High Imperial Roman army vs Late Roman army

[Frank]

Those numbers are impossibly large. Accurate estimates of the Roman Army put it at around 90,000 in the west and 120,000 in the East based on the Notitia,...

Do you mean field army without limitanei with these numbers? The estimations based on the Notitia Dignitatum differ greatly. The problem is, that we do not know the paper strength of the several units. Was a cohors, ala, vexillatio, ... 1000, 500, 300 or even just 80 men? Was a legio 1000, 1200, 2000 or even 3000 men?, and so on ...

With all due respect, a number of 400,000 men at Adrionople is as absurd as 300,000 Romans at Chalons.

Not 400.000 at Adrianople, 400.000-600.000 men means total number of all soldiers in the west- and east empire together. And we are talking about the time pre-Adrianopel.

[Robert Vermaat]

Hmm, maybe we need a new thread about Adrianople?

[Frank]

Hmm, maybe we need a new thread about Adrianople?

I am sure we would find a lot of older threads, we could revive.

My intention was just to propose, that we do not mix up different eras of the late roman army. Because the roman army in the East and the West was in a very different shape according to these eras. I usually distinguish between:

1. From Diokletian/Constantin until 378/394
2. The West from 394-476
3. The East from 378 until Anastasius (~500)
4. The East from Anastasius to Herakleios (~640)

It is highly questionable, if it makes sense at all, to compare the early imperial army with the late roman army. But if we really like to compare and discuss changes in equipment, organization and formations, the phase 1 above makes perhaps most sense.

[Timianus]

What I don't understand is the conflict in Heathers book between the numbers he assumes about the roman army in total and at Adrianopel. Ancient and modern historians estimate 400.000-600.000 soldiers for the roman army pre-Adrianopel. I trend to believe in the smaller 400.000. But Heather claims 600.000. This means authorized (normal) strength not real strength. Authors also assume, that around half of them were limitanei and the army was divided almost equally between East and West.

. . . .
However, Heathers huge army of overall 600.000 men and his small field armies of 2 x 10.000 men at Adrianopel does not match.

I find the numbers game to be very confusing, even aside from the paper vs real strength. Are we talking about limitanei or permanent field army? Do those figures reflect every unit that was on the payroll or active combat troops [not the same in this period. My understanding is that a lot of "official" positions were technically part of a military unit]?

That said, to me the actual numbers are not what is important; what is important is the actual effect the loss had. Whatever the exact numbers, based upon the Romans' inability to contain the Goths after this period, Theodisius' inability to defeat them decisively in battle, the very favorable terms of the subsequent treaty, and the heavy recruitment of goths and use of federates thereafter, there can be no doubt in my mind that whatever the actual numbers, the Romans lost a sizeable portion of their combat troops at Adrianople and that this loss had a significant impact on 1) recruitment; 2) their ability to protect the borders; and 3) Roman-Goth relations.

If Heather is right about his 20.000 men at Adrianopel, then something is wrong with the shiny and glorious empire without any major decay, he describes in the first chapter of his book.

That is a whole different topic.

[Marja]

Warren Treadgold is probably the leading advocate of the 'high count' for the 3rd-5th century Roman army, although he uses a 'low count' for the 3rd-5th century Roman population. His book Byzantium and its Army, 284-1081 focuses on the east, but probably explains the numbers game better than anyone else; unfortunately, he doesn't cover the effects of Hadrianopolis in much detail.

It's not entirely clear that the Illyrian army was absent, but when Gratian goes east with a small force, I suspect he's trying to join up with the Illyrian army.

If we take Constantine's reorganization as the starting point, there are a whole series of major shocks in the following decades: first the civil war between Constantius II and Magnentius, second the Persian War, with Tomlin and Hoffman arguing for reorganizations afterwards, third the Gothic War, and on its heels the civil war between Theodosius and Magnus Maximus, and fifth the civil war between Theodosius and Eugenius, with the new Theodosian units in the Notitia either newly-formed or reorganized or replacing old units... I'm leaving out several smaller civil wars, border wars, etc.

[Domen]

there was no longer an unlimited resource of soldiers, meaning large battles could no longer be risked as much.

Are you sure about this Robert? Let's remember that during times of Diocletian and Constantine (late 3rd and early 4th centuries AD) the Roman army was bigger than ever before this period. But it is true that they also divided the army for limitanei (border troops) and comitatenses (field army) for better protection of borders and halting enemy invasions already in the borderland, rather than allowing the enemy to penetrate deeply into own territory and plunder the countryside and towns. Perhaps more than half of the entire army were limitanei, the main task of which was defending borderland regions.

Different armies for different times. What changed was that due to a changing society, demographics and politics,

One very important reason for Roman military reforms during the timeframe between Diocletian and Constantine was also because the Roman army had to adjust itself to the Persian army after the takeover of power by the Sassanids and the military reforms of the Persian army carried out by Shapurs I and II. The Sassanid army - especially after those reforms - was significantly different than the Parthian army. Not only had Shapurs I and II greatly increased the numerical strength of heavy cavalry as compared to Parthians, but they also improved both melee and missile infantry and increased their numbers:

http://romanarmytalk.com/rat/7-off-topic...=60#336122

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Regarding the size of the Roman army in late 3rd / early 4th centuries:

The Roman Empire had ca. 435,266 soldiers (including 45,262 in the Navy) in the beginning (most probably) of Diocletian's reign (according to Joannes Lydus Laurentius - his numbers are so precise that they are probably from some official document) and around 645,000 in the early 5th century CE (according to Agathias Myrinae), probably after tetrarchy and reforms of Constantine. However, these are most likely numbers "on paper" rather than in reality according to the book "Amida 359" by Tomasz Szeląg (and also according to A.H.M. Jones) and Szeląg estimates the real number as 450,000 including around 200,000 in the field army and the rest as garrison troops, Navy, etc. ("Amida 359", page 79). Other estimations say 500,000 (C. Zuckermann), 400,000 (A. Cameron).

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However, Heathers huge army of overall 600.000 men and his small field armies of 2 x 10.000 men at Adrianopel does not match.

Remember, that field army was less than 50% of all forces. And 600.000 men was surely not the actual size of the Roman army, but could be its size "on paper" only. Real strength could never be 100% of "paper strength", for various reasons - both "natural" (such as casualties, diseases, leaves / passes, deaths, desertions, etc.) and other reasons - such as cheating regarding the number of soldiers in order to receive more supplies, more money as soldier's pay for a particular unit, etc., etc.

And of course not entire field army could be gathered for a single campaign at one given point in time. But Adrianople is not the best example. For his invasion of Persia in 363 AD, Emperor Julian gathered over 80,000 soldiers and further 20,000 sailors in the fleet (the Roman fleet - 1000 ships - in this invasion sailed along the Euphrates). When Julian destroyed his fleet, they reinforced the army.

Garrison of just one of Roman border fortresses - Amida - had 10,000 troops during the siege in 359 AD.

[Timianus]

If we take Constantine's reorganization as the starting point, there are a whole series of major shocks in the following decades: first the civil war between Constantius II and Magnentius, second the Persian War, with Tomlin and Hoffman arguing for reorganizations afterwards, third the Gothic War, and on its heels the civil war between Theodosius and Magnus Maximus, and fifth the civil war between Theodosius and Eugenius, with the new Theodosian units in the Notitia either newly-formed or reorganized or replacing old units... I'm leaving out several smaller civil wars, border wars, etc.

Do we have any idea what the losses in those wars were? Also, I know that Theodisius "de-nuded" the frontier of liminati to bolster his numbers before Frigidus. Is there any indication that Stilicho returned the pseudo-comitatenses to border-guard status, or were they just incorporated into the field army?

[Flavivs Aetivs]

Yes, you have to remember that border troops were constantly made into field-army units. And Iw as referring to both Limitanei and Comitatenses/Palantines

[Marja]

Do we have any idea what the losses in those wars were?

Not really.

I think Zosimus claims there were enormous losses at Mursa, and the troops transferred from Gallia and lost at Mursa and other battles may have contributed to the collapse of the Rhine frontier, that prompted Constantius II to appoint Iulianus. I just think that the Persian war probably involved worse losses than the Gothic war, and the major civil wars would also be important.

Is there any indication that Stilicho returned the pseudo-comitatenses to border-guard status, or were they just incorporated into the field army?

I don't think all the pseudocomitatenses were the same. Some of the pseudo-comitatenses seem to correspond with border units from territories the Romans had surrendered, particularly to the Persians. Others seem to be local garrisons in the interior rather than mobile units. Some of the pseudo-comitatenses may have been unusual/nonstandard units otherwise equivalent to the comitatenses.

[Flavivs Aetivs]

I think some units pseudo-comitatenses were permanently assigned to the field armies, and were units with specific tasks that would be impossible for the whole army (i.e. Ambushes, defending the camp while the rest of the Army was out in Battle, etc)

[Theodosius the Great]

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I would answer to this question in a simpler manner :

For the ennemies of Rome in high imperial times, the high imperial army was better.

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I suspect the late Roman army was better suited for mountain warfare than the army of the principate. The Cantabrian Wars of Augustus in Spain lasted 10 years with he himself taking personal command at certain points. Eight legions plus auxiliaries were required to conclude the conquest of Spain in that small portion of the peninsula. Why? The disparity of resources and time required to do so compared with Caesar's conquest of Gaul is startling.

I wonder if the reason the wars were prolonged was because Augustus had to retrain his legions for mountain warfare. (Concurrently, Augustus had completed the conquest of the Alps.)

In the later eastern empire there were the unconquered mountain tribes of the Isaurians. Why the later Romans never conquered the area isn't clear to me. The tribes were a nuissance but I suppose there were higher priorities demanding the Romans' attention. Unlike the Catanbrian Wars of Augustus I suppose such a prospect wasn't profitable.

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I trend to agree about the discipline. There are just too many hints, how the emperors were enforced to pamper the soldiers in order to secure their reign and survive at all.

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I think the later western army had also lost some disipline even before the battles of the Save and Frigidus. The Battle of the Save should have been a relatively easy victory for the western army. Remember it faced the post-Adrianople army of the east which now comprised of second rate Roman troops with Gothic federates. But the western army, unscathed by Adrianople, had a hard time and lost. Why? I have some guesses but I'm curious as to read what others think first. Maybe on another thread though.

~Theo

[Robert Vermaat]

Hi Peter,

Mind your quotes! Not all in your post was claimed by me..

there was no longer an unlimited resource of soldiers, meaning large battles could no longer be risked as much.

Are you sure about this Robert? Let's remember that during times of Diocletian and Constantine (late 3rd and early 4th centuries AD) the Roman army was bigger than ever before this period.

Quite sure. The difficulty of raising new troops and ensuring that recruits reach the army are well-documented. One of the major changes after Adrianople was due to these problems, and army numbers were augmented by trecruiting abroad. Such recruits were admitted into the ranks of the standing army, as well as used as temporary allies (these would not show in the ND of course). Pitched battles were no longer risked because of the recruiting problem.

I see this as one of the major differences between the earlier periods and the Late Roman period. The disaster of Cannae was comparable to that of Adrianople, yet it did not force Rome to fight defensive battles afterwards. Simlarly, the Varus disaster was also comparable, and although it had an impact, it did not force Augustus into a purely defensive strategy afterwards, let alone his successors. The main differece between Cannae/Varus and Adrianople is Roman society, and the (un)willingness of citizens to fight in the army.

Regarding the size of the Roman army in late 3rd / early 4th centuries:
The Roman Empire had ca. 435,266 soldiers (including 45,262 in the Navy) in the beginning (most probably) of Diocletian's reign (according to Joannes Lydus Laurentius - his numbers are so precise that they are probably from some official document)

I have heard other opinions about that seemingly accurate number, but his overall number is comparable to other sources. It would have been nice if he coukld have told us how many of these were limitanei and how many were comitatenses.

[Blake]

Something I have noticed, when putting together lamellar in the method prescribed by Dr. Timothy Dawson is the similarity between Byzantine lamellar and Lorica Segmentata. Given the long military memory of the Romiosi this likeness cannot be coincidental. The similarities are striking in construction, but as the evolution of this type, later metal Byzantine lamellar offers superior protection.

I mention this because although the Empires suffered setbacks in the migration age and late antiquity, we can still see here a progression and improvement in the military. This development of panoply and tactics was necessary because Rome's enemies changed, evolved and improved their ways of war.

[Flavivs Aetivs]

Something I have noticed, when putting together lamellar in the method prescribed by Dr. Timothy Dawson is the similarity between Byzantine lamellar and Lorica Segmentata. Given the long military memory of the Romiosi this likeness cannot be coincidental. The similarities are striking in construction, but as the evolution of this type, later metal Byzantine lamellar offers superior protection.

I mention this because although the Empires suffered setbacks in the migration age and late antiquity, we can still see here a progression and improvement in the military. This development of panoply and tactics was necessary because Rome's enemies changed, evolved and improved their ways of war.

I often wondered if the Alba Iulia depiction of LS with Scale Cuirass was representing a step towards the evolution of LS into Lamellar.

[Marja]

Ioannes Lydus' number [435,266] is sometimes assumed to refer to the beginning of the reign of Diocletian, with Zosimus' and Agathias' [645,000] figures dating to the collapse of the Tetrarchy. Treadgold, for example, takes this view, noting that Ioannes Lydus' number is pretty close to some estimates of Antonine and Severan army strengths.