Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.

[Nathan Ross]

to around Chester from Wroxeter, c120miles... across N wales rugged hills for 60/70 miles... tell me if 5 days is enough

Wroxeter to Chester is 38 miles. Wroxeter to the Menai Strait is less than 100 miles.

Nothing in the timeline I suggested mentioned how long it took to build boats - July/August was all I specified.

you directly contadict the author pliny, who wrote "There is another rotation again—when the ground has been cropped with spelt,383 it should lie fallow the four winter months"* spelt has a 4 month fallow period.

This is the quote in full: "There is another rotation again - when the ground has been cropped with spelt, it should lie fallow the four winter months; after which, spring beans should be put in, to keep it occupied till the time comes for cropping it with winter beans." (Pliny NH 18.52)

Pliny is discussing crop rotation here; specifically growing beans after grain crops. Elsewhere he covers the regular sowing season more directly:

"The winter grains are those which are put in the ground about the setting of the Vergiliae, for they receive their nutriment throughout the winter, for instance, wheat, spelt, and barley." (NH 18.10)

"...they sow beans and winter- wheat in the month of Novembor, and spelt at the end of September, up to the ides of October; others, however, sow this last after the ides of October, as late as the calends of November." (NH 18.56 - 'The Proper Times for Sowing')

The last quote accords with the one I gave previously from Varro.

Applebaum, whose work from 1958 you quote in your post, argues for a continuity of 'Celtic' agriculture into Romano-British times, and describes the change in Iron Age agriculture in Britain:

"A few years ago, working from Helbaek's analysis of prehistoric grain-finds in this country, I endeavoured to demonstrate that in the last 500 years B.C. a shift of emphasis began to take place in Britain from the cultivation of summer to that of winter grains, partly under the impact of climatic deterioration… The known crops of the British Early Iron Age were eincorn, emmer, spelt, breadwheat, naked and hulled barley, and (uncultivated) oats, barley being the preponderating cereal… The introduction of spelt was associated with the technique of drying the grain in ovens before threshing." (Agriculture in Roman Britain, Agr. Hist. Rev. VI, 1958, p.68)

So the change to winter cereals (i.e. planted in the autumn) happened in Britain (or the southern areas at least) in the centuries BC, long before the Roman conquest, and would have been the norm by the 1st C AD.

And that is pretty conclusive, I think, although I realise that trying to persuade you of this fact is virtually pointless.

Caesar’s letter carriers reached Rome from the coast of Britain in 27 days

Pretty good going, across partially-conquered Gaul, with no established road network or posting system!

In the very next paragraph the author mentions a courier travelling 110 miles per day for four days. And we have the message from Mainz to Rome via Reims in winter AD69, taking less than 9 days - a speed of approx 150-160 miles a day, depending on route.

However, if you wish to consider this unbelieveable, I can see that you will not be convinced otherwise.

The ones that you claimed were not needed when you started, and now you need them have re appeared, yes i noticed that.

I was referring to the passage in the Historia Augusta, about the 'usual seventeen days ration' carried by the soldiers, and how Alexander Severus allowed them to carry part of it on mules. I never suggested that Paulinus's men would not be using mules. I raised it only to counter your ideas about mass relays of mules being needed to support troops marching at any distance from their home base.

I think you know all that, of course!

There are 7 principle*  recent Uk works on the subject only one has the whole Army with P go to London...

You left out Nicholas Fuentes, who also argued very persuasively for the march to London (Graham Webster's reply to Fuentes could offer little real objection). 

With no disrespect to (some of) the authors you mention, I believe this idea of Paulinus going on reconnaissance down to London is faulty, and our ten years of discussion on this thread have conclusively demonstrated that. Your suggestions would rule out even his supposed reconnaissance mission - which would be pointless if his army stood no chance of reaching London.

The historical record (Tacitus, Dio) is virtually all we have for determining the chronology of these events. Once you start adjusting it or amending it to suit the requirements of your theories, we depart from history and enter fantasy. As I've said, if modern theories cannot account for historical evidence, then it is the theories that are at fault, not the evidence.

However, I recognise that you will not be persuaded, and so as we have reached a point of irreconcilable difference I will end our discussion here. Others may wish to continue debating these points with you, but I will do so no further.

[Renatus]

There are 7 principle*  recent Uk works on the subject only one has the whole Army with P go to London...

You left out Nicholas Fields, who also argued very persuasively for the march to London (Graham Webster's reply to Fields could offer little real objection). 

You mean Nicholas Fuentes, I think.  One may also mention Edward Foord and Gordon Home, 'England Invaded' (1913, reprt. 2014).

[Nathan Ross]

You mean Nicholas Fuentes, I think.

Aha, so I did! Thanks - corrected.

(I was thinking of the Osprey writer, I suppose - who as I recall went with the trad Mancetter option...)

[John1]

"went with the trad Mancetter option.." with a side order of Church Stowe which was so hot off the press it didn't get the main feature, but surely would now

[Renatus]

Hanny,

I will depart from the usual quotation and response method of dealing with your replies to me in your post #2041 and try to deal with them thematically.

The outbreak of the revolt is intimately connected with the timing of Suetonius' Anglesey campaign, as we are told that it coincided with the closing stages of that operation.  The actual fighting on Anglesey seems to have consisted of a single battle but preparations for it would have taken longer.  We have spoken of road-building to get to the Menai Straits but this need not mean the construction of metaled Roman roads, rather pioneers going ahead of the main column, identifying the easiest route and clearing it of obstacles.  The construction of barges for the crossing of the Straits would probably have taken some time, however.  Unfortunately, Tacitus does not give us precise dates.  If the campaigning season starts in spring and spring in the northern hemisphere is taken to run from mid-March to mid-June, we have some sort of indication.  It cannot start too early, if reliance is to be put upon there being grain in the fields to forage for, as Julian found to his cost.  Summer need not be ruled out, as early in the season there will be corn ripening in the fields.  Nevertheless, to get the maximum practical period for campaigning, late-spring would seem to be a sensible starting point and we can probably see Suetonius on Anglesey in mid- to late-summer, but not too late.

The missed planting season is a problem.  If the main planting season is in the autumn, it is virtually impossible to imagine that Boudica would have planned the revolt so far in advance as to neglect planting in the autumn of AD60.  On the other hand, if spring planting was supplementary to the main planting and was harvested at the same time, it is difficult to see how this would make such a difference to the availability of grain as to cause the famine that Tacitus reports.  Nathan has proposed that the revolt broke out after the harvest of AD61.  This is not impossible but one has to be careful.  Harvest was a longish process, involving reaping, threshing and winnowing.  In pre-mechanised 19th century England it lasted through August to mid-September.  This seems to be too late but, if one imagines the harvest in AD61 to be limited to reaping only, leaving the corn in stooks in the fields, it becomes more plausible.  The missed planting season would then be that of autumn that year, the rebels having gone to war before seed-time.  The fact that this caused a famine need not be a problem.  Tacitus is not specific as to the year of the famine and it need not be in the year of the revolt.  I have suggested that was actually in the winter of 62-3.  However, there is another possibility.  Suetonius' reprisals involved ravaging the tribes with fire and sword.  Incidentally or deliberately, this would very likely have involved the destruction of stored grain and, with depleted stocks and nothing coming through to replace them, the famine could have begun much earlier than winter 62.

What makes me slightly uncomfortable with Nathan's timing, if I have understood it correctly, is that it leaves little time in the rest of 61 for the events described by Tacitus - the revolt and its defeat, the arrival of reinforcements, Suetonius' reprisals, Classicianus' realisation that these were going too far and reporting to Rome, Polyclitus' journey to Britain, investigation and report, and eventually Suetonius' loss of ships and replacement by Petronius Turpilianus.  Of course, some of this can be pushed into 62 but not too much for reasons that I will come to.

If, to gain more time for these events, one brings the outbreak of the revolt forward to sometime after the time for spring planting and assumes that it was this that was missed, as I have said, that should not have caused a famine.  I therefore wonder if what Tacitus may have had in mind, although he does not say it in terms, is that it was the harvest that was also missed and that the crops planted in autumn 60 rotted in the fields, either because the revolt went on too long for them to be harvested or, because of the losses sustained in the battle and the disruption caused by Suetonius' campaign of reprisals, there was not the manpower or opportunity to harvest them.

You have suggested, if I have it right, that the revolt was not necessarily settled by one battle and that resistance persisted and continued into a second or even, possibly, a third year.  I cannot agree with this.  First, all our sources are adamant that there was only the one battle.  Dio says that those who escaped were prepared to continue the fight but, after the death of Boudica, realised that the cause was lost and gave up.  Tacitus says that they remained at large because they were afraid of retribution at the hands of Suetonius.  Neither says that there was any further fighting.  However, the major reason for believing that the events described by Tacitus could not have persisted beyond the early part of 62 is what he says about the replacement of Suetonius by Petronius Turpilianus.  He says that, after the loss of the ships, Suetonius was ordered to hand his army over to Turpilianus 'as if the war continued' (tamquam durante bello).  He goes on to say that Turpilianus did nothing to provoke the enemy and they did nothing to trouble him and the same continued under his successor, Trebellius Maximus.  In short, the rebellion was completely over by the time Turpilianus succeeded Suetonius.

The question then is when the changeover took place.  The rebellion started during the consular year of Caesennius Paetus and Petronius Turpilianus (AD61) but Turpilianus had stepped down as consul by the time he took over from Suetonius (qui iam consulatu abierat).  The key word here is 'iam '.  This has a variety of meanings - 'already', 'just', 'recently', 'by this time', etc. - but all imply that the event was comparatively recent.  Turpilianus had handed his consulate over to a suffect consul in mid-61, so I would say that he must have taken over from Suetonius a maximum of six months later.  Carroll gets round this by suggesting that he was appointed as Suetonius' successor in 61 but did not actually go to the province until 62.  Suetonius would have been obliged to remain in Britain until Turpilianus arrived to replace him.  The result of this is that Turpilianus' effective governorship is most likely to have begun in early 62 at the latest and, as we know, he was back in Rome to take up the post of curator aquarum in 63.  The upshot of all this is that all the evidence points to the rebellion beginning and ending in 61, although Suetonius' reprisals could have continued a short way into 62.

[Hanny]

Renatus

Why do i consider it last longer?, well thats because its a snapshot of the big picture, we know history from how it turned out, not how it unfolds without knowing the outcome, but big picture pacification of the iceni following the battle was unlikley to be brief in time.

Why are the Romans in Angelsey?, well thats because they are completing the isolating of the Ordovices tribe by cutting of Druidic influence and removing its agricultural aid to wales, to do so means road building, fleet building and an expected 4/5 months, Wroxeter is the base because its the Ordovices who are the problem to be solved, the Romans went the long way round.

To a Roman you were either dependents of Rome, subjecti, or recalcitrant , superbi to Rome, and if the they have a moral right, as given by Virgil for instance "to crush the proud who will not submit" and a religouse duty, again given by Virgil, to make you into the former by whatever means is required, including extinction at human or political level, Iceni were made extinct at a political level. Things went differently than planned for, they dont return to solving the Ordovices till the iceni have returned to subject status, to do that they had to be defeated militarily in the field, so the martial class of society knows it cant win in the field, time for this need not be long in time,but they dont know it cant win in low intensity warfare, so the Romans ravage the land to convince them thats not an option, and it also drives home to the general poulation that your a subject, you had better start acting like one, and any low level resitance is simply not going to be tolerated, these things take time, and create the natural human reaction of resentment ( perhaps lastinga generation) to those policies, so killing 00s of 000s in the field, starvation of the rest either makes you stay recalcitrant or become subjecti. How long that took we dont know know, but we are told the Iceni were willing to fight Rome earlier as well, so they acted like other celts whom resisted and took decades of military action, involving defeat in the field followed by low level ploice action and and extensive garrisoning for decades, to be convinced they were beaten. We know low entensity resistance lasts for a long time after the main military actions have been fought, people being people resist because of many reasons, banning your religion and cruxifiction for following it, having family killed or staved tends to produce long lasteing resentment. We know Rome was undertaking the human extinction of the tribe but chose to go another way, this prob ties in with Iceni looking to be a tribal host seeking to move away from Norfolk and away from Roman control, Rome tendended to be harsh on such tribal movements.

Building barges need not have been a time delay depending on how its planned and how many are involved, if 20k are at Menai then the entire Welsh frontier and some more is here so that to high a count, but if it is it will impose a longer time delay, if its a single Legion doing it all then yes a time delay occurs, as is if teh Legions calls for further forces, of course that might be cav, so again no delay, but if its aux then delay is agian likley.

Caeser had 2 legions make 600 barges in 12 weeks, so 25 a legion a week, to cross Menai straights in a barge is a 5 min operation rowing at 6 knots speed, with loading and unloading, so a 3 Cohort first wave can be re infoced in short order and you dont need enough barges for all in a single lift. Barges had c30t capacity so 30 men. So you need c50 barges, so, a single legion, which is all you need to build a road netthrough allied cortini land towrds chester, marches c20/30 miles ( 2 days) on existing roads, then builds its way to Chester in around 2 months, ( 60 days no rest days) crosses 60 odd miles ( 5 days) of welsh hills, it then starts to build barges, while any others needed for the assult can come over the now existing road net, they have c120 miles on roads and 60 over hills and tracks, if they march as fast as Caesers Legions they get there with 2 rest days in 12 days, so you have the barges built by the time they arrive.

Rome does not return to its original plan to solve the Ordovices till Agricola, 77/78 goes back to Angesey and then engulfs Ordovices.

Caesers acount of the Helvetti tells us how celts prepared for war, in advance of the fighting they pepared the logistics to conduct it, he also tells how sophisticated and adpative the celts behaved, which included scorched earth tactics against Caeser in gaul to deny him crops to live of, these were not unthinking brutes but organised, determined, and competent and we have no acounts of there version of events, only Roman.

[Nathan Ross]

Nathan has proposed that the revolt broke out after the harvest of AD61.  This is not impossible but one has to be careful. 

I also suggested that the harvest that year might have been particularly poor - that could be why the Romans were already importing food from the Mediterranean (which had an earlier harvest), and the Britons 'reckoned on our supplies as their own' (Tac. Ann 14.38).

Perhaps the Iceni harvested whatever they could of the depleted crop in August, just enough to sustain them until they seized Roman provisions, and took most of it with them when they departed for the war. This would have been supplemented with whatever they captured at Colchester and London. But the whole lot would have been lost at the final battle, with the capture and destruction of the baggage train.

The survivors who straggled back to Iceni country would have had only the remaining seed corn left to sustain them over the winter, and Roman reprisals could, as you suggest, have destroyed that too. By the beginning of following year, famine would already be setting in. Any Iceni who refused to throw themselves on Roman mercy or the charity of neighbouring tribes, or to again take up arms and attack Roman depots, would have starved.

it leaves little time in the rest of 61 for the events described by Tacitus

Yes, you're probably right. The mission of Polyclitus in particular was more likely the following spring, with the appointment of Turpilianus in the early summer. For the rest, though, I still think there would be time in the autumn of the year.

We have been assuming, I think, that the reinforcements from the Rhine armies must have been sent in response to a request from Paulinus. But Tacitus says they were sent by the emperor. This could be merely a formality of expression, but Catus Decianus would also have sent a report when he fled Britain himself, presumably detailing the loss of Cerialis's force, and it would have arrived in Rome some time before any requests from Paulinus.

So the troops from the Rhine could have been despatched by imperial order to reinforce the army in Britain, before Paulinus himself had even fought his battle against Boudica, giving them far more time to cross the Channel and join him before the close of the sailing season.

However, if we really need Paulinus to be the one requesting the reinforcements, a message sent from London on September 18th could have reached Rome in 14 days inclusive, covering the 1048 miles at an average of 75 miles per day. At the same speed, a message from Rome could have covered the 875 miles to Cologne in 12 days (three days slower than a message by a much longer route in January AD69).

Presuming the governors in Germania had been forewarned by Paulinus and could get their troops on the road at once, they could have covered the 240 miles from Cologne to Boulogne and still reached the Channel by the last day of October, with ten days before the close of the sailing season.

[Hanny]

Hanny,

  We have spoken of road-building to get to the Menai Straits but this need not mean the construction of metaled Roman roads, rather pioneers going ahead of the main column, identifying the easiest route and clearing it of obstacles. 

Doing this i believe was standard practice for all marches.
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Roman-Art-War-C...0752419390

The army included 200 scouts also encamped in the praetentura ( 24), because they would lead the army out of the camp. The construction of roads in unconquered territory seems a bit unrealistic and perhaps the clearing of obstacles was their primary function. If there are no roads being contructed then the entire march to Angelsey is cross county, as is comming back.

[Hanny]

I don't think the individual legionaries were fresh from N.Africa, afterall, the invasion was 17 years old. Hardy they were and acclimatised to the UK. Their water need is extrapolated from USArmy and Nato studies for marching, fully loaded, combat troops operating in temperate climes (not N.Africa). The USArmy gives a sustaining water requirement of 20litres/man/day and 12.? for the minimum. My 9 litres/legionary/day is based on a tougher man, marching for his life, not caring too much if he misses a wash or two. Also, my lower figure adds an additional level of conservatism to the hydrology vs water-need calculations.

9 litres is 19 lbs of water. This means your average 160lbs legionary has replaced 19lbs, 3lbs an hour, of sweat in a days march and remained fully hydrated, to sweat 19 lbs means a lot  level of physical activty, like doing an Iron man events of 2.4 klm swim, 112 mile bike ride and then a marathorn to require that exchange rate, and burn 6000 calories, which his ration can replace at best half.https://www.triathlete.com/culture/a-physiological-view-of-what-the-human-body-goes-through-in-an-ironman-2/

Your average roman at 160lbs, under 100lbs load weight burns 500 calories an hour, so 3000 a day, at 60lbs 400 an hour, 2500, at 100lbs he is expending more than he is replacing.
https://www.outsideonline.com/outdoor-ad...estimator/

Your paper on events, page 4 gives a therorical 22 operational bound, ( which is wrong as its 30 days, who will carry the next month 30 day ration when it arrives is unclear)  based on 3/4 rest, leaving 638klm to be covered when marching, so actual marching days is not 29klm, but 34klm as you cant march and rest at the same time.next is romans were trained to march at 2.5mph for 6.2hours a day, which is 16mpd, you have them at 21mpd., so your force matching every day you march, and doing what no Roman ever achieved.

You give 17 days rations and equipment a weight of 95lbs. Romans used Posca so around a third of the water is wine instead. Yet you make zero allocation for weight of water carried, at 19lbs a man thats 152 lbs to be carried per 8 men and 2 mules, yet you have acounted for all the 300lbs on the mules already without it.

You then detail its the  2 mule ( who estimates 300lbs?) per 8 man so 1250 mules, you allow for them 85lbs in food in 17 days, so 5lbs a mule a day, almost a third  what is needed to keep them alive if they can graze for hay,See US Army Regs for Mules with 220 lbs load, so increasing the load increases the food ration to 14lbs, so your giving them third of what they require.
Mules – Paragraph 1121.  “For mules, fourteen pounds of hay and nine pounds of oats, corn, or  barley.”146

Or you could use the current Regs http://thepeakinc.com/wp-content/uploads...s.-pdf.pdf

Key bits are Mules can carry (150 to 300 pounds [lb]).
Field Rations
2-50. The detachment uses this ration while it is deployed so the pack animals can maintain condition and strength during heavy work. The field ration contains an allowance of about 12 pounds of grain (10 for mules), 14 pounds of hay, and no bedding. Normally, a pack animal requires about 8 gallons of water per day. However, the temperature and amount of work being performed will determine water requirements, you allow them 30 when they require a min of 36, and you have them at max weight carried so water needs will be prorportianly higher.

You  compare to US self hydration, but use the average of all units, so combat units, actual 6 litres (13lbs) a man, inc 6 hand washes day, 2 toothbrushes a day and sponge bath ( Romans dont use toothbrushes), plus allowances for the support services inc clothing laundry, 5 showers a week, Aircraft maintence, Enginering, inc water used in Vechicles to generate the potable water and in radiators of MTV to transport it, to get it up to the number you used.file:///C:/Users/User1/Downloads/MP-HFM-086-$$ALL.pdf You ignore that the US Army brings the river to the Army, while teh Roman Army brings teh Army to the water source, so pre and post march uses the local water for most of its needs, nd only needs to carry what he it requires for the marching period of the day, its difficult to see a less appropriate comparission.

So your Table 1 water requirment is inacurate, as is the marching rates, so any use of either makes non sense.

Does anyone have, or know of, battle sites where the disposal figures are known?

https://www.academia.edu/11918646/Wartim...thropology

---

Maybe of topic, but some may find it of interest.

Roman legions at 60lbs inc ration, WBTS USA 60lbs inc ration.

Romans trained to march at 2.5 mph for 6.4 hours, exactly how caeser averaged, WBTS was not that different mostly because 2000 odd years is not enough timje to change the length of a human pace.

US Qm reports for WBTS can give us some clues, on what happens to over worked mules, and the effects on Army movement rates from using the same technology, except for a better throat harness so wagons get bigger as animals can pull more. USA had overa million mules for the war, 1 for every 3 men, c250k did not survive the war.
May 25, 1863 Brigadier General R. Ingalls Chief Quartermaster Army of the Potomac

Working them badly/hard for 7 days.Their average load was over 220 pounds.
1st Div 78 mules. 16 dead, or lost requiring replacements, to sore backs etc.
3rd div 56 mules. 3 dead, or lost requiring replacements, to sore backs etc..
Loss rate 15%.


Effect on march rates of the Army train on movement rates.
QM for the whole Army
"With all these hindrances to encounter, our armies, on a five days march make from ten to fifteen miles daily in the winter, and from fourteen to seventeen miles in the summer. But for the delay of the train, there is no doubt that the average daily distance attained would be six miles more. The calculation is equally accurate when applied to forced marches; for though twenty and even twenty-two miles may be made for each of three consecutive days, respect must at last be had to the arrival of the wagons."

Army size he is giving from AoP, a mule to every 3 men, plus horses, yes they are mostly carrying munitions rather than food, but its the weight thats the thing.
One hundred and twenty thousand (120,000) effective fighting men, six thousand three hundred (6,300) wagons, nine hundred (900) ambulances, thirty-two thousand (32,000) artillery, cavalry, ambulance, and draught horses, four thousand five hundred (4,500) private horses, and thirty-six thousand mules, making an aggregate in all of some seventy-two thousand (72,000) animals.

Or to put it another way, yes you can march 20 mpd as the US Army was trained to do, but in practice your logistical elements of wagons/mules, cannot, so you typically move together at the speed of the Army train, however when you get into range of the enemy, you can cut loose from this impediment to your marching speed. In 3 days at Gettysburg the two sides fired c250t of munitions at each other, but they ate and drank c5235t.

One reason why the States fought the AWI was an objection to quartering troops at their expense, so its Mil Regs (articles of war) include paying for what you take because you need it, this changed under Liber code mid war and you dont haveto pay rebels for what you take, its lawfully confiscated under laws congress enacted in the several confiscation acts, food and fodder was the principle $£ cost of the war, not munitions,lanyone talking the loyalty oath gets payed, c60% of the QM costs were for food/fodder, by end of war the CS owed to its own people a billion in CS $ paper requisitions after paying and running out of money, it just wrote IOUs, every 90 days US QM fill in an account for what they payed out, sending it back for checking at Dept for war who the bill to congress, by end of war around third of the food and fodder requirements of the Army had been met by not paying for it but by taking it for free from the CS States. US census figures give us an idea in number values as to how many cattle etc lost to a state that meant, some States moved over by Armies losing c30% of animals.In 1864 the US QM dept was employing 750 steamers average forward lift 250 ton, and 1100 shallow draft inland vessels 150 tons average forward lift. 352500 tons capacity, 775500000lbs, or 800lbs a day per member of the US Army. By contrast the entire RR could deliver 125 lbs a day per member. So, 550000 lbs per steamer. A RR Loco with typically 10 box cars was 200,000lbs, which means a single steamer is doing the job of 3 such trains with barges contributing 1.7. So water borne was 4.7 times more ton miles better than a RR system. Sherman at Atlanta was sucking up 40% of the entire northern locomotive stock to sustain himself there. In General Orders, nos. 5 and 6, Pope ordered, "the troops of this command will subsist upon the country in which their operations are carried on." "no supply or baggage trains of any description will be used unless so stated specifically in the order for the movement." The army would rely almost exclusively on local food sources for both the men and horses" Pope was hand picked by the radicals to prosecute the hard war policy they advocated. Lee remarked, this miscreant must be supressed.

The scale of what you can take from productive land to sustain your armies is in proportion to pop levels and productivity of the region.
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Gettysburg-Camp...0684845695
"The Cumberland Valley in Maryland and Pennsylvania was so rich in agricultural produce that by June 23, within a week after the first units of Ewell's corps had crossed the Potomac, they had accumulated enough supplies to feed all of his corps until June 30, as well as 1,700 barrels of flour for the rest of the army"." At Mount Jackson in several 000s of bottom land was aprox 26000 head of cattle and 22000 head of sheep taken in Pa and Maryland and sent back"

1700 barrels of flour is 333200lbs of flour, (a llb loaf of bread requires 300 grams of flour)at 450 grams a pound that 499,800 1 lb loaves of bread. Half a million daily rations worth, 5 days worth for a 100k men, this is another example of the ease in which you can live of the land, depending on population density, far easier than being supplied from depot.

ANV was still eating Union meat for xmas, it had gained in Gettysburg campaign, but it cuts both ways, Shenandoah valley took 2 decades to recover from both sides fighting through it for 4 years.
Shenandoah Valley 1860 census production or livestock inventory totals, less the the amount listed as confiscated by Sheridan in his 64 report of his campaign in the valley.

Hogs 184,424 Loss of 12%
Sheep 73,607 Loss of 24%
Cattle 53,957 Loss of 18%
Horses 41,037 Loss of 12%

Hay loss of 31%
Wheat loss of 27%.
Corn loss of 52% by 1870 census, Sheridan came at the wrong time of year and found little of the principle crop of corn to take, Corn crop being 50% larger than wheat.

Lets look at wheat, 1,596,896 bushels produced in 60, what does make?, ie what kind of scale is that when people write its the breadbasket of the confederacy, it makes 63 one lbs loaves of bread a bushel, 100,604,448 loaves of bread, as a mil ration thats enough bread for a CSA Army of 500k to eat a loaf every day for 5 years, Sheridan rode of with nearly a third of that and found it all in 2 months of looking for it.

Lets look at London as a base of supply for the legions, and comercial port, by 359 A.D. 800 cargoes of grain were exported to the the Rhine from london.

There is a mass of cerial crops that can be lived on as you move through the crop lands, Caeser tells us he foraged to 10 miles from teh line of advance, this allows a legion to take froma massive erea.

June 1864, Grant ordered his Chief Quartermaster General, Brevet Major General Ingalls, to create a Naval supply depot at City Point capable of supporting the forces, participating in the siege of Petersburg with food and fodder.

They built or converted, 8 wharves, 350,000 sq feet, exclusive to military traffic, 25 ships a day unloading capacity, around 6250 tons a day, 22 miles of rail lines around the port and warves/storrage sheds to unload int onto RR completed by July 5th, 100,000 sq feet of warehouses for storage, it required 10,000 personnel, Rail line of 22 miles, to the front finished by 2 July, the 24 Trains a day, with 1400 tons of supplies began, finishing by moving 470,000 tons by rail,the return trip brought back the WIA to the 7 Hospitals built at city Point with 10,000 beds, covering 200 acres,and items for repair, over 6k wagons and ambulances which were then sent back to the front, It used 10,000 wagons a day, pulled by 60k horses and mules, driven by 20,00 men on extra duty from the Army moving 130,000 tons to the front. In 334 days, City point had moved over 600,000 tons to the front, which was 30% of what the ships had brought in. There was a seperate munitions port, which CSA was abele to blow upa ship comming in with munitions, which set of a nearby ship in sympathetic explosion, 500 odd tons of munitions wenet up along with those who were killed injured.

In Roman times sea and rivers were the RR** providing the bulk tansfer of cargo.

**USA and CSA RR capacity for the war.

CS RR logistical capability, entire rail inventory for miliitary and civilian use.
1,220 locomotives
13,282 cars of all types, average 8 tons capacity.
So 1220 loads of 88 tons per day, which is 107360 tons a day or 236192000 lbs.

1863 CS Army daily needs of food water fodder, for 480,000 men, 210,000 animals
required 10% of all RR traffic by weight.

US RR logistical capability. The only logistical ability avaiable to invade the south with was the USMR and its assets, rest of the North Rail carried on commerce as usual.
USMR, 419 locomotives with 6,330 cars average 10 ton capacity.
So each day 419 loads of 62850 tons, or 138270000 lbs, 60% of the entire CS rail capacity devoted to supply of its forces.

1863 US Army daily requirements of food water and fodder using the entire USMR can deliver 35% of daily needs. So on the border and for the first 100 miles into the CSA the USMR can supply 35% of your daily requirements, the further you go the worse it gets.

Sherman at Atlanta in 64 with 100k men and 30k animals was 400 miles from his base of supply, so there were 4 days supplies in the RR supply chain to feed what was eaten each day, this required 40% of the total rail capacity to move it each day just to eat for the day.

Legion of 5000 rations at 2.2 ( by weight and calorie intake its a low number, by WW2 German fighting/in hospital formations got over 3lbs while garrisons and admin units under 3lbs) for 30 days weighs 330000, so to bring rations each month to the army requires 1500 mules* or its equivalent, this on itself places a limit to your operations, 15 days there and 15 back, puts a ton mile capacity into play, ie 270 miles from a base of supply is the re supply limit, or you need more mules. But if you use a river, which is like a RR, 5 river barges each pulled by mules, you can do the same thing at 3mp. But then enemy is not always bya river, its only then your going to have to use Mules and people.

How many mules did Rome have access to?.
https://www.berksarch.co.uk/index.php/th...rspective/ Mules make up half the equids, and c500k in use by the Augustan Army, so perhaps 2 mules for each soldier.

[John1]

"I don't think the individual legionaries were fresh from N.Africa, after all, the invasion was 17 years old." - The Steve Kaye

A few of points here;

1 Legio XX recruited heavily in North Africa, including several primo pilus according to Steve Malone.
2 The commander of the 1st Cohort of Aquitanians in Derbyshire was a Numidian, presumably attached to the XX (probably a century or so later than the revolt)
3 In the 40's AD Paulinus was Governor of Mauritania (anyone got more detail on this?)
4 The XX pottery at Holt was cranking out North African vessels.

So it seems likely there would have been North Africans in the ranks of the Legions but who knows what impact this would have on logistics.

[Hanny]

https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/classics/...sity/army/
and especially this one https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/classics/.../evidence/
Scientific Evidence for Black Romans in Britain?

[Nathan Ross]

A few of points here

I think you've made these points before?

The North African recruitment and pottery relating to the 20th was later 2nd century, after a detachment was supposedly sent on expedition there during the Mauretanian war of Antoninus Pius.

[Steve Malone's prosopographic paper on XX VV discusses Quietus, primus pilus of the twentieth, 'sent with an army on a Mauretanian campaign by the emperor Antoninus Augustus' (p.97) - but Malone says there's no indication that troops from the legion were involved. He also says (p.37) that "what we know of normal patterns of recruitment... would render it most unlikely that men of African origin would be recruited into the legion"]

[Hanny]

Pottery https://romanpotterystudy.org.uk/wp-cont...n-1-33.pdf

[Hanny]

We have been assuming, I think, that the reinforcements from the Rhine armies must have been sent in response to a request from Paulinus. But Tacitus says they were sent by the emperor. This could be merely a formality of expression, but Catus Decianus would also have sent a report when he fled Britain himself, presumably detailing the loss of Cerialis's force, and it would have arrived in Rome some time before any requests from Paulinus.

Only the Emperor can dispatch legions between provinces, Procurators have no military duties, only civil duties, like i cant collect the dues im supposed to, the mil Governors job was to inform the Emperor on military matters.

So the troops from the Rhine could have been dispatched by imperial order to reinforce the army in Britain, before Paulinus himself had even fought his battle against Boudica, giving them far more time to cross the Channel and join him before the close of the sailing season.

However, if we really need Paulinus to be the one requesting the reinforcements, a message sent from London on September 18th could have reached Rome in 14 days inclusive, covering the 1048 miles at an average of 75 miles per day. At the same speed, a message from Rome could have covered the 875 miles to Cologne in 12 days (three days slower than a message by a much longer route in January AD69).

Presuming the governors in Germania had been forewarned by Paulinus and could get their troops on the road at once, they could have covered the 240 miles from Cologne to Boulogne and still reached the Channel by the last day of October, with ten days before the close of the sailing season.

Timeline/distances are all wrong.

Sept 18 from London, 1270 miles London to Rome is 17 days.

From Rome to the Legionary basses that have to supply the forces.
https://www2.rgzm.de/Transformation/Deut...n_engl.htm

"In the 1st century, legionary fortresses, containing one or two legions, could be found on the left bank at Vetera-Xanten, Novaesium-Neuss, and near the oppidum Ubiorum-Köln (not all were in use at the same time) "

Aux had there own forts and they provide the bulk, they dont march the same speed as legions so will be comming in later still..

Rome to Xanten 930 miles. 13 days.
Rome to Novaesium-Neuss. 894 miles. 12 days.
Rome to Cologne 869 miles.12 days.

Boulugna to Xanten, 254miles. 16 days at normal march.
Boulugna to Novaesium-Neuss, 263miles. 16 days at normal march.
Boulugna to Cologne, 284 miles. 18 days at normal march.

Arrival at Boulugna from:
Xanten 46 days. So, 4th Nov.
Novaesium-Neuss. 45 days. 3rd Nov.
Cologne. 47 days. 5th Nov

No one gets there in the normal campaign season, which has long ended, and gets there is the gale season.

close of sailing season?https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=2kWhfns-cRcC&pg=PA358&lpg=PA358&dq=gale+season+starts+in+english+channel&source=bl&ots=tyAAeUR2PF&sig=ACfU3U0LLJW2HjVFGHsn9WXfrNrx7uhtnQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj5rryhhczzAhVXgFwKHfE0DYIQ6AF6BAgTEAM#v=onepage&q=gale%20season%20starts%20in%20english%20channel&f=false gales season in theUK channel is October to April, hence the great Uk storm on 1987, from French ports Gale season is a month earlier, so Sept is also prob,German planning for sea lion was to go by mid Sept or the weather meant it had to wait till May next year. Then no Roman mariner sailed on set days, the 2nd, 8th and 10th etc days as its ill omened. Caesar lost a large portion of ships in September storm. AD 60 storm season was a bad one as well https://premium.weatherweb.net/weather-i...-to-499ad/

So to cross in the campaign season for the year you need to reach the channel earlier, if you send for it earlier why is it not on hand to use to put down the revolt.

[Hanny]

(Tuesday, October 12th, 2021, 09:47 am)Hanny Wrote:
There are 7 principle* recent Uk works on the subject only one has the whole Army with P go to London...

You left out Nicholas Fuentes, who also argued very persuasively for the march to London (Graham Webster's reply to Fuentes could offer little real objection).

With no disrespect to (some of) the authors you mention, I believe this idea of Paulinus going on reconnaissance down to London is faulty, and our ten years of discussion on this thread have conclusively demonstrated that.

Yes i left him out, (the late Fuentes was a good archologist but out of his depth in explaining militry matter) as he his march to London is a fantasy that no competent mil commander would attempt to do in the time frame he uses, P being described by T as" Rather, he preferred a "cautious, well considered plan to the luck of the gambler''

https://archaeologydataservice.ac.uk/arc...11_317.pdf
"Paulinus was in Anglesey when news of the revolt reached him - having captured the island he was in the process of installing a garrison and cutting down the sacred groves1". He immediately took ship, perhaps to Chester"

Here he tells us the Army,( now grown to 2 Legions plus Aux leaving the Welsh frontier empty of troops) which includes Cav as they swam to Angsey but cant swim to Chester, is in Angelsey, which he leaves there and sails to Chester. ( he invents Chester as Dio is only one to use sail and he has P sail to london) He then tells us "A grave tactical error would have been committed if Paulinus had indeed separated himself from his infantry" But has P make exactly that error. He does not know when P get news of Cerialis defeat but he has him in Chester to hear it, so has to relay his orders back to the Army creating further delay as only at that point in time does he know something's gone wrong, since any messengers from S E roman Britain were looking for him in Angelsey, changing his location presents a further delay in them reaching him.

https://archaeologydataservice.ac.uk/arc...11_317.pdf
"The location from which Paulinus set out is unknown, but as the Roman Army's normal rate of marching appears to have been 20 Roman miles a day29, 13 days to cover the 250 miles (400 km) from Anglesey seems reasonable; perhaps it might have been only 9 days or less if he set out from Chester (180 miles1290 km). Paulinusarrived in Londinium before the rebels, perhaps only justbefore, to find that the 2nd Legion had not arrived"

13 days from Angelsey is not reasonable because at 18mpd its 14 days not 13, 180 miles Chester to london is 10 days, not 9 and has zero rest days, so he has P do what no other Roman general ever attempted to do, how/when/why did the Army go to Chester in the first place, to take 9 days to get to london using 9 days to help your Roman movement rates comparative to Iceni, is the only way for that to happen, no, we are told the army is in Angelsey and moves from there in response to the revolt, so both Roman and Iceni movement rates start from then. So a messenger has to get to P to decide what to do, and the army does it from Angelsey, so being in Chester merely adds a 1/2 days to orders to it from Chester, being a cautouse man he may have ordered it to march to Chester and join him, 60 miles away, then it goes to london 190 miles away, so 250 miles is still 14 days reaction time with no rest days, to an Iceni who can reach it before then, he even tells us a large section of the march, is through hostile land of the Catuvellauni, means he is marching is ripe for ambush after crossing the Avon, hasa supply line now going througha hostile region, so spends over 100 of those miles with both through hostile land. Sounds like a tactical error waiting to happen and the plan of a gambler, the very opposite of how T describes P being. Caeser managed 16mpd in Gaul, which was mostly hostile to his movements, and had rest days, to march all week is to require a supply service of MTV, as even by ww2 Germany still had to rest a day a week as it relied on so many horse elements.

https://archaeologydataservice.ac.uk/arc...11_317.pdf
"If the Roman Army's marching rate was indeed 20 Roman miles a day, then it must be supposed that the rebel's rate was very much 'less"

Supposed only in terms of his timeline.

He relies on Iceni movement rates being lower than Roman, as they have 60 miles to cover to get to london, "it is interesting to note that in Marlborough's time a daily average marching distance of between eight and ten miles was considered good" But Marbrough was faster as he lived of others food he moved onto, just as the iceni are planning to do, so will be moving faster not slower as they move onto supply rather than be pushed forward by supply.

He uses Chandler, who is referring to marching distances through hostile lands, pushed from supply behind, and how Marlborough 14mpd through friendly lands was remarkable, but no one hada 4:1 movement ratio advantage in that period, Marlborough was the fastest and he had 2:1 over the slowest from moving onto supply.

However when doing so through friendly land https://www.jstor.org/stable/44225601?re...b_contents see page 108 In Marlborough time you march 4 days, 12 miles, moving onto food water waiting for you and then rest totally different way to march in a day. See Crevald https://www.amazon.co.uk/Supplying-War-L...0521546575 detailing 12 to 14 mpd for Marbrough and how it was achieved.

https://archaeologydataservice.ac.uk/arc...11_317.pdf
"a very different model for these episodes: the prudent Paulinus having left behind a suitable force to hold the newly-won areas in North Wales (say, something of the order of half of the20th Legion together with auxiliaries)"

Angelsey had to be re conquerd by Agricola and was Roman free for decades after the revolt, so since P wins then Angelsey wont need to be reconqurerd, which since it was means its made up and can be ignored.

https://archaeologydataservice.ac.uk/arc...11_317.pdf
"How far west Paulinus marched is a moot point. A mounted messenger sent to locate the 2nd Legior, should have been able to reach Exeter and return within three days, only to report that the unit was still stuck in its fortress 172 miles (275 km) away"

Anothr false premise, 340 miles in 3 days is 120mpd.