08-09-2015, 11:25 PM
@ Bryan
I do not understand the usefulness of the image you posted, apart from the fact that some are drawn according to your line of thinking and not like the sources present them. How exactly does it help with establishing the fact that they have anything to do with the real descriptions, their being the tactical norm and the manipular system of the Republican Roman army? If you really need to find clear examples of how armies fought with gaps do look into the battles I mentioned and the Byzantine manuals. But, personally, I do not think that these diagrams are helpful in discussing the gaps between maniples.
As to why sizable gaps, or any gaps, against a spear or sarissa phalanx mainly, is a generally bad idea, I will make an initial attempt to list some issues.
1. A unit that is outflanked has vulnerable edges. Even if another unit stands behind or near it, the men in the edges will be simultaneously attacked by more spears / sarrisas than the rest of the unit, without the need of the enemy to actually surge into the gap. Especially the right side of the subunit will be attacked on the shieldless side along much of its depth, in the case of sarissas, even along the whole of its length.
2. Apart from being needlessly exposed to spear and sarissa attacks, the subunits are also exposed to missile attacks. The fact that you have a heavy infantry line does not mean that the lines do not keep attacking each other with missiles too. Light infantry would shower the enemy from behind the lines and even the heavy infantry would throw various missiles against the enemy. Again, there would be no need to really lose integrity to exploit the flanks of the opponent subunits.
3. The argument that some propose that with such subunits you could actually draw parts of the enemy phalanx and thus force it to lose cohesion is also invalid. Lines (and if there is any doubt to this I can provide the exact sources as this issue is being discussed in the ancient texts) would resemble more like snakes than real lines. One can see that even today you can have a line of riot police keep its 'line integrity' even at very 'unline' shapes. Having part of your line step forward to follow the retreat of a Roman subunit would not break the line, while the Romans who had not followed the retreat would see themselves engulfed (by simply looking to the left and right), which would result in loss of morale, even if they were not actually attacked themselves. An actual battle would never look like the neat lines in your black vs. red diagram.
3. Greek phalanxes would also open lanes for skirmishers, cavalry, to receive elephants and chariots as we perfectly well know. What would stop them from exploiting their tactical doctrines to attack the enemy with even more skirmisers or ekdromoi (heavy infantry in skirmish, like the Romans also did), eventually pinning the Roman (or some) subunits down, making it even more difficult to retreat or get relief? Note, that, although the Greeks also had tactics involving gaps and knew how to form intervals for various tactical purposes, they still normally fought in unison, without intervals between subunits, Having a small gap between legions or units of thousands could work, as the vulnerable points would be few in number, having huge gaps between small units on a relatively even (usual, normal) battlefield is another thing.
4. The Byzantines are those who inherited the Roman military tradition and I have always stressed the importance of studying their manuals in order to understand the logic behind older Roman battlefield tactics. In those manuals, the issue of gaps is often discussed and these discussions are for me very important evidence as to the dangers they would entail (some of them mentioned above) as well as the measures suggested to mitigate these dangers (like how to make gaps invisible to the enemy) and believe you me, they are run by a very different logic as to the one you propose, one that is more 'legion based', than 'maniple based', which is a huge difference. One more thing that is worthy of study in the manuals is the distance between the infantry lines. In your images, you propose that they were very close, which is never suggested in the texts. In contrary, there is a lot of evidence, that the lines were far apart, sometimes in the hundreds of meters, which would make a quick response and missile support actually very unlikely...
The key to all this is that I do not say that intervals were never used. They had their tactical uses and were a viable choice for certain tactical circumstances. However, the manipular tactic proposed, that is maniples in checkerboard formation fighting and then somehow retreating through the maniples behind them etc, is not supported by the literary evidence, ancient or medieval.
I do not understand the usefulness of the image you posted, apart from the fact that some are drawn according to your line of thinking and not like the sources present them. How exactly does it help with establishing the fact that they have anything to do with the real descriptions, their being the tactical norm and the manipular system of the Republican Roman army? If you really need to find clear examples of how armies fought with gaps do look into the battles I mentioned and the Byzantine manuals. But, personally, I do not think that these diagrams are helpful in discussing the gaps between maniples.
As to why sizable gaps, or any gaps, against a spear or sarissa phalanx mainly, is a generally bad idea, I will make an initial attempt to list some issues.
1. A unit that is outflanked has vulnerable edges. Even if another unit stands behind or near it, the men in the edges will be simultaneously attacked by more spears / sarrisas than the rest of the unit, without the need of the enemy to actually surge into the gap. Especially the right side of the subunit will be attacked on the shieldless side along much of its depth, in the case of sarissas, even along the whole of its length.
2. Apart from being needlessly exposed to spear and sarissa attacks, the subunits are also exposed to missile attacks. The fact that you have a heavy infantry line does not mean that the lines do not keep attacking each other with missiles too. Light infantry would shower the enemy from behind the lines and even the heavy infantry would throw various missiles against the enemy. Again, there would be no need to really lose integrity to exploit the flanks of the opponent subunits.
3. The argument that some propose that with such subunits you could actually draw parts of the enemy phalanx and thus force it to lose cohesion is also invalid. Lines (and if there is any doubt to this I can provide the exact sources as this issue is being discussed in the ancient texts) would resemble more like snakes than real lines. One can see that even today you can have a line of riot police keep its 'line integrity' even at very 'unline' shapes. Having part of your line step forward to follow the retreat of a Roman subunit would not break the line, while the Romans who had not followed the retreat would see themselves engulfed (by simply looking to the left and right), which would result in loss of morale, even if they were not actually attacked themselves. An actual battle would never look like the neat lines in your black vs. red diagram.
3. Greek phalanxes would also open lanes for skirmishers, cavalry, to receive elephants and chariots as we perfectly well know. What would stop them from exploiting their tactical doctrines to attack the enemy with even more skirmisers or ekdromoi (heavy infantry in skirmish, like the Romans also did), eventually pinning the Roman (or some) subunits down, making it even more difficult to retreat or get relief? Note, that, although the Greeks also had tactics involving gaps and knew how to form intervals for various tactical purposes, they still normally fought in unison, without intervals between subunits, Having a small gap between legions or units of thousands could work, as the vulnerable points would be few in number, having huge gaps between small units on a relatively even (usual, normal) battlefield is another thing.
4. The Byzantines are those who inherited the Roman military tradition and I have always stressed the importance of studying their manuals in order to understand the logic behind older Roman battlefield tactics. In those manuals, the issue of gaps is often discussed and these discussions are for me very important evidence as to the dangers they would entail (some of them mentioned above) as well as the measures suggested to mitigate these dangers (like how to make gaps invisible to the enemy) and believe you me, they are run by a very different logic as to the one you propose, one that is more 'legion based', than 'maniple based', which is a huge difference. One more thing that is worthy of study in the manuals is the distance between the infantry lines. In your images, you propose that they were very close, which is never suggested in the texts. In contrary, there is a lot of evidence, that the lines were far apart, sometimes in the hundreds of meters, which would make a quick response and missile support actually very unlikely...
The key to all this is that I do not say that intervals were never used. They had their tactical uses and were a viable choice for certain tactical circumstances. However, the manipular tactic proposed, that is maniples in checkerboard formation fighting and then somehow retreating through the maniples behind them etc, is not supported by the literary evidence, ancient or medieval.
