Alexander the Great was antiquity\'s greatest commander

[Virilis]

What amazes me in Alexander most is the high quality & commitment of his commanders during his campaigns. The rebellions were probably mainly due to the combat / campaign fatigue. This is the "thing" that made Alexander "great" in my opinion, the willingness of his staff / men to fight on for so long and under such harsh conditions...

[Paullus Scipio]

.....and for such rich rewards! The amount of wealth Alexander accrued by conquest and distributed to his Friends and even the common soldiers was obscene, even by modern standards, let alone those of ancient times.....

I'm afraid I agree with those who see him as something of a buccaneering spirit, armed with a magnificent weapon forged by his father and his father's generals, and that Alexander, charismatic as he may have been, was a rash commander who was lucky enough to meet less then powerful opponents ( until he got to India! )

In purely military terms, a commander like Hannibal or Pyrrhus was far more innovative in tactics and strategy ( personally I rate Hannibal as the greatest commander in military history, ever - he achieved things against quality opposition that have never been surpassed, before or since.) Even the Hellenistic successors, such as Demetrius Poliorcetes showed more pure military ability.....

[Brennus]

I wonder how someone like Alexander would have handled something like crossing his army over the Alps, like Hannibal. It might be interesting to imagine how certain leaders would have acted in another time or in another leader's shoes/or situation.

[Virilis]

I think Hannibal is overrated in one respect: romans of his time lacked the tactical / strategical finesse (which they later acquired) and their strength was mainly ability to bounce back from awful losses which would have broken the backbone of many hellenistic armies. Every commander should be judged in context of their opponents. Rome in Hannibal`s time was a crude totalitarian state with immense reserve of manpower and not yet the finely tuned fighting machine it turned out to be later, methinks...

[rocktupac]

Alexander was one of the most important and successful commanders of antiquity ... <SNIP>

Good post - I agree. It's a little bit fashionable to suggest that Alexander didn't do so much and it was all due to the army he inherited from Philip. But I think your list is important is making a full assessment of Alexander's phenomenal ability.

Couldn't agree more.

[Paralus]

What makes Philip II a great commander? We hardly know any particulars of any of his military feats.

You answer, in part, your own question:

Alexander inherited the throne at the age of 20 after his father was assassinated, and had grown up as the heir to the most powerful king in Greece. I doubt that many would be anything but arrogant, headstrong and belligerent in such a case!

Diodorus – gutting (sorry, summarising) contemporary sources – summarises his own summary (16.1.3-6):

For Philip was king over the Macedonians for twenty-four years, and having started from the most insignificant beginnings built up his kingdom to be the greatest of the dominions in Europe, and having taken over Macedonia when she was a slave to the Illyrians, made her mistress of many powerful tribes and states. And it was by his own valour that he took over the supremacy of all Hellas with the consent of the states, which voluntarily subordinated themselves to his authority. Having subdued in war the men who had been plundering the shrine at Delphi and having brought aid to the oracle, he won a seat in the Amphictyonic Council, and because of his reverence for the gods received as his prize in the contest, after the defeat of the Phocians, the votes which had been theirs. Then when he had conquered in war Illyrians, Paeonians, Thracians, Scythians, and all the peoples in the vicinity of these, he planned to overthrow the Persian kingdom, and, after transporting his armaments into Asia, was in the act of liberating the Greek cities; but, cut short by Fate in mid-career, he left armies so numerous and powerful that his son Alexander had no need to apply for allies in his attempt to overthrow the Persian supremacy. And these deeds he accomplished, not by the favour of Fortune, but by his own valour. For King Philip excelled in shrewdness in the art of war, courage, and brilliance of personality.

It is well to remember that Bardyllis had just annihilated Perdiccas’ army and that Philip had “inherited” what remained of a kingdom beset by the same Illyrian king, the Paeonians, the Chalcidian League, Thracians pushing a pretender and an Athens dreaming of empire past with her own pretender. For all of these parties the “Macedonian kingdom” had been the plaything of politics for a generation or more.

By the time of Philip’s death not only had the kingdom been rebuilt, it was the acknowledged military powerhouse of Europe. Not bad considering what Philip was left with.

As for Alexander’s “genius”, if the story of his charging from the field of battle at Gaugamela whilst his centre left and left faced defeat is not simply that – a heroising story – then he displayed gross incompetency. For the record I believe this “pursuit” was a “charge” toward the centre after the initial breakthrough ala Issus.

The man was a “drunk” – likely not greatly worse than other Macedonians – as Aristobulus’ constant apologia suggests. His strategic vision was limited, largely, to the next unconquered people over the horizon and, at his death, Thrace was in revolt if not independent, great areas of Cappadoccia remained unconquered and the Greek states were seething over the “exiles decree”. He had just finished what has been somewhat dramatically referred to as a “reign of terror” removing and executing many a governor of his “well governed” empire. Yet Alexander would sail on to subdue the Arabs, this instability at his back, because “he thought himself quite worthy to be considered by the Arabs as a third god”

His men may have “loved” him but, as Paullus Scipio notes, they loved the rewards more. His men, after the demobilisation of the Greeks, are more and more in need of cajoling, coercion and bribery to induce them to follow him. Diodorus records (17.94.1-5) the loved commander being reduced to outright bribery of the soldiers’ wives in order to win their support in convincing their husbands to agree to yet more conquest. It is instructive that “the Macedonians did not accept it”.

Commeth the conquests; commeth the myth.

[Paullus Scipio]

Hear, Hear !....A great and pithy post, Paralus, well worthy of our much lamented lost 'laudes'.

As for Alexander’s “genius”, if the story of his charging from the field of battle at Gaugamela whilst his centre left and left faced defeat is not simply that – a heroising story – then he displayed gross incompetency. For the record I believe this “pursuit” was a “charge” toward the centre after the initial breakthrough a la Issus.

This raises a most interesting point. Throughout military history, large bodies of cavalry operating in line on a broad front, once set in motion in a"charge" can do nothing but move forward, and are hard to even 'pull up' when successful, and impossible to wheel. Examples abound.

So how then was Alexander able to perform this feat of wheeling his cavalry in battle ? The Macedonian heavy cavalry charged in a 'wedge' formation, deeper than it was broad, which allowed the formation to 'follow it's leader ' and change direction. This was originally a 'Scythian' formation, necessitated by their 'hit and run' mounted archery tactics.

And who was the genius who saw the advantage of this formation, and adapted it to the needs of the Macedonian cavalry, and introduced this innovation ??

Why, the Hellenistic manuals tell us it was Philip of Macedon !!

( trivia note: The Thessalian cavalry too could perform this feat ( of wheeling after launching a charge), thanks to their peculiar 'rhomboid/diamond' formation, which had similar advantages - though perhaps not as advantageous as the 'scythian wedge', and which the manuals credit the invention of to the great Thessalian leader, Jason of Pherae ( assassinated in 370 BC, and who but for his unfortunate death, might have unified Greece, as Philip would do in the next generation. Significantly, Philip did not just copy Jason's innovative cavalry tactic, but chose the even more advantageous 'wedge')

[Paullus Scipio]

I think Hannibal is overrated in one respect: romans of his time lacked the tactical / strategical finesse (which they later acquired) and their strength was mainly ability to bounce back from awful losses which would have broken the backbone of many hellenistic armies. Every commander should be judged in context of their opponents. Rome in Hannibal`s time was a crude totalitarian state with immense reserve of manpower and not yet the finely tuned fighting machine it turned out to be later, methinks...

I can't entirely agree with this, though it is certainly true that the Romans ability to 'bounce back' from enormous casualties, whether on land (second Punic War) or sea (several times! first Punic War), thanks to their vast Italian manpower reserves was a major factor in their ultimate success in their wars, and should not be under-rated. The Romans certainly did not lack tactical/strategic finesse for their time, and as you say in context of their opponents. They had conquered Italy - against formidable opposition from Etruscans, Samnites and Gauls. They had 'seen off' one of History's great generals - Pyrhhus - and his powerful Hellenistic army, which introduced elephants to the western Mediterranean, and they had defeated Carthage, the greatest power in the Mediterranean on land and sea. Thus just before the second Punic War, the Roman Army was the undisputed Champion of the Mediterranean world.

Hannibal's feats, innovations and success should be seen in that light - against the best Army of the time. If they seem inept against Hannibal, that is a measure of HIS greatness. Certainly, once they had learnt from his genius (largely via Scipio Africanus), they became even greater, easily disposing of the Hellenistic kingdoms - Alexander's military heirs, be it noted - despite elephants, scythed chariots and other "wonder weapons".

They then, their military strategy/Tactics forged and tempered by Hannibal's genius, rapidly established a lasting ( contrast Alexander) huge Empire in fairly short order.....

Furthermore, many of Hannibal's feats remain unsurpassed ( though sometimes equalled). For example, commanders regard it as difficult to successfully pull off a company sized ambush. Hannibal had the imagination and skills to pull off an army-sized ambush ! (Lake Trasimene). His feat of enveloping and destroying a larger foe ( Cannae) is something all modern armies study ( consider German strategy in World War 1, or Kursk, a failed emulation in World War 2, or Norman Schwartzkopf's admiration of Hannibal's brilliance), or his skill at escaping when surrounded, by the ploy of tying torches to the horns of cattle at night, while his army slipped away by another route - a tactic much copied since.

Cannae must be, and generally is by Military Professionals, regarded as the outstanding military achievement of all time, against the best Army in the region, nay, the world at the time!!

[Paralus]

So how then was Alexander able to perform this feat of wheeling his cavalry in battle ? The Macedonian heavy cavalry charged in a 'wedge' formation, deeper than it was broad, which allowed the formation to 'follow it's leader ' and change direction. This was originally a 'Scythian' formation, necessitated by their 'hit and run' mounted archery tactics.

And who was the genius who saw the advantage of this formation, and adapted it to the needs of the Macedonian cavalry, and introduced this innovation ??

Why, the Hellenistic manuals tell us it was Philip of Macedon !!

Indeed and double indeed.

Arrian attempts to communicate that attacking wedge in his description of Gaugamela when he has Alexander "create like a wedge" his companion cavalry and the infantry next to them to run at or charge Darius' formation. Clearly this wedge would have the heavy infantry alongside the Companion Cavalry echelonning away to the left and capable then of advancing towards Darius' position in the centre. Battlefield application of the "drill " at Pelium?

[Paullus Scipio]

One minor point......
Gregory wrote:-

Firstly, even his reorganization of the Macedonian army was largely based on the Theban model, which we can thank Epominondas and Pelopidas for.

This cannot be correct. The organisation of Thebes armies was based on part-time militia 'Hoplites', who purchased their own equipment, augmented by a cavalry force and supported, like other Greek armies, by 'peltast's and 'psilo'i light troops, used as skirmishers/light infantry.Theban organisation was no different to that of other Greek 'poleis'.

The problem for Philip was that he could NOT emulate the organisation of the armies of the Greek 'poleis', based on a mass of urban' wealthy' individuals who could afford the expensive heavy infantry equipment ('Hopla'). Macedonians were largely tribal agrarian peasants, and relatively poor, who thus could only afford the less expensive ( because it could be home-made, largely) gear of the 'peltast'. So how do you create an effective force of heavy infantry? What Philip's genius did was to take advantage of his position as absolute ruler ( not possible for the Greek 'poleis' such as Thebes) to carry out drastic reforms, drilling his tribal 'peltasts' as heavy, close-order Infantry ( like Hoplites) and giving them a 'sarissa'/pike to outreach 'Hoplites', and thus create an effective 'close order heavy Infantry' . This allowed him to have the first 'dual purpose' infantry - a major tactical innovation in itself - troops who with 'pelta' and 'longche' could fight in their traditional manner as 'peltasts', but who could, by taking up the 'sarissa' and thanks to long hours of drill, fight equally well as 'heavy infantry'.

What a remarkable achievement to create something out of nothing, so to speak - an act of genius!! Another difference in organisation is that 'Hoplites' provided their own gear, but Philip as King began by equipping his men, and as he got wealthier, their equipment got better, with the front ranks at least, and perhaps all by Alexander's day, having defensive body armour and greaves the equal of any hoplite's gear.

What, if anything, Philip learnt from Epaminondas and Pelopidas was that tactically it was not necessary to destroy the enemy as a whole, but simply to destroy the leadership - Epaminondas' famous analogy of "cutting off the snake's head" before Leuktra. This tactic was central to Alexander's tactics against the Persians - all designed to kill the leadership/Darius, in all three of his major victories, Granicus, Issus and Gaugemala......

[Gregory J. Liebau]

Paullus,

You'll have to excuse me. I could have been a lot more exact in making that statement. I was referring generally to the organization of the army on the field of battle, and not how it was organized for war, and even more specifically to the phalanx rather than the auxiliary troops, which of course would have been very unique in nature so far north as Macedonia, and incomparable to anything the Boeotians may have had available... As far as I'm aware, it's still debatable even to suggest that sarissa were adopted by the Thebans prior to Philip, but the density of his phalanx formations was certainly inspired by them... What do we know about the sarissa situation? Certainly it wasn't something that could be credited as early as Epominondas.

Perhaps that question calls for another thread, or may even point me to another thread of the past?

-Gregory

[Paullus Scipio]

You can use the search function at the top right.....search 'sarissa' and you'll come up with a number of threads.....

[Ghostmojo]

Alexander's place in history is absolutely assured - as not only the greatest Greek captain-general ever - but as one of the greatest warrior leaders of not only ancient times, but any era. His is a remarkable tale and one that is continually worth telling. Perhaps his greatest qualities were his absolute conviction about his own abilities, confidence in the capabilities of his own forces and of course a shrewd understanding of his enemies and how they would fight. As a commander he was first rate - as a human being, however, he left a lot to be desired. But as with Napoleon and a handful of others - his world view (both the spreading of Hellenism and incorporation of the best of what he discovered from other cultures) and interest in trade, architecture, law, geography etc. make him a serious contender for not only the greatest commander and conqueror, but perhaps the greatest of antiquity's 'renaissance' men. That is no doubt a point that can and will be argued. I often wonder, however, how he squared his apparently belief in his own divinity with his weakened state on his death bed in Babylon. The Makedonian Achilles having discovered his heel ...

It is always interesting to conjecture what might have happened if he had returned to Greece and then set off aconquering westwards meeting a nascent Rome and Carthage.

He was undoubtedly the product of some social engineering by both his parents though, and his birth into one of the northern Greek feudal territories had much to do with his opportunities. Pyrrhos was similar in that respect (although their careers quite different). To be born into the upper stratas of the nobility in places like Thessaly, Epeiros or Makedon was to be a different type of Greek than those who appeared into the central and southern states. The status of autocratic leader didn't sit happily with many Greeks at that time, and without that cultural background - historically unchanged in Makedon, and reinforced by Phillip II - his talents might never have had the opportunity to shine.

That's why it is worth considering how many other ancient Greek commanders possibly had the genius of Alexander III, but lacked the path to glory that he was destined for.

In (quick) response to what has been said previously, I would place the Spartan king Leonidas I as one of history's bravest commanders and agree that apart from that, we know little about his abilities. In fact, we know precious little about him, full stop. I would also add Agis III as a very brave (and optimistic) king/commander. Hannibal Barca (one of my faves) was somewhat akin to Alexander I think, but lacking the complete power (and support at home) again was always restricted - but his brilliant victories demonstrate a quite unique talent (certainly amongst Carthaginians).

Back to my own favourite topic - the Spartans - I guess I would have to say historic circumstance really prevented us from seeing what Brasidas might have been truly capable of given the narrowness of his strategic operations; but I think he was potentially every bit as capable as Alexander or Hannibal. Perhaps this is also true of Kleomenes III who was a victim of timing and circumstance as much as anything else. If Sellasia is viewed as being far from a certainty in its outcome, who knows how far this commander might have projected his power, if he had been given more chance to consolidate and grow it? And then there is the curious case of Xanthippos who gave the Romans a bloody nose at the Bagradas. There are far too many of these guys who get just a few brief footnotes and then disappear...

[Dan Howard]

Bah. He's a spoilt kid who just happened to have more dangerous toys to play with than most kids.

[hoplite14gr]

Bah. He's a spoilt kid who just happened to have more dangerous toys to play with than most kids.

Well spoilt. No! Phil saw to it.

He conquered Afganistan. So far this makes a very successful commander. (Soviets and British are jealous )
Some "coalition" is currently making a mess I think...

Dangerous toys yes, but the same goes for Great Pete and Great Friz too.

Guess royal brats get all the fun :evil:

Kind regards