Flexibility of the Legion

[Paullus Scipio]

Yes, you are right, to an extent. The African 'heavy' infantry(NOT pike armed, by the way ) were held back behind the flanks as a tactical reserve, and as the Roman centre pressed forward, these reserves turned inward 'in phalanx' i.e in close order line-of-battle and helped by compressing the flanks inward. This forced many of the Romans to turn outward. Similarly, Hasdrubal and the heavy cavalry attacked the rear. The Roman momentum was lost, as the troops turned outward and.....you know the rest.
But I reckon it was probably a close run thing -- Hannibal's centre was under great strain, which is why Hannibal went there to encourage his troops, and if it had given way...... No doubt, Hannibal was a mighty relieved man at the end of that terrible day!
However, reconnaissance/scouting would not have helped in this situation.
Incidently, don't feel embarrassed.....your general point about Roman lack of recon/scouting leading to disaster was quite correct, and you are clearly very knowledgeable, especially for one so young. Impressive !!

[sonic]

The difficulty with this thread is that Coriolanus did not give a timescale to his original question.

Very true! But we get a lot of "timeless" questions around here.

A decent scouting option would probably have saved thousands of Roman lives at Cannae!!

I don't see how. The two armies were camped in full view of each other for a day or two before the battle. The Romans had an excellent line-up and good troops, and were pretty much winning in the center until they got hit in the rear by Hannibal's cavalry! It was bad leadership, not bad scouting.

In the Imperial period things do appear to have improved, since I cannot recall any instances of major Roman forces being ambushed. (I do not count the Teutoburgerwald disaster, since circumstances dictated that scouts were not needed!)

Oh, but didn't Varus use his trusty German auxiliaries as scouts? That should have worked perfectly! Oops...

Yet it was common in Greek warfare to send light troops ahead to occupy hills and other significant points that guarded the line of march - for example, The March of the Ten Thousand. It would be surprising if the Romans failed to learn from these predecessors, since in many cases they were only too willing to copy and learn from their enemies.

Doesn't Caesar mention numerous little cavalry skirmishes? Those would have been scouting forces, very often. I think there are similar actions in many other campaigns.

Valete,

Matthew

Let me clear up a little point. :oops: I meant to type 'Trasimene', not 'Cannae', where scouts may have found the Carthaginians waiting in ambush. (Oh the shame: where can I hide my face ....!!!) :oops: :oops:

At the Teutoburgerwald disaster there was no need for Roman scouts, since they were marching through 'friendly' territory - or have I got the timescale wrong? When ambushed, were they in 'enemy' territory? I discounted the battle since I thought that the Romans would see no point in sending out scouts!

Yes, Caesar did send troops out to skirmish with the enemy, and they were probably scouts. This validates my point that the Romans should have learned about scouting - and probably had. But he was still ambushed when he shouldn't have been. :?

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Ian (Sonic) Hughes

[Coriolanus]

Ave,

I see that there are several theories about this. To answer Matthew Amt, I had no specific era in mind. It was more of an open question. That said, I find the late Republic or early Empire to be the most interesting.

Back to topic. I find it hard to believe that a highly successfull army like the Roman did not use it's Legions as the flexible tactical tool they were. The cohort, or manipele, units seem capable of opperating alone for a few days, even without an extra baggage-train. Especially during the mop-up face of the campaign, where moving five thousand men around the country-side would seem overly rigid, not to mention inefficient.

There are also several tactical cenarios where I see smaller units being more suited for the task. For instance securing minor tactical locations (like river-crossings or bridges), or when the scorched earth tactique were being deployed.

During a fall-back situation, eighty heavy infantry could buy the main force valuable time at a bridge or a pass.

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I am sorry about my generic theories and lack of sources, but as I'm at work, I'm without my dear books.

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Avatar Takk, takk. Rogalending og, ja. Heisann, nabo

[Lochinvar]

Dear Harald,
A good, and important thread - for which you deserve applause.
In contemporary terms, to 'Find' is an essential function in combat, and should happen regardless of whether one is on friendly territory or not (I note the comment several postings ago).
What interests me, and for which I cannot yet distil a satisfactory answer, is whether recce was carried out at more than one level (Army, legion, cohort) and simultaneously Deep and Close. I rather suspect not but would be fascinated to learn.

[sonic]

On a large scale, I was always fairly convinced that the average Roman general would not bother with scouting too much, since they were confident in their ability to beat the enemy using the sheer power of the legions - a fact that Hannibal used against them at Cannae. Moreover, wasn't Cynoscephelae an 'encounter' battle, with the two sides meeting at the crest of a ridge and being unable to deploy fully before the battle began? Hardly an excellent use of scouts!! :lol:

Although it must be acknowledged that the Roman system of Consulships in the Republican era resulted in some excellent generals coming to the fore, we should also remember that there were many 'not-so-good' generals who either didn't bother to use scouts, or refused when scouts were recommended by more experienced senior officers under their command.

I believe that the concept of the Roman army as a professional force run in an exceptionally professional way along modern lines does need to be tempered with the realisation that in many cases forces were ad hoc groupings of troops with no experience of working together under leaders whose arrogant belief in the superiority of their troops led to complacency and error. Thankfully (for them) their senior officers and troops often managed to pull the general's fat out of the fire!

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Ian (Sonic) Hughes

[Matthew Amt]

On a large scale, I was always fairly convinced that the average Roman general would not bother with scouting too much, since they were confident in their ability to beat the enemy using the sheer power of the legions - a fact that Hannibal used against them at Cannae.

But even a bad general needs to know where the enemy is (whether he wants to fight the enemy or avoid them!), and that means scouting.

Moreover, wasn't Cynoscephelae an 'encounter' battle, with the two sides meeting at the crest of a ridge and being unable to deploy fully before the battle began? Hardly an excellent use of scouts!!

I may be misremembering, but I thought the two armies were camped on opposite sides of the ridge, and neither knew the other was there. The first forces that met were actually foraging parties, each of which called for reinforcements, and the battle grew from there.

Although it must be acknowledged that the Roman system of Consulships in the Republican era resulted in some excellent generals coming to the fore, we should also remember that there were many 'not-so-good' generals who either didn't bother to use scouts, or refused when scouts were recommended by more experienced senior officers under their command.

There were probably plenty of others who used their scouts very well but were still crappy generals! Plus, I don't think the system of appointing generals in the Empire was much better--you mostly had to be a trusted friend of the Emperor.

I believe that the concept of the Roman army as a professional force run in an exceptionally professional way along modern lines does need to be tempered with the realisation that in many cases forces were ad hoc groupings of troops with no experience of working together under leaders whose arrogant belief in the superiority of their troops led to complacency and error. Thankfully (for them) their senior officers and troops often managed to pull the general's fat out of the fire!

True enough, to a certain extent. But that's how any large force was back then, and everyone was used to it. Since warfare essentially consisted of getting your army to the battlefield and then lining them up facing the right direction, training together wasn't that big a deal. Tell the archers to fire first, make sure the infantry holds firm and the cavalry doesn't charge too soon, etc. The whole system could work fine if the basics were covered and the troops were good--as the Romans usually were! Any good generalship beyond that was gravy. Also remember that during the early Empire, legions were based in pairs or in threes, with regular units of auxiliaries nearby that they operated with frequently, so armies weren't necessarily completely ad hoc.

Besides that, many modern forces are very thrown-together! There are all kinds of horror stories from recent campaigns of units not even knowing how to communicate with each other. It was all easier in ancient times!

Valete,

Matthew

[sonic]

So many points to answer...

But even a bad general needs to know where the enemy is (whether he wants to fight the enemy or avoid them!), and that means scouting.

My whole point is that you are talking from the viewpoint of a decent general; many generals did not use scouts as "these were pointless, since once my legions get stuck in the enemy are defeated". Scouting is now taken for granted, but this was not always the case and Roman generals could be guilty of not using them. :evil:

Moreover, wasn't Cynoscephelae an 'encounter' battle, with the two sides meeting at the crest of a ridge and being unable to deploy fully before the battle began? Hardly an excellent use of scouts!!

I may be misremembering, but I thought the two armies were camped on opposite sides of the ridge, and neither knew the other was there. The first forces that met were actually foraging parties, each of which called for reinforcements, and the battle grew from there.

If they were within foraging distance, shouldn't they also have been within scouting distance? :?

Although it must be acknowledged that the Roman system of Consulships in the Republican era resulted in some excellent generals coming to the fore, we should also remember that there were many 'not-so-good' generals who either didn't bother to use scouts, or refused when scouts were recommended by more experienced senior officers under their command.

There were probably plenty of others who used their scouts very well but were still crappy generals! Plus, I don't think the system of appointing generals in the Empire was much better--you mostly had to be a trusted friend of the Emperor.

I agree with your point about poor generals using scouts, but then surely we are talking strategy v. tactics, with the point of strategy being to outmanoeuvre the enemy prior to the day of battle and the point of tactics being to defeat him (or her!!) on the battlefield? A poor tactician could lose a battle due to his lack of tactical skills but have been a good enough strategist to have outmanoeuvred the enemy before the battle and so have been in a superior position prior to the fighting.

Furthermore, I wasn't suggesting that the system under the the Empire was better, but there could still be outstanding generals such as Corbulo alongside bad ones such as .....?

I believe that the concept of the Roman army as a professional force run in an exceptionally professional way along modern lines does need to be tempered with the realisation that in many cases forces were ad hoc groupings of troops with no experience of working together under leaders whose arrogant belief in the superiority of their troops led to complacency and error. Thankfully (for them) their senior officers and troops often managed to pull the general's fat out of the fire!

True enough, to a certain extent. But that's how any large force was back then, and everyone was used to it. Since warfare essentially consisted of getting your army to the battlefield and then lining them up facing the right direction, training together wasn't that big a deal. Tell the archers to fire first, make sure the infantry holds firm and the cavalry doesn't charge too soon, etc. The whole system could work fine if the basics were covered and the troops were good--as the Romans usually were! Any good generalship beyond that was gravy.
Besides that, many modern forces are very thrown-together! There are all kinds of horror stories from recent campaigns of units not even knowing how to communicate with each other. It was all easier in ancient times!

I think your concept of 'lining up facing the enemy' may be a little simplistic. Even in ancient times it seems to have been recognised that training troops to fight together was useful, for example Scipio Africanus in Spain and Belisarius in his early Persian campaigns. It was also an accepted fact that generals who trained their troops well were likely to succeed. The advantage of the Roman system was not just the flexibility of the legion, as is often stated, but also the knowledge of the basic combat ability of a legion. Therefore, Roman legions who had not fought together before could be placed alongside each other with a certain level of confidence, since their approximate abilities would be known and a certain level of capability expected. Yet there would always be a degree of wariness if you were unsure of the fighting capability of the legion fighting at your side.

This may have been why in the majority of battles the legions did tend to be used in roughly the same fashion. It was only the outstanding generals who did things differently, usually with troops that they knew, that they had fought alongside before, and who were veterans of combat.

Finally, are you sure that it would have been much easier in ancient times? Would there have been no chance of confusion between the Roman army that fought in the East and their Commagene allies?

Also remember that during the early Empire, legions were based in pairs or in threes, with regular units of auxiliaries nearby that they operated with frequently, so armies weren't necessarily completely ad hoc.

Are you sure about this? I thought that legions were used on campaigns but would then be be dispersed and based separately? I didn't think that the practice of using legions in pairs came in until after the reign of Constantine? Can I ask where you got this from, since it's new to me! :? lol:
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Ian (Sonic) Hughes

[Felix]

The use of scouts is precisely what allowed many generals to conduct their battles in the routine way

"getting your army to the battlefield and then lining them up facing the right direction, training together wasn't that big a deal. Tell the archers to fire first, make sure the infantry holds firm and the cavalry doesn't charge too soon, etc. "

When a general didn't know the enemy were around, then battles became non-SOP events, and the Romans could have a very tough time. The fate of the IX Hispania during Boudicca's revolt, and success of the Romans at Watling Street, has a lot to do with preparedness - which hinges on scouting, among other things. Caesar vs. the Nervii is another case in point.

[Matthew Amt]

My whole point is that you are talking from the viewpoint of a decent general; many generals did not use scouts as "these were pointless, since once my legions get stuck in the enemy are defeated". Scouting is now taken for granted, but this was not always the case and Roman generals could be guilty of not using them.

Sorry about that! I honestly didn't go back and re-read the whole thread to remind myself which side of the argument I was on! I'm sure there were times when we are told the general did *not* scout, it's just been a while since I've run across them so I guess I was curious about your documentation on that score.

If they were within foraging distance, shouldn't they also have been within scouting distance?

Yup! Again, couldn't tell you if the accounts mention anything about that.

I agree with your point about poor generals using scouts, but then surely we are talking strategy v. tactics, with the point of strategy being to outmanoeuvre the enemy prior to the day of battle and the point of tactics being to defeat him (or her!!) on the battlefield? A poor tactician could lose a battle due to his lack of tactical skills but have been a good enough strategist to have outmanoeuvred the enemy before the battle and so have been in a superior position prior to the fighting.

Fair enough, but I think we get into a hazy area between strategy and tactics. Some would say they're the same! Regardless, you're right that any general might have his strong points and weak points, or just good luck or bad!

I think your concept of 'lining up facing the enemy' may be a little simplistic.

Yeah, a little, but I was in a hurry and those are really just the VERY basics!

Even in ancient times it seems to have been recognised that training troops to fight together was useful, for example Scipio Africanus in Spain and Belisarius in his early Persian campaigns.

Oh, I agree that training units together and (even better) having units that have been on campaign together already will improve your army! What I really meant was that most everyone back then knew the basic roles of infantry, cavalry, archers, etc. Any grunt could tell you that slingers wouldn't be leading a charge against armored pikemen, for instance! Nowadays there is a lot more diversity in weapons systems and troops types, and not every general or admiral knows how to best utilize all his resources.

Finally, are you sure that it would have been much easier in ancient times? Would there have been no chance of confusion between the Roman army that fought in the East and their Commagene allies?

In the East it was probably a little better since Roman officers and all the locals typically spoke Greek. In the west, you've got German, Gallic, Spanish dialects, Thracian, etc. Now, as I understand it, an *allied* unit would have a commander who presumably spoke enough Latin or Greek to communicate with the Romans in charge, and probably enough officers of auxiliary units could get enough of the word across to their non-Roman troops. So commands from the general would go down the chain of command pretty intelligibly. Lots of commands were given by trumpet call or visual signals as well, and hopefully the commander told all his unit leaders just what his basic plans were and what signals to watch and listen for. (There we go again with that training thing, eh?) Things certainly got hairy sometimes when the battlefield was simply too big for signals to get from one part to another, or if there was dust or fog or darkness. In the modern army, doesn't matter if you all speak English if you don't have the right radios to talk the artillery units that are shelling you, or to the air support you need.

Are you sure about this? I thought that legions were used on campaigns but would then be be dispersed and based separately?

Ah, great book you should read, Lawrence Keppie's "The Making of the Roman Army". It's one of the few that covers that fascinating era between Caesar and Claudius. Anyways, in the Republic the legions were an annual strike force, disbanded in winter or (by Caesar's time) grouped in winter camps. This continued through the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius, with 2 or 3 legions in one fortress a little ways back from the border, poised to strike each spring. Even under Claudius, there were still a couple 2-legion forts in Germany. It's only after then that the legions were completely dispersed, with only one per fort. I expect that Imperial paranoia had something to do with this, though it also shows a slow transition in thinking, from the army as an annual machine for conquest to more of a border protection.

I really must read up on all this stuff again some day! I get into these great arguments and suddenly find myself wondering where in the heck I learned something, or why I think that way at all! Of course, when the other guy goes and documents his arguments, I shut up quick cuz I know I'm outgunned!

Valete,

Matthew

[sonic]

To Matthew Amt and Felix ...

I believe that the lack of scouting is implicit in many of the sources, such as Cynoscephelae, where any scouts deployed in a sensible fashion should have discovered the enemy prior to a surprise contact. I think the problem lies in that we now take the idea of scouting for granted and so don't look for it in the ancient sources, simply assuming it was happening. It's interesting that Procopius claims that Belisarius displays exceptional ability in his deployment of advance scouts and flank guards prior to the battle of Ad Decimum. Surely the concept wasn't that unusual....?

To Matthew Amt

I had completely forgotten about the Late Republic/Early Imperial practice of deploying legions. I will now go and do my Homer Simpson impression - back shortly...

(D'oh!!)

I'm back now!

I really must read up on all this stuff again some day! I get into these great arguments and suddenly find myself wondering where in the heck I learned something, or why I think that way at all! Of course, when the other guy goes and documents his arguments, I shut up quick cuz I know I'm outgunned!

And don't I just know that feeling! I last read much of this stuff in the early/mid 90's, so I know that I'm way out of date, apart from relying on a very fragile memory!! I've got Keppie in my 'library', but it's been so long since I read it, what with reading Goldsworthy, Heather et al....



As for being in a hurry, I find that that is the second greatest difficulty I face whenever I come into the forum. The first is my appalling lack of typing skills! :lol:

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Ian (Sonic) Hughes

[Sardaukar]

Well..Caesar,when encountering more mobile foes (in Africa, for example) found it difficult to engage them with legionaries because "they could not advance far from standards"..which is interpreted that they were trained to fight in close formation. That is interpretation is augmented by the statement that Caesar had to specially train some of his troops to counter enemy Numidian light infantry and operate together with cavalry.

Legionary equipment does not make them suitable for such tasks either...which is the task of light infantry and cavalry.