11-15-2010, 10:53 PM
2nd Post
No, the challenges faced by Alexander were far more diverse than those faced by Philip. Philip might have organized a powerful Macedonian state and had he lived more, he might have done everything Alexander did and more. Yet, he died before being able to realize his Eastern campaign and so the comparison must be made accordingly. And in the entirety of possible challenges, Alexander had, at least due to the nature of his campaigns, to deal with more.
How do you come to this conclusion? The most powerful state in Europe? Why not Carthage or Rome? Unchallenged on the battlefield? Why? Because Philip won at Cheronea? Philip fought many battles and actually lost some. Alexander and Antipater also had to fight against European opponents, so there were forces who doubted the Macedonian military might. Of course to state that the Macedonian army was invulnerable is too bold and we have to keep in mind that an army can win only if properly commanded and led. And here is again where Alexander's ability comes to the picture. What we certainly know is that Macedonia was heavily indebted and Alexander had to swiftly deal with the fear of possible challengers in this "loose" kingdom of customarily semi-independent tribes that was Macedonia, a problem also faced by his father. And Athens was ready to rebel too and would have too unless Alexander hadn't shown the "barbaric" resoluteness in his swift punishment of Thebes. And of course he was ruthless in this endeavor as any ruler has to be in these circumstances. As to an alliance against Macedon, had Alexander allowed Thebes to organize better, I doubt that a new alliance would have been thwarted.
Of course he was interested and he fought himself against them as against Bardylis. I never made any effort to lessen Philip's genius, which may have been equal or even greater than Alexander's. This of course does not lessen Alexander's exploits, just makes us wonder where Philip would have reached had he lived. I did not comment on why Philip did not venture as far to the north, I just reminded of what Alexander did and offered it as a prelude to his ambition. Philip mostly occupied himself with Greek Thrace and would, according to my opinion also have made a march to the north before crossing the Hellespont. I do not think there is any reason for us to strategically explain why Alexander did what he did in order to determine his value, the fact that he did it is what counts.
Of course he was at the battles and of course he led his army. But, he is not attested, even in those passages, to fight at the head of the cavalry or fight hand to hand. He always is in full tactical control of the situation somewhere among the lines. His "leading"his army does not imply his rushing against an enemy. All this has nothing to do with the image of Alexander fighting on the head of the Companion wedge, stabbing at his opponents, being the target of thrusts, storming walls, as we later hear in Asia... Hannibal fought in the center of his line, Pyrrhus was among his own Companions in the first line receiving a direct attack from a Roman horseman! Darius was in the head of his army, even surrounded by his friends, Demetrius, Antigonus, Antiochus, countless Persian commanders, Porus, Leonidas, Philopoemen, Epaminondas, Pelopidas...so many other Greek strategoi... Philip... why should we condemn Alexander for doing what customarily was done ?
Alexander crossed the Istrus and on the way secured the Balkans. Crossing the river helped him secure stability among the barbarians and his protection even more desirable, since Macedon had nothing to fear from the Celts in the north but his allies had. The Thracian and the Illyrian tribes were not secure at the moment since Philip was dead. The same feeling of disrespect that the southern Greeks had towards Alexander the barbarians had also. As he had to reestablish himself in Greece, he had to also among the barbarians. No Thracian warlord would keep away from the vulnerable Macedonian holdings now that Philip was gone. In the end, he had to fight, he did not just stroll through the Balkans drinking and partying...
Phlilip had only sent a small expeditionary force to incite the Ionian cities into rebellion. This was not the force of Alexander crossing the Hellespont of which we have details. Alexander commenced his campaign 2 years after his father's death making all the tactical decisions himself. Was he influenced by his father? Of course he was, is there any commander who gained his knowledge and experience alone, with no one to provide him experience with? Alexander decided on what forces to take with him, what forces to leave back, what mercenaries and allies to take with him and of course he had, as I already mentioned, to decide how to use this army. Philip never had an army of this composition, so any tactical and strategical decisions Alexander made from them on, were his and his alone. It is the job of the C-in-C to listen to his consultants and then take the decisions. I cannot really say where Napoleon would have been without the likes of Davout, Soult or Ney, all less in general competence than Bonaparte but invaluable in their sectors of action. It is Alexander who was in charge and if we are to judge from the immediate future, he was often highly critical of the suggestions of his staff. Unless we believe that other commanders did not have their advisors or that good human resource management is not also a characteristic of a great commander.
First of all there was no such thing as a "strategos" in the Macedonian army. There were many subordinate commanders who took part in the war councils and were trusted with various tasks and responsibilities. Parmenion was of course not Philip's "only general", nor was he Alexander's. And his son was one of Alexander's, not Philip's. You are trying to find parallels were there are none. What we are calling "Generals", as I already mentioned in my initial position is nothing more than "subordinate commanders". And of all these, of course Parmenion stood out for his ability, experience and loyalty. And among these able men, some were old guard (like Antigonus and Cleitus the Black) and others belonged to the Young Guard (Hephaesteon, Philotas or Perdiccas).
Apart from the Macedonian pezetairoi, the phalangites and the hypasists, the Macedonian psiloi and toxotai and the Macedonian Companion cavalry, Alexander had to use and coordinate Agrianians, Paeonians, Thracians, Southern Greek infantry and cavalry. Actually the Macedonians in his army were only a minority (12.000 pezetairoi, some 2.000 etairoi and a number of light troops). Had Alexander any experience in commanding such non-homogenous armies? Maybe yes, maybe not. We know that Philip had Greek allies at Cheronea but their role in the battle is completely unknown. What we do know is that Alexander took these men and was able to competently marshal them all the way to India. And what does it really matter? Are you proposing that Alexander just sit back and enjoyed the ride up to Hydaspes? That this war machine operated on its own, just because half of it was well-oiled by Philip? I guess that there is little parthenogenesis in most army compositions.
Quote:Paralus wrote : But nothing near what his father faced. To use an Athenian comparison, Alexander succeeded Pericles whereas Philip found himself in the position of Conon post Aegespotami.
No, the challenges faced by Alexander were far more diverse than those faced by Philip. Philip might have organized a powerful Macedonian state and had he lived more, he might have done everything Alexander did and more. Yet, he died before being able to realize his Eastern campaign and so the comparison must be made accordingly. And in the entirety of possible challenges, Alexander had, at least due to the nature of his campaigns, to deal with more.
Quote:Paralus wrote : He inherited the most powerful state in Europe: unchallenged on the battlefield. With a cowed, vacillating Athens and a Sparta with eyes west, there never really was an alliance that could hope to counter what Macedon could put into the field. Granted the new ruler had to establish his authority – something he did with (pardon the Pythonesque phrase) a ruthless efficiency and a fanatical devotion to disposing of threats perceived or real.
How do you come to this conclusion? The most powerful state in Europe? Why not Carthage or Rome? Unchallenged on the battlefield? Why? Because Philip won at Cheronea? Philip fought many battles and actually lost some. Alexander and Antipater also had to fight against European opponents, so there were forces who doubted the Macedonian military might. Of course to state that the Macedonian army was invulnerable is too bold and we have to keep in mind that an army can win only if properly commanded and led. And here is again where Alexander's ability comes to the picture. What we certainly know is that Macedonia was heavily indebted and Alexander had to swiftly deal with the fear of possible challengers in this "loose" kingdom of customarily semi-independent tribes that was Macedonia, a problem also faced by his father. And Athens was ready to rebel too and would have too unless Alexander hadn't shown the "barbaric" resoluteness in his swift punishment of Thebes. And of course he was ruthless in this endeavor as any ruler has to be in these circumstances. As to an alliance against Macedon, had Alexander allowed Thebes to organize better, I doubt that a new alliance would have been thwarted.
Quote:Paralus wrote : That is not quite right. Philip was indeed interested in the “barbarian Balkans” and his campaigns attest to it. The difference is strategic: Philip had Athens and her allies to deal with in the north. Thus much of his campaigning in this direction was aimed at neutering her renascent imperial ambitions. His campaigns against Thrace and his campaign into the Sea of Marmara and the Bosporus are examples.
Pays to keep in mind also that Philip did not have a “pacified” Greece during his forays northeast. Whilst Alexander might have had to deal with his succession he had a recently annihilated Greece facilitating his adventure northwards. Philip was much engaged in politics and warfare attempting to but Greek heads into some sort of compliance. If anything is clear about Alex’s old man it is this: he wanted Greece behind him – by political as much as military methods or belted and cowed if necessary which, in the end it was. Clearly he wanted Macedonia to be part of Greece – the part that mattered of course; the ruler – but, at heart, Greek as did Macedonian monarchs before him who had not the means to achieve it. Alexander saw it rather differently: at Thebes he demonstrated that Greece was now Macedonian; a subject for her king to rule and do not forget it.
Of course he was interested and he fought himself against them as against Bardylis. I never made any effort to lessen Philip's genius, which may have been equal or even greater than Alexander's. This of course does not lessen Alexander's exploits, just makes us wonder where Philip would have reached had he lived. I did not comment on why Philip did not venture as far to the north, I just reminded of what Alexander did and offered it as a prelude to his ambition. Philip mostly occupied himself with Greek Thrace and would, according to my opinion also have made a march to the north before crossing the Hellespont. I do not think there is any reason for us to strategically explain why Alexander did what he did in order to determine his value, the fact that he did it is what counts.
Quote:Paralus wrote : Hmmm…. I don’t think that can be said with any real certainty…
Arrian, Anabasis from those northern campaigns…
Of course he was at the battles and of course he led his army. But, he is not attested, even in those passages, to fight at the head of the cavalry or fight hand to hand. He always is in full tactical control of the situation somewhere among the lines. His "leading"his army does not imply his rushing against an enemy. All this has nothing to do with the image of Alexander fighting on the head of the Companion wedge, stabbing at his opponents, being the target of thrusts, storming walls, as we later hear in Asia... Hannibal fought in the center of his line, Pyrrhus was among his own Companions in the first line receiving a direct attack from a Roman horseman! Darius was in the head of his army, even surrounded by his friends, Demetrius, Antigonus, Antiochus, countless Persian commanders, Porus, Leonidas, Philopoemen, Epaminondas, Pelopidas...so many other Greek strategoi... Philip... why should we condemn Alexander for doing what customarily was done ?
Quote:Paralus wrote :There was no barbarian threat from across the Danube to my knowledge. There had been no concerted barbarian threat from the Illyrians (aside from the pitifully documented campaign where a certain hypaspist called Pausanias stepped in front of Philip). Indeed Philip had created a secure Macedonian border.
Had Alexander been murdered after his northern campaign he will have been remembered as a short-lived inheritor of a dominant Macedonian state who added to the kingdom – if not greatly – unlike his namesake Alexander II.
Alexander crossed the Istrus and on the way secured the Balkans. Crossing the river helped him secure stability among the barbarians and his protection even more desirable, since Macedon had nothing to fear from the Celts in the north but his allies had. The Thracian and the Illyrian tribes were not secure at the moment since Philip was dead. The same feeling of disrespect that the southern Greeks had towards Alexander the barbarians had also. As he had to reestablish himself in Greece, he had to also among the barbarians. No Thracian warlord would keep away from the vulnerable Macedonian holdings now that Philip was gone. In the end, he had to fight, he did not just stroll through the Balkans drinking and partying...
Quote:Paralus wrote : Unlikely. The expeditionary force was already in Asia executing Philip’s orders and Alexander will well have known what was to follow. Unless we are supposing he was kept out of any planning. The forces to remain in Europe and those to invade will have been well discussed and the young king’s “general staff” would only have been too well aware as well.
Alexander may have tinkered but the plan was well set.
Phlilip had only sent a small expeditionary force to incite the Ionian cities into rebellion. This was not the force of Alexander crossing the Hellespont of which we have details. Alexander commenced his campaign 2 years after his father's death making all the tactical decisions himself. Was he influenced by his father? Of course he was, is there any commander who gained his knowledge and experience alone, with no one to provide him experience with? Alexander decided on what forces to take with him, what forces to leave back, what mercenaries and allies to take with him and of course he had, as I already mentioned, to decide how to use this army. Philip never had an army of this composition, so any tactical and strategical decisions Alexander made from them on, were his and his alone. It is the job of the C-in-C to listen to his consultants and then take the decisions. I cannot really say where Napoleon would have been without the likes of Davout, Soult or Ney, all less in general competence than Bonaparte but invaluable in their sectors of action. It is Alexander who was in charge and if we are to judge from the immediate future, he was often highly critical of the suggestions of his staff. Unless we believe that other commanders did not have their advisors or that good human resource management is not also a characteristic of a great commander.
Quote:The first part of that is incorrect. Parmenion – Philip’s “only general” – was the second highest ranking officer in the army. His son (Philotas) commanded the Companion Cavalry and another the Hypaspists whilst Cleitus commanded the Ile Basilikoi: the most important commands in the army. Parmenion's son in law commanded a battalion of the phalanx as did a son of Andromenes. The claim that "many of his generals were his and not Philip's" in the invasion army in no way stands scrutiny. That would certainly come later in what appears strongly, if in retrospect, as a purge of the old guard. Certainly by India we have “Alexander’s men” and those who became such (Coenus, Craterus for example) in control.
Which troops did the army of invasion have that Philip did not that may have needed special attention?
First of all there was no such thing as a "strategos" in the Macedonian army. There were many subordinate commanders who took part in the war councils and were trusted with various tasks and responsibilities. Parmenion was of course not Philip's "only general", nor was he Alexander's. And his son was one of Alexander's, not Philip's. You are trying to find parallels were there are none. What we are calling "Generals", as I already mentioned in my initial position is nothing more than "subordinate commanders". And of all these, of course Parmenion stood out for his ability, experience and loyalty. And among these able men, some were old guard (like Antigonus and Cleitus the Black) and others belonged to the Young Guard (Hephaesteon, Philotas or Perdiccas).
Apart from the Macedonian pezetairoi, the phalangites and the hypasists, the Macedonian psiloi and toxotai and the Macedonian Companion cavalry, Alexander had to use and coordinate Agrianians, Paeonians, Thracians, Southern Greek infantry and cavalry. Actually the Macedonians in his army were only a minority (12.000 pezetairoi, some 2.000 etairoi and a number of light troops). Had Alexander any experience in commanding such non-homogenous armies? Maybe yes, maybe not. We know that Philip had Greek allies at Cheronea but their role in the battle is completely unknown. What we do know is that Alexander took these men and was able to competently marshal them all the way to India. And what does it really matter? Are you proposing that Alexander just sit back and enjoyed the ride up to Hydaspes? That this war machine operated on its own, just because half of it was well-oiled by Philip? I guess that there is little parthenogenesis in most army compositions.
