risk of attack. So, there is no need for encampments. And, if he quickly gets to Calleva, we can explain the total lack of encampments to support this crazy idea that Suetonius went north, by the simple fact, Suetonius was safe behind the walls of Calleva, and his army were marching South along the border of Wales through area that was controlled by the Romans.

No, it takes 2-3 days to move camp.

Just to be clear here - are you suggesting that while Roman infantry could march 15 miles a day, they would then have to wait for two days for their baggage to catch up with them, before making camp? What would they be doing for those days? Where would they be sleeping in the meantime?

You'll be aware that most other people believe Roman soldiers carried much of their kit and put the rest on baggage mules, and could therefore move considerably faster than you are claiming? I mean, this is not a wildly outlandish idea or anything...

Of course not, they would go back and forth with the baggage train and indeed, at times they were the people carrying the supplies.

That is why the Romans had to control an area before moving camp. Standard military practice.

And your argument is that the Romans never built walls ...

SIGH!

OK, let's try and reframe this a bit. If you can restrain your urge to make bizarre non sequiturs and so on:

Since believe that Suetonius Paulinus probably withdrew west from London to Silchester (not, as I say, a madly unusual idea), where do you think he fought the final battle? (the actual subject of this thread...)

"where do you think he fought the final battle?" The two options from Calleva, is that Boudica crosses ... perhaps around Oxford and then the two armies meet on the rigdeway hills (Berkshire downs according to OS), or that Suetonius cross the Thames above Goring and then heads toward Boudica.

I have looked at sites on the Ridgeway hills and although some look tempting, there is not the slightest archaeological evidence of any battle**.

I would therefore suggest, having regrouped with his infantry, having twisted a few local elites to supply axillaries, having gained as much intelligence as he can about the Iceni, Suetonius, decides to draw Boudica into battle. Presumably, he had a plan as to where. What I think we can say, is that, having almost certainly taken down the bridges over the Thames, and the fords on the lower Thames, being as difficult for him as for Boudica, he would have made for some crossing point between Goring and Oxford. The classic crossing point is Wallingford. However, the Iceni would know that, and could also use that to lure him into a trap. So, Suetonius probably chose an obscure ford to cross the Thames, of which there are a number.

Whatever the scenario, I think we can be sure that Suetonius crosses the river Kennet at Aldermaston Wharf.
If Suetonius is crossing the Thames, then he would have gone through Streatley
If Suetonius still held Dorchester, and the ford (probably bridge ... as they hated fords) was still intact, then that looks a possible crossing so it is possible he goes to Dorchester. However he may also have crossed at Wallingford, and based on names, there were other fords every few miles along the Thames (Shillingford, Appleford), all of which he could have used. However I should say here, that fords move over time and old ones disappear and new ones appear. So there could be a crossing point anywhere in this section.

This places him at the foot of the Chiltern hills ... from where I have to leave it to those with more knowledge of the area.

**Which does not mean no evidence, but without archaeological finds associated with a battle it would be daft to propose them.

---

The problem with this discussion is that we have two fundamentally differing and incompatible interpretations of the evidence.  I set out below what I believe to be MonsGraupius' position, which I have culled from his various posts.  I offer it without comment and, as it has been gathered piecemeal, there may be omissions or errors.  If I am mistaken on any point, I will no doubt be corrected.

Upon hearing of the threat to Colchester (or, perhaps, the fall of the colony and the defeat of Cerialis.  I am not sure of this.), Suetonius withdrew his campaigning army from North Wales and set off with it down Watling Street to London.  As his cavalry moved faster than the infantry, which was also encumbered by a full baggage train, he travelled with the cavalry ahead of the infantry.  In the meantime, Boudica and her forces, having sacked Colchester, had spread across the country and had attacked St. Albans, after which she advanced on London.  Suetoonius and his cavalry passed through the enemy surrounding St. Albans and arrived in London first.  His infantry, with the enemy occupying the country ahead of it, diverted down the Fosse Way to Cirencester, then branched off to Calleva and thence to London.  Suetonius, having decided that he could not make London his seat of battle, withdrew south of the Thames to Calleva, detaching contingents to guard the various crossing points across the Thames.  He then waited several months and then, with a force of about 10,000 men (I am not sure how many he would have had when he first withdrew), he crossed the Thames to confront the rebels.  There was an earlier suggestion that Boudica may have crossed the Thames, possibly at Oxford, so that the final battle may have taken place south of the river, but I don't think that that was persisted with.

I think that that is a fair summary.

No, I'm saying that Suetonius arrives in London after rushing there. Which means he did not have his baggage train and I suggest that it was only Cavalry, but it becomes the same scenario even if he has infantry. The key is he decides to abandon London, and he decides he will not use St.Albans as his "seat of war".

The key point, is that he does not feel he is able to secure London. So either he didn't have the time to build secure defences, or he lacked the means (no infantry). In either case, he is clearly in a location which he cannot defend ... and the obvious move is for him to hop across the Thames.

After the ninth infantry are massacred we have: "Alarmed by this disaster and by the fury of the province which he had goaded into war by his rapacity, the procurator Catus crossed over into Gaul." ... so we can assume every high ranking Roman was heading the same way to Gaul.

We also see where the priority was when he got to London:

"Nor did the tears and weeping of the people, as they implored his aid, deter him from giving the signal of departure and receiving into his army all who would go with him. Those who were chained to the spot by the weakness of their sex, or the infirmity of age, or the attractions of the place, were cut off by the enemy. Like ruin fell on the town of Verulamium, for the barbarians, who delighted in plunder and were indifferent to all else, passed by the fortresses with military garrisons, and attacked whatever offered most wealth to the spoiler, and was unsafe for defence. "

It seems likely in that situation, that whatever force Suetonius has, is ordered to spend time rescuing all the Roman elite (relatives & friends of Suetonius and Catus) north of the Thames and all their belongings ... at least until the Iceni get to London.

So, Suetonius would not be allowed to simply block the crossings over the Thames, instead he would be ordered to hold the various bridges and fords, to allow as many of the Roman elite north of the Thames to escape Boudica, whereupon at the last moment, Suetonius  tears down any bridges and makes the fords uncrossable ... but still leaving many Romans behind.

At that point all those Roman elite like Catus will be telling him, in no uncertain terms, that Suetonius must at all costs prevent the Iceni following Catus etc, or in any other way, preventing the cowards crossing the Channel to Gaul.

Whether Suetonius likes it or not ... the political imperative of the situation ends up with him south of the Thames, guarding the fords. It doesn't matter the order of events, it doesn't even matter what forces he has or hasn't got, he is stuck holding the Thames whilst Catus and his cronies make their escape. Fortunately for Suetonius, the Thames was the ideal barrier to prevent Boudica advancing further and that enabled Suetonius to regroup sufficiently to take the battle back to Boudica.