what was the function of the Roman cavalry?

[Gaius Julius Caesar]

If I remember correctly, at Cannae, the Triarii were left to guard the camp... Hell, its hard enough to follow the commands in a small group, when the centurio is at the far end. If you are focused on the ensuing disaster to the front, the rear may well be neglected. I'm not saying if all goes well, the rear shouldn't be able to form another front, as is evidenced by Caesars battle in Africa in the Civil war, but specifically, Cannae, where leadership was wanting, and disaster already well under way, the few at the rear who were ABLE to turn and fight were overwhelmed. The majority were so hemmed in they couldn't even use their weapons, AFAIK :wink:

[Tarbicus]

If I remember correctly, at Cannae, the Triarii were left to guard the camp...

Goldsworthy doesn't think so, finding it highly unlikely. He thinks it more likely different units had men allocated to the camp and baggage, including some cavalry, or even an entire legion with its supporting ala.

Hell, its hard enough to follow the commands in a small group, when the centurio is at the far end....the few at the rear who were ABLE to turn and fight were overwhelmed. The majority were so hemmed in they couldn't even use their weapons, AFAIK :wink:

Were they hemmed in at the stage that the Carthaginians attacked from the rear? More likely afterwards. Of course the Romans at the rear were able to turn about, given the spacing between the men. These men weren't at all involved in the fighting at the front. Also, why would they need to be ordered to turn about? A mass of cavalry are coming at them from the rear, and I absolutely believe the men would turn out of sheer instinct. The optiones were at the rear as well, so they could order it if necessary, but I find it more likely the optiones screaming "What are you waiting for?!"

[Gaius Julius Caesar]

From what I read, due to the anticipation of the impending victory, given that they were pushing the center back, the rear was pushing forward, crowding those in the front, so, I think it is safe to stick to my guns on this one!

By this stage of the battle there would have been little if no spacing to speak of!

[Tarbicus]

From what I read, due to the anticipation of the impending victory, given that they were pushing the center back, the rear was pushing forward, crowding those in the front, so, I think it is safe to stick to my guns on this one!

By this stage of the battle there would have been little if no spacing to speak of!

The rear would be pushing forward, or following the front maniples?

[Gaius Julius Caesar]

That is the way it unfolded, as I have read in a couple of books on the subject!
I read Goldworthy's version a few years ago too. Whenever I quote him, people jump to shoot him down anyway! :? roll: :wink: :lol:

[Tarbicus]

I personally think the rear was pushed forward in the centre only when the attack on them happened. If they were already engaged at the wings then that might have already slowed their advance as a whole. Then the front comes back in panic and retreat from Hannibal, to compress the Roman whole.

[Gaius Julius Caesar]

The front were actually pushing the center back, AFAIK

[Goffredo]

Hi Aryaman2
are you sure cavalry could and did overrun steady infantry formations?
I find it hard to believe. Cavalry might charge straight only after the formation was no longer steady but falling apart, possibly after many cavalry indirect attacks (turning to briefly following infantry line while throwing lances or shooting arrows). Direct charge? No way Jose'!

[Robert Vermaat]

Hi Aryaman2
are you sure cavalry could and did overrun steady infantry formations?
I find it hard to believe. Cavalry might charge straight only after the formation was no longer steady but falling apart, possibly after many cavalry indirect attacks (turning to briefly following infantry line while throwing lances or shooting arrows). Direct charge? No way Jose'!

I second that. For the Late Roman period it is attensted that even mediocre heavy infantry, provided the hold fast and are not very much outnumbered, could and did stop larger numbers of (heavy) cavalry. In some of those occasions, they were dislodged (if at all) after holding for a long time against vastly superior numbers, or when the opposing cavalry dismounted.

[Tarbicus]

The front were actually pushing the center back, AFAIK

I meant the centre of the front ranks. But it's also possible the middle ranks were the first to rout, which is why the more experienced and steady were placed at the rear of a unit. The very front ranks can't actually flee, as such, because they will just be cut down.

[Aryaman2]

For instance in the 17th century, John Cruso in his "Militarie Instructions for the Cavallerie", the standard manual used for cavalry in the English Civil War, wrote how to train a horse "to ride him against a compleat armour, so set upon a steak, that he may overthrow it, and trample it under his feet: that so (and by such other means) your horse (finding that he receiveth no harm) may become bold to approach any object"
In that period there are plenty of battles in which infantry was charged and routed by cavalry.

I think that 17th century is a clear example about the fact that horses can't charge against disciplined infantry. The standard way cavalry attacked at this century was the "caracole", where each row of cavalrymen fired its pistol at a close distance of infantry and retreated, without any physical contact. By the way they didn't gallop, moving horses at a fast pace without expecting any clash against steady infantry.



Xavi

The caracole was no longer in use since the early 17th century, by then cavalry shot their pistols at close range and then charged, as they did at the battle of Tournhout (1598) for instance.

[Aryaman2]

Hi Aryaman2
are you sure cavalry could and did overrun steady infantry formations?
I find it hard to believe. Cavalry might charge straight only after the formation was no longer steady but falling apart, possibly after many cavalry indirect attacks (turning to briefly following infantry line while throwing lances or shooting arrows). Direct charge? No way Jose'!

I second that. For the Late Roman period it is attensted that even mediocre heavy infantry, provided the hold fast and are not very much outnumbered, could and did stop larger numbers of (heavy) cavalry. In some of those occasions, they were dislodged (if at all) after holding for a long time against vastly superior numbers, or when the opposing cavalry dismounted.

As I said, it depends on different periods and armies, I know the famous description by Procopius of how Byzantine infantry resisted Persian cavalry, for instance, but I would point that Persian cavalry was not a real heavy cavalry, despite wearing extensive armour. Some military historians think that charging is a purely Western fighting method, anyway as I said, there are plenty of eyewitness accounts of cavalry charging steady infantry, and I am willing to discuss individual cases, but I readily admit they are not from the Ancient Times.

[Felix]

Some comparative military history may be helpful.

We have some very detailed descriptions of exactly what happened to deep formations in Napoleonic times when they began to collapse. In the battles between the French and Wellington, the English were usually on the defensive and deployed in reverse slope position, which protected them from French artillery bombardment. It also made it very hard for advancing French infantry to tell exactly how far they were from the English line. Since the French usually maneuvered in columns, this resulted in the French blundering into range of the English muskets while still in deep formation. The results were quite striking. The English line would stand or advance into clear view of the French, and unleash their first volley. This usually brought the French to a halt; and the first ranks of the French would return fire. Now, the rear ranks of the French column had no clear idea of what was happening at the front. As a rule, it was the men in the back who began to panic first. They didn't know what was going on up front, they couldn't fight or even see the enemy, but they could tell something had gone wrong.

It is worth noting that military manuals of the Byzantine period emphasize that the best/most experienced and senior man is in the front row of a column - and that the next best man is at the back. This is a critical position.

Turning a fighting line around is not a trivial matter. For the first thing, it is quite possible no one realized enemy cavalry were in the rear until the enemy horsemen were almost on top of them. Yes, a group of horsemen are noisy, but so are 40,000 (or so) marching/fighting/dying legionaries. They might not have been heard until it was too late. They would be hard to see. Battlefields are notoriously dusty, noisy places, and uniforms and flags were not as standardized as they would be in the 18th and 19th centuries. The problem of recognizing friend from foe (and the secondary problem of friendly fire) have always plagued armies, let alone when the foe is coming from a direction they aren't supposed to be at.

One modern case in point is the British Gloucester regiment. This regiment had a unique honor - they could wear their unit badge on the front and the back of their caps. They gained this right in the Napoleonic Wars, when, in one battle, they were already engaged in their front and a new enemy force assailed their rear. All they did was turn the rear rank around and begin firing in the other direction -- but to do this "simple" task successfully was so unheard-of that the unit was honored forever after.

[Tarbicus]

I realised that the triarii would actually not be at the rear of the army, but the velites would be after retiring from their initial role in the opening of the battle. The Carthaginians must have slaughtered them and drove them into the ranks of the triarii.

As to who would have routed first, I still think the middle ranks. Daly points out that the most experienced were at the front and rear. But, when the legions were outflanked that would mean the usually safer and inexperienced middle rankers would have been exposed to serious assault from one of the worst positions.

[Felix]

Ardant du Picq says this about very deep formations:

"There is a point beyond which man cannot bear the anxiety of combat in
the front lines without being engaged. The Romans did not so increase
the number of ranks as to bring about this condition. The Greeks did
not observe and calculate so well. They sometimes brought the number
of files up to thirty-two and their last files, which in their minds,
were doubtless their reserves, found themselves forcibly dragged into
the material disorder of the first ones."

He wrote in the mid 19th century, out of a background of Napoleonic warfare, and in his opinion the disorder propagates all the way to the back of a deep formation.