The 1,000 man legion

[Timotheus]

Look at it this way. You train with your comrades in a tight formation, and you are completely oblivious who is standing ten metres to your left or right. It's not your duty to know. Your commander barks his orders and you carry them out, not knowing if the left flank is victorious or the right flank is turned. You need not worry about that, just about your orders and the enemy in front of you. You may be fighting with 500 or 500 men, it matters not. Just carry out your duties.

Which means the individual soldier may do fine but if you think that commanding 200, 500, 5000, or 15,000 men takes the same skills and same amount things from the officers leading them then this conversation really is pointless

[Paullus Scipio]

A few minor comments:

I would not be too hasty in dismissing Goldsworthy's/John's points....it may well be the case that political reasons were a major factor in the reduction of unit sizes, not to mention that necessary dispersion ( and the aforesaid political factors) led firstly to the disappearance of two-legion bases, ( a process which began following the first major usurpation in 69 A.D. - at the end, Vespasian immediately broke up the two-legion bases on the Rhine and Danube, where Vitellius had proclaimed himself Emperor, purely for political reasons, although spreading the legions out along the fontier was also advantageous militarily).As well, the use of vexillations which seldom returned to their parent units, and the necessity to guard against raiders and hence spread out, all contributed to the evolution of smaller 'legions'/units in the Later Roman Empire.......it is unlikely that a single either/or reason existed, but rather many......Secondly, Robert's point about small units being essentially identically trained ( from the contubernium upward ) is very true. It was Roman Military genius to refine and apply the 'building block' principle to military affairs....large armies were 'built' from smaller components, expeditions could be made up of Legions, Auxiliary pedites and Cavalry as needed - flexibility on a vast scale.
From this flexibility, it is readily apparent that it didn't matter too much for fundamental military reasons what size the the 'Basic' units were. For a field army, units of 500-1000 could come together and operate as well as units of 6.000 to make up an Army of 20-50,000.
Conversely, it didn't matter whether a unit of 500-1,000 was sent to stamp out a 'brush fire', or a similar sized vexillation/sub-unit was detached from a larger parent Legion to do the job.....however, the changing military situation faced by the static Empire meant there were more 'brushfires' than major Wars against other organised states, hence the military reasons for the trend toward smaller 'Basic' units, combined with the political reasons.

Incidentally, this 'building block' principle, as used by Rome's Army is fundamental to all professional Armies since - the Army which crossed on D-Day in 1944 was vast, and had never trained or operated together as a whole before, yet functioned efficiently, nor for that matter had the U.S. Army operated or trained before on such a scale in the two Iraq wars ( for a current example)......

As to Timotheus' point, modern miltary forces do not deploy armies of 50,000 men in order to train the commanders !! Officer training is done by means of TEWTS ( Tactical Exercises Without Troops) and Staff Courses. The 'Basic' unit sizes are immaterial to this ( because any sized hypothetical units can be used). Doubtless the Romans did the same ( though they may not have needed complex Staffs, given the different scale of armies involved....certainly their Staffs seem to have been minimal....but that is a different discussion for another day !

[Marcus_Ulpius_Trajanus]

I think there's been a slight misreading of Goldsworthy here. (Assuming I'm reading the same Goldsworthy.) In his Complete Roman Army, he notes that the field armies were not tied to a region--(I think its more likely that they're not tied to stretch of border) and so moving these formations was less turbulent to the borders than had been the case in the 1st and 2nd centuries.

True, he also questions whether these were true reserves for the empire, (given that they moved no faster than armies ever had) but does suggest that there is 'truth' in that intrepretation. Where he differs is that he suggests that these field armies also provided a powerful tool against usurpers. Actually, what he says is:

"...What is certain is that they provided a powerful military force to protect the emperor from the internal threat of usurpers. Civil wars remained common throughout the late Empire, so that the army's structure was to a great extent intended to guard against threats of this nature."

Which might make sense in terms of regional governors revolting, but I don't think that makes as much sense in terms of the number of the field armies listed in the Notitia Dignitatum.

Take for example the numbers in the field army in Eastern half of the Empire:
Army of the Emperor's Presence I; 21,000 (in Anatolia)
Army of the Emperor's Presence II; 21,000 (in Anatolia)
Army of the East; 20,000 (in Syria)
Army of Thrace; 24,500 (in Thrace)
Army of Illyricum; 17,500 (in Illyricum)

They're basically all the same size.

And then compare them to the regional border garrisons:
Moesia I;12,500
Dacia ripenses; 11,500
Moesia II; 10,500
Scythia; 9,000
Armenia; 16,000
Mesopotamia; 9,000
Osrhonene; 10,500
Syria; 9,000
Phoenice; 14,000
Arabia; 13,000
Palestine; 16,500
Egypt; 25,500
Thebaid; 22,500
Libya; 13,000
(numbers all cribbed from Warren Treadgold's "Byzantium and its Army: 284-1081")

On a paper strength level, any one field army can pretty much handle any one border army, but that's about it. All it would take for this to go wrong is for more than one border army (or field army) to declare against the reigning emperor, and you're back to the same problem.

I think it only really makes sense in terms of delegation of authority and areas of operations. The border duxes and so on had their responsibilities and the field armies were available as expeditionary forces for whatever purpose, whether that's to help repel an incursion, go chastise somebody beyond the border, or put down a revolt. The field armies are a flexible repsonse tool.

Now, how do these Late Roman field army numbers compare to armies of the 1st-2nd century?

Varus' expedition--3 legions plus auxiliares, which is usually supposed to be around 30,000 men, using the rule of thumb that number of auxiliaries equals the number of legionaries. I think its probably less. More than 15,000, less than 30,0000.

Arrian's expedition:
2 legions, and about 10 auxiliary formations. Not quite 1 to 1 correspondence between legionaires and auxiliaries, so I'll guestimate about 15,000 men.

So for two actual expeditionary forces, for which we can posit actual numbers, we don't see a lot of difference in strength from (at least the paper strength of) Late Roman field armies.

Anyone want to contribute any more numbers?

[Ironhand]

In numbers yes somewhat, strength no. The security, strategy, and liberties of previous eras were gone. Rome previously had some good scraps against large numbers of enemies, but for the most part they were pretty secure in their power and could employ a majority of strength against whatever enemy came up. Cultural dynamics had changed greatly with the migrations and forced banding together for protection of previously smaller tribal groups. Rome had too many wolves at the border and within and even with previous strength in numbers it was no longer enough. Even in the East where Rome was at its strongest the enemies they faced had massive armies and it was more about maintenance than conquest and mass battles had to be fought selectively. Rome adapted admirably to the changes and in some ways they were at their height strategically and militarily, however their time was passing and no culture is imprevious to a similar falling even if the manner is different.

[Timotheus]

I think there's been a slight misreading of Goldsworthy here. (Assuming I'm reading the same Goldsworthy.) In his Complete Roman Army, he notes that the field armies were not tied to a region--(I think its more likely that they're not tied to stretch of border) and so moving these formations was less turbulent to the borders than had been the case in the 1st and 2nd centuries.

True, he also questions whether these were true reserves for the empire, (given that they moved no faster than armies ever had) but does suggest that there is 'truth' in that intrepretation. Where he differs is that he suggests that these field armies also provided a powerful tool against usurpers. Actually, what he says is:

"...What is certain is that they provided a powerful military force to protect the emperor from the internal threat of usurpers. Civil wars remained common throughout the late Empire, so that the army's structure was to a great extent intended to guard against threats of this nature."

I am quoting information from "Roman Warfare" by Goldsworthy. The pages relevant are 170 to 171.

"Traditionally it was assumed that this trend towards troop concentration with the Empire supplied a need for strategic reserve, allowing the Emperor to cope with hostile incursions .... This view is not supported by the evidence. ... Severus came to power after a long civil war and his need for personal security was probably the main reason for the creation of an army in Italy."

The explanation here is quite clear. Large central to Italy reserve armies existed to give Emperors an iron fist to smash usurpers.

[Timotheus]

A few minor comments:

As to Timotheus' point, modern miltary forces do not deploy armies of 50,000 men in order to train the commanders !! Officer training is done by means of TEWTS ( Tactical Exercises Without Troops) and Staff Courses. The 'Basic' unit sizes are immaterial to this ( because any sized hypothetical units can be used). Doubtless the Romans did the same ( though they may not have needed complex Staffs, given the different scale of armies involved....certainly their Staffs seem to have been minimal....but that is a different discussion for another day !

My point was that especially in the day before war colleges and advanced simulation knowing your troops and your fellow officers would be an invaluable asset on the battlefield.

Given equal terrain and equal equipment a principate legion of 6000 men who have travelled and fought under the same general. Knows what he expects, whose officers know how to interpret his commands and how to react and fit within his strategic style when forced to think on the fly are going to always be better and more efficient than taking six 1000 man legions and throwing them together before the battle and expecting them to perform as well.

This point was only relevant to the idea that lots of little units would then be less useful in the east where dealing with small tribal barbarian raiders would be much less of an issue and dealing with much larger Persian excusions much more likely.

[Robert Vermaat]

Hi Paul,

I would not be too hasty in dismissing Goldsworthy's/John's points....it may well be the case that political reasons were a major factor in the reduction of unit sizes

We agree, politics should not be denied a role, but I was addressing some ‘facts’. Robert (the other one) already pointed out that the armies at the disposal of the emperor were not larger than those commanded by his general, as was claimed. Neither were the armies much smaller than the armies used by Roman commanders of the republic and the Principate, as John claimed. See my rebuttal to John and the list of numbers below.

Excellent points about the Roman ‘building block’ principle btw. I wish I could have made my point so eloquently.


Hi John,

I'm of the opinion that Goldswothy was mistaken. So far I've not seen any proof of such a claim that the LR army was changed for political reasons instead of strategical ones. Nicasie makes a lot more sense than Goldsworthy!
_________________

I believe Goldsworthy's conclusions are logical given the facts he presents. The armies of the late empire were smaller than earlier periods.

Robert (the other one) already demonstrated in this thread that this is not a fact. If Goldsworthy actually says so than he’s thoroughly mistaken. See the list below.

By practice, Roman Emperors of the period almost never entrusted larger formations to anyone but themselves, and, when they did, they inevitably created generals who then got "royal" aspirations. It is logical to suppose that no Roman emperor was intersted in doing this. After the history of the 1st and 2nd centuries where Roman generals regularly pretended to the throne, can we blame them? Even entrusting a member of one's own family was dangerous.

That is not a fact. hock: Did Goldsworthy actually write that??? How many emperors after Constantine actually took the field with their troops? Take a look at Robert’s list of armies, and mine below, which shows large armies under the command of emperors and generals alike. How could this even be a ‘fact’? It would mean that only the emperor commanded large armies, which we know they did not.

Throughout Roman history, generals attempt to take the throne. Only during the 3rd c. this really became an epidemic, with commanders as low as the level of cohorts taking the opportunity. But apparently, as we can see from the numbers, this did not really influence the numbers in an army. And therefore I reject the notion that it influenced the numbers in a unit.

Another point is ignored too, and that is that this ultimately weakened the flexibility of the Army and its ability to meet threats. This made the Empire vulnerable in the long run. By the time of the late Empire, the political entity of Rome, that was able to lose 50,000 men in one day and still come back swinging, was long gone.

Very true, recruitment was an ever increasing problem for the Roman army, because a) it increased in number (and therefore needed more recruits), b) every person in the empire had become a Roman citizen (and therefore the lure of the army decreased), c) the empire was under threat (decreasing the lure of booty to be gained from conquered enemies).

But all this has no bearing whatsoever on decreasing the numbers of the larger infantry units.

Why does nobody mention that the number of men in a cavalry number actually increased during this same period? :wink:

To enhance Robert’s list, here are some numbers of Late Roman expeditionary armies, led by emperors and generals alike. I say that they do not differ that much from the size of armies from the Republic or Principate.

188.000 - army of Maxentius, 312 AD (Zosimus II.15.2)
165.000 - army of Licinius, 324 AD (Zosimus II.22.1)
130.000 - army of Constantine, 324 (Zosimus II.15.2)
130.000 - army of Licinius at Chrysopolis, 324 (Zosimus II.26)
100.000 - army sent to Africa 457 (Procopius Bella III.6.1)
98.000 - army of Constantine, 312 (Zosimus II.15.1)
70.000 - army of the rebel Gildo, 398 (Orosius VII.36.12)
65.000 - main Roman army in Persia, 363 (Zosimus III.13.1)
50.000 - garrison of Egypt, 269 (Zosimus I.44.1)
35.000 - army of Licinius at Cibalae, 317/8 (An. Val. I.5.16)
30.000 - army of Macrianus, 261 (SHA, Gall. Duo II.4)
30.000 - army of the magister peditum Barbatio, 357 (Lib. Or. 18.49), Ammianus has it at 25.000 (AM XVI.11.2)
30.000 - army of Procopius, Persia 363 (AM XXIII.3.5)
30.000 - Roman army in Armenia, 543 (Proc. Bella II.24.16)
25.000 - army of Galerius in Persia, 298 (Festus Brev. XXV)
23.000 - army of Julian, 360 (Zosimus III.10.2)
20.000 - army of Constantine at Cibalae, 317/8 (An. Val. I.5.16)
20.000 - army of Vetriano, 350 (Jul. Or. 2.77B)
20.000 - army of Procopius, Persia 363 (Lib. Or. 18.214) though Zosimus has it at 18.000 (Zosimus III.12.5) and Malalas at 16.000 (Chron. XIII.21)
20.000 - Roman army in Mesopotamia, 531 (Proc. Bella I.18.5)
15.000 - Roman army in Africa, 533 (Proc. Bella III.11.2)
15.000 - Roman army in Illyria, 548 (Proc. Bella VII.29.3)

[Robert Vermaat]

I think there's been a slight misreading of Goldsworthy here. (Assuming I'm reading the same Goldsworthy.)

Excellent points made here, Robert!

[D B Campbell]

Why does nobody mention that the number of men in a cavalry number actually increased during this same period? :wink:

How so, Robert?

[Timotheus]

I think there's been a slight misreading of Goldsworthy here. (Assuming I'm reading the same Goldsworthy.)

Excellent points made here, Robert!

Actually as I pointed out the quote was from a completely different source than what I was reading at the time. The quote he put up was a rather general statement.

The quote and the pages I mentioned were a much more complete discussion of the topic by Goldsworthy where he lists examples to support his arguement.

[John M McDermott]

188.000 - army of Maxentius, 312 AD (Zosimus II.15.2)
165.000 - army of Licinius, 324 AD (Zosimus II.22.1)
130.000 - army of Constantine, 324 (Zosimus II.15.2)
130.000 - army of Licinius at Chrysopolis, 324 (Zosimus II.26)
100.000 - army sent to Africa 457 (Procopius Bella III.6.1)
98.000 - army of Constantine, 312 (Zosimus II.15.1)
70.000 - army of the rebel Gildo, 398 (Orosius VII.36.12)
65.000 - main Roman army in Persia, 363 (Zosimus III.13.1)
50.000 - garrison of Egypt, 269 (Zosimus I.44.1)
35.000 - army of Licinius at Cibalae, 317/8 (An. Val. I.5.16)
30.000 - army of Macrianus, 261 (SHA, Gall. Duo II.4)
30.000 - army of the magister peditum Barbatio, 357 (Lib. Or. 18.49), Ammianus has it at 25.000 (AM XVI.11.2)
30.000 - army of Procopius, Persia 363 (AM XXIII.3.5)
30.000 - Roman army in Armenia, 543 (Proc. Bella II.24.16)
25.000 - army of Galerius in Persia, 298 (Festus Brev. XXV)
23.000 - army of Julian, 360 (Zosimus III.10.2)
20.000 - army of Constantine at Cibalae, 317/8 (An. Val. I.5.16)
20.000 - army of Vetriano, 350 (Jul. Or. 2.77B)
20.000 - army of Procopius, Persia 363 (Lib. Or. 18.214) though Zosimus has it at 18.000 (Zosimus III.12.5) and Malalas at 16.000 (Chron. XIII.21)
20.000 - Roman army in Mesopotamia, 531 (Proc. Bella I.18.5)
15.000 - Roman army in Africa, 533 (Proc. Bella III.11.2)
15.000 - Roman army in Illyria, 548 (Proc. Bella VII.29.3)

Before we go farther, we might ask which of these armies was commanded by a general and which was commanded by an Emperor?

Also, the preponderance in this list is for armies to be about 20,000.

Also, one is listed as the army of the rebel Gildo, numbering around 70,000.

This, of course, does not even begin to question the accuracy of the numbers, or, how long the "general" in question was allowed to retain command.

Then again, there are lies, damn lies and statistics.

The system of command in the Republic was for the Senate to appoint one of its number to command a Roman Army, regardless of its size. Power was dispersed into the Senate and to some degree to the people by plebiscite.

In the early Principate, Roman Emperors (who didn't necessarily call themselves by that name) appointed family members to command. Later, generals not related to the Emperor, and not necessarily Senators were named by the Emperor to command, and, thus began the period of renegade generals who pretended to the throne.

As the institution of the Senate waned and the last vestiges of Republican power were extinguished, all power came to reside in the Emperor. Any time he appointed a general to command an army, he was allowing power to revert to someone not himself, always an inherently dangerous thing for an Emperor to do. It should also not be forgotten that popular and successful generals could end up dead at the hands of the Emperor.

Lastly, the question ought to be raised as to the quality of troops allowed to be commanded by someone other than the Emperor. Were these armies well funded and well equipped? Was there quality equal to those commanded by the Emperor himself?

I believe Goldsworthy's valid point is that large armies tended to be commanded by the Emperor personally, a by-product of which was that the Emperor himself could be imperiled when a battle was lost.

[Marcus_Ulpius_Trajanus]

I think there's been a slight misreading of Goldsworthy here. (Assuming I'm reading the same Goldsworthy.)

Excellent points made here, Robert!

Thank you, Robert!

[Robert Vermaat]

Why does nobody mention that the number of men in a cavalry number actually increased during this same period? :wink:

How so, Robert?

Ah, darn a typo. I meant to say:
Why does nobody mention that the number of men in a cavalry unit actually increased during this same period?
The :wink: was a give-away: it's from Vegetius (II.6), which means that the number, given in his description of the cavalry of the Legio Antiqua, may not be a reality from Late Roman times.
Neverthelesss, the Principate cavalry had commonly 120-horse alae which supported the legions, plus a number of 500-strong cohortes equitatae.

Later Roman armies still had alae in frontier units (we know 83 units), but the cohortes equitatae were replaced (only two are known from the Notitia Dignitatum) by equites units (of which we know 27). We also know some cunei equitum with the limitanei (47 units), but most units are simply styled equites, of which we know a 123 units along the borders..

The new Late Roman cavalry serving with the new field armies is a new type - the vexillatio. This now purely cavalry unit operated independent from infantry formations in the field armies, and shows how much the cavalry had incresed after Constantine: of the vexillationes palatinae we know 24 units, and of the vexillationes comitatenses we even know 64 units.

All this shows the heavy increase of cavalry units in the Late Roman armies, each possibly larger than the old-style predesessors. The infantry units may have reduced in size, but the cavalry unit showed an opposite development.

[Robert Vermaat]

I believe Goldsworthy's valid point is that large armies tended to be commanded by the Emperor personally, a by-product of which was that the Emperor himself could be imperiled when a battle was lost.

Goldworthy's point is only valid for the period that the emperors take the field. This was the case some times during the 4th c., but it began to change when the emperors got ever younger. During the 5thc., I can't recall any emperor who took the field, with the exception of usurpers who were of course generals.
Most armies were commanded by generals, emperors (when they still did) only took the field during major campaigns.
So as a general point I would say it's invalid.

[John M McDermott]

Goldworthy's point is only valid for the period that the emperors take the field. This was the case some times during the 4th c., but it began to change when the emperors got ever younger. During the 5thc., I can't recall any emperor who took the field, with the exception of usurpers who were of course generals.
Most armies were commanded by generals, emperors (when they still did) only took the field during major campaigns.
So as a general point I would say it's invalid.

Well then, you must have a basis, say a time line, that proves your assertion.

Goldsworthy's observation is still valid to me. It explains the inability of the later Empire to meet military threats at least in part and serves to better explain why Rome "fell".