Hoplites fighting in Phalanx formation

[Alexandr K]

Hi,

But I find CAesar's account of all front rankers jumping on the enemy to indicate that it was not unusual for the men as a whole to act in what many would view to be a foolhardy way.

Well, not all front rankers were jumping on the enemy. Many [of the legionaries] (complures nostri) were jumping on the enemy. Only the front rankers could reach the enemy in this way and I believe, these were the selected aggressive men. The rest was still in the relative safety of the second/third/fourth/... rank (which I'm not saying was psychically easier for them). I would say, that Caesar is stressing this situation, because it wasn't usual to do so. IIRC nothing similar is described in any of the other engagements in his Commentaries. But hey, these are only personal interpretations of the text. I can be wrong and so can you.

Check out the news coverage over the last couple of days of the football battles between English fans and the Italian and Spanish police. I saw many untrained, unarmed and unarmoured civilians taking on the police through simple rage at their situation, and what was happening to their peer group and friends. Now apply the same principal to a unit of armed, trained and tightly bonded Roman or Greek soldiers in a similar situation.

Well its a great difference to attack a line of policemen, when you know that they won't try to kill you and to attack a line of soldiers, who certainly will try to kill you.

My point was the opposite of the one which was taken. I am pointing out that men do attack en masse, putting themselves into immediate danger which they cannot effectively respond to. If the attackers are allowed or encouraged to fire, the attack usually breaks down. As a general rule, the attackers did hold their fire until they were in effective range of the defenders. The crisis began once the defenders started firing.

There were a few cases when soldiers attacked with unloaded muskets, so they couldn't stop to fire even if they wanted to, and were forced to rely on bayonets and elan to attack - and some of these attacks were successful. Obviously, avoiding danger was not the primary thought in these men's heads. Equally obviously, these attacks were not made only by the naturally aggressive minority of men, but by formations of considerable size.

As I said earlier today: "You must also realize, that to care more about your life than about killing enemies doesn't automatically mean, that you'll run away as soon as the fight begins or that you won't even advance to enemy. It means that during the clash you'll do your best to survive and if you have the opportunity to attack some enemies, you'll do that only if it doesn't poses greater risk for you. " Of course with some modifications for various kinds of combat.
The bayonet attacks are a chapter of its own. Modern studies (confirmed by du Picq's experience!) revealed that actually only very rarely the two lines met to fight with bayonets. In the absolute majority one of the sides ran away before contact. It seems that if one side was able to nerve themselves to attack with bayonets believing that the enemy will flee, it often really happened. If the enemy stood ground, the attackers slowed down and eventually halted. A gunfight at close distance resulted. It's difficult to understand all the mechanisms working here, but fear and the instinct of self-preservation are certainly the most important aspects. The soldiers are able to withstand some risk to their lives, but everything has its borders and it seems that fighting with bayonets at close quarters without armour or shield was simply too much for them.

Greetings
Alexandr

[Tarbicus]

Well its a great difference to attack a line of policemen, when you know that they won't try to kill you and to attack a line of soldiers, who certainly will try to kill you.

I think you need to see that footage again, and make your mind up again about whether there was risk to life from the police batons, or at least and more importantly, whether as one of those fans you would believe there was. In the face of superior arms and training and at great risk of serious injury, the fans still attack the police to help their friends.

[Felix]

Alexandr,

I agree that bayonet combat is a very specialized subject unto itself.

As you mention at the end of your last post, fighting with armour and shield may well have been a different experience, especially if neither side has significant missile weapons available.

With a big shield and an eight foot spear, standing 4 feet away from your enemy might well be the equivalent of having having a musket and shooting at enemies 50 feet away - and we agree that kind of combat was quite common.

Whereas, actually banging your shield on your enemies, and trying to kill him with a short sword (very short, if you are a Spartan) might have the same psychological impact that bayonetting an enemy would have for an 18th century grenadier.

[Alexandr K]

Hi Felix,
yes, I agree here, although I think the fight at close quarter probably wouldn't be as dreadful for heavily armoured soldiers as a bayonet fight for men without any protection for their bodies.
Greetings
Alexandr

[Tarbicus]

Whereas, actually banging your shield on your enemies, and trying to kill him with a short sword (very short, if you are a Spartan) might have the same psychological impact that bayonetting an enemy would have for an 18th century grenadier.

yes, I agree here, although I think the fight at close quarter probably wouldn't be as dreadful for heavily armoured soldiers as a bayonet fight for men without any protection for their bodies.
Greetings

I agree also to a certain degree, but I think the evidence of the beneficial effects of training to overcome fear and stress, and therefore use the weapons more effectively, is being forgotten or discounted - you can have the best handheld weapon in the world, but if you can't use it properly through fear and stress then it may as well be a chopstick. It was absolutely clear during the Falklands Conflict that the British soldiers had a far higher targeted firing rate, and overall firing rate, than the Argentinian conscripts, even though they were more exposed and out-gunned (even much of the Argentinian equipment and clothing was better). There can be little doubt that this is attributed to a better training regime for professional soldiers, as opposed to conscripts. What is it that the Roman soldier did every day, including officers?; training. Even Josephus tells us that the Romans were impressive in being able to keep formation and perform their maneouvres under almost any conditions, and he indicates this is down to training. Training is able to overcome all sorts of stress induced irrational behaviour in battle, and this, as well as unit cohesion, is also indicated in the report when applied to the Iraqi soldiers, who displayed a far higher willingness to surrender, and rarely fired their weapons in comparison to their opponents. Conscripts with poor training, no common bonds between the men, no unit cohesion, disinterested and incompetent officers, fear of their own side shooting them from the rear outweighing any motivation to attack invaders to the front. The Iraqi units that did operate more effectively tended to include those with more tribal bonds and thus unit cohesion.

Take more modern extreme situations where life and death is imminent, and one that's more serious and dangerous than combat - survival after being stranded in the wilderness (plane crash, boat sunk, etc). A simple fact that will be stressed by all survival experts is the ability to mentally keep positive is one of the most important things that will keep you alive, if not the most important. It's just a simple truth that those who can stay positive, and even display a sense of humour are far more likely to stay alive than those who don't. In groups of survivors, it's those groups who co-operate better that have the higher chance of surviving as well.

If more effective armour in ancient times is equivalent to more air and artillery support in modern times, then the Falklands Conflict demonstrates to me that better armour and arms is not the deciding factor in who wins, but that's only IMHO :wink:

[Alexandr K]

Hi Tarbicus,
I agree with you, although (as I wrote several times before) everything has its limits. For example, the soldier in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries were trained to fight with bayonets. IIRC some generals even emphasized the ability to fight with this weapon. And even so bayonet fights were very rare.

But otherwise you're right. Many of our sources for ancient warfare name as the most important factors in deciding the outcome of battles and wars the morale and discipline of soldiers (Caesar, Vegetius, Josephus, Cicero, Frontinus, Appian... sorry I'm much more familiar with the Roman warfare and its sources, than with the Greek ones), which are raised through training. Only then come the quality of armour, numbers etc.

Greetings
Alexandr

[Lion_of_Sparta]

As a former soldier, let me just say that men under fire will have one of two desires or both at the same time. Fight or flight.

Now, an individual soldier fighting alone will be far more likely to flee than a soldier in a tight group. For those who fought in the phalanx, they knew that sticking together WAS their best shot at survival. If they ran, they might as well have fallen on their swords.

The best modern example is the reaction to an ambush. We were taught to always leave a way out of any ambush. Soldiers who are trapped and have no avenue of escape will fight to the death. Give those same soldiers a "possible" way out and they will run. (most of them at least) In a tightly packed phalanx, there is no way out except forward. Your best defense is to remain with your comrades.

**An interesting note is that we were trained to charge into enemy fire if ambushed. It actually turns out to be the best chance of getting out alive. If you run, they expect that and will have something waiting. The last thing they expect is to be charged. **

Now, punch a hole in the phalanx and it crumbles. A man won't stand there guarding his neighbor while you shove a sword into his exposed flank. This will also account for the large loses for the losers and the small losses for the victors. Once they break ranks and run, it's a rout and they will die by the hundreds.

That's the theory anyway.

[TraderTrey9785]

If soldiers are in a tight group, fighting in a phalanx formation, it isn't so much their passive or aggressive nature, but the fact that Ancient Greece was a shame culture. It looked bad on an individual to flee in combat, especially if it meant breaking the line of fighting. I believe it was Tyrtaeus who said that Spartan soldiers aren't seen as cowardly if they throw away their helmet and breastplate because those are worn for individual protection. However, if he is seen discarding his shield it is cowardice because it threatens the safety of the entire phalanx. The foe doesn't matter -- above all, you don't want to appear weak in front of your own citizens...

[Alexandr K]

Hi,
well, I read this "the men don't want to leave their buddies and don't want to look bad in their eyes, and the Greek culture shamed those who behaved cowardly" thing again and again in this discussion. And I agree... to a certain degree. But once again (yes, I know I'm already extremely annoying) I must say: everything has its limits. One important thing happened at the end of (almost) every battle. One side broke and its soldiers (surprisingly) fled. Often only part of the battle line fled, while the rest was still fighting and sometimes they won in spite of the flight of their fellow soldiers. And - we know that most casualties occurred when the winners were pursuing the fleeing enemies. The ancients knew it too. They knew that to flee is more dangerous for soldiers than to remain in formation and fight or retreat orderly. How is this possible that they always fled? Moreover if all the Greeks were so painstakingly trying to support their comrades and not to look cowardly in the eyes of their fellow citizens, why was it important to have the special, brave rear rankers to prevent the escape of the (say) less brave men?
Its simple. Its self-preservation. For many men their lives mattered more than all the glory, honour or shame. In the extremely dreadful and stressful environment of direct battle the men are often driven by their fears and instincts, not by cold logic and social ties and regulations.
Greetings
Alexandr

[Aryaman2]

Very interesting thread, I would like to make some points
1) I am for the close formation in phalanx, not only for physical reasons, as well as well documented accounts, not only Ancients but also 16th and 17th century pike blocks.
2) The psycology of battle is one of groups rather than individuals, a group can fight, resist or run away in seconds, pancik and or fighting spirit can burst very quickly, anyone with the experience of being part of a large group in a tense situation knows that.
3) In most battles well reported those actually killed are a minority, you can check casualty lists from Napoleonic battles or the ACW and you will see that. In a defeated army those who run away or surrender usually are much more numerous than those who die in the spot.

[TraderTrey9785]

They knew that to flee is more dangerous for soldiers than to remain in formation and fight or retreat orderly. How is this possible that they always fled? Moreover if all the Greeks were so painstakingly trying to support their comrades and not to look cowardly in the eyes of their fellow citizens, why was it important to have the special, brave rear rankers to prevent the escape of the (say) less brave men?

Good point -- I can't argue that one. However, one must admit that one reason that they would decided to flee instead of retreating in a close-order fashion is the fact that not very many Greek commanders knew how to utilize cavalry effectively. Hoplites, wearing that much bronze armor and such, can't move that fast so if one side were to flee (for whatever reason), it wouldn't be that dangerous, given that there wouldn't be a fast, mobile force bearing down on them. Obviously if some of these commanders maintained and kept a cavalry force then not only would they have the option for pursuing fleeing enemies, but that would also allow them to attack the flanks of the enemy formation, sending them to flight.

Honestly, I can't say to what reasons it was "acceptable" for Greeks to withdraw in combat. Being a shame culture, I would assume that if you broke ranks then you'd be seen as a coward, however, where that definition stops applying in a major route, I have no idea. I also think that the training (as it has been stated in previous posts) makes the difference. For Sparta, the fact that they were a professional army and you were 100% sure of the ability of the other soldiers in the phalanx, gave them an advantage in at least feeling secure in their formation when going into battle. Other city-states without professional hoplites, probably couldn't have enjoyed that security, making them more likely to flee. I guess it is really hard to include Sparta in this discussion because of their radical beliefs on valor in warfare -- it is still pretty interesting though.

All the Best!

[Tarbicus]

One side broke and its soldiers (surprisingly) fled. Often only part of the battle line fled, while the rest was still fighting and sometimes they won in spite of the flight of their fellow soldiers....How is this possible that they always fled? Moreover if all the Greeks were so painstakingly trying to support their comrades and not to look cowardly in the eyes of their fellow citizens, why was it important to have the special, brave rear rankers to prevent the escape of the (say) less brave men?

Not quite. They also surrendered. The Macedonian phalanx, at least, had a surrender signal which was to raise all of their pikes.