Killing officers

[Jona Lendering]

After the disastrous Nivelle Offensive in the First World War, French social scientists discovered that when a military unit suffers heavy losses, the soldiers start to revolt. Often, the officers are killed by their own men. The phenomenon of killing officers became known as 'fragging' during the Viet Nam war.

It has been claimed that there is an almost universal law that revolt becomes inevitable once a certain number of casualties has been reached. Indeed, it seems that killing officers was not unheard-of in the Roman army: the murder of Dillius Vocula during the Batavian Revolt may be a case in point.

I am certain that I have read about this, and recall that the number of casualties is 17%. However, I can not check this, because I do not remember where I have read it. Does anybody know?

I am trying to find this out because I want to show that if Hannibal arrived in Italy with 26,000 men, he can not have left Spain with an army of 102,000 men, as Polybius says. Segre Lancell has already shown that the statistics are unreliable (Hannibal, 1995), but I am looking for another type of argument.

[Tiberius Geracius]

I must agree with your statement. I have moticed that when my friends and I play "War" games or stratigy game we tend to blaim our leader if we start to loose. Now we dont kill him (but some times we want to) we just replace him as the unit leader with someone else. I even saw this happen in BoyScout troops when one patrol was loosing they would replace the commander. Its just a physicological reaction. We tend to blame others. Also we have to look at the the Roman officers and the common soldiers. The officers would most likely be upper class citizens (aquestrians I think they are called) who when not on the clock would not always socialize with the commoners. Likewizes for the soldiers they hated the upper class. These issuse still exist to this day.

[Eleatic Guest]

I am trying to find this out because I want to show that if Hannibal arrived in Italy with 26,000 men, he can not have left Spain with an army of 102,000 men, as Polybius says. Segre Lancell has already shown that the statistics are unreliable (Hannibal, 1995), but I am looking for another type of argument.

I vaguely recall that Mommsen (Roemische Geschichte) wrote that Hannibal sent half of his army back at the Ebro, never actually planning to attack Italy with the whole army. Mommsen paints it as if this was a deliberate stratagem by Hannibal who wanted to show his remaining troops that "they were already enough' to handle the Romans. I found this trick already curious then, because as a soldier I would feel naturally the safer the more of my own comrades are around.

[conon394]

I would think you need to consider relative expectations. Many/most of Hannibal’s losses were the result of non-combat attrition during the crossing. The general expectation of an ancient army with respect to loss from illness, weather, and even doctors would almost certainly be higher than a post 20th century army. In other words I’m not so sure you can generalize modern ‘casualty’ evidence back in time. The Athenian forces besieging Potidaea suffered over 14% casualties (like Hanniblal mostly non-combat) and yet they sustained the siege and did not fall apart.

It is also worth considering that much of Hannibal’s army would have participated in the sack of a Roman ally (Saguntum) and may perhaps have felt they had little prospect of mercy from Rome. Thus while marching on the march into Italy, with hostile Celts behind them and already guilty in the eyes of Rome; would they not have more than a little incentive to stay loyal to Hannibal perhaps beyond what you might expect.

[S SEVERUS]

Interesting question from Jona! That could also mean that the many revolts in the 3th century came from the fact that the constant wars led to more soldier revolts?

It is also worth considering that much of Hannibal’s army would have participated in the sack of a Roman ally (Saguntum) and may perhaps have felt they had little prospect of mercy from Rome

I don't agree with this because as a whole Hannibal soldiers were mercenaries so they fought for pay and loot (the roman soldiers also were attracted with the prospect of loot). To my opinion they didn't fear Rome that much at that time.

[floofthegoof]

Some things to consider regarding Jona's theory, is whether this phenomenon is scalable, or somewhat constrained to smaller units. Also, how does time factor in? Obviously, if the loss happens over years it won't have the same effect as if it happened in an hour.

For Hannibals troops to go from 100,000 to 26,000 in one battle, well that would be a huge defeat, but if the reduction is the result of 5% loss, 5% loss, 5% loss etc.... Maybe it's sustainable.

[Jona Lendering]

Thanks for all the comments, which are certainly useful. Still, does someone know the sociological publication? Thanks - also for other comments!

[Kate Gilliver]

Don't know the ref, Jona, sorry, but if you find it can you post it please?!

[Gaius Decius Aquilius]

... French social scientists discovered that when a military unit suffers heavy losses, the soldiers start to revolt. Often, the officers are killed by their own men. The phenomenon of killing officers became known as 'fragging' during the Viet Nam war.

It has been claimed that there is an almost universal law that revolt becomes inevitable once a certain number of casualties has been reached. Indeed, it seems that killing officers was not unheard-of in the Roman army....

.

I don't really want to get into this. I have found it pointless to try to explain what the psychological or social mindset is during combat. However, since this is an "Army" forum I will do so. It is not my intent to debate anything, however. At my age, I just don't care because I know it will change nothing. I have been both in combat, and "the military". The two mindsets are very different.

I don't think a comparison with modern to ancient systems is totally applicable here. The social systems were not comparable. The French study may apply for France at that time. However, the Vietnam example, I believe, is based on a modern perception that originated to serve political ends, even if indirectly. It is an "Urban Legend". I know of only one murder and that was between two rear echelon enlisted men over drugs. Most combat troops were physically isolated from high ranking officers and didn't have the opportunity, in any event. There was a distinct difference in moral, outlook, and discipline between Combat and support troops. Combat troops hate the "Micky Mouse" discipline approach of the rear echelon troops, and are more cohesive as a unit. To be blunt, we just don't like each other. Incompetent leadership at the company level in a combat unit was handled through an informal, but real communications line that did not officially exist. I saw several face-offs over some command issues, but they were handled by a go-between, and may have been insubordinate, were never close to violent, or even officially noticed. I was with two combat units for a total of 11 months. One of my units did take very heavy casualties. Even if we wanted to frag someone, and I never heard any talk of such, I don't know who it would be, most of our officers and NCOs, who were only about a year older than most of us, were casualties of normal attrition. I never knew of a real "fragging" then, nor do I now. I have heard a lot of exaggerated stories of American misconduct, and a lot of underplayed reports on NVA war crimes. This based on my own experience, not what someone told someone else. I heard a lot of wild rumors, and they got more exaggerated the farther from the war I got both in time and distance. In short, I have talked to a lot of "Nam Vets" who tell such tales but then turned out not be vets at all. A lot of these war stories are just plain false.

I think the motivation for 'killing' in the ancient world was more social, that is, there was less cultural homogeneity in the trend towards ethnic units in the makup of the Roman Army, and more socio-cultural isolation. Support troops did not exist as in a modern system. Mutiny was more a coherent unit event and motivation was based more wildly on more issues than just casualties. Example: Julian made Emperor; revolt because of regional transfer of unit to the East. The revolt under Augustus, if Tacitus can be believed, was on pay and length of service. Loyalty was often to commanders, not the "Roman Empire" per se. You may whack Vitellius, but its for Vespasian you are doing it for. We also have a 1000 year time-span to deal with. I read of high casualties in the Centurion ate, not through murder, but by leading by example. Unfortunately we only have second hand accounts for the most part, which ironically, is the same as today. In any war you have non-combatants who have a priori beliefs on both sides. Neither want to hear from the actual participants who may tell both sides things they don't want to hear.

If anyone wants to take issue with the Vietnam part of this post, PM me. I think its Off Topic from this point out.

Ralph Izard

[rkmvca1]

Thanks very much for the post. I think it was highly appropriate, very informative, and quite on-topic for this forum and thread.

rich klein

[Magnus]

Great post Ralph. I think it has relevance to the thread.

[Jona Lendering]

I have found it pointless to try to explain what the psychological or social mindset is during combat.

That's indeed the big problem; people who have not been there, do not know what it is.

What surprises me, is that you're so on the defensive; you post is an excellent reply and I can not possibly imagine that someone takes issue with it. I found it very illuminating.

[TFLAVIUSAMBIORIX]

although it is a very interesting theory, i believe it flawed. If a unit mutinees with 17% casualties, then the whole phenomenon of soviet soldiers taking 80% or more casualties during the GPW is ignored, and contrary to popular belief, the soldiers were rarely faced with the 'you will be shot if you retreat' that the movies and media say they were. And before you chew me up, i am personal friends with a couple of these veterans. The same holds true for many late war german units, and the communists during the indochinese war, and on and on.

[TFLAVIUSAMBIORIX]

also, american civil war, with units suffering over 50% casualties.

[Jona Lendering]

although it is a very interesting theory, i believe it flawed.

That's why I want to go back to the source. Which sociologist did this research?