04-03-2007, 01:42 PM
Hello everyone.
As we know, poor Publius Quintilius Varus perished, along with his three legions, in the horrific ambush inflicted upon them in September of 9 A.D. at the hands of Arminius and his Germanic force composed of warriors of the Cherusci, Bructeri, Marsi, and Chatti tribes. His 'real' name, Hermann der Cherusker, may have been invented by Martin Luther, or maybe just re-established, as Arminius was the Latinized name.
The Teutoburger Wald (the saltus Teutoburgiensis, as Tacitus called it) battle was indeed significant, as it led to the frontier being permanently established on the Rhine, and not the Elbe. But would the Romans have without doubt conquered further north and east if not for the horrendous ambush inflicted upon Varus, who perished, perhaps making him a convenient scapegoat?
The Germanic lands had always been the bane of the Roman dominion. Domitian finally brought the lands on the frontier just to the east of the Rhine and just to north of the Danube under some control, and Trajan made gains against the Dacians, but not by encroaching deep into the the Germanic lands. Roman culture primarily was based on cities, and Germania, as Tacitus told us, was a wild territory of endless forests and forbidding swamps, without the wealth and resources that the Iberian and Gallic lands offered - lands more networked by towns and settlements than the Germanic regions. The Roman border fortifications and garrisons would lead to settlements, which would eventually lead to the cities of Cologne, Mainz, and Strasbourg - all located on the Rhine. Remember, the likes of Viriathus and Quintus Sertorius were never militarily defeated; the Romans had to purchase their murders to get rid of them, which required alliances within the regions of Iberia. Contrarily, Germany was a vast land they barely had a foothold in. But Arminius did have one of the biggest advantages in military history over Varus that day; not only was his victory aided by the element of surprise, but Varus thought a friend was guiding him. Roman legionaires always gave a good account of themselves, whether at crushing defeats like the Trebbia or Carrhae, and the Romans were nothing if not a 'can-do' people. But, again, empire boundaries must stop somewhere, and the Elbe seemed impracticable (though not necessarily by glancing at the map).
Tiberius clearly identified that the campaigns under Nero Claudius Drusus (in response to a Germanic incursion into Gaul in 13 B.C.) and the punitive expedition of Germanicus, in revenge of Teutoberger Wald (Arminius was defeated in 18 A.D and assassinated a year later), needed to be sustained from the imperial fisc. These campaigns showed the legions could beat the Germanic tribes if not ambushed or drawn into unfavorable terrain. But that very terrain seemed too much of the country east of the Rhine. Tiberius, seemingly, prudently decided that Roman military efforts should be applied to the eastern provinces, where greater wealth was available to be extracted for imperial coffers etc. Again, frontiers have to be drawn somewhere, and the Rhine made geographic sense, even if an Elbe-Danube line would shorten the frontier a bit. But even with the frontier established on the Rhine, migrations, tribal rebellions and harsh weather kept Romanitas somewhat isolated. This similarily happened in Britain.
To hold down Germania beyond the outposts of the Rhine would have required an outlay of men and money greater than Rome could seemingly afford, especially being there was trouble on the Parthian border. The empire had reached various natural boundaries of sea and desert, and the three great rivers of the Rhine, Danube and Euphrates made practical borders. The Rhine would remain as a political and cultural boundary far beyond Rome's influence. It is a huge question, and potentially fascinating discussion, as to whether or not the crushing ambush of Varus' three was as 'decisive' as many seem to feel, in terms of affecting German and British evolvement. It definitely had a pschological effect on Augustus' thinking, but would it had made much of a difference? With Arminius' failure of ambushing Varus, would the Roman empire have extended to the Elbe? Did this battle truly change the course of the world? I lean towards no - I don't think it did. The bulk of Germania was most likely never going to absorbed by Rome regardless of the outcome of that battle. True, Roman armies proved they could beat Germanic forces in the field, but it takes more to hold what is initially conquered. The Roman army was a superb instrument of conquest, with its mobile trench warfare, but that very style can only be substantially hampered by a guerilla-style defense amid interior lines in 'wild' terrain, which is likely what would have occured.
The Gallic campaigns of Julius Caesar paid for themselves and yielded profits above and beyond. Caesar's conquest of Gaul was one of the most impacting campaigns in history; he provided security and wealth for Rome that maybe quadrupled its currect condition regarding both. But when he sortied into Germany, via the incredible bridge he swiftly built to bridge the Rhine, he realized, among the other factors I mentioned, to hold the Rhine frontier was possible only under certain conditions, one of which was the possession (or alliance) of Britian. Caesar realized that Germanic brigands would be almost impossible to subjugate, and he also probably saw, as Tiberius certainly did 6 decades later, Rome couldn't have both, and Britain was more practicable. But Caesar created the Rhine frontier, and would have likely encroached east of the river to scout further etc. if not for the pressing political events that happened, causing him to cross the Rubicon. Moreover, one reason he crossed over in the first place as a show of political and military muscle to Rome itself.
Caesar tells us in his Gallic Wars (Book VI) that the Germans differed from the Gauls in their way of living; their lives centered around hunting and warlike purposes. They didn't care for regulated agriculture, and no man was permitted to own land; each year the tribal leaders assigned to regional clans as much land as they thought necessary, and after a yearly 'lease', so to speak, the land had to be surrendered. This method was for the purpose to prevent farming to not impede the warlike zeal amongst the tribal warriors, and to prevent any passion of money to arise form ownership of the land, which would 'be parent of parties and of quarrels'. Caesar tells us,
"...it is their aim to keep common people in contentment, when each man sees his own wealth is equal to the most powerful..."
If Julius Caesar can be sustained relatively well, which is always difficult, the Germanic tribes devastated their lands which surrounded their regions to to remove 'all fear of a sudden inroad', which illustrates an understanding of some understanding of a defensive strategy. This is paramount - how could Roman armies, if encroaching Germania to a substantial degree, be able to set up their marching camps, their very impregnability, to the fullest? True, it seems Drusus and Germanicus led more than mere raids into German territory, but never were challenged to circumvent what Caesar is describing. If German tribes starting putting up unwavering resistence, which the two mentioned did not completely face, it would have been extremely difficult for the Romans to gain the headway that would justify the degree of difficulty. Moreover, the not-so-close proximity of Germania and the lack of wealth of the lands, as has been mentioned, would not justify an assiduous campaign into these lands.
No doubt about it: the inclusion of Britian and not Germany into the Roman sphere of influence went far to determine the course of European history, and the development of Germany as a great nation of extremely cultured people belies anyone's claim that Rome was the exclusive conduit of 'civilization' into the Western World. However, I don't think that is a common claim and Roman ideas must have rubbed upon the Germanic peoples in some form. It's very likely Germania was never going to be part of the Roman Empire, no matter what happened at the Teutoburger Wald. But such a proclamation is certainly entertainingly debatable and disprovable.
But I'm just a student, and there's much I do not know. Maybe I'm off significantly.
Thanks, Spartan JKM
As we know, poor Publius Quintilius Varus perished, along with his three legions, in the horrific ambush inflicted upon them in September of 9 A.D. at the hands of Arminius and his Germanic force composed of warriors of the Cherusci, Bructeri, Marsi, and Chatti tribes. His 'real' name, Hermann der Cherusker, may have been invented by Martin Luther, or maybe just re-established, as Arminius was the Latinized name.
The Teutoburger Wald (the saltus Teutoburgiensis, as Tacitus called it) battle was indeed significant, as it led to the frontier being permanently established on the Rhine, and not the Elbe. But would the Romans have without doubt conquered further north and east if not for the horrendous ambush inflicted upon Varus, who perished, perhaps making him a convenient scapegoat?
The Germanic lands had always been the bane of the Roman dominion. Domitian finally brought the lands on the frontier just to the east of the Rhine and just to north of the Danube under some control, and Trajan made gains against the Dacians, but not by encroaching deep into the the Germanic lands. Roman culture primarily was based on cities, and Germania, as Tacitus told us, was a wild territory of endless forests and forbidding swamps, without the wealth and resources that the Iberian and Gallic lands offered - lands more networked by towns and settlements than the Germanic regions. The Roman border fortifications and garrisons would lead to settlements, which would eventually lead to the cities of Cologne, Mainz, and Strasbourg - all located on the Rhine. Remember, the likes of Viriathus and Quintus Sertorius were never militarily defeated; the Romans had to purchase their murders to get rid of them, which required alliances within the regions of Iberia. Contrarily, Germany was a vast land they barely had a foothold in. But Arminius did have one of the biggest advantages in military history over Varus that day; not only was his victory aided by the element of surprise, but Varus thought a friend was guiding him. Roman legionaires always gave a good account of themselves, whether at crushing defeats like the Trebbia or Carrhae, and the Romans were nothing if not a 'can-do' people. But, again, empire boundaries must stop somewhere, and the Elbe seemed impracticable (though not necessarily by glancing at the map).
Tiberius clearly identified that the campaigns under Nero Claudius Drusus (in response to a Germanic incursion into Gaul in 13 B.C.) and the punitive expedition of Germanicus, in revenge of Teutoberger Wald (Arminius was defeated in 18 A.D and assassinated a year later), needed to be sustained from the imperial fisc. These campaigns showed the legions could beat the Germanic tribes if not ambushed or drawn into unfavorable terrain. But that very terrain seemed too much of the country east of the Rhine. Tiberius, seemingly, prudently decided that Roman military efforts should be applied to the eastern provinces, where greater wealth was available to be extracted for imperial coffers etc. Again, frontiers have to be drawn somewhere, and the Rhine made geographic sense, even if an Elbe-Danube line would shorten the frontier a bit. But even with the frontier established on the Rhine, migrations, tribal rebellions and harsh weather kept Romanitas somewhat isolated. This similarily happened in Britain.
To hold down Germania beyond the outposts of the Rhine would have required an outlay of men and money greater than Rome could seemingly afford, especially being there was trouble on the Parthian border. The empire had reached various natural boundaries of sea and desert, and the three great rivers of the Rhine, Danube and Euphrates made practical borders. The Rhine would remain as a political and cultural boundary far beyond Rome's influence. It is a huge question, and potentially fascinating discussion, as to whether or not the crushing ambush of Varus' three was as 'decisive' as many seem to feel, in terms of affecting German and British evolvement. It definitely had a pschological effect on Augustus' thinking, but would it had made much of a difference? With Arminius' failure of ambushing Varus, would the Roman empire have extended to the Elbe? Did this battle truly change the course of the world? I lean towards no - I don't think it did. The bulk of Germania was most likely never going to absorbed by Rome regardless of the outcome of that battle. True, Roman armies proved they could beat Germanic forces in the field, but it takes more to hold what is initially conquered. The Roman army was a superb instrument of conquest, with its mobile trench warfare, but that very style can only be substantially hampered by a guerilla-style defense amid interior lines in 'wild' terrain, which is likely what would have occured.
The Gallic campaigns of Julius Caesar paid for themselves and yielded profits above and beyond. Caesar's conquest of Gaul was one of the most impacting campaigns in history; he provided security and wealth for Rome that maybe quadrupled its currect condition regarding both. But when he sortied into Germany, via the incredible bridge he swiftly built to bridge the Rhine, he realized, among the other factors I mentioned, to hold the Rhine frontier was possible only under certain conditions, one of which was the possession (or alliance) of Britian. Caesar realized that Germanic brigands would be almost impossible to subjugate, and he also probably saw, as Tiberius certainly did 6 decades later, Rome couldn't have both, and Britain was more practicable. But Caesar created the Rhine frontier, and would have likely encroached east of the river to scout further etc. if not for the pressing political events that happened, causing him to cross the Rubicon. Moreover, one reason he crossed over in the first place as a show of political and military muscle to Rome itself.
Caesar tells us in his Gallic Wars (Book VI) that the Germans differed from the Gauls in their way of living; their lives centered around hunting and warlike purposes. They didn't care for regulated agriculture, and no man was permitted to own land; each year the tribal leaders assigned to regional clans as much land as they thought necessary, and after a yearly 'lease', so to speak, the land had to be surrendered. This method was for the purpose to prevent farming to not impede the warlike zeal amongst the tribal warriors, and to prevent any passion of money to arise form ownership of the land, which would 'be parent of parties and of quarrels'. Caesar tells us,
"...it is their aim to keep common people in contentment, when each man sees his own wealth is equal to the most powerful..."
If Julius Caesar can be sustained relatively well, which is always difficult, the Germanic tribes devastated their lands which surrounded their regions to to remove 'all fear of a sudden inroad', which illustrates an understanding of some understanding of a defensive strategy. This is paramount - how could Roman armies, if encroaching Germania to a substantial degree, be able to set up their marching camps, their very impregnability, to the fullest? True, it seems Drusus and Germanicus led more than mere raids into German territory, but never were challenged to circumvent what Caesar is describing. If German tribes starting putting up unwavering resistence, which the two mentioned did not completely face, it would have been extremely difficult for the Romans to gain the headway that would justify the degree of difficulty. Moreover, the not-so-close proximity of Germania and the lack of wealth of the lands, as has been mentioned, would not justify an assiduous campaign into these lands.
No doubt about it: the inclusion of Britian and not Germany into the Roman sphere of influence went far to determine the course of European history, and the development of Germany as a great nation of extremely cultured people belies anyone's claim that Rome was the exclusive conduit of 'civilization' into the Western World. However, I don't think that is a common claim and Roman ideas must have rubbed upon the Germanic peoples in some form. It's very likely Germania was never going to be part of the Roman Empire, no matter what happened at the Teutoburger Wald. But such a proclamation is certainly entertainingly debatable and disprovable.
But I'm just a student, and there's much I do not know. Maybe I'm off significantly.
Thanks, Spartan JKM
"A ship in harbor is safe - but that is not what ships are built for."
James K MacKinnon
James K MacKinnon
