Operation Overlord

[Jona Lendering]

Because it's the sixth of June, I thought I'd link to this website - it felt like a proper thing to do.

[Et tu brute]

That looks like a very good article, I don't have time to read it now but i'll certainly take a peek in a couple of hours.

[Primvs Pavlvs]

Thank you Jona! I lost a dear friend of mine in March of last year who participated in this with the 508th PIR, 82nd Airborne.

[Jona Lendering]

I lost a dear friend of mine in March of last year who participated in this with the 508th PIR, 82nd Airborne.

Which means that your friend probably also saw combat at Nijmegen, and liberated a friend of mine, who tells her story here (in Dutch).

[Primvs Pavlvs]

Yes Jona he won his 2nd Bronze Star at Nijmegen.

[Praefectusclassis]

combat at Nijmegen

For which the 82nd deserve many laudes! Their crossing of the Waal river under fire in flimsy collapsible rowing boats is an example of sheer guts and determination. Had the same spirit been shown across all Allied levels and units during operation Market Garden, its outcome might well have been different.

[Narukami]

Good article Jona -- most appropriate.

I would also recommend the book Overlord by Max Hastings. It makes clear just how amazing the Allied landings and subsequent battles really were given the German defenses.


http://www.amazon.com/Overlord-Max-Hast ... 462&sr=8-1

Thanks for reminding us Jona.

:wink:

Narukami

[Robert Vermaat]

Had the same spirit been shown across all Allied levels and units during operation Market Garden, its outcome might well have been different.

Ouch! meaning which part of the Allied organisation in particular?

I'm of the (personal) opinion that Market Garden was overambitious and would most probably have failed even if the planning had been perfect.

[Praefectusclassis]

Well, I agree that hte plan for MG was highly or overambitious. Re the lack of offensive spirit, how about the RAF? Had they allowed two drops on the first day, and/or dropzones closer to the objectives, a lot of lives might have been spared trying to get there. Question is whether the added danger would've been outweighed by less casualties later on.
And then there are of course XXX, XII and VIII Corps, often picked on for lack of sense of urgency. There are certainly explanations for this, but they could (should?) have pushed harder especially on the Sunday and Monday.

[Robert Vermaat]

OK, I agree to some extent. Were the dropzones really decidd by the RAF? I assumed it was the army who thought that certain areras were unsuitable for gliders, especially the meadows south of the Arnhem bridges. Of course, parachuting the British right on top of the city would have made more certain that they would have occupied the bridges, but also a lot more casualties!

I would not diss the RAF too much - they suffered many casualties while (in vain - but they did not know that) attempting to supply the heroic British paras from the air.

Especially the main road for XXX Corps was completely unsuitable for any advance of that nature. Warning that any delay along those rnarrow roads would cause the plans to become obsolute with a day became all too true. That caused too many delays before the 82nd even could begin to take the Nijmegen bridge, let alone the armour to push through to Arnhem. By that time, the SS was across the Rhine and had taken up positions that made any push from Nijmegen to Arnhem impossible.

I think especially the Polish arborne brigade was led to slaughter for politics' sake.

[Primvs Pavlvs]

I think especially the Polish arborne brigade was led to slaughter for politics' sake.

I agree!

[Praefectusclassis]

All Allied units suffered high casualties and they deserve everyone's highest regard and gratitude for what they did to liberate the Netherlands. There were many displays of individual heroism in all units as well.
The problem is that an operation like MG is very much a game of "Getting there the furstest with the mostest". Individual heroics are very quickly outweighed by the effects of the clock and logistics.
From the moment the operation started, the Germans reacted with lightning speed, getting reinforcements from everywhere they could to the operations area as soon as possible. That sense of urgency seems to have been lacking in the higher echelons, especially at the start of the operation.
Because the RAF was afraid of Flak over Arnhem (never mind the biggest fighter bomber escort ever), not the dropzones (good enough for the planned drop of the Poles on the Tuesday) and fatigue of ground- and aircrew, the 1st Airborne and 82nd had to fight the first day with one hand tied behind their backs, guarding dropzones for their reinforcements.
This was aggravated by Browning insisting that his Corps HQ was useful the first day. That required 38 gliders for HQ troops and equipment to Nijmegen, which could've brought almost an entire batallion to Arnhem.
And yes, the road from Belgium to Nijmegen was narrow, but nothing prevented XXX Corps from driving in the evening or at night. They might have hooked up with the 101st on the first day, instead of the second.

[Robert Vermaat]

All Allied units suffered high casualties and they deserve everyone's highest regard and gratitude for what they did to liberate the Netherlands. There were many displays of individual heroism in all units as well.

Absolutely, without any doubt.

The problem is that an operation like MG is very much a game of "Getting there the furstest with the mostest". Individual heroics are very quickly outweighed by the effects of the clock and logistics.

Never mind politics - the reason for the plan was the British (Montgomery) apparent need to outdo or emulate the Americans (Patton) when it came to success onb the battlefield. The race through France had, it seems, after all been too easy. had the command been more careful (too often it was thought the war had already been won), they might have remembered similar situations in North Africa as well as Italy, lessons learned at great cost but drowned out in the late summer of '44. And, alas, bad planning and over- as well as underestimating a number of things.

From the moment the operation started, the Germans reacted with lightning speed, getting reinforcements from everywhere they could to the operations area as soon as possible. That sense of urgency seems to have been lacking in the higher echelons, especially at the start of the operation.

Indeed, as I said above - it was a serious underestimation of the germans, as well as a failure in reconnaissance.

Because the RAF was afraid of Flak over Arnhem (never mind the biggest fighter bomber escort ever), not the dropzones (good enough for the planned drop of the Poles on the Tuesday) and fatigue of ground- and aircrew, the 1st Airborne and 82nd had to fight the first day with one hand tied behind their backs, guarding dropzones for their reinforcements.

Ah? I read that the areas near the bridges had been deemed too soft. Which indeed sprouted the question why the Poles had been dropped with more succes later (but then the original landing zones had long since been lost).

This was aggravated by Browning insisting that his Corps HQ was useful the first day. That required 38 gliders for HQ troops and equipment to Nijmegen, which could've brought almost an entire batallion to Arnhem.

That was due to sheer arrogance, I think.

And yes, the road from Belgium to Nijmegen was narrow, but nothing prevented XXX Corps from driving in the evening or at night. They might have hooked up with the 101st on the first day, instead of the second.

I'm not so sure there. The road was very narrow, but the area on both sides remained very much in German hands, allowing them to cut the road on many occasions. At night, allied air support was not present, which would have meant that any advance or activity would have been extremly vulnerable until the corridor had sufficiently been widened. Fighting in De Peel later proved how difficult that was, without much operational possiblities for allied armour in the soft terrain. It was, in some ways, the success of Von Zangen's 15th army (I think it was?) that escaped from Flanders, which allowed the Germans to keep up the pressure on the corridor for a long time.

[Praefectusclassis]

Absolutely agree on the underestimation of the Germans, which led to a less than optimal sense of urgency and speed (see above )

As to the narrow road, you're right, but I think that XXX could / should have risked more and pushed on from Valkenswaard to Eindhoven and Son. Also, but I have never read much on that, I never really found out why XII and VIII, which were supposed to protect XXX Corps flanks, advanced so slowly.

[Jona Lendering]

Ain't it funny that a thread on Operation Overlord ends up as a fairly detailed discussion of Market-Garden?