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High Imperial Roman army vs Late Roman army
#46
Quote:The difficulty of raising new troops and ensuring that recruits reach the army are well-documented.

Maybe it was due to the fact, that the army was already so large - much bigger than ever before? Looks like the army reached its maximum possible size at that time. However, difficulties of raising new troops and ensuring that recruits reach the army are well-documented also regarding earlier times - for example there were such difficulties in the 2nd century BC, especially when it comes to wars in Spain.


Quote:The disaster of Cannae was comparable to that of Adrianople, yet it did not force Rome to fight defensive battles afterwards.

Didn't it? At least for some time? Rome's military operations in Italy after Cannae for the rest of the 2nd Punic War were defensive - or rather harassing - in nature. Romans tried to avoid major battles against Hannibal, even when having larger forces. Only Publius Cornelius Scipio acted in an aggressive way, but that's because he fought outside of Italy, facing worse Carthaginian commanders and knowing his own value as a general (BTW - he learned a lot from studying Hannibal's battles).


Quote:Simlarly, the Varus disaster was also comparable, and although it had an impact, it did not force Augustus into a purely defensive strategy afterwards, let alone his successors.

But it did! At least in this theatre of war!

Romans never again tried to conquer Magna Germania after that defeat. After Teutoburg Forest, Romans applied a purely defensive strategy, defending their territory, not attempting to conquer areas east of the Rhine. They also built border fortifications systems (Limes Germanicus, Limes Raeticus).
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#47
Quote:Ioannes Lydus' number is pretty close to some estimates of Antonine and Severan army strengths.

Hmm. I'm sure everybody else know this already, but I've just noticed that if you take Lydus's number for the army, minus naval personnel (389,704 men), divide it in two to represent an approximate 50/50 split between legionaries and auxiliaries (194,703.5), and then subdivide this figure by 6000 (the probable 'paper' strength of a legion, e.g. following Vegetius), you get 32.45.

This is so close to the 33 legions supposed to have existed under Septimius Severus that I'm inclined to believe Lydus got his figure from around that time. Maybe some military census connected with the Antonine Constitution of AD212, at a guess?
Nathan Ross
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#48
Quote:Romans never again tried to conquer Magna Germania after that defeat. After Teutoburg Forest, Romans applied a purely defensive strategy, defending their territory, not attempting to conquer areas east of the Rhine. They also built border fortifications systems (Limes Germanicus, Limes Raeticus).

Actually, nothing changed after the Clades Variana. Tiberius changed his mind after Germanicus' campaign failed, or at least had not the expected success. A change in military strategy can not be seen before Domitian reorganized border defense after he definately conquered territory east of the Rhine.
Ut desint vires, tamen est laudanda voluntas
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#49
Quote:Actually, nothing changed after the Clades Variana.

Hans Delbrück had a different opinion regarding Germanicus' campaign.
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#50
Quote:Romans never again tried to conquer Magna Germania after that defeat. After Teutoburg Forest, Romans applied a purely defensive strategy, defending their territory, not attempting to conquer areas east of the Rhine. They also built border fortifications systems (Limes Germanicus, Limes Raeticus).

Immediate result of this defeat,certainly wasn't that romans resigned from other attempts to subdue inner Germania.And it is very likely that during Marcus Aurelius reign,they once again make an serious attempt to incorporate large territory in Magna Germania to the Empire.
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#51
Quote:Immediate result of this defeat,certainly wasn't that romans resigned from other attempts to subdue inner Germania

It takes a while to recover military strength and recover forces after 3 entire legions are reduced to a few straggling survivors. The other legions had other areas of responsibility, and couldn't just be pulled from there to Germania.
M. Demetrius Abicio
(David Wills)

Saepe veritas est dura.
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#52
Quote:
Quote:Immediate result of this defeat,certainly wasn't that romans resigned from other attempts to subdue inner Germania

It takes a while to recover military strength and recover forces after 3 entire legions are reduced to a few straggling survivors. The other legions had other areas of responsibility, and couldn't just be pulled from there to Germania.

Hang on - for that's exactly what happened. Apart from the punitive raids thereafter - using what forces were available - the 3 legions lost were not replaced for 30 years; when Caligula raised the Primigenia pair for the, indeed, planned next campaign in Germania.

The legion total didn't get back to the 28 until Nero raised I Italica.

The overall inference is that, between 9AD and the invasion of Britain in 43AD it took ~23 legions to just stand still. Thereafter it seems legions were raised specifically in order to conduct the next campaign.

So - military strength wasn't 'recovered'.
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#53
Hi Peter,

We know about the recruiting problems, and these had nothing to do with the number of the army, but with the unwillingness of citizens to serve and of landowners to supply 'bodies' for the army. The army was no longer as popular as it had been in earlier times.

As to Cannae and Varus:
Nothing really changed. Sure, Cannae hindered offensive operations for some time, but Rome bounced back with high speed. And true, the Clades variana led to the desicion not to conquer Germania, but it did not stop Rome from other conquests, such as Britannia, Dacia, Persia, Armenia etc.
Adrianople on the other hand cause a break with strategic operations as in the past. Offensive tactics on the battlefield were aoided if possible, as were high-risk pitched battles. Most impact would have the hiring of large-scale barabarian forces under their OWN command. These, at least in the West, would play a part in the eventual downfall.
Robert Vermaat
MODERATOR
FECTIO Late Romans
THE CAUSE OF WAR MUST BE JUST
(Maurikios-Strategikon, book VIII.2: Maxim 12)
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#54
The comparisons between post-Cannae and post-Frigidus are interesting. In both instances, the army was unwilling to commit to full set piece battles even if it had superior numbers because of the need to preserve what they had. Stilicho's strategy of manuevre and ambush seems remarkably similar to Fabian's guerrilla tactics. In both cases, the army had run out of reserves and could not afford to replace any future losses in the short term.
There are some who call me ......... Tim?
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#55
Quote: but Rome bounced back with high speed.

Yet Rome did not destroy Hannibal's army in Italy.

And Hannibal was not avoiding pitched battles.


Quote:Offensive tactics on the battlefield were aoided if possible

The same happened after Cannae in battles fought against Hannibal. Even in the battle of Zama Hannibal attacked first, Scipio was in defensive posture until Carthaginian elephants were routed.

BTW - let's maybe establish, whether we are talking about offensive tactics or offensive strategy, because these are two different things. You can apply an offensive strategy in a war or in a campaign, but fight your battles with use of defensive tactics. You can also fight a war with use of defensive strategy, but at the same time use offensive tactics in individual battles.
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#56
So if an Principate army fought a Late Roman army on a field battle, who would win????
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#57
Quote:So if an Principate army fought a Late Roman army on a field battle, who would win????

Andy, tell us what you think.
Francis Hagan

The Barcarii
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#58
The one who would had more courage and mental strength,experience(and I bealive the late roman soldier saw some real action far more often then his predecesors from much more stabile times)and with Better commander that day.Difference in equipment would be adding only very slightly if both armies would wear their best things to such battle.
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#59
I would vote for the roman army of the Principate because the roman armies of the late antiquity were only roman army in name.
"Quintili Vare, legiones redde!“

Augustus when heard of Varus his defeat at the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest.
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#60
Well, unless the Principate Romans were as fearsome as the skeleton warriors in the OLD Jason and the Argonauts, the Late Romans would win. The Principates were all dead and buried. Heh.
Confusedilly:

Problem is, the style of fighting was different. It's an even chance. Whoever got the upper hand in the first few minutes would decide the day.
M. Demetrius Abicio
(David Wills)

Saepe veritas est dura.
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