(Late) (Roman) Formations

[John Conyard]

I certainly appreciate that parallels found in other periods are useful, and Hanson's work is excellent. I have an interest in drill of all periods, and I believe drill does develop from the classical period.

But I'd like to re-focus the discussion of late 4th century infantry tactics.

For a moment I believed we had reached some sort of agreement. Robert's last email leads me into the fray once again. I'm glad we now seem to believe the ability to push is a necessary part of close order fighting. On the defensive or attacking in a wedge. As said earlier, Vegetius and Maurice have little to guide us in terms of the mechanics of warfare. Ammianus can be used as a guide and he does use language which not only is reminiscent of the push but even gives us the trick of pushing with the knees. So Robert, you have not "dealt" with Ammianus! He's my witness and he's still standing. In close order, shields overlapping.

Some of us seem to see Strasbourg as a "one off". I don't understand why. Romans fighting Germanic types. Surely a common occurrence, even on a smaller scale, in Yorkshire!

More than one of you have asked what happens if say 4 files of Dutch/Australians step backwards to induce us into your formation, perhaps falling over in the process. In the noise and confusion you would need to give a signal to the relevant files to disengage, in perfect unison, and at speed to create a gap for us to fall into. Even if you are 8 deep I don't see it happening. You may be able to withdraw, and in so doing weaken your formation. But remember your shields are interlocked. Whatever, we either get to widen the gap, breaking up your formation, or just simply follow you pushing you back and taking advantage of your mistake.

You suggest that your men on either side of our salient could kill us. They will have lost the support of their fellows as they withdrew, and would be coping with increased pressure on their front and flanks. I have broken through many formations, and the enemy on my left don't matter. I have my shielded side to their shielded side, it's not an issue. But on my right I am carrying my weapon to your unshielded side, and I'm going to have fun. They are concentrating on the enemy in front of them. It's as if I'm the responsibility of the friends in front of me. If they want to contend with me, they are still in a push. But I'm going forward, and I have space.

No, small numbers of files trying to withdraw will disrupt their formation more than mine. I suspect this tactic draws on Greek/Macedonian experience, where some allied contingents didn't always engage cohesively. Liner formations were often broken up, especially due to running into contact. This will not be occurring in my Roman formations.

Remember, try nothing complicated in the face of the enemy. Rather than worrying about tricky manouvers, I want my file leaders to be concentrating on ripping throats out with their teeth, not when to start an almost impossible manouver.

As described earlier I would like my line to try and defeat the enemy with missiles, then close up, and make only a very short advance. I firmly believe the ill discipline of the early army had turned into something more professional.

I appreciate that perhaps the majority of people see things the other way around. Disciplined armoured early legionaries developing into a part time ill-organised late 4th century army. But in the filed army our troops have developed not only the perfect Roman cavalryman, but are on the way to producing the perfect infantryman as well.

I hope your wedge at Archeon was closed up, shields overlapping to deflect missiles, and with the push being timed by the guys at the front. That attacking formation is hard to stop. The complete opposite is the open wedge used by some 1st century groups. That would have no effect on a well constructed line.

[Tarbicus]

I firmly believe the ill discipline of the early army had turned into something more professional.

There's a difference between ill-disciplined and acting on initiative.

[John Conyard]

Initiative is when things turn out well.

Ill-discipline is when things turn out badly.

[Tarbicus]

Initiative is when things turn out well.

Ill-discipline is when things turn out badly.

I think until we know more about how commands and signals were given (or perhaps not given), and how effective they were on the battlefield with all of the noise and clamour (in some cases the topography of the land must have had an influence, blocking visual and audible signals) it's difficult to judge what was initiative/ill-discipline, and what was simple necessity and how decisions were made in actual practice on the battlefield at the micro level. If later Roman armies were so compressed as you say, how would a commander effectively pass orders from unit to unit, and how would he even know the commands were successfully received and followed?

[John Conyard]

I move away from the nature of combat to signaling with a large sigh of relief!

It is logical to assume signals must have been audible or visual. I agree that the sheer noise of combat, especially on contact, must have made audible signals unreliable. And as you say battlefield geography, added to dust, must have made visual signals ineffectual.

I fondly imagine that as a general you would try and get your troops physically and mentally prepared for combat. You would develop a plan, and impart it to juniors. Then you sit on a hill and try to assess how badly it falls apart. I'm sure commanders could influence parts of the battle, by the use of reserves etc. Some more successfully than others.

Whatever, this discussion shows there is an interest in the human experience of Roman battle. I sometimes wonder if we should spend less time counting rivets in helmets and more time considering these weighty matters.

[sonic]

Whatever, this discussion shows there is an interest in the human experience of Roman battle. I sometimes wonder if we should spend less time counting rivets in helmets and more time considering these weighty matters.

I always think we should spend more time on the human side and less on 'rivet-counting'. After all, can you extrapolate the whole of the experience of World War Two from looking at the typology oif a German helmet? I think not ......! :lol:

________________________________

Ian (Sonic) Hughes

[Robert Vermaat]

Ammianus can be used as a guide and he does use language which not only is reminiscent of the push but even gives us the trick of pushing with the knees. So Robert, you have not "dealt" with Ammianus! He's my witness and he's still standing. In close order, shields overlapping.

Yes, close order, yes shields overlapping, yes, occasional pushing when trying to brek into the enemy formation.

Continuous pushing matches where whole formations push - no, nothing there in Ammianus.

I hope your wedge at Archeon was closed up, shields overlapping to deflect missiles, and with the push being timed by the guys at the front. That attacking formation is hard to stop.

It was:

http://www.fectio.org.uk/shows/2005archeonlitus14.jpg

[falco]

My main problem is with the 'battle as a pushing match' affair, but I see what you are pointing out. My main problem is, as Paul has worded too, that the other force can also lock shields in close order, and then the pushing is useless.
I agree that against troops in loose formation, a concerted push will most probably be succesful.

Just a bit of input from one who does 17thcent "pushes".....if both sides lock & push,then training will out...the group that can pack in tighter,and (most importantly),still manouver at closest order will penetrate the opposing line....this is the point where the broken force fall flat on their backs!(and where you hack them down in real life).....my belief is that this type of combat always devolves down to sub-units...the larger the looser!
Steve

[falco]

OK...messed up quote function...second paragraph is mine!
Steve

[Salvianus]

My understanding of the Late Roman panoply of missile weapons seems to suggest that, if not a last resort, hand to hand was at least well down the list of actions they were prepared for. However, if units came to contact, I feel they would favour close order formation instinctively if not by training and that the outcome would be decided by which side maintained its cohesion most successfuly over the next few crucial seconds and perhaps, if well matched in training, experience, morale, numbers and equipment, minutes.

For me the point of re-enactment is to illuminate the gaps in the historical record, so I would be interested in hearing more explicitly about what our various experiments would suggest about the nature of such large scale infantry clashes.

I ought to put my money where my mouth is, so I offer three observations although my own experience in big shield formations is limited (so apologies to the many of you who have stood amongst 2000 other re-enactors at Hastings).

Firstly, whatever the motivation of the officers, I believe some members of the rank & file are sometimes reluctant to close with the enemy. At a time when men were prepared to mutilate themselves to attempt to avoid service, I could imagine that a formation might be designed partly to control their disposition to run. A close order advance with more experienced troops pressing behind seems to me to be pretty effective in supporting your morale and locking you in position. I certainly feel more secure in close order than open, and, if under attack, maintaining pressure & the structure of the formation seems to become an immediate matter of personal protection quite different from any training or order to advance individually to relieve a comrade.

Secondly, even in a single rank, when under blunt missile fire and cavalry attack I have felt highly motivated to maintain my position rather than desert it, and when comrades have gone down the line closed instinctively & without order. Whilst orders appear to take a considerable time to travel down a shield wall, the need to shelter seems to impose a tendency to follow the active elements into attack (or indeed to fall back in response to an opponent's break-through): as pressure leaves the shield, one tries to move to re-establish that safe connection. This appears to result in 'waves' of action along a line of a couple of hundred.

Thus, the interpretation of a cuneus as an attack column that distorts into something of a wedge in charging makes perfect, visceral, sense. Without physical contact, I haven't experienced how an open order formation might handle such motion.

Thirdly, we have experimented with competitive skirmishing in wooded areas, including repeatedly pitting 'heavy' infantry (but perhaps more objectively described as 'medium': large flat shields, mail or scale cuirass armour & late helmets) against light (small shields and some light helmets). The results suggested that the heavier units remained unassailable even against mixed javelins & archers until separated by terrain or tactic. The light troops then quickly adapted and surrounded individuals that moved into in open order, resulting in consistent wins.

Obviously, the classic Imperial Legionary protected by much heavier helmet, segmented plate and heavily curved shield is a very different case.

To summarise, occasions when the dead could not fall might have been notable and uncomfortable exceptions, but my re-enactment experience urgently recommends close order to me as a matter of practical protection even facing friendly blunts, let alone contact with a line of men that wish me ill.

[Paullus Scipio]

Whew ! A veritable flood of ideas is now emerging ! Better still, we seem to be moving toward something of a consensus, even if discussion is now broadening and digressing with numerous fresh points being added to the discussion. In order to keep discussion less scattered and more ordered, I shall divide what follows into sub-headings.
Greek warfare and Pushing:
There seems to be a view that we generally accept that Hoplite warfare involved locked shields and pushing, and that therefore since Late Romans were similarly equipped, they could have done the same. Vortigern/Robert seems to accept this for Greek warfare, but not Late Roman. As I indicated in an early post, I don’t believe this for one minute, and I suspect that if Mithras were to produce his ’dozen’ references, they would be open to interpretation , like the two he mentions ( see Sonic’s post, for example). I simply do not believe that a concerted “shoveâ€

[falco]

Very valid point about formations....Be it Spartans or a "locked-on" 18thcent firing line,once you are at that closest order,there's not much you can do but go forward...slowly....with constant dressing checks....
It doesn't help that,(as far as I know),we don't fully understand the Late Roman Sub-unit organisation....what 1000 men can't do,10 units of 100 probably can!
I quite agree about the danger of analogy.....But looking for close parellels may be the nearest we can get to working out how these things work!(or don't.....), I don't think real 17th Pike "pushed"....but the fact that modern re-enactors do may help in understanding the mechanics of such a combat at any period.
Steve

[Paullus Scipio]

Indeed, Steve....I agree with you entirely - for example, watching a large crowd of demonstrators against a police line does not "simulate" an ancient battle, but may still offer insights into what happens when a large number of un-cordinated people clash with a disciplined, trained line.
As I said, your points about what happens in a "pushing" contest are very valuable - if I understand your point correctly, even in that circumstance it is the penetration/collapse that is decisive, rather than a general 'shove-back' of the opposing unit.

[falco]

Correct!......There may be a "push back",but it's very short in time & is rapidly followed by collapse!....incidentally,the "winning" side also loses cohesion at that point as resistance suddenly disappears....that's when training/morale comes in to see who sorts themselves out first.
Steve

[John Conyard]

Gentleman it is the push that leads the enemy to lose formation, to start going backwards, to break up and to run.

I've just spent nearly two hours putting together references, most of them Greek, but also from Arrian and Livy, describing the contact, the push and the collapse of formations. Having lost them in this bloody system I'm in no mood to go through it all again. But a few moments reading Victor Davis Hanson's "The Western Way of War" will give you many examples of how the ancients pushed in battle.

I stand accused of not explaining how the Roman legion of the late 4th century co-ordinated it's push. Do I have to? We have already considered the limitations of visually and audibly transferred orders. Isn't it enough to know troops closed up, locked shields, pushed, disrupted the enemies formation and broke them. I'm sensing we agree on this...........

Now I'm off to teach a horse how to charge down several shields. not just one.