Thread Rating:
  • 0 Vote(s) - 0 Average
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4
  • 5
The 1,000 man legion
#1
With constant raiding by barbarians across the Empire the legions responded by being shrunk down from massive formations of 5,000 men to smaller 1,000 men units. These units allowed for more rapid response and could be spread out over a larger area to deal with problems.

Was this ever done in the eastern portion of the Empire or was it something strictly done to the legions along the border in the north and west where raiding was a major issue.

It seems to me that this change while it helps when fighting barbarians would have no benefit when facing the Sassanid Persians and would have allt he disadvantages of too many officers and lack of large unit cohesion if used against a large amy like the Persians would be fielding.
Timothy Hanna
Reply
#2
Yes, this was done in the same way in the East. But don't think of this as a controlled reform of the Roman army in which all units were 'modernised'. You could find a few 6000-strong legions next to several of 3000 men of a good number of 1000 men.

I posted this back in April 2006:

Nicasie estimates the following unit strengths:
scholae - 500
legiones (comitatenses) - 1000
legiones (limitanei) - 3000
auxilia palatinae - 800
infantry units (limitanei) - 300
cavalry units (limitanei) - 350

Legions
The traditional legion was 6000 strong. Johannes Lydus also mentions this high number (De Mag. I.46). Vegetius mentions two very strong legions of 6000, but he stresses that legions 'in his day, although the name legion still existed, were much smaller in size.' (I.17, II.3). Vegetius' 'old legion' numbered 10 cohorts, the first numbering 1105 infantry and 132 cavalry, the others 555 and 66, totalling 6100 infantry and 726 cavalry (II.6). However, it is generally assumed that if this organisation ever existed, it probably belonged to the early 3rd century.

It was Mommsen who first noticed that old style legions were probably broken up into 6 detachments of a 1000, each of these commanded by one of the 6 tribunes of the old unit. Only the legions of the limitanei were still commanded by praefecti. Only Nischer proposed that 'new' legions existed of two units of 500, drawn from every border legion, but his theory lacks evidence. However, the Beatty papyrus mentions detachments of 500 men. One vexillatio consisted of 1000 men from legio III Gallica and legio I Illyrica. Another, legio II Traiana, consisted of two 500-men units. Two vexillationes of legio III Diocletiana numbered 1100.

Border legions seems to be much larger than field army legions, because they are usually divided over as much as 7 stations.

When in 359 AD 7 legions (including equites indigenae, two units of superventores, praeventores and comites sagittarii) were trapped at Amida, they numbered 20-25000 men together with the inhabitants and refugees (XIX.2.14). Two of these legions suffered 400 casualties during a sortie (XIX.6.11). If we assume there were 7500 civilians, this hardly allows for more than 1500 per legion, if the garrison was not a legion of 6000 or if there weren't even more civilians than assumed.

All in all, it seems that Late Imperial legions numbered between 1000 and 1200.

Infantry cohorts
During the time of Septimus Severus, a reorganisation apparently resulted in cohorts 550 strong (up from 480), possibly those meant by Vegetius (II.6). But see below.
Ammianus mentions that Julian sent detachments of 300 men from each unit to Constantine (XX.4.2). In 378, Gratian sent detachments of 500 men to storm the position of the Lentienses (XXXI.10.13). Also in 378, Valens sent detachments of 300 from each legion to meet the Goths at Adrianople (XXXI.11.2).
It is thought that some of these detachments never returned to their parent unit but retained the original name (hence the repetition of such names in the Notitia Dignitatum lists). It is also possible that many of the field army units were split up into iuniores and seniores, reducing the original strength of these units.
Infantry units mentioned by Ammianus number 300, 500, 800, 1000 and 1500 (XVII.1.4, XVIII.2.11, XXIV.1.6, XIV.1.2, XXIV.6.4, XXV.6.13-15, XXV.7.3).
Johannes Lydus mentioned cohortes of 300 and vexillationes of 500 (De Mag. I.46).

Cavalry units
The old style alae numbered 500 and seem to have remained that way. On paper at least. On the basis on the Beatty papyri, Duncan Jones calculated that around 300 AD in the Thebaid (Egypt), a unit of equites was 121 strong, an ala 116 and a cohors 164. These may not have been complete units, or else very much understrength.
Nothing much is known about cavalry unit strengths. The ala III Assyriorum was organized in old-style 11 turmae, giving it a possible strength of 350 (ChLA XVIII 660). Ammianus mentions that the cataphracti defeated at Strasbourg were 600 strong, which is echoed by Johannes Lydus who says that alae were that number, and turmae 300 but also 500 (De Mag. I.46). Ammianus also mentions two turmae at Amida numbering 700 together (XVIII.8.2). Procopius has various sizes, between 200 and 800 strong (800: Bella VI.5.1, VI.7.25-6). Some units are larger, between 1000 and 1500, but it is unclear if these are units grouped together, or maybe allied forces (1500: Bella V.27.22-3 and VII.34.42). Maurikios mentions cavalry units should be between 300 and 400, but in any case not less than 200 and not above 400; if understrength, they should be combined.

Finally, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle mentions that in a battle in 457 AD, '4 units' of Britons were destroyed, while another version of the text mentions a number of 4000. (ASC. Laud Chronicle year 456, Parker Chronicle year 457).

Two main conclusions can be drawn of Late Roman units (Nicasie):
a) in practise, the actual number of troops fielded will have been lower than the paper strengths.
b) it seems possible that Late Roman units did not have fixed establishment strengths at all, but varied between a certain minimum and maximum according to need.
Robert Vermaat
MODERATOR
FECTIO Late Romans
THE CAUSE OF WAR MUST BE JUST
(Maurikios-Strategikon, book VIII.2: Maxim 12)
Reply
#3
This makes more sense that 1000 men was the described standard but not an absolute that was 100% enforced. As I mentoned in my initial post while this would work well when dealing with barbarian raiders in Gaul it would be devestating to Roman effectiveness if used against Persia.

It would be like the US Army not having any permanent formation above battalion. So when you needed to form a Corp you just mashed together more and more battalions till you had enough soldiers.
Timothy Hanna
Reply
#4
Quote:This makes more sense that 1000 men was the described standard but not an absolute that was 100% enforced. As I mentoned in my initial post while this would work well when dealing with barbarian raiders in Gaul it would be devestating to Roman effectiveness if used against Persia.
Not at all. The number of men in a single unit were lowered as a standard unit, but that did have no effect on the strenght in a battle. The LR army combined two units (like modern regiments) to form a pair that usually went into battle together. You just have more units in an army, even when the total number remains the same. This reflects a different way of fighting, for which the legion simply was too large. Recall that the large legions aready had begun sending vexilia to other places where men were needed, or lots of vexilia to form expeditionary forces - this practise became the bais for smaller units but was essentially the same.

Modern armies did the same with 'battle groups' (Task Forces, Kampfgruppen), where smaller groups are detatched from a larger force to undertake a specific task. Or does the US army still go into battle with whole divisions? Big Grin
Robert Vermaat
MODERATOR
FECTIO Late Romans
THE CAUSE OF WAR MUST BE JUST
(Maurikios-Strategikon, book VIII.2: Maxim 12)
Reply
#5
Quote:
Timotheus:16bkjhb8 Wrote:This makes more sense that 1000 men was the described standard but not an absolute that was 100% enforced. As I mentoned in my initial post while this would work well when dealing with barbarian raiders in Gaul it would be devestating to Roman effectiveness if used against Persia.
Not at all. The number of men in a single unit were lowered as a standard unit, but that did have no effect on the strenght in a battle. The LR army combined two units (like modern regiments) to form a pair that usually went into battle together. You just have more units in an army, even when the total number remains the same. This reflects a different way of fighting, for which the legion simply was too large. Recall that the large legions aready had begun sending vexilia to other places where men were needed, or lots of vexilia to form expeditionary forces - this practise became the bais for smaller units but was essentially the same.

Modern armies did the same with 'battle groups' (Task Forces, Kampfgruppen), where smaller groups are detatched from a larger force to undertake a specific task. Or does the US army still go into battle with whole divisions? Big Grin


Goldsworthy doesnt agree. He feels that the smaller units made unit cohesion smaller and ment commanders had less experience properly using large forces on the battlefield. One example being Adrianapole. One entire unit could not be found on the battlefield.

1000 man units can be combined into larger units sure. 5 or 6 and you have what used to be a legion. That does not mean those 5000 men know how to align together, communicate, move, or attack as a combined unit the way they did when they were just one unit. Odds are they were only combined into groups that large when a battle required it. It doesnt bode well for an army if the first training some of the men get in fighting together is the battle they are fighting in.
Timothy Hanna
Reply
#6
Quote:
Vortigern Studies:2sclufv0 Wrote:
Timotheus:2sclufv0 Wrote:Modern armies did the same with 'battle groups' (Task Forces, Kampfgruppen), where smaller groups are detatched from a larger force to undertake a specific task. Or does the US army still go into battle with whole divisions? Big Grin

Goldsworthy doesnt agree. He feels that the smaller units made unit cohesion smaller and ment commanders had less experience properly using large forces on the battlefield. One example being Adrianapole. One entire unit could not be found on the battlefield.

1000 man units can be combined into larger units sure. 5 or 6 and you have what used to be a legion. That does not mean those 5000 men know how to align together, communicate, move, or attack as a combined unit the way they did when they were just one unit. Odds are they were only combined into groups that large when a battle required it. It doesnt bode well for an army if the first training some of the men get in fighting together is the battle they are fighting in.

Does he? Then I have to disagree with him. The units of the field armies were in the field for a far greater number of days, working and fighting together, than a legion would have in the days of Hadrian.

besides, this is a matter of training rather than experience of working together. if the training was right, than the practise would be the ssame for each unit, no matter if they were used to each other or not.

And this is proven! Even in the days of the Principate, expeditionary forces were smaller forces, say 500 to a 1000 each (like the Later regiments!) which were drawn from a number of legions. And this was standard practise, so apparently this did in no way diminish their effectiveness in lining up together, communicate, move, or attack as a combined unit the way they did when they were just one unit.

This was the uniqueness of the Roman army - each cohort, each contubernium even, was ready to be snapped into place with whatever unit it was combined with. It did not matter if it was their sister cohort or their parent legion or a totally different one. the orders were the same and every man knew what they were.

Or how do you suppose that a legion trained -? 6000 men on the training grounds every day? Of course not. I'm very surprised that Goldsworthy would have missed this. Confusedhock:
Robert Vermaat
MODERATOR
FECTIO Late Romans
THE CAUSE OF WAR MUST BE JUST
(Maurikios-Strategikon, book VIII.2: Maxim 12)
Reply
#7
I disagree as well. Sounds like a bit too much supposition without strategic grounds. 1000 is a much better number in some ways. The times necessitated a smaller, faster, more mobile fighting force that could deal with a larger variety of situations than just the previous large scale invasions. It also meant you could forage and lodge locally without being as much a drain on provisions and the surrounding provinces. The Huns and the Mongols did this well by dividing into smaller groups that can handle most situations that could raid, scout, spy, forage, move more stealthily and with excellent communication the groups had a lot of play as far as strategy goes. Any large enemy force will move slow enough the unit could attack supply lines, act as diversion, play hit and run warfare, or unite with other groups for a mass battle. 1000 is a more than sufficient number in most cases without being unwieldy or draining and if the situation calls for it more forces can be combined. I have a hard time believing these leaders were as undisciplined and poorly trained as Goldsworthy claims, especially after reading military treatises of the time. Perhaps its another common case of overly idealizing the previous systems.
Derek D. Estabrook
Reply
#8
Quote:
Timotheus:302pyqnx Wrote:
Vortigern Studies:302pyqnx Wrote:
Timotheus:302pyqnx Wrote:Modern armies did the same with 'battle groups' (Task Forces, Kampfgruppen), where smaller groups are detatched from a larger force to undertake a specific task. Or does the US army still go into battle with whole divisions? Big Grin

Goldsworthy doesnt agree. He feels that the smaller units made unit cohesion smaller and ment commanders had less experience properly using large forces on the battlefield. One example being Adrianapole. One entire unit could not be found on the battlefield.

1000 man units can be combined into larger units sure. 5 or 6 and you have what used to be a legion. That does not mean those 5000 men know how to align together, communicate, move, or attack as a combined unit the way they did when they were just one unit. Odds are they were only combined into groups that large when a battle required it. It doesnt bode well for an army if the first training some of the men get in fighting together is the battle they are fighting in.

Does he? Then I have to disagree with him. The units of the field armies were in the field for a far greater number of days, working and fighting together, than a legion would have in the days of Hadrian.

besides, this is a matter of training rather than experience of working together. if the training was right, than the practise would be the ssame for each unit, no matter if they were used to each other or not.

And this is proven! Even in the days of the Principate, expeditionary forces were smaller forces, say 500 to a 1000 each (like the Later regiments!) which were drawn from a number of legions. And this was standard practise, so apparently this did in no way diminish their effectiveness in lining up together, communicate, move, or attack as a combined unit the way they did when they were just one unit.

This was the uniqueness of the Roman army - each cohort, each contubernium even, was ready to be snapped into place with whatever unit it was combined with. It did not matter if it was their sister cohort or their parent legion or a totally different one. the orders were the same and every man knew what they were.

Or how do you suppose that a legion trained -? 6000 men on the training grounds every day? Of course not. I'm very surprised that Goldsworthy would have missed this. Confusedhock:

No they wouldnt have. When legions were 6000 men though their goal was find the enemy engage them in straight up battle and destroy them.

When legion size dropped to 1000 the strategy changed more to hit the enemy when they were nto looking and avoid large scale battle unless it couldnt be avoided.

1000 men no matter how well they train alone are never going to be able to learn how to work as an integrated team. Sure you can "pretend" that the legion on your left is going this and the legion on your right is doing something else and do your part but it will never teach you how to communicate within larger formations. It will not teach you how to deal with the chaos that many men will create. Nor will it teach you how to deal with the number of opponents that a 6000 man legion will face.

Tactics are different for different sized units. A 6000 man legion can split off units to station at other locations for a time when wintering for example and they can learn to work alone. A 1000 man legion located alone or paired with a second legion cannot no matter how hard it tries train to operate as a 6000 man unit. Its just not possible. You cannot pretend yourself the extra 4000 men.
Timothy Hanna
Reply
#9
Quote:I disagree as well. Sounds like a bit too much supposition without strategic grounds. 1000 is a much better number in some ways. The times necessitated a smaller, faster, more mobile fighting force that could deal with a larger variety of situations than just the previous large scale invasions. It also meant you could forage and lodge locally without being as much a drain on provisions and the surrounding provinces. The Huns and the Mongols did this well by dividing into smaller groups that can handle most situations that could raid, scout, spy, forage, move more stealthily and with excellent communication the groups had a lot of play as far as strategy goes. Any large enemy force will move slow enough the unit could attack supply lines, act as diversion, play hit and run warfare, or unite with other groups for a mass battle. 1000 is a more than sufficient number in most cases without being unwieldy or draining and if the situation calls for it more forces can be combined. I have a hard time believing these leaders were as undisciplined and poorly trained as Goldsworthy claims, especially after reading military treatises of the time. Perhaps its another common case of overly idealizing the previous systems.

Either you missed my point or I stated it poorly. I did not say 1000 men from a large scale principate legion would be better than 1000 man legion of the late Empire.

The point made was that smaller legions made legions less effective in large scale battles such as Adrianople. In the Principate the Roman forces would have amounted to 2 legions plus some auxillarly forces. In the late period 14,000 men amounts to over a dozen independent legions not used to working together.

Basically by becoming specialized in small unit combat you lose some effectiveness in very large number combat.

Look at it this way. Spend all your time playing heads up poker. Then go sit at a table with 9 other players. Things are very different and it takes different skills for each one.

The problem is that losing the large scale battle can hurt you a whole lot more than a small battle. The advantage is obviously that smaller units can travel easier, take less logistics, can catch fast moving raiders, and are less of a threat if they support a rival who wants to claim the throne.
Timothy Hanna
Reply
#10
Quote: 1000 men no matter how well they train alone are never going to be able to learn how to work as an integrated team. Sure you can "pretend" that the legion on your left is going this and the legion on your right is doing something else and do your part but it will never teach you how to communicate within larger formations. It will not teach you how to deal with the chaos that many men will create. Nor will it teach you how to deal with the number of opponents that a 6000 man legion will face.
Of course a 1000 men can learn how to work as an integrated team - why shouldn't they?? Confusedhock:

Timothy, you miss the point. A legion does not need to train with 6000 men to learn how to operate as a legion. They did not even have to train with a 1000 men to learn that. The big idea was that they all trained the same and all followed orders. That way it never mattered if they fought as a cohort of 500 or as a cohort 500 among many more cohorts of 500 in an army of 6000 or 20.000. Each unit knew what to do and could in case of a crisis be sent aas a cohort to another legion or a group of vexillated cohorts to form a large army in the field. This was done in the Principate as well as the Late Roman period. You claim it's not possible, but apparently the Romans disagreed with you.

Quote:Tactics are different for different sized units. A 6000 man legion can split off units to station at other locations for a time when wintering for example and they can learn to work alone. A 1000 man legion located alone or paired with a second legion cannot no matter how hard it tries train to operate as a 6000 man unit. Its just not possible. You cannot pretend yourself the extra 4000 men.
Yes, surely tactics vary for a 6000 men or for a 1000 men. that's mainly why the LR army changed unit size, because tactics changed. They no longer needed such large units to fight effectively.

Quote:The point made was that smaller legions made legions less effective in large scale battles such as Adrianople. In the Principate the Roman forces would have amounted to 2 legions plus some auxillarly forces. In the late period 14,000 men amounts to over a dozen independent legions not used to working together.
I totally disagree with that. The training they received made that they could work together just fine, which is proven by battle after battle after battle. Why are you denying that? Just because of one lost battle - Adrianople? the cause for that defeat was absolutely not explained by 'small units not being able to work together'.

Quote:Basically by becoming specialized in small unit combat you lose some effectiveness in very large number combat.
No you don't, as is proven throughout Roman military history.

Quote:Look at it this way. Spend all your time playing heads up poker. Then go sit at a table with 9 other players. Things are very different and it takes different skills for each one.
Look at it this way. You train with your comrades in a tight formation, and you are completely oblivious who is standing ten metres to your left or right. It's not your duty to know. Your commander barks his orders and you carry them out, not knowing if the left flank is victorious or the right flank is turned. You need not worry about that, just about your orders and the enemy in front of you. You may be fighting with 500 or 500 men, it matters not. Just carry out your duties.

Quote:The problem is that losing the large scale battle can hurt you a whole lot more than a small battle. The advantage is obviously that smaller units can travel easier, take less logistics, can catch fast moving raiders, and are less of a threat if they support a rival who wants to claim the throne.
Exactly! That's a few of the reeasons for the 'shrinking' legions. They never lost their effectiveness.[/quote]
Robert Vermaat
MODERATOR
FECTIO Late Romans
THE CAUSE OF WAR MUST BE JUST
(Maurikios-Strategikon, book VIII.2: Maxim 12)
Reply
#11
Quote:
Look at it this way. You train with your comrades in a tight formation, and you are completely oblivious who is standing ten metres to your left or right. It's not your duty to know. Your commander barks his orders and you carry them out, not knowing if the left flank is victorious or the right flank is turned. You need not worry about that, just about your orders and the enemy in front of you. You may be fighting with 500 or 500 men, it matters not. Just carry out your duties.

I agree with Robert here.In formation your focus is on the man in front of you or the advancing enemy.

Training is the key.
Fasta Ambrosius Longus
John

We are not now that strength which in old days
Moved earth and heaven; that which we are, we are
One equal temper of heroic hearts,
Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

[Image: Peditum3.jpg]
Reply
#12
Adrian Goldsworthy made an excellent point in one of his books: The later Roman Army's units were kept small for political reasons, not tactical ones. No Roman emperor of the later period could trust anyone but himself with a large Roman Army, lest he create a rival for the throne. Thus, Roman Armies, and their units, were kept small. The usual army size was 20,000 or less. Armies of 50,000 were commanded only by the Emperor personally. This, also, could lead to catastrophe when an Army commanded by the Emperor was defeated.
"In war as in loving, you must always keep shoving." George S. Patton, Jr.
Reply
#13
Quote:Adrian Goldsworthy made an excellent point in one of his books: The later Roman Army's units were kept small for political reasons, not tactical ones. No Roman emperor of the later period could trust anyone but himself with a large Roman Army, lest he create a rival for the throne. Thus, Roman Armies, and their units, were kept small. The usual army size was 20,000 or less. Armies of 50,000 were commanded only by the Emperor personally. This, also, could lead to catastrophe when an Army commanded by the Emperor was defeated.
I'm of the opinion that Goldswothy was mistaken. So far I've not seen any proof of such a claim that the LR army was changed for political reasons instead of strategical ones. Nicasie makes a lot more sense than Goldsworthy!
Robert Vermaat
MODERATOR
FECTIO Late Romans
THE CAUSE OF WAR MUST BE JUST
(Maurikios-Strategikon, book VIII.2: Maxim 12)
Reply
#14
Agreed. I like the way you think.
Derek D. Estabrook
Reply
#15
Quote:I'm of the opinion that Goldswothy was mistaken. So far I've not seen any proof of such a claim that the LR army was changed for political reasons instead of strategical ones. Nicasie makes a lot more sense than Goldsworthy!
_________________

I believe Goldsworthy's conclusions are logical given the facts he presents. The armies of the late empire were smaller than earlier periods. By practice, Roman Emperors of the period almost never entrusted larger formations to anyone but themselves, and, when they did, they inevitably created generals who then got "royal" aspirations. It is logical to suppose that no Roman emperor was intersted in doing this. After the history of the 1st and 2nd centuries where Roman generals regularly pretended to the throne, can we blame them? Even entrusting a member of one's own family was dangerous.

By denying this conclusion we ignore one of the political problems that is inherent in concentrating all power in one person. In the Republic, the armies were raised and were ultimately answerable to the Senate. The Senate appointed commanders and removed them. By the late Empire the Senate was almost extinct as it was known in the Republic. All political power to raise and command armies now reposed in one person: the Emperor. By sharing such important power with a "general", the Emperor was going against every principal he stood for, which was unlimited power in him and him alone.

Another point is ignored too, and that is that this ultimately weakened the flexibility of the Army and its ability to meet threats. This made the Empire vulnerable in the long run. By the time of the late Empire, the political entity of Rome, that was able to lose 50,000 men in one day and still come back swinging, was long gone.
"In war as in loving, you must always keep shoving." George S. Patton, Jr.
Reply


Forum Jump: