Nice work Roy.
If I may, there's a battle which seldom gets mentioned. I think it is worth mentioning, and despite the energy, resolve, and sound decision =-making of the Senate throughout the war (they were the 'silent service' really), this event seems, in retrospect, a classic example of Roman
Bona Fortuna in the Second Punic War.
Livy provides a description as grim as it was tactically adept on the part of the Boii (Book 23.24), when they wiped out the consular army in northern Italy in late 216 B.C. (maybe early 215).
Sextus Julius Frontinus also cites the disaster in his list of anectodes of ambushed (
Strategemata, Book 1.6.4).
Despite the fact that the Romans found
Hannibal's tactical measure, the political situation
Hannibal was attemting to molest was working slowly, and Rome even had to lower the wealth-qualification by perhaps 60% for service in the army as early as 215 B.C. - an indication that her manpower drawn from her citizenry was diminishing. But even if this is accurate (see
Peter Brunt's Italian Manpower 225 B.C.-A.D 14, Pgs 66-75), Rome may not have been as strained as
Livy implies. But she might have been. The one event that may have altered the outcome occured here in late 216 B.C. When the army of Cannae was assembled, one
Lucius Postumius Albinus was sent north with a legion to divert the Gauls away from
Hannibal's army. It came to nothing for that purpose, but
Postumius' army had reached that of a standard consular army, a paper-strength of 25,000 or so men.
Postumius was elected consul for 215 B.C., but sometime in the winter of 216 B.C., perhaps November (a guess), he and his force were thoroughly ambushed and cut down almost to the man by the Boii, in what
Livy calls the Litana Forest, probably near modern Modena in northern Italy, just south of the Po.
Livy says 'ten men' escaped, an illustration of the magnitude of the disaster, despite a certain overstatement (maybe it was fifteen who escaped!). It was an impressive military display by these Gauls: they had cut trees to a point so they still stood, but could be toppled upon the road with a little force. When the Romans entered the path through this wooded area, the Gauls indeed pushed the trees upon the marching column, and had surrounded the perimeter, cutting down the Romans who were trying to escape in the limited escape-routes.
This disaster, at least as bad as Lake Trasimene or the Teutoburger Wald, was very serious because, at this juncture, Rome had no standing army to immediatley replace it. In the Senate, for the only time in the war, they had to acknowledge, following
Livy, that a theater had to be shelved; the Gallic war was compeeled to be left in abeyance, not because they had options.
Hannibal was supreme in the south, though Rome itself could not be taken by assault.
Livy tells us of
Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus' speech, Book 23.25,
"...'We,' he said, 'who were not crushed by the overthrow at Cannae must not lose heart at smaller calamities. If we are successful, as I trust we shall be, in our operations against Hannibal and the Carthaginians, we can safely leave the war with the Gauls out of account for the present; the gods and the Roman people will have it in their power to avenge that act of treachery. It is with regard to the Carthaginians and the armies with which the war is to be carried on that we have now to deliberate and decide'..."
'The gods will have it in their power'? If the Gauls,
Hannibal's looser allies, had swooped down from their close proximity, Rome would have been in deeper trouble than any time during the actual events of the war. They did it in 390 B.C., with an open road to Rome then too, and would revolt again in 200 B.C. This is what makes this so peculiarly fascinating. We cannot blame the Gauls for carrying a grudge with
Hannibal; they had beared the brunt of his victories, and were more interested in forage. But the diversionary attempt by the Senate to deplete
Hannibal of his Gauls in the south didn't even work slightly. The Gauls in the north, standing solid and surely galvanized by their crushing destruction of a Roman army did nothing, even after no other Roman force came to replace it.
They didn't even attack the primary nascent colonies of Placentia and Cremona. A Roman army, under one
Marcus Pomponius Matho, would not arrive in Gallic territory for more than two years. The inactivity of the Gauls at this point not only enabled the Romans to concentrate fully against
Hannibal in the south, where they would slowly and
inexorably gain operational superiority, but Etruria and Umbria, showing signs of revolt in the years to come, were given no reason to do so now, as they could conform to Rome's war effort with no interference.
Polybius tells us of
Hannibal's dealings with his Gallic allies in his march south after the Trebbia, Book 3.78,
"...During this winter he also adopted a truly Punic artifice. Fearing the fickleness of the Celts and possible attempts on his life, owing to his establishment of the friendly relations with them being so very recent, he had a number of wigs made, dyed to suit the appearance of persons differing widely in age, and kept constantly changing them, at the same time also dressing in a style that suited the wig, so that not only those who had seen him but for a moment, but even his familiars found difficulty in recognizing him.
Observing that the Celts were dissatisfied at the prosecution of the war in their own territory, but were eagerly looking forward to an invasion of that of the enemy, professedly owing to their hatred of the Romans, but as a fact chiefly in hope of booty, he decided to be on the move as soon as possible and satisfy the desire of his troops..."
But this all gets even more interesting: in 200 B.C., a major uprising broke out, in which all the tribes, stirred up by the Cenomani, Insubres
and the Boii, sacked and burned Placentia, and then proceeded towards Cremona - a battle you do have on your list. They were led by a Carthaginian named
Hamilcar, who had stayed in northern Italy; he is believed to have been an officer of the army of either
Hasdrubal or
Mago, the invaders from the previous decade. Anyway, Roman forces, though dealing with the preliminary round of the next bout with Macedon, where readily available to deal with this threat;
Livy tells us some 40,000 Gauls (such numbers will always be exiguous) were under
Hamilcar. The threat was ultimately dealt with by a praetor, one
Lucius Furius, under, of course, decisions made by the Senate.
Livy tells this tense event, Book 31.10-11, and 31.48-49.
Hannibal, in retirement at this time, must have been very disappointed, assuming he heard of this; why didn't they rise in late 216 B.C.? Simultaneous serious threats from north and south might have doomed Rome in this critical time; operations in Spain would be forsaken, and things might have been different. Carthage could not have defeated Rome, but Rome might have been defeated by circumstances at the right time favoring
Hannibal. Much depended on the peoples of Italy, Sicily, and Spain - on whom, between Rome and Carthage, it was in their better interests to join or at least come to terms with. The Gallic threat following
Postumius' destruction might have affected things greatly in Carthage's favor. Maybe
Hannibal should have assigned an officer to the north to effectuate a resistence against the Roman realm in the north, as he did in sending
Muttines to Sicily in 212 B.C. But maybe he didn't know at the moment, as he was in Campania behind the Volturnus. Clearly, as events would show, the Gauls coud be stirred up under a Carthaginian officer - and in a time when Rome had forces in the area to resist them.
Actually, around Casilinum in late 216 B.C., the first Roman field army sent out since Cannae, was mauled by
Hannibal. Perhaps
Livy suppressed another battle you can add Roy, in which
Hannibal administered his wily stratagem. We must also wonder of the degree
Livy had control over his historical material, and the significance of his selection and arrangement (see
T.J. Luce,
Livy: the Composition of his History). But four different stories come form three other ancient sources of a battle fought around Casilinum in late 216 B.C.,
Dio Cassius,
Roman History, Book 15.57 (
Joannes Zonaras,
Extracts of History, Book 9.3),
"They overtook Hannibal and encamped near him, so as to watch his movements. Junius, the dictator, ordered the Romans to do exactly as the Carthaginians were commanded to do. So they took their food and sleep at the same time, visited the sentries in the same manner, and were doing everything else in similar fashion. When Hannibal became aware of this, he waited for a stormy night and then gave notice to some of his soldiers of an attack to be made in the evening. Junius did the same thing. Thereupon Hannibal ordered different detachments to attack him in succession one after the other, in order that his opponents might be involved in constant hardship as a result of sleeplessness and the storm; but he himself rested together with the troops not in action. When day was about to break, he recalled the army, to all appearances, and the Romans put away their weapons and retired to rest; then all of a sudden he attacked them, with the result that he killed a number and captured the entrenchments, which were deserted"
Julius Sextus Frontinus,
Stratagems, Book 2.5.25,
"Hannibal, when contending against the dictator Junius, ordered 600 cavalrymen to break up into a number of squadrons, and at the dead of night to appear in successive detachments, without intermission around the camp of the enemy. Thus all night long the Romans were harassed and worn out by sentry duty on the rampart and by the rain, which happened to fall continuously, so that in the morning, when Junius gave the signal for recall, Hannibal led out his own troops, who had been well rested, and took Junius' camp by assault."
Polyaenus,
Stratagems, Book 6.38.5-6,
5."Hannibal defeated the Romans in Campania by the following stratagem. During a storm, he gave these instructions to his army: when he gave the signal for fighting, they should rest and sleep, but when he gave the signal for retiring, they should leave [their camp] at about the second watch [of the night]. When he gave the signal for fighting, the Romans were alarmed, and stood ready for battle. A long time later, Hannibal gave the signal for retiring. The Romans, who were worn out by standing in the storm and by lack of sleep, returned [to their camp] and fell asleep. Then Hannibal attacked them, and killed them all."
6. "When Hannibal was near Casilinum on a stormy night, he split his army into several divisions, and led them out to battle. He gave instructions, that when he first gave the signal for fighting, the first division should attack the enemy; but when the trumpeters gave the signal for retiring, the first division should retreat and the second division should move to the attack; and so on with the third and fourth divisions. And by this stratagem he defeated the enemy."
Especially with the Romans having trouble in Campania with
Hannibal at this juncture, if many of the Gauls had descended down, Rome might have succumbe to the double-force.
But perhaps it is merely an indication that
Hannibal needed too many things of 'chance' to go his way. But the allies were disgruntled as early as late 216 B.C., having 'meetings' etc., and
Livy has
Fabius opposing a proposal to grant two senators from each Latin community full citizenship, his argument centered around the belief that the allies' feelings were unpredictable, and their loyalty uncertain' (Book 23.22). That is very substantial for
Hannibal's strategy, and after Second Herdonea, the inner ring of Latin communities could no longer support the war effort, and the others were in the firing range of the war's activity, thus they probably could not make up the difference as much as
Livy seems to imply.
The poster Sardaukar (Mika) made an astute point on another thread:
Hannibal didn't necessarily underestimate Roman resolve and prowess, but he underestimated the loyalty of the core allies. I think that's true, but what many seem to overlook is that, though his pleas fell on deaf ears in the north and center of Italy (except the Samnite cantons and Campania), his attempt to enervate the Roman Federation came very close.
Food for thought.
Again, great work!
Thanks, James