Late Roman Army during the 5th century

[Robert Vermaat]

Rather than trying to throw people into the army, in fact there was a whole raft of people who were excluded from recruitment. In AD 370 we have laws exempting Imperial estates providing recruits, and restrictions on recruits drawn from a whole range of social groups. A law of 407 exempted tribunes and praepositi from providing recruits from their estate. Another of 423 exempted decurions and silentiaries. Some palatini and agents in rebus were also exempt.

Add to that the church and increasing difficulties of the state to enforce payment of taxes from the wealthy.

Certainly the late Roman army made use of “barbarians” but the army always had used such soldiers. After the non Roman auxiliaries were assimilated into the legions there was a greater need of foederati with their own internal organisations.

Federates were used as sources of manpowweer as well as border control, but they came indeed with their own organisations and thus problems. External 'mercenary' troops were especially sought after as 'temps'- raised fast, dismisssed after the campaign, and used more andd more. Eventually they replaced the army in the West.

Late 4th century limitanei appear to have enjoyed a salary roughly equivalent to their Hadrianic brethren. In pure cash terms they were paid less, but received food and equipment on top of this. They were certainly paid better than their late 2nd and early 3rd century counterparts who suffered from Empire-wide inflation and the debasement of currency.

It seems that the total amount in moneey, land or goods did not differ too much over the ccenturies, but the various amounts differed: sometimes more money and less goods, sometimes the other way around.

[starman2012]

You could try and level a charge of the late army finding it hard to recruit, but it is hard to make stick even considering the greater size of the army compared to the early Imperial period.

Goldsworthy raised doubts about the supposedly larger size of the late army.

Rather I suspect the charge that it is hard to recruit soldiers is a constant refrain through history, up to and including today.

Compare the Rome of the punic wars with the one under siege in 410 CE. A city of perhaps half a million people couldn't raise enough troops to deal with maybe 30,000.

Rather than trying to throw people into the army, in fact there was a whole raft of people who were excluded from recruitment. In AD 370 we have laws exempting Imperial estates providing recruits, and restrictions on recruits drawn from a whole range of social groups. A law of 407 exempted tribunes and praepositi from providing recruits from their estate. Another of 423 exempted decurions and silentiaries. Some palatini and agents in rebus were also exempt.

Can this explain a near-total reliance on people from beyond the frontiers? Many people couldn't serve in republican times, prior to Marius (couldn't meet the property qualification) , but republican armies did rather well. :wink:

Certainly the late Roman army made use of “barbarians” but the army always had used such soldiers. After the non Roman auxiliaries were assimilated into the legions there was a greater need of foederati with their own internal organisations. Marcus Aurelius had already recruited slaves, gladiators and robbers into the army. Plague in the Antonine period meant more mercenaries were employed. A large list of foreign units serving with the third century army can be put together.

There's a difference between foreigners or barbarians making up part of the army and comprising virtually all of it.

Late 4th century limitanei appear to have enjoyed a salary roughly equivalent to their Hadrianic brethren. In pure cash terms they were paid less, but received food and equipment on top of this. They were certainly paid better than their late 2nd and early 3rd century counterparts who suffered from Empire-wide inflation and the debasement of currency.

So evidently pay wasn't the problem.

Rather than a steady decline I see an army developing by the end of the 4th century into perhaps the first “modern” army in the way we understand such terms.

Didn't seem to fare too well for all that. mile:

[Flavivs Aetivs]

Judging by the revenue generated form Africa before the loss (around 1.3 million solidi based on figures from the law of 445) prior to the loss of Africa this most likely wouldn't have been a problem. The army didn't dissapear until after the loss of Africa (and even then it wasn't all lost until after 455; Tripolitania still generated as much output as numidia did prior to the loss, and the 3 Mauretanias were still there). My point is that witht he funding the WRE could have (and probably did) pay their army in coins before the loss. After that most became personal Bucellarii to Aetius and the other self-serving Gallic Possesores.

EDIT: This was supposed ot quote Robert's statement. Stupid Keyboard.

[starman2012]

Judging by the revenue generated form Africa before the loss (around 1.3 million solidi based on figures from the law of 445) prior to the loss of Africa this most likely wouldn't have been a problem.

Very interesting, thank you.

The army didn't dissapear until after the loss of Africa (and even then it wasn't all lost until after 455;

Somehow Majorian c 460 scraped up enough to put together a credible force which unfortunately for him, was "preempted." I believe the west also made a contribution to the 468 effort, which fared no better.

Tripolitania still generated as much output as numidia did prior to the loss, and the 3 Mauretanias were still there).

Sure due to the treaty of 442.

My point is that witht he funding the WRE could have (and probably did) pay their army in coins before the loss.

So that's further evidence that (at least prior to 439) pay wasn't the problem. The WRE became effete for some other reason(s).

[Nathan Ross]

Goldsworthy raised doubts about the supposedly larger size of the late army.

I'd be interested to know more about those doubts. Granted, army numbers in any ancient source need to be taken with considerable salt, but most sources I've come across seem to accept that the later army (at least in the 4th century) was larger.

Didn't seem to fare too well for all that. mile: ... The WRE became effete for some other reason(s).

Comparing the later army with that of the principiate is perhaps a little skewed - their military and political situations were very different. From the third century on, the empire faced massive and sustained pressure on all its frontiers, often simultaneously - coupled with periodic internal collapse, it's not surprising that the army didn't fare so well!

But this matter of reluctant recruits clearly goes back at least to Constantine, and the army of Constantine was one of the most effective in Rome's history. So either the reluctance is overplayed in the sources, or it was always a problem and the army had ways of coping with it.

But if comparison is allowed, it might be worth considering some of the failures of the army even its earlier and more glorious days. As an example - during the reign of Domitian there were successive military disasters on the Danube: in AD84 a governor (Oppius Sabinus) was killed in battle and his army routed by the Dacians. The following year a second commander (Praetorian Praefect Cornelius Fuscus) was also killed and his force annihiliated at Tapae. Six years after that a legion (possibly XXI Rapax) was completely destroyed by the Sarmatians. In the midst of all this, two legions mutinied on the Rhine in support of their commander Saturninus, who had made a deal with the Chatti.

All these reverses were absorbed and countered, but if the enemy had possessed the strength and motivation of their third and fourth century descendents, the results could have been catastrophic. In other words, the Roman army was never infallible, but while the adversaries of an earlier day were unable to capitalise on their successes, those of the later era could and did - the later army only had to fail once for disaster to ensue. Whether this makes them 'effete' or not is another question... :wink:

[ValentinianVictrix]

To avoid these inconveniences, the young men enlist in the auxiliaries, where the service is less laborious and they have reason to expect more speedy recompenses.'

Another reason to distrust Vegetius - the 'auxxiliaries' were no longer in existance by the time he wrote (whether that was the later 4th or the later 5th c.). These differences between both services no longer applied in the Late Roman army.

I'm not sure I agree with you on this Robert. Auxilliaries are mentioned a number of times in Ammianus, both in the context of auxilia units and also as foreign mercenaries hired for the occasion i.e. the 'Sythian Auxilliaries' with Julian on his Sasanid campaign, the 'Taifali auxilliaries' who Constantius II approached for assistance against the 'Free Sarmatians' and the 'Limogantes', these are just a couple of examples. I am sure I have read in my collection that those who enrolled in the auxilia units were not expected to perform the non-combat roles that the Legiones were expected to perform i.e. building camps and roads. I believe Heather noted that an infantryman in an auxilia unit received higher pay than those in the Legiones, and there was no obligation for your son to serve in the auxilia when you retired.

I agree that the difference between the roles of the legiones and auxila units on the battlefield may have been almost the same by the Late Roman period, not withstanding Vegetius stating that they were best posted on the wings of the Legiones. Auxilia units also appear to have formed the reserve forces at Argentoratum and Adrianopolis.

[starman2012]

I'd be interested to know more about those doubts. Granted, army numbers in any ancient source need to be taken with considerable salt, but most sources I've come across seem to accept that the later army (at least in the 4th century) was larger.

In his How Rome Fell Goldsworthy considers the Notitia Dignitatum unreliable, and the apparent lack of resistance to various incursions evidence that much strength was just on paper.

Comparing the later army with that of the principiate is perhaps a little skewed - their military and political situations were very different. From the third century on, the empire faced massive and sustained pressure on all its frontiers, often simultaneously - coupled with periodic internal collapse, it's not surprising that the army didn't fare so well!

It fared well enough prior to c 408.

But if comparison is allowed, it might be worth considering some of the failures of the army even its earlier and more glorious days.....All these reverses were absorbed and countered, but if the enemy had possessed the strength and motivation of their third and fourth century descendents, the results could have been catastrophic.

They threatened to be catastrophic in the second century. The barbarians took advantage of weakness caused by the parthian war and plague and got as far as Italy. But Marcus restored the situation everywhere.

In other words, the Roman army was never infallible, but while the adversaries of an earlier day were unable to capitalise on their successes, those of the later era could and did - the later army only had to fail once for disaster to ensue.

It appears the key difference between the fifth century and earlier times was the lack of resilience. As you note, the Romans had always suffered severe setbacks. But they always bounced back admirably--until about 409 CE or so. Look at the terrible defeats of the mid third century, and the enemy successes--the deep, devastating raids--along key frontiers. But by 300 CE the Romans had recovered very well in the East and elsewhere. The old resilience since Cannae or earlier, was still there. For some reason, the fifth century western empire was different. It just couldn't summon the strength (i.e. of its own) to crush enemies settled on its own territory, or prevent a progressive erosion of its position.

[Renatus]

I am sure I have read in my collection that those who enrolled in the auxilia units were not expected to perform the non-combat roles that the Legiones were expected to perform i.e. building camps and roads.

You may be thinking of Ammianus 18.2.6. When Julian was restoring the defences of a number of cities on the Rhine in AD359, '. . . the auxiliary soldiers (auxiliarii milites), who always disdain such tasks, induced to diligent compliance by Julian's fair words, willingly carried on their shoulders timbers fifty feet or more in length, and in the work of building rendered the greatest service' (Loeb translation).

[Lothia]

Ave Civitas,

I recommend you look at Michael Grant's Fall of the Roman Empire. He presents thirteen reasons for the collapse, one, People Against the Army, touches on this topic. Very informative read.

Tom

[starman2012]

People Against the Army,

Why, and why presumably c 400 and later?

[Flavivs Aetivs]

I would argue that the Notitia Dignitatum was an Ideal organization of the Army listing paper strength units; the army itself probably only numbered around 90,000 in the West, and about 12000 in the East (Paper Strength). This is supported by the fact that the Western Empire had to cut off pay to ~~30000 troops after 439, and probably only had around 30000 left afterwards (about 5000 in Italy based on some later figures under Ricimerus, enough in Illyria to conquer Italy absed on Marcellinus' claims, and about 12000 in Gaul with Aetius consisting of Private Retainers [Bucellarii], remnants of the Field armies and Palatina units, and pseudocomitatenses [re-purposed Limitanei])

The west fell because of money - the west never had the money to sustain an adequate defense force without help from the Eastern Empire's rich provinces of Egypt and Anatolia.

As for the mention of Auxilia, have you considered Vegetius is just referencing the Limitanei using a different word? It was easier in the Limitanei and they often settled down in the area they were stationed (a problem in that day for the army when mobility was considered important) in the communities that sprung up outside the forts.

[starman2012]

The west fell because of money - the west never had the money to sustain an adequate defense force without help from the Eastern Empire's rich provinces of Egypt and Anatolia.

Dunno where Majorian got the money for his force of c 460, or what might've been accomplished had it not been "preempted" by Geiseric. Anyway, the Western Roman Empire of 445 CE was roughly comparable in geographical extent to the Roman republic at the start of the second punic war. Resources may have been comparable. Strange that the republic could field enormous armies, and ultimately overcome a more formidable opponent than Geiseric. Times sure had changed.

[Flavivs Aetivs]

The west fell because of money - the west never had the money to sustain an adequate defense force without help from the Eastern Empire's rich provinces of Egypt and Anatolia.

Dunno where Majorian got the money for his force of c 460, or what might've been accomplished had it not been "preempted" by Geiseric. Anyway, the Western Roman Empire of 445 CE was roughly comparable in geographical extent to the Roman republic at the start of the second punic war. Resources may have been comparable. Strange that the republic could field enormous armies, and ultimately overcome a more formidable opponent than Geiseric. Times sure had changed.

The difference was that the Empire had the massive infrastructure of Gaul and Italy to maintain, along with a professional army rather than a Militia Army. In the republic you supplied your own equipment while in the Late Empire massive fabricae supplied rather standardized equipment for the whole army.

Not only that, but in the Republican Era most of the Farming was in italy - in the 3rd century agriculture began moving to Syria and Proconsularis/Numidia/Tripolitania. I read a lot about that in "Empires and barbarians" although I don't remember exactly why.

[starman2012]

The difference was that the Empire had the massive infrastructure of Gaul and Italy to maintain, along with a professional army rather than a Militia Army. In the republic you supplied your own equipment while in the Late Empire massive fabricae supplied rather standardized equipment for the whole army.

I think the main difference was a reluctance to serve, for whatever reason(s). Massive infrastructure and fabricae had been in existence for some time, and professional armies go back to Augustus. The Empire seemed resilient enough with all these down to 300 CE at least.

Not only that, but in the Republican Era most of the Farming was in italy - in the 3rd century agriculture began moving to Syria and Proconsularis/Numidia/Tripolitania.

From what I've read, Egypt had already become the granary of Rome in/by the first century. Not only was Vespasian said to have gained an edge by "capturing Egypt and controlling its grain supply" the original deployment of legions in Syria was said to reflect concern for the safety of Egypt, given its importance. I don't perceive a correlation between reliance on nonItalian agriculture and military impotence. The Empire was pretty strong most of that time.

[Flavivs Aetivs]

The difference was that the Empire had the massive infrastructure of Gaul and Italy to maintain, along with a professional army rather than a Militia Army. In the republic you supplied your own equipment while in the Late Empire massive fabricae supplied rather standardized equipment for the whole army.

I think the main difference was a reluctance to serve, for whatever reason(s). Massive infrastructure and fabricae had been in existence for some time, and professional armies go back to Augustus. The Empire seemed resilient enough with all these down to 300 CE at least.

Not only that, but in the Republican Era most of the Farming was in italy - in the 3rd century agriculture began moving to Syria and Proconsularis/Numidia/Tripolitania.

From what I've read, Egypt had already become the granary of Rome in/by the first century. Not only was Vespasian said to have gained an edge by "capturing Egypt and controlling its grain supply" the original deployment of legions in Syria was said to reflect concern for the safety of Egypt, given its importance. I don't perceive a correlation between reliance on nonItalian agriculture and military impotence. The Empire was pretty strong most of that time.

Egypt Remained important; what i'm saying is that Agriculture moved out of italy.

The Fabricae were not mentioned at all until the late 4th century; Prior to the 4th century as far as we know local manufacturers supplied armor and weapons to the legions.

The Army had to increase it's size by approximately 1/3rd when the Sassanid Empire came about in (238?). That's what caused the collapse of the 3rd century. It wasn't good for buisness to be in Italy. People shifted over itme ot better agricultural areas. The loss of africa meant the loss of revenue - Africa produced about 2-3 million Solidi prior to the loss. (3 million solidi would have supported an army of 90000 based on a rate of 30 solidi per annum). The Empire was faring just fine until they lost africa - prior to the loss of Africa there was still a chance to recover the Empire.