(Late) (Roman) Formations

[John Conyard]

Good troops should not rush into a gap, they stand stand and keep together. Not too unlike Caesar's men when charging against Pompey's line. They stopped, picked up their dressings and came on again.

But how many troops could stage a withdraw from one specific part of the line during a battle? I understand Phillip and his Macedonians could withdrawn entire units, but not part of a unit.

And if they were able to it just allows their fellows to be flanked. So it does seem pointless.

To address your other points you push with your body, fight with your right hand. It's easy enough.

On the approach you may stick a spearhead into my shield, and it will stay there. Better keep it for the close order stuff afterwards.

I can't source elephants but we did look at the cost of camels. There are costly to hire compared to horses, but I remember one of Graham's illustrations in Military Illustrated a few years back. I would like to try putting a Turkish saddle on a camel, strap the equipment to it, and just try it out. It's achievable, but the camel hire costs put me off.

And ...... our ballista will sink your Dutch barges 200m out.

[Paullus Scipio]

John Conyard ! Shame on you ! :o shock: .......and then you duck the issue !!!!!
The key point of difference in opinion is what happens in that last few metres - if I understand you correctly, your men are going to "lock shields", so you are going to maintain your line-cohesion the way less-trained/skillful troops do ( there's a disadvantage for a start - the process of 'locking' means your troops are now hindered in the free use of their scuta..."...close up,forward into contact at the last moment to push opponents off balance, push, win..." BUT you don't say how, even hypothetically this is to be achieved !!!!
You have already seen why I don't think a co-ordinated push, on a front of several hundred men at least is physically possible. No commander, even by trumpet/horn is going to be able to make his command heard along the line to allow a co-ordinated 'shove' --perhaps a visual signal from a standard, or a pre-rehearsed move might work, but even then where men fall on either side gaps will open...clearly discipline will come into play on both sides so line-cohesion is maintained --- on our side by skill-at-arms, on yours by the locked shields, but you can see already, co-ordinated pushing and even pressure along our line is out of the question, so where your men fail/ become casualties, the successful 'pushers' ( even if we allow that such a thing is possible) will have to hold fast, alongside their less successful neighbours......ergo, no co-ordinated 'push-back' of our line is possible. So our equally well-disciplined infantry each maintain their line, then, until mutual exhaustion draws them apart. The men recover their breath ( and here is where I suspect Robert and I might disagree about the feasibility of troops, at least late-roman ones, changing over.) But today Robert holds supreme command, and our tired File- leaders raise the Barritus, the trumpets blast, the standards dip, and our respective lines clash again.
This is the critical point.
What physically happens ?
Well, many historians concede that cavalry never clash head-on, because horses are not so stupid as to run head-on into each other, but mutually pull up. Similarly, horses won't run into close-ranked infantry 'walls' - we have any number of authorities for this, see e.g. Arrian's order against the Alans for a real ancient general's views. Shall we grant that our respective troops are not more stupid than horses ? (even if your file-leaders are "too daft to know when they are dead" :lol: ) I know also, from martial arts contests, and re-enactment combats ( at least those taken seriously) that even where opponents charge furiously, they always tend to pull up just out of effective 'range'....if not, one or both is swiftly rendered 'hors de combat'/dead !!
This is especially so when facing a line of opponents.
The fight commences from this distance, roughly a metre, with a certain wariness by opponents whose first priority is not to get killed. Even gladiators urged on by hot irons do not break this universal instinct !
So then, what can our equally well-disciplined infantry do to break this deadlock ??(assuming the battle is not being decided elsewhere by a cavalry charge on the flanks, say, e.g. Battle of Zama, or Adrianople)
Yours are determined to maintain their 'locked shield wall', but during a lull, Robert decides that attrition by our more skilled-at-arms men is taking too long - he issues orders to some of our more heroic tribunes to gather their best and form 'the saw', or 'wedges', a.k.a 'swines heads'. We will smash our way through your line !!
Wait a bit !! This sounds familiar ! Isn't this just how Ammianus describes Strasbourg ? As Robert has pointed out, no line is overthrown by pushing, but near-disaster occurs when the line is ruptured :evil: :twisted:

But we will grant that you too know your Ammianus, and your reserves save the day, and seal off the ragged holes in your shield wall.
With all your reserves committed, and your men and ours exhausted by their exertions, the climax of the battle has arrived.
Robert smiles to himself idea: .......the Battle is won !!!
It is our troops who step over the wounded despatching them as they go, and our cavalry who swoop on your fleeing men :twisted:
Now our troops reap their reward, stripping the dead, despoiling nearby villages and churches....and then of course, there are all those friendly buxom Yorkshire lasses to look forward to..... (they are far friendlier and welcoming than their southern counterparts !) :lol: :lol: :wink: :wink:

Now, joking aside, doesn't this sound more plausible than "we will move forward in a battle line shields locked together and literally knock you off balance" ???
I don't think I can recall, either in martial arts contests, or in re-enacted combat, such a thing occurring when an opponent is braced and balanced, even when there is a considerable disparity in size.
Let alone it occurring all along a front of hundreds of yards/metres!( which would be necessary to 'push back ..the line')
Are you convinced yet, John ?? .....I suspect not, but what about other more impartial readers?
Whose version of the way Late Roman Infantry formed and fought seems more plausible??
Let us hear from others !! D

[John Conyard]

I was careful to describe a situation where you are attacking, in your case tickling, my defensive line. I have only to advance a couple of steps to hit you and knock you off balance. My subsequent advance is possible because of the open weak unbraced nature of your formation.

It is true most horses will not charge head on into cavalry. Those that are trained can, most can't. Another discussion!

But infantry do charge into each other, covered in protective armour and shields from ankle to crown. Punching with the shield is a honorable Roman tradition. Don't be so .......... tentative, give it a go!

Your formation, with shields unlocked together, will present us with multiple targets of opportunity. You will not only be going backwards, but suffering casualties at a greater rate. I'm sure you may drop a weapon and accidentally cause our formation some casualties, but in our rigid ranks and files it will be easier to maintain a viable formation.

I appreciate other nations and cultures used a shield wall, that is because it works! However they may not have used drill, or orders of precedence within rank and files. Indeed they may not even have had rank and file.

Now we can move to the question of the wedge formation and the attack.

Easy for me to do, the centre marker steps out, the locked shields realign on him. It takes seconds. When we move forward the weight of the formation will be directed through the apex into your, frankly weak, line. Unlocked shields are like bricks without mortar. You don't cover your neighbour, you are not supported by your fellows. We would be through your formation easily. Even if you stay to contest the issue.

From what I can tell your wedge, with shields unlocked and open to missile fire from your right, comes bravely up to our line, stops for a bit of fencing, and sees if it can use weapon skills to cut a way in. We would barely have to move a muscle. The greaves, shields and helmets give me almost complete protection. While you aimlessly cut and stab I will be discussing your opinions on southern women.

If you are going to attack into means smashing into the opponents line. Not tickling it. Surely this is the whole ethos of the Western Way of War. Dress yourself up in armour, smash into the enemy, smell what they had for breakfast.

I look forward to meeting your cavalry in combat. My current mount cannot charge into infantry lines, but can hit/bite/kick individual infantry and other horses very nicely. Should I start feeding him on Australian meat to get him used to the flavour?

[Paulus Claudius Damianus]

There are a very interesting discussion about the subject which fascinates me!

Bravo at all for the quality of your analyses and the relevance of your arguments. Regrettably my limited English don't help me to argue with you as I shall wish...

I would like to give one idea wich is importante to my own. If you read all descriptions of the battles offered by the late Roman authors, the situations of push " umbo against umbo " are not so numerous as it.

The on-line battle practised by the Roman stays an order where the soldier stay free of his movement and shields don't overlaping with the wingers.

we do not forget that the compact formations as the " head of pig " or the situations of press between two armies are formations and very punctual situations which doing only at some point of the battle in a decisive way or not.

Late Romans dont wish neccesary the very close combat like the press.

In Strasbourg battle, if the Romans join their shields it is because Alamans charges with "rashness" and without order, counting on the mass of their strength to take him. The Germans are going very fast to the contact and go as far as using of them knees to push lines. We are in situation of press. The Roman strengths have no choice considering their small number. To join shields and overlaping is the best methode to resist to the push of the Germans.

The Germans number takes him and the first Acia gives up. Alamans begin again their tactic but in a more orderly way by tightening them rows to come to press on the second Acia with elite legions. No choice to the romans again, but this time the order and deeper and the rows more tight. Alamans crashes on the second Acia steelyards and the push loses of its energy whereas they are surrounded. Once the pressure of the fallen again push, the legions of elites find the space which they needs them to fight, normally with their swords and their shields, free of their movements. So, here, shields don't joined.

Of same Vegetius indeed says to us that " the head of pig " as formation distributes of the line of battle, it concerns only precise place at some point. Also the resistance in this type of formation cannot concern that precise places of the opposite line.

To me, the battle of Strasbourg, of course, is not all the late roman battles and the Overlaping shield is not all the common late roman battle front line.

[John Conyard]

I'm very pleased the discussion is widening out.

I think we need to acknowledge that most Roman combat was carried out at a low level skirmish/patrol level, or in the local tavern. Battles were rare. Very rare. Skirmishes would require a different approach. But I would still like to feel my partner's shield against mine.

But in a big battle situation, when you fight hand to hand against an enemy who is well motivated such as the Germans at Strasbourg, it's close order, lock shields and push. As you say, it's the best way to withstand the assault, and maintain your formation. The "othismos aspidon" . Hoplite battles are full of references to the push of shields.

I understand that some of you still feel that Strasbourg was an exception and that the clash of battle lines were generally more open affairs. But I would love to see the evidence. [/i]

[Robert Vermaat]

Hi John,

To summarise so far:

Close order combat - agreed, absolutely.
Locked shields - agreed, absolutely.
Battles - I agree that they were rare, late Roman armies did probably not seek a big confrontation, and if they did the enemy (apart from the Sassanids) was even more battle-shy.
Cavalry attacking infantry directly - agreed. The trained cavalry, like you say, will indeed do that. I've read how Marcus Junkelmann gradually trained his horses to attack an enemy formation.

My main problem is with the 'battle as a pushing match' affair, but I see what you are pointing out. My main problem is, as Paul has worded too, that the other force can also lock shields in close order, and then the pushing is useless.
I agree that against troops in loose formation, a concerted push will most probably be succesful.

Paul, indeed I see no evidence for troop rotation - to the contrary, I see evidence why no troop rotation would have taken place, such as close order fighting, formation commands and especially ranks and armour in the for line.

[sonic]

Hi John,

To summarise so far:

Close order combat - agreed, absolutely.
Locked shields - agreed, absolutely.
Battles - I agree that they were rare, late Roman armies did probably not seek a big confrontation, and if they did the enemy (apart from the Sassanids) was even more battle-shy.
Cavalry attacking infantry directly - agreed. The trained cavalry, like you say, will indeed do that. I've read how Marcus Junkelmann gradually trained his horses to attack an enemy formation.

My main problem is with the 'battle as a pushing match' affair, but I see what you are pointing out. My main problem is, as Paul has worded too, that the other force can also lock shields in close order, and then the pushing is useless.
I agree that against troops in loose formation, a concerted push will most probably be succesful.

Paul, indeed I see no evidence for troop rotation - to the contrary, I see evidence why no troop rotation would have taken place, such as close order fighting, formation commands and especially ranks and armour in the for line.

My first point is that I would treat Junkelmann with a great deal of care: I have been led to believe that he may over-emphasise those aspects of his research that support his own views. It may be possible to train horses to attack an enemy formation from the front, however if the infantry formation stands firm, such a charge exposes the horses to missiles and other weapons at very close quarters. Given the cost, time and effort needed to train these horses, almost certainly the question should be whether the Romans actually did charge into the front of formed infantry, not whether the horses would or not.

If they did charge, then surely it would be up to the skill of the Roman commander to judge the moment when the infantry were likely to break when charged, rather than stand and kill many of the expensive horses milling about and vulnerable just in front of them?

As to whether the infantry fought in close formation, locked shields formation, or whatever, wouldn't this depend mainly upon circumstances? Having read van Wees and Goldsworthy, I am now little inclined to believe that two infantry forces would close up and then begin an epic 'pushing match' in order to decide the battle. From what the above historians have said, it is likely that individuals or small groups would take the initiative and try to force back those troops opposite them. When both sides resisted, then the reinforcements sent in would possibly close up and push. However, this would not be very long lasting as such pressure is physically draining. After a short period, either one side lost and suffered heay casualties, or the press loosened and the troops retired to their own 'lines' to catch their breath before a second attempt.

This would explain the high reputation of Roman centurions. These men were willing to take the risk and attempt to force the issue with the enemy battleline. This would also help to explain the large proportion of Roman victories: the centurions led the way and the rest followed, causing the enemy morale to drop and routs to set in. On a further note, it would also help to explain the large proportion of casualties suffered in battles by Roman centurions as they attempted to break the enemy.

Maybe it could further hint at why the Late Roman Army were no longer prepared to fight so many open battles: the increased political and military importance of the 'centurions' resulted in their being less willing to risk life and limb in order to break the enemy, and their being more likely to take a position to the rear, leaving the common soldiers to take the initiative?

Just a thought.....


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Ian (Sonic) Hughes

[Tarbicus]

But I would love to see the evidence. [/i]

When attacking the Pompeiian lines the Caesarians stopped halfway and dressed their ranks and regained their breath, as Pompey's men unusually held their ground. Stopping and dressing the ranks when charging would seem to be an unusual thing to do, given it is specifically noted as being so. Therefore, if Pompeii's men had counter-charged, the logic is that the merge between the two sides would have been with the lines uneven - not dressed, so to speak.

Not late Roman, but certainly an indication of how the merge happened between two Roman armies. I would definitely challenge anyone to keep a few thousand men in a neat line when they are charging at the run.

However, if two sides approached each other at walking pace it would be much easier. But even then, the likelihood is that the lines would be straighter outside of missile range, simply because they would have stopped and waited for an opportunity to attack more safely. Even that could have been a disorderly affair, with small charges by small groups spurred on by individual brave souls.

Whenever thinking of how two sides fought and made contact I always dismiss images from the age of the musket and think of them more like two boxers as an analogy, probing and jabbing at each other looking for the opportunity for a knockout. There is a reference in primary sources which I can't find again for the life of me, but it's definitely out there, I've read it and it's online somewhere. It specifically notes that barbarians (German or Gauls, I can't remember which) in battle are uncivilised, and don't break for the sides to regain their breath as is the civilised way of making battle. Again that makes me think of boxers in the ring, and that the physical actions of the individual men in battle are also very similar.

One simple fact is that in the later armies, where many were called citizen and legionary, only a century or two earlier they would have been called auxiliary. Why, all of a sudden, would these men change their modus operandi because of a change in title, especially if they outnumber the traditional citizens in the ranks?

Cannae is often quoted as evidence of the push and close quarter shove, but it's a mistake to use that as an example. The Romans were surrounded and had nowhere to step back to or manoeuvre in.

[Mithras]

Forgive me coming into this discussion quite late, forgive me also if I have miassed anything that has been said (I probably have).

It occurs to me that Late Imperial warfare has much in common with classical Greek warfare, large round shields, long thrusting spears - what is missing, certainly is a much heavier emphasis on javelins thrown from the body of the infantry en masse. But we can certainly discuss Late Empire battle tactics in comparison to Greek if we move beyond those first javelin barrages to that moment when the lines meet.

If I remember correctly, Maurice certainly advocates a 16 man-deep formation which is identical to the Spartan. Indeed, John believes that the Late Roman drill is derived from surviving Spartan drill manuals. Certainly Greek drill was just as sophisticated as Roman and did not involve a Viking mob pushing a shield wall in the face of their enemies! Yet pushing was the essence of Greek spear and shield war.

To quoteVictor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War, "The ancients took it for granted that the deeper the column the greater its thrusting power and momentum". Sixteen men deep is useless in battle if those rear troops are supporting the front line, they cannot use their spears, javelins are as likely to kill their own front-rankers and archers are too close. They can, however provide momemtum to the formation.

There are many, many, many references to pushing in Greek warfare, and I can supply a dozen if requested...!

Some are enlightening, Diodorus and Thucydides both record the trampling of bodies both in the advance and retreat. The Persians at Thermopylaa (according to Herodotus) trampled their own men to death from the pressure from the rear.

Rome? Lucan could envision a battle where the pressure was so great that "every corpse remained standing" (Lucan 4.787), and of course Ammianus was himself packed into a unit of soldiers so tightly packed that he stood next to a corpse, upright like a tree stump, carried along by his fellows.

Is not this indicitative of a tightly packed force using moment to achieve its aims. Ask anyone whp participates in shield-wall training, get two or three men out of the shield wall, and you can push through, force the gap and start killing from inside the unit, causing a rout. You can get these two or three men out of the fight with spear-point or sword with cutting and fencing; but those three men are much more easily dispatched by pushing them over, trampling them and exploiting the gap. Spears prevent the front line from giving their 'all' in the push by forcing the opposing side to keep under cover behind their shields.

Without pushing, why have 16 ranks of infantry? Why have 8? Do you have to fight and fence and whittle down the enemy rank, by rank?

Hanson also gives us an idea of the point at which units break and run. Men in the rear and in the middle of a unit are confident when the unit is advancing, they are uncertain once the unit stops and fighting and pushing begins, and become demoralised when the unit gives ground. The demoralised troops are likely to flee if the ground given is too great.

[John Conyard]

To answer Robert first. When you meet an enemy as good as you are, and neither of you are pushing the other back, there is little to do but keep at it until one side wins. Trust in your fellows, your God, your cavalry out there somewhere, but keep up the pressure and never waver. "Give me one more step and I'll give you victory" etc etc.

Now to move away from the 4th century. Caesar's infantry did come forward to charge into Pompey's, not unlike Greek hoplites went forward at the run. Pompey's troops did not respond. So the Cesareans halted, dressed ranks and came on again. Good discipline. If the troops of Pompey had come forward at the run it would just duplicate a hoplite clash, shaking itself out into a pushing match.

In the early period centurions often did display a lack of discipline and individual courage. But by the 4th century we have developed into a disciplined army, with different ideas of personal virtue. Not heroes, but true professionals.

I suspect that our own personal perceptions are informing this discussion too heavily.

[sonic]

I suspect that our own personal perceptions are informing this discussion too heavily.

I completely agree. We all have a fixed idea of what ancient warfare was like, whether based on pushing, fencing or whatever. As I have already said, mine is based around the 'what fits at the time' idea.

However, before people carry on quoting ancient Greeks at me, could somebody please answer the question of whether these quotes are based around individual experience, or are poetic interpretations of what happened? It seems to me that if it is poetic, the 'pushing' aspect may be over-emphasised in order to fit the metre or feel of the poem etc. Furthermore, even if you are not pushing, if the enemy retreat then you will trample over the bodies of their dead and wounded. Don't forget that recoiling and routing troops are likely to lure the enemy into mass pursuit....

The whole question of pushing in battle appears to be very complex and not easy to understand. If you were to push against a weak line and they were to break, the front ranks of your own troops are liable to fall over with the sudden removal of the opposing forces. They may even fall over the opposing dead and wounded.

Maybe the real reason for the supremacy of the Spartans, and of the Romans, was the training that they received causing their forward momentum rarely to lose power, so demoralising opponents and causing them to lose morale.

Personally, I am unsure as to the soundness of the 16 deep phalanx as a 'weapon'. Surely there is a limit to the number of men that can add impetus to a phalanx. Otherwise, wouldn't the Greeks have gone from 8-, to 16-, to 24-, or even to 32- deep phalanxes in order to maintain momentum?

Maybe, even in the late-Roman era, once the enemy approached, it was a case of 'lock-shields' and wait. Have the rear ranks use missiles and everybody shout insults before slowly advancing. Possibly, more likely than not, the enemy may even begin to give ground before contact, so giving your troops a morale boost and enabling them to really launch themselves at the opposition. In this scenario, the 32- man phalanx makes sense: the opposition would realise that they had a lot of fighting to do in order to reach the back of the phalanx. Don't forget, a deep phalanx would be far more formidable to the opposition than a thin one.

Oh dear, there's just too much confusion in my head.....


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Ian (Sonic) Hughes

[Robert Vermaat]

Hi Ian,

My first point is that I would treat Junkelmann with a great deal of care: I have been led to believe that he may over-emphasise those aspects of his research that support his own views. It may be possible to train horses to attack an enemy formation from the front, however if the infantry formation stands firm, such a charge exposes the horses to missiles and other weapons at very close quarters. Given the cost, time and effort needed to train these horses, almost certainly the question should be whether the Romans actually did charge into the front of formed infantry, not whether the horses would or not.

You are not wrong, but I think Junkelmann is right. All he did is try to train his horses to charge directly into an enemy, just to prove that it was possible. I should re-read that chapter again, but I don't recall that Junkelmann advocated that this was THE Roman way of attack. But he proved that it could be done. Like you, I don't think that it was the common way to attack an enemy, because I agree that it would be very costly. Normally, cavalry would attack from the flank or harass the infantry by riding past it, etc. But if the battle could be won, a commander (I think) would not hesitate to force his cavalry straight into an enemy formation. That's as common today as it was back then - if a victory was within reach, to hell with the consequences.

As to whether the infantry fought in close formation, locked shields formation, or whatever, wouldn't this depend mainly upon circumstances? Having read van Wees and Goldsworthy, I am now little inclined to believe that two infantry forces would close up and then begin an epic 'pushing match' in order to decide the battle. From what the above historians have said, it is likely that individuals or small groups would take the initiative and try to force back those troops opposite them. When both sides resisted, then the reinforcements sent in would possibly close up and push. However, this would not be very long lasting as such pressure is physically draining. After a short period, either one side lost and suffered heay casualties, or the press loosened and the troops retired to their own 'lines' to catch their breath before a second attempt.

I'm more with John here, but not entirely. I think that when two sides got close, they first would try to dislodge the other side by missile fire, and only then (or like Adrianople, if one side got wenthusiastic) would one side rush the other. Close order combat would then follow, spears first and swords afterwards, maybe at that time would one side try to push the other side away. Or, miore likely, one side would try to break the other line with a concerted attack at a weak spot. If one side broke, that was it. meanwhile, cavalry would attack the flanks each other and possible the rear if possible.

Maybe it could further hint at why the Late Roman Army were no longer prepared to fight so many open battles: the increased political and military importance of the 'centurions' resulted in their being less willing to risk life and limb in order to break the enemy, and their being more likely to take a position to the rear, leaving the common soldiers to take the initiative?

If I read the sources correct, that might be part of it - but also extended to the rest of the army. Apparently, at times the soldiers were difficult. Apparently, when Stilicho had shut Alaric up on some Greek peninsula, he did not destroy him. Some say it was because Constantinople warned him off, but others these days are of the opinion that he could not trust his combined armies. Even Julian had such problems - I'd say that the partition of East and West had caused rivalries that made the troops think twice about throwing away their lives, if they could choose whom to fight for.

[Robert Vermaat]

Now to move away from the 4th century. Caesar's infantry did come forward to charge into Pompey's, not unlike Greek hoplites went forward at the run. Pompey's troops did not respond. So the Cesareans halted, dressed ranks and came on again. Good discipline. If the troops of Pompey had come forward at the run it would just duplicate a hoplite clash, shaking itself out into a pushing match.

In the early period centurions often did display a lack of discipline and individual courage. But by the 4th century we have developed into a disciplined army, with different ideas of personal virtue. Not heroes, but true professionals.

You are right, but my question was not about a charge over a large distance. I wondered about the possibility that if two sides are pushing against each other, one side could (having trained just that), suddenly open a small gap (say 4 men wide) and cause the other side (being pushed from behind) to fall forward. You know that game? You don't expect it and can't help stumbling forward. Chaos ensues, the unlucky one who have 'fallen into enemy hands' are quicly taken care of, while possibly their broken lines are suddenly vulnerable.

That's what I meant - I don't think that when whole formations are pushing, the surprised side can suddenly stop pushing if the other gives way. Of course they hope that the other side gives way and breaks, but if the above thing happens, they're dead meat.

Btw, I think that by the 4th c., as I wrote to Ian above, the army was on its way down again...

[sonic]

You are not wrong, but I think Junkelmann is right. All he did is try to train his horses to charge directly into an enemy, just to prove that it was possible. I should re-read that chapter again, but I don't recall that Junkelmann advocated that this was THE Roman way of attack.

I didn't mean to imply that Junkelmann was saying that the Roman cavalry charged frontally into enemy infantry, and if that's the impression I gave I apologise: all I was saying is that I have been informed that Junkelmann is not the most unbiassed of experimenters.

I'm more with John here, but not entirely. I think that when two sides got close, they first would try to dislodge the other side by missile fire, and only then (or like Adrianople, if one side got wenthusiastic) would one side rush the other. Close order combat would then follow, spears first and swords afterwards, maybe at that time would one side try to push the other side away. Or, miore likely, one side would try to break the other line with a concerted attack at a weak spot. If one side broke, that was it. meanwhile, cavalry would attack the flanks each other and possible the rear if possible..

And that is probably my main point: circumstances would dictate what happened to a large degree - not merely in the deployment and terrain of the battle, but also in the psychological and physical events during the course of the battle itself. I know that we shouldn't use different periods as examples, but I'm going to do it anyway! :lol:

Recent research has suggested that in the Napoleonic period, many infantry battles were decided at the point where the first few volleys were fired. It was at this point that the infantry's morale either stood up to the task or failed. When it failed the infantry fled. Apparently, massed bayonet fencing was probably rare. So, at Waterloo (sorry, very 'British' of me, but off the top of my head I can't remember the name given to the battle on the continent! ) the French guard did not stand up to the British infantry at the moment of the first volleys, they routed and the battle was over.

It is quite possible that many of the battles fought by the Romans were decided in this manner: just look at the casualty figures for some of the Roman victories! My favourite is still the Battle of Mount Bourgaon, fought by Solomon against the rebelling Moors during the reconquest of Justinian/Belisarius. Here, Procopius gives the casualties as the Moors losing 50,000 men in the pursuit (possibly slightly exaggerated? :lol: :lol: ) whilst the Romans did not lose even a single man wounded. :o Although very suspect, it does indicate that morale was of vital importance in at least some conflicts and that hand-to-hand fighting did not always occur in the manner that we imagine.

Apparently, at times the soldiers were difficult. Apparently, when Stilicho had shut Alaric up on some Greek peninsula, he did not destroy him. Some say it was because Constantinople warned him off, but others these days are of the opinion that he could not trust his combined armies. Even Julian had such problems - I'd say that the partition of East and West had caused rivalries that made the troops think twice about throwing away their lives, if they could choose whom to fight for.

I agree. I'm currently writing about Belisarius in Italy, and the number of times that troops change sides is incredible: maybe they simply weren't as 'nationalistic/patriotic' as we are today?

Like I said in my last post, I do find many of the concepts surrounding armed conflict in the Ancient World confusing. Mind you, at least the troops then didn't have to stand for hours in front of enemy artillery, unlike some of the troops in the Napoleonic Wars!! Now that I really don't understand!! hock:

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Ian (Sonic) Hughes

[Robert Vermaat]

Hi Paul,
You're forgiven. :wink:

It occurs to me that Late Imperial warfare has much in common with classical Greek warfare, large round shields, long thrusting spears - what is missing, certainly is a much heavier emphasis on javelins thrown from the body of the infantry en masse. But we can certainly discuss Late Empire battle tactics in comparison to Greek if we move beyond those first javelin barrages to that moment when the lines meet.

Paul, I should receive your book next week, so don't know if you read these articles:
Wheeler, Everett L. (2004): The Legion as Phalanx in the Late Empire (I), in: L'Armée romaine de Dioclétian à Valentinian Ier, Actes de IIIe congrès de Lyon sur l'armée romaine, ed. Y. Le Bohec and C. Wolff (Paris), pp. 309-58.
Wheeler, Everett L. (2004): The Legion as Phalanx in the Late Empire (II), in: Revue des Études Militaires Anciennes 1, pp. 147-75.

Wheeler advocates that 'phalangial' (as in 'non-manipular, with a continuous front) warfare always remained part of the Roman tactical array. What you described above certainly looks like it.

If I remember correctly, Maurice certainly advocates a 16 man-deep formation which is identical to the Spartan. Indeed, John believes that the Late Roman drill is derived from surviving Spartan drill manuals.

Hmm, not entirely I think. Maurice advocated an 8- 16- or 32-deep formation, with 32 as the ideal, but 16 if possible. the reason was mainly because he always took the precaution of doubling his front against an attack from the rear. Apparently, with the mainly cavalry armies of his day, this was a distinct possiblity. I doubt that this was anything the ancient Spartans worried abotut though.

To quoteVictor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War, "The ancients took it for granted that the deeper the column the greater its thrusting power and momentum". Sixteen men deep is useless in battle if those rear troops are supporting the front line, they cannot use their spears, javelins are as likely to kill their own front-rankers and archers are too close. They can, however provide momemtum to the formation.

Which sort of period are we talking about here? Macedonian formations or Classical Spartan formations?

There are many, many, many references to pushing in Greek warfare, and I can supply a dozen if requested...!

Ah, but I think no-one denying that Greek formation used oushing, is there? However, so far I have noit seen proof for Roman formation using pushing.
What do Greek shield bosses look like? Late Roman ones are ofter sharp or pointed, which is not likely to support pushing your mates from behind. they are found in such numbers that I think the notin that only the front lines used them, unlikely.

Some are enlightening, Diodorus and Thucydides both record the trampling of bodies both in the advance and retreat. The Persians at Thermopylaa (according to Herodotus) trampled their own men to death from the pressure from the rear.

OK, no problem there, armies do move, and when they move, like any crowd shows, the ones who get underfoot are helpless victims. But that's no proof for pushing matches. Close order will do that for you too.

Rome? Lucan could envision a battle where the pressure was so great that "every corpse remained standing" (Lucan 4.787), and of course Ammianus was himself packed into a unit of soldiers so tightly packed that he stood next to a corpse, upright like a tree stump, carried along by his fellows.

No problem there either, we are not disputing close order. vegetius gives a foot for each man, that's synaspismos for me. But, again, no pushing match.

Is not this indicitative of a tightly packed force using moment to achieve its aims. Ask anyone whp participates in shield-wall training, get two or three men out of the shield wall, and you can push through, force the gap and start killing from inside the unit, causing a rout. You can get these two or three men out of the fight with spear-point or sword with cutting and fencing; but those three men are much more easily dispatched by pushing them over, trampling them and exploiting the gap. Spears prevent the front line from giving their 'all' in the push by forcing the opposing side to keep under cover behind their shields.

Well, read my answer to JHohn, above. I agree with you here, but that's what I see as a concerted attack on a small front. A wedge will also do that for you (no matter how exposed the lead men), we did that at Archeon and it went well. But i don't say that pushing never happened - you're right, if you can bowl the men in front over that very good. I'm still seeing no evidence of whole formations poushing like a tug-of-war all across their front to achieve the victory. i DO see close order heavy fighting, but with pauses in which both sides get their breath, then satart again, sometimes using the push at a very small front in a concerted effort to break the enemy line.

Without pushing, why have 16 ranks of infantry? Why have 8? Do you have to fight and fence and whittle down the enemy rank, by rank?

Maurice describes that. You have 16 to form a double front. You have 8 because that's a contuvbernium, the first 4 fight with spears, the second 4 provide covering fire and act as reserve. IF pushing ensues (and it surely will at times), they beef up the formation, as you see it. But still, no whole formations pushing here - does Maurice even describe it? Or Vegetius? Or Ammianus (and I've dealt with Strasbourg already)?