Thread Rating:
  • 0 Vote(s) - 0 Average
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4
  • 5
The significance of the Battle of Adrianople, 378 A.D.
#1
As most of you know, the eastern Roman army of Valens was destroyed by the Goths in Thrace, a little west of modern Istanbul, in 378 A.D. This battle has been described by modernists as a revolutionary battle which saw the advent of the cavalry-cycle - heavy cavalry becoming the chief arm on European battlefields until the English longbow set new trends in the mid 14th century.

Are they right, most notably Charles Oman? Was this battle different, in terms of the set-piece dispositions and equipment used by both sides? Could it have been a debacle for the Romans due to faulty intelligence and tactical failures?

Please forgive me if this is too long; I simply have trouble being succinct :roll:

This is how I basically see it. Some accounts claim the Goths as having stirrups - that these horsemen were different, being 'glued to their hoses'. I think its unlikely there were stirrups used at Adrianople by the Goths, Alans and their other mounted briganded friends (perhaps a loop of some sort rather than the metal rings?); there is just no concrete evidence to support their use. These horsemen, like all horsemen growing up riding and fighting on horseback, could ride adeptly without stirrups. Stirrups would be a necessity for the mounted archers who maneuvered while implementing firepower upon thier enemies, most notably the Mongols, to achieve what they excelled at, but the saddles these horsemen had were probably efficient enough for stability. Despite the wonder as to why the stirrup wasn't in Europe earlier, being it was in the eastern lands perhaps 1/2 millennia earlier than when it was used prevalently in Europe, there is simply no evidence to support their use. I don't see how it could have 'gotten by anybody' until the 7th century, when in fact it did arrive. One major asset the stirrup rendered was for men not bred to riding horses to effectivley clash while mounted, and reduce fatigue throughout long marches.

Another element which improved the capabilities of cavalry was the horse-shoe. Rough terrain could be manipulated on shod horses without long periods of time afterwards for the animals to heal in soft pastures. Anyone know when this came along?

I think the battle of Adrianople was significant because it irrevocably changed the conditions on which barbarians and Romans would deal with each other in the future, and Rome might have been sacked sooner if not for the diplomatic astuteness of Theodosius I; the trained army lost that terrible day at Adrianople could not be replaced, at least any time soon. His offer to the vagabonding Goths in the Balkan regions of allied status (foederati) with Rome, while retaining their own sovereignty, proved very efficacious until his death in 395 A.D. There was something more appealing for many barbarian chieftains about leading their warriors to fight along the ranks of the Roman military system than merely leading their own federated mobs (somewhat) into battle against Romans. They were probably thinking along the lines of stature, such as gaining war ministries in the empire. Moreover, Theodosius paid them higher than the Roman troops (reputedly), and showed them greater consideration. Trained units were also transferred from Egypt to replenish Thedosius' ranks.

The result of the battle of Adrianople also seemed to signify the reality to the Eastern Empire's military that efficient cavalry must be adopted more fully, but not necessarily changed, in terms of structure. Part of Theodosius' foederati was perhaps 40,000 conscripted Gothic warriors, many being cavalry. This must have been instrumental in the vanquishing of Theodosius' rivals, Magnus Maximus and Eugenius by 394 A.D. Actually, I believe Alaric, who would sack Rome in 410 A.D., was part of the campaign that crushed Eugenius.

Now, I would like to pose three major questions. I will refrain from addressing anything in depthly on the first two right now until, or if, the thread gets going.

Was the battle of Adrianople the advent of the cavalry cycle - the so-called tactical revolution in the relation between cavalry and infantry which would influence the period when heavy cavalry, typified by the Medieval knight, dominated the battlefields of Europe for another 1,000+ years?

Was the battle simply a battle lost catastrophically by the emperor Valens because of his tactical and intelligence failures, combined with a swift tactical surprise from the Gothic horsemen? But remember, it wasn't an ambush akin to what Hannibal achieved at Trasimene, Scipio's 'Burning of the Camps' (night ambush), or the Teutoburger Wald. The clash at Adrianople was fought on an open plain.

Did the Gothic cavalry contemporaneously send the Roman horsemen into flight and aid their infantry in the destruction of their enemy? Or was it really a battle won by Gothic infantry over Roman infantry, who were already thrown into disorder (terribly tight-packing of their ranks) by the initial salvo of Gothic cavalry, who all left the field chasing Roman cavalry, thus being merely a preliminary supplement?

Some reputable modern sources state unequivically 'no' to the cavalry-cycle issue. I am inclined to agree; this battle led to a Roman catastrophe due to faulty intelligence and tactical surprise from the Gothic cavalry. It doesn't seem the arms and tactics employed from both sides were anything novel.

Our primary source for this event was Ammianus Marcellinus, whose work is available thanks to the Loeb Classical Library.

I think, basically, both armies numbered between 20-30,000 men, with Valens having an edge in quality and quantity (slight edge in numbers). But Valens thought he was approaching an enemy force, primarily Fritigern's footmen housed in their wagonlaager (wagon-fort), composed of slightly more than 1/2 of what it actually was. Fritigern had sent for his allied horsemen, out foraging 'far away', and was 'begging' a truce with Valens, sending out envoys of 'low origin' initially, whom Valens refused to see. Valens wanted to be sent a suitable chieftain to execute a lasting treaty. Fritigern then sent a 'common' soldier as a herald, requesting that picked men of noble rank among the Romans be sent to him as hostages, and he would tolerate the anger felt by his warriors because of his virtual overture of peace. But, in actuality, he was purposely delaying, hoping that amid the pretended truce his cavalry might return. Valens approved, but may have been also buying time to deploy efficiently (Marcellinus doesn't say this on the part of Valens). This makes sense, as the wagonlaager was, presumably, well situated and difficult to assault, and Valen's men were weary and the day was extremely hot.

Fritigern also set the surrounding land afire, thus exposing further with time the Romans to such horrid conditions in the 'fiery summer', exhausting them by heat and thirst. Valens had already imposed a forced march on his men to get here. Hunger began to set in for the Romans, too.

Marcellinus tell us of Valens' emissary, one Richomeres,

"...As he was on his way to the enemy's rampart, the archers and targeteers, then under the command of one Bacurius of Hiberia and Cassio, had rushed forward too eagerly in hot attack, and were already engaged with their adversaries; and as their charge had been untimely, so their retreat was cowardly; and thus they gave an unfavorable omen to the beginning of the battle..."

This untimely action, perhaps one of insubordination, is believed to have been instigated by the right (we don't know for sure) Roman cavalry. Then, like a 'thunderbolt does near high mountains', the cavalry under Alatheus and Saphrax arrived, and threw themselves into the 'confusion'.

This is the Marcellinus' overview of the entire battle, Book 31.13 (Loeb Classic Library),

"All the Goths united, namely, the Theruingi under the command of King Fritigern, and the Greuthungi led by Alatheus and Saphrax, and engaged with the Romans in the open, routed their cavalry, and put to flight the infantry, thus left unprotected and crowded together, with enormous losses; Valens was killed, but his body could not be found."

Just a pedantic observation - 'All the Goths united', with no specific mention of all of the Gothic cavalry leaving the field. Thus, in my opinion, the revised theory that this was a battle of technically infantry over infantry is not incontrovertible. But Marcellinus' account does carry some holes.

Right from the beginning, Marcellinus states,

"On every side armor and weapons clashed..."

A few sentences later,

"...the lines dashed together like beaked ships, pushing each other back and forth in turn..." (could infantry alone, of no more quantity, cause this?)

He then tells us that the left cavalry wing of the Romans, deserted by some of their comrades, was hard pressed by the enemy's numbers, crushed, and overwhelmed, the infantry now unsupported. Again, he does not say the Gothic cavalry left the field. But he doesn't say the stayed either. Gosh, I wish he had specified!

He continues,

"...Because of the clouds of dust the heavens could no longer be seen, and echoed with frightful cries. Hence the arrows whirling death from every side always found their mark with fatal effect...But when the barbarians, pouring forth in huge hordes, trampled down horse and man...no room for retreat..."

Now, I hope the 'picking and choosing' doesn't signify a taking out of context, but think it is plausible, though the word 'cavalry' doesn't come up from Marcellinus after the initial charge of the Gothic horsemen, that phrases such as, "On every side", and, "Because of the clouds of dust the heavens could no longer be seen", and, "arrows whirling death from every side", and, "barbarians, pouring forth (not 'out', as out of their wagon-fort), in huge hordes, trampling down horse and man", and, finally, "no room for retreat", can not mean only the Gothic infantry itself surrounded the Romans, which has been a major belief of the current appraisals of the battle (Thomas Burns and Stephen Williams, to name a couple). These beliefs have been accepted, and are very credible (I have skimed Williams' excellent Theodosius: The Empire at Bay) on many issues. This is definitley not a black & white issue. Much of the Gothic cavalry vanquished the Roman horsemen with great celerity mainly because of the element of surprise, but some quite possibly swung inwards to aid in the envelopment of the Roman infantry, already thrown into disarray. Men alone do not "trample down horse and man" (do they?).

Perhaps I am being too academic, and ancient accounts can suffer from 'static' with the translations down the timelines. One of the eminent and panoramic works of Roman history, especially of this period, says this of the battle of Adrianople,

"On the 9th of August 378 A.D., a day which has deserved to be marked among the most inauspicious of the Roman Calender, the emperor Valens, leaving under a strong guard his baggage and military treasure, marched from Hadrianople to attack the Goths, who were encamped about 12 miles from the city....The event of the battle of Hadrianople, so fatal to Valens and to the empire, may be described in a few words: the Roman cavalry fled; the infantry was abandoned, surrounded, and cut to pieces. The most skillful evolutions, the finest courage, are scarcely sufficient to extricate a body of foot encompassed on an open plain by superior numbers of horse..."

- Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. III, Ch. XXVI.

Gibbon always drew his work from the fountainhead, as he put it, though certain sources he used have been edited in superior texts (supposedly). Archaeology has become a science since his day. He wrote his masterpiece throughout the 1770s-1780s , but drew from the same sources our contemporaries do. Actually, he is constantly used for a source. Another is Theodor Mommsen, whose famed work I don't have with me.

Thanks, James K MacKinnon Smile

EDIT: real name on signature (sorry)
"A ship in harbor is safe - but that is not what ships are built for."

James K MacKinnon
Reply
#2
Hi Spartan
Please use your real first name in your signature: board rules. Also, have you read any more recent literature than Charles Oman? That's late 19th century, iirc.
Greets!

Jasper Oorthuys
Webmaster & Editor, Ancient Warfare magazine
Reply
#3
Hi 'Spartan' (is that your real name?),
One laudes point for t eoverview. But it's kinda longish for a question - I'll have a look at it today.
Robert Vermaat
MODERATOR
FECTIO Late Romans
THE CAUSE OF WAR MUST BE JUST
(Maurikios-Strategikon, book VIII.2: Maxim 12)
Reply
#4
I agree that stirrups are a red herring.

In re the text: "All the Goths united, namely, the Theruingi under the command of King Fritigern, and the Greuthungi led by Alatheus and Saphrax, and engaged with the Romans in the open, routed their cavalry, and put to flight the infantry, thus left unprotected and crowded together, with enormous losses; Valens was killed, but his body could not be found."

I feel that "All the Goths" does not imply anything about the infantry or cavalry, but refers to the political union of the Theruingi and Grehthungi, this part of the sentence doesn't describe the maneuvers of the battle.

Later on, "...the lines dashed together like beaked ships, pushing each other back and forth in turn..." (could infantry alone, of no more quantity, cause this?)
- I have no problem with this sentence. For one thing, it sounds a lot like a literary flourish, perhaps copied from some other author. Lines of battle do really move back and forth, so we are told; in descriptions of medieval battles like Agincourt or Najera it is said that the initial impulse of the attackers pushed the defenders back the length of a lance. Even with a wagonburg, it is possible at some times the fighting was before the wagons, and at others among them or even behind them.

On the larger issue, I have little doubt the Gothic cavalry at least in part surrounded/outflanked the Roman foot. One major reason is the large scale slaughter among the Romans. If the fighting were strict between Roman soldiers on foot and Gothic infantry defending a wagonburg, it is hard to see how a cataclysmic slaughter of Romans could have occured. Even if the Roman assault failed utterly, the Goths would have been ill-prepared to counterattack, seeing as they were behind the wall of wagons. Even if they did counterattack, it is hard for infantry to effectively pursue fleeing infantry - they all move at the same rate, and the defeated soldiers have no problem tossing their shields, weapons, and other impediments. For a devastating defeat, the Gothic cavalry must have been involved in the later stages.
Felix Wang
Reply
#5
Thanks everyone. Jasper, I have come across plenty of text regarding this substantial event, and simply saw how overt the inconsistincies were. Indeed, Oman seemed to opine that Adrianople portended the heavy cavalry of the medieval knight. I basically disagree, though such an event, even if no change in tactical structure is necessary, definitely changes things.

True, as Felix pointed out, much narrative can be quite extravagant, thus I shouldn't get too hung up with the verbatim.
Quote:I feel that "All the Goths" does not imply anything about the infantry or cavalry, but refers to the political union of the Theruingi and Grehthungi, this part of the sentence doesn't describe the maneuvers of the battle.
Actually, I think Marcellinus stresses "All the Goths united" within the context of the beginning of the fighting. But you could be correct, and again, I don't want to put too much stock in the words. I think they were already united the previous couple of years, when they arrived in the region.

But the revised works of Thomas Burns and Steven Williams (and S. MacDowell?), assess that Adrianople was a clash of infantry against infantry, with the cavalry being merely a sideshow. I can't see the plausability to that. Apparently one of the revisionists surveyed the ground, 'proving' that in the height of summer, only a certain amount of horsemen could have been there, due to lack of victuals. Well, the cavalry were certainly foraging relatively far away. That takes some digging into (no pun intended), but the battle was definitely a Roman disaster. My thoughts were practically identical to what Felix posted (thank you). Marcellinus claims the battle was the worst for a Roman army since Cannae, which means, if he is close with his assessment, roughly more than 20,000 were slaughtered. The Gothic infantry could not have alone achieved this against Roman soldiers, even if they not quite the famed X or XIII Legions under Caesar.

Thanks again, James K MacKinnon Smile
"A ship in harbor is safe - but that is not what ships are built for."

James K MacKinnon
Reply
#6
Felix, James,

I still don't see the 'wagonburgh' coming into it. Sure, they may have defended their families, but for a major field battle it would not be used as a defense, I think. In fact, I think that fighting behind such an obstacle would be very unwise. Suppose the Romans had started burning it? The Goths would've been trapped.

Also, how many cavalry are we talking about? The Alans, Huns and Gothic cavalry managed to drive the Roman cavalry away (or at least initially one part), but I've never read anything about them dominating the battle afterwards. That part must go to the Gothic infantry.

So who did the killing? It must have been the infantry, mainly with missile weapons and heavy fighting with an increasingly tiring Roman force.
Robert Vermaat
MODERATOR
FECTIO Late Romans
THE CAUSE OF WAR MUST BE JUST
(Maurikios-Strategikon, book VIII.2: Maxim 12)
Reply
#7
Hi all,

I am glad someone has brought up Adrianople as it is something I have been thinking about for some time.

When I was working on fire signalling, a colleague suggested that the battle might be worth looking at, so I did. Smoke signalling has not been associated with the battle and (as far as I can discover) the idea of the battle as an extensive (and hitherto unnoticed) Gothic stratagem has not been made.

I apologise for the length of what follows and for repeating some of what Spartan JKM has posted although I hope I have a different spin.

At 31.12.12-13 Ammianus tells us that after the armies had been brought up the barbarians sent envoys to Valens to sue for peace. This was in order to gain time so that the Gothic cavalry under Alatheus and Saphrax, who were far away and had been sent for (procul agens et accita ), might return. At no point does Ammianus or any other source suggest that the purpose of the cavalry being absent was to forage.

This envoy was rejected by Valens who demanded that proposals for a more lasting peace be brought by suitable chieftains. Ammianus accuses the barbarians of purposely delaying in order that their cavalry might return and:
‘also that our soldiers might be exhausted by their dry throats, while the broad plains gleamed with fires, which the enemy were feeding with wood and dry fuel, for this same purpose.’ et miles fervore calefactus aestivo, siccis faucibus commarceret, relucente amplitudine camporum incendiis, quos lignis nutrimentisque aridis subditis, ut hoc fieret idem, hostes urebant.

It would seem more probable that this was a fire signal to the Gothic cavalry rather than an attempt to exacerbate the thirst of the Roman forces (as it would have the same effect on the Goths – perhaps even more so). More probable because soon after, when skirmishing between the Goths and Roman archers and scutarii had escalated:
‘the Gothic cavalry, returning with Alatheus and Saphrax, combined with a band of the Halani, dashed out as a thunderbolt does near high mountains, and threw into confusion all those whom they could find in the way of their swift onslaught, and quickly slew them.’equitatus Gothorum cum Alatheo reversus et Saphrace, Halanorum manu permixta, ut fulmen prope montes celsos excussus, quoscumque accursu veloci invenire comminus potuit, incitata caede turbavit.

This also seems to suggest that the skirmishing, although a normal precursor to battle, may have been part of a delaying tactic. Elton lists when such skirmishing escalated into battle during the period, so such an escalation may have been part of the Gothic strategy. (See Elton Warfare in Roman Europe AD 350-425 (Oxford, 1996), 253-254 and n. AM 27.10.10, 28.5.5-6, 31.12.16, cf. 14.2.17.)

Most modern accounts of the battle record things as Ammianus does. (Thomas S. Burns ‘The Battle of Adriaople: A Reconsideration’ Historia 22 (1973), 336-345; G. Crump ‘Ammianus Marcellinus as a Military Historian’ Historia Einzelschriften 27 (1975), 92-95, (‘The soldiers were forced to stand in formation, afflicted by the heat of the sun and the German fires’ (95)); M. Whitby Rome at War AD 293-696 (Oxford, 2002), 44; Also Elton Roman Warfare in Europe, 79 and 250.) These accounts have that the cavalry arrived late from foraging.

The situation seems more likely to suggest that it was an ambush and that a fire signal was involved to signal the attack. Certainly the terms Ammianus uses imply an immediate attack by the cavalry which also suggests that it was premeditated rather than opportunistic when they arrived late. It is unlikely that a cavalry force arriving late from foraging would be able to launch into battle immediately and it is also unlikely that, had they been foraging, that they would have stayed in, and returned in, one body. Ammianus is criticised for his vagueness on certain aspects of the battle account by Crump but it is possible his account is more misleading than vague.

What is more, Ammianus praises Fritigern for his foresight in several places. At 31.5.4 Ammianus states of him that:
‘but he with his natural cleverness in foresight protecting himself against anything that might happen’.
At ille genuine praevidendi sollertia, venturos muniens casus …

At 31.12.14 Fritigern is called callidus futuri coniector (shrewd to foresee the future) immediately before the cavalry make their unexpected appearance. However, Ammianus also claims that he was Martemque pertimescens ancipitem (fearing the uncertainty of war) and so sent a soldier to the Romans to request that picked men of noble rank be sent to him as hostages and saying that
‘he himself would fearlessly meet the threats of his soldiers and do what was necessary.’ impavidus ipse minas militares laturus, et necessaria.
The tribune Aequitius was chosen to go to Fritigern but he protested and so Richomeres commander of the household troops, volunteered to go.

It is possible Ammianus has missed or not been informed of Fritigern’s real agenda. The reason for the delays and envoys may have been to allow the cavalry to get into a flanking position and then the signal was given to attack just as Richomeres was making his way toward the enemy.

Fritigern’s comment that he would meet the threats of his own soldiers may have been less to do with reassuring them about his overture of peace than to tell them to trust in his generalship and allow his stratagem time to work. If this stratagem was his purpose then Ammianus’ judgement that he feared the uncertainty of war may also have been misplaced.

The idea that the Gothic cavalry were far away may also reflect Fritigern’s stratagem and this may have been information passed on to the Romans by fake deserters or informants. Elton, Roman Warfare in Europe, 248 and n, also lists the uses of informants and deserters for information. Deserters: AM 17.1.8; 21.7.7; 21.13.4; Informants: AM 16.11.9; 12.19-21; 17.10.5.

The cavalry may well have been far enough away to avoid detection and Valens’ eagerness and haste (31.12.10-11), and the fact that the army went straight into battle line after their march from Adrianople as soon as they saw the laager suggests that Valens did not allow sufficient time to scout the surrounding area.

Elton, Roman Warfare in Europe, 248, argues that there ‘are few accounts of the Romans losing track of the enemy and the ignorance of the location of some Gothic cavalry at Adrianople appears to be an unusual event not a common one.’ See Suda E.396 and II.380 for losing track of an enemy. Nonetheless it is clear that the Romans lost track of the Gothic cavalry at Adrianople and therefore, knowledge of what they were doing exactly.

It is possible that no thought was given to the idea that the Goths would undertake such a stratagem. This is reinforced by Ammianus’ terms that the Goths feared the Roman army (31.7.7 sed oppositi exceritus metu praestricti) and that they gathered together earlier at their wagon city (carrago) in greater numbers fearing an attack. However, Ammianus also claims (31.12.9.) Fritigern was ‘all too skilled in craft and in various forms of deception’(qui astu et ludificandi varietate nimium sollers) making it strange that he was not suspected or charged of performing a stratagem at Adrianople.

What is more, the Goths attempts to perform stratagems both before and after the battle should be no barrier to suppose that they could have used one during the battle itself. For the Goths attempts to take the city of Adrianople by ruse see Ammianus Marcellinus 31.15. 8-9 and Hydatius 115? Elton, Roman Warfare in Europe, 85 and n.

Ammianus also reports (31.7.6) that the Goths may have been informed of the Romans’ approach by deserters and that the Romans learned (it is not reported how) of the disposition and state of the Goths (31.7.9). This interchange of information seems to suggest the use of deserters, real or fake. It is possible that this picture of the Goths quaking inside their wagon circle reported to the Romans was all part of Fritigern’s ruse. This interchange of information may have been repeated at Adrianople.

Ammianus (31.7.7) also mentions that the Goths had a signalling system (tessera data gentilli ‘by means of the message used by their race’) in order to summon their scattered groups. This may have been the doleful trumpets (triste sonantibus classicis) of 31.5.8 but Gibbon argued they were flaming beacons. (Edward Gibbon The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, (Penguin Edition, Harmondsworth, 1996) Chapter XXVI, 1056). No matter what form they took these signals show the Goths were capable of (and used) rudimentary signalling systems. Certainly if the fires at Adrianople were a fire/smoke signal sent to the Gothic Cavalry it did not need to be complicated. It would only need to signal a basic command like ‘charge’ or even ‘now’ to serve its purpose.

What is more, this stratagem seems not only to have deceived Roman historians but also to have continued to deceive authors for 1600 years and more.

The battle of Adrianople may therefore not represent a decline in the Roman army but their defeat at the hands of a Gothic stratagem.

I realise that there are problems with this and that to argue an interpretation missed by all our sources and historians for 1600 years is a bit rich.

Anywhoo

Please let me know what you think.

Cheers

Murray
Murray K Dahm

Moderator

\'\'\'\'No matter how many you kill, you cannot kill your successor\'\'\'\' - Seneca to Nero - Dio 62

\'\'\'\'There is no way of correcting wrongdoing in those who think that the height of virtue consists in the execution of their will\'\'\'\' - Ammianus Marcellinus 27.7.9
Reply
#8
Quote:The situation seems more likely to suggest that it was an ambush and that a fire signal was involved to signal the attack. Certainly the terms Ammianus uses imply an immediate attack by the cavalry which also suggests that it was premeditated rather than opportunistic when they arrived late. It is unlikely that a cavalry force arriving late from foraging would be able to launch into battle immediately and it is also unlikely that, had they been foraging, that they would have stayed in, and returned in, one body. Ammianus is criticised for his vagueness on certain aspects of the battle account by Crump but it is possible his account is more misleading than vague.

Hi Murray,

Thanks for the very useful overview.

First of all, though, a bit of a clarification (maybe superfluous): the Gothic cavalry was probably not in majority Gothic at all (but made up from Alans and Huns). I have no doubt that the Goths could field some cavalry but in Visigothic battles with the Roman army it seems that cavalry never played any significant role if I remember correctly. That may be the reason why the Goths needed the Alans and Huns in the first place?

Also, I don’t think that the absence of that cavalry was part of the stratagem, it was not a ruse or something (for all I know of course, I don’t know the mind of Frithigirn). Ammianus tells us that the cavalry had already been alerted to return, but was still too far away to offer support when the Romans attacked. That does not sound lie a stratagem of surprise! The cavalry was supposedly foraging to get supplies for the large concentration of Goths at Adrianople. Why should we notbelieve Ammianus but rather think of an unproved alternative? Foraging was always a problem and the Romans had managed before to disperse the Goths by denying them their foraging. They could have done that again I think – by waiting long enough, the Goths would have exhausted the land and would have been forced to move elsewhere. I guess the Goths were maybe lucky that the cavalry was close enough to hurry them back in time.

The fact that the cavalry was not present at the time of the Roman attack (and remember the Romans penetrated through the Gothic ranks right tto the laager during that attack) makes the thought of their absence as a stratagem unlikely. Also, I see not reason to doubt a) their arrival in one body (they could easily have operated in one body or assembled before the attack) or b) their preparedness to immediately enter the battle.

I agree that the Romans had no clue about the whereabouts of this cavalry. That must mean that their intelligence was not good: even a few observers would have been able to notice that the cavalry was missing, or else they must have thought that the cavalry was hidden inside the laager. Or maybe the Romans thought that the cavalry was not even in the area? All speaks for the correctness of Ammianus’ complaint: Valens was too hasty and did not want to wait for the attack.
I think I cannot blame his generals for sneaking away – who’d want to die for a commander who just brought so much predicament through his pride alone? The Romans were maybe either convinced the cavalry was away, but anyway they were surprised due to too little recon and too much haste.

For the remainder, I still see the battle as mainly an infantry conflict. The Roman cavalry, formed up on the right flank) attacked too soon, was driven off and caused immense confusion in the ranks of the Roman infantry. I agree with MacDowell that it is possible that the Romans may not even have formed up properly at that time (after all Ammianus tells us that the left flank cavalry was still dispersed, I think in a guard role). If they had formed up, the Romans would have had a formation that would not only have been 8 to 16 ranks deep, but supported by missile troop, and able to easily turn 180 degrees and form a front to the rear. The movement of lines ‘as banging into each other’ may well come from an eyewitness who saw the Roman formations go into chaos.
Anyway, once that chaos started and the envelopment had succeeded to deny the Romans any room to manoeuvre, it was mainly a job for the infantry to peel off layer for layer of the Roman union, achieving superiority along the entire frontline.
It must have been pure terror. Only the Romans in front could fight and they were under such pressure that they were automatically at a disadvantage. The men behind them did not have room to swing a sword, let alone hurl a spear and fire an arrow. No one speaks about the formation of a Roman testudo/fulcum, so I guess therefore that organised defence had broken down amongst them. Fire support from their own ranks was impossible because there would have been no room to throw the missiles, whereas the Goths could fire at will into the dense mass of Romans. Combine that with the chaos, the exhaustion and the heat, and you’ll see why I see this as a battle of attrition and not some action by superior cavalry.

This was therefore not a ‘first’ on European battlefields of ‘proto-knights’ or something. We have no information about the Alans and Huns being armoured cavalry.
However, they were by no means numerous enough to achieve half the envelopment of the Romans. Even if they took part in that, horses can’t be engaged in battle for hours and hours, and I doubt if they could have held a breakout by the Romans. Maybe Ammianus’ comparison to Cannae was not just about the scale of the defeat, but also about how this defeat took place? The Romans at Cannae were also enveloped, after their cavalry had been driven off.
Robert Vermaat
MODERATOR
FECTIO Late Romans
THE CAUSE OF WAR MUST BE JUST
(Maurikios-Strategikon, book VIII.2: Maxim 12)
Reply
#9
I am confused by the last post. If the Gothic (and allies) cavalry didn't close the rear of the Roman line, who did? Infantry enveloping attacks are historically very rare, with Cannae being one of the very few cases. The Zulu in southern Africa did adopt a typical formation leading to outflanking their enemies, but then they lacked cavalry of any kind, and I still don't think they actually expected to encircle the enemy with infantry. Aside from ambushes, I can think of no battle when infantry forces actually encircled their foes. Of course, the Gothic foot were initially on the defensive, and inside a wagon laager, both of which would hamper any kind of enveloping maneuver on their part.

You don't need a huge number of horsemen to achieve an envelopement. Look at Cannae - Hannibal's horsemen numbered maybe 10,000 at most, and sealed the rear of a much larger number of Roman infantrymen. (An unknown number of Hannibal's horse may have continued pursuing the fleeing Roman cavalry, and there likely were some casualties as well.) Horses are very good at pushing people around (hence their use in modern crowd control), it doesn't take a huge depth of horseflesh to do this. As for the endurance of horses, I am not sure that it is significantly worse then for people, when close combat is concerned. I have never seen any data to this effect.

One item I definitely disagree with: it is not easy to "turn 180 degrees and form a front to the rear". This is a very difficult task to do in battle. Two cases in point: Cyanoscephalae was won, as we all know, by the Roman triarii slipping behind the Macedonian phalanx and taking it from the rear. Now, the phalanx was a totally homogeneous formation, and turning some rows of phalangites around would seem to be simple, yet this could not be done. The Roman force at Adrianople was likely a more complex formation (i.e. with missile troops in support), and I doubt it was better trained than the Macedonians. A second case is modern: during Napoleon's campaign in Egypt, his forces were opposed by some British units. At this time, of course, a unit was completely homogeneously armed and the formation completely symmetric. The Gloucester regiment was among them, and happened to be in the unfortunate position of being attacked front and back at tthe same time. The regiment did succeed in "turn 180 degrees and form a front to the rear" and repelled both enemies. The British considered this feat to be so outstanding that the unit was given the unique honor of wearing two badges on their caps - one in front and one in back. This unique honor lasted at least a century and a half. THAT is how rare it is for a unit to successfully fight in two directions.
Felix Wang
Reply
#10
Quote:Felix, James,

I still don't see the 'wagonburgh' coming into it. Sure, they may have defended their families, but for a major field battle it would not be used as a defense, I think. In fact, I think that fighting behind such an obstacle would be very unwise. Suppose the Romans had started burning it? The Goths would've been trapped.

....

Wagon laagers have been effective defenses in many different conflicts. The Hussites in Central Europe used them very effectively against more conventional late medieval armies. A mass of wagons was critically misused by Boudicca in her climactic battle against Rome - the wagons trapped her own army so that it had no way to flee the victorious legionaries, so they clearly constituted a significant obstacle. In southern Africa, the Boers used a wagon laager to critical effect in the battle of Blood River, when less than 500 Boers defeated a large Zulu army (10,000 to 30,000, depending on who you believe), with muzzleloading single shot firearms.

I agree the Romans might have tried burning them, but they didn't, for whatever reason.
Felix Wang
Reply
#11
Quote:
Vortigern Studies:2liudyd9 Wrote:Felix, James,
I still don't see the 'wagonburgh' coming into it. Sure, they may have defended their families, but for a major field battle it would not be used as a defense, I think. In fact, I think that fighting behind such an obstacle would be very unwise. Suppose the Romans had started burning it? The Goths would've been trapped.
....
Wagon laagers have been effective defenses in many different conflicts. The Hussites in Central Europe used them very effectively against more conventional late medieval armies. A mass of wagons was critically misused by Boudicca in her climactic battle against Rome - the wagons trapped her own army so that it had no way to flee the victorious legionaries, so they clearly constituted a significant obstacle. In southern Africa, the Boers used a wagon laager to critical effect in the battle of Blood River, when less than 500 Boers defeated a large Zulu army (10,000 to 30,000, depending on who you believe), with muzzleloading single shot firearms.
I agree the Romans might have tried burning them, but they didn't, for whatever reason.

Hi Felix,
My question was not so much about the occurrance and use of wagon laagers, which I thank you for, but more about the use of this particular one by the Goths. From Ammianus' description of the battle, it looks like the Goths took up a defensive position in front of the wagons, not behind them, since the first (hasty) Roman attack managed to reach the wagons. That would be silly if no Goths had been positioned in front of them.. Hence my doubt about the wagons as part of the Gothic frontal defences.
Robert Vermaat
MODERATOR
FECTIO Late Romans
THE CAUSE OF WAR MUST BE JUST
(Maurikios-Strategikon, book VIII.2: Maxim 12)
Reply


Forum Jump: