Rome vs Han essay- want get some opinions

[MARCvSVIBIvSMAvRINvS]

Clearly, the writings of Sun Tzu are of a much more pragmatic nature than anything I've read from ancient Rome.

Eeeh......... you forget Lao Tse........

anyway what i'd like to add is that you probably have never read the Enchiridon by Epictetvs..........

one of the most pragmatic collection of useless one liners i have ever seen.. as some of the Sun Tze and Lao Tse one liners are....

like: if you do not know wether or not you will win, do not start a war.

:x

ching chong chang

M.VIB.M.

[floofthegoof]

one of the most pragmatic collection of useless one liners i have ever seen.. as some of the Sun Tze and Lao Tse one liners are....

like: if you do not know wether or not you will win, do not start a war.

:x

ching chong chang

M.VIB.M.

Probably the most obvious, yet somehow ignored bit of military advice ever.

[Felix]

interesting argument guys. Really a neat topic, and one that I have thought about alot myself.

But let's focus on the generalship. While Rome had great generals, even military geniuses for all time such as Gaius Caesar, Scipio, and others, keep in mind that China had a much more regular system of generalship. The system from the Warring States period would have most likely carried over, with professional generals, drawn from a seperate class than the aristrocracy leading their men.

While I am not trying to demean the average Roman general, I believe that the Chinese generals were of a higher average caliber, discounting the occasional geniuses on both sides.

Clearly, the writings of Sun Tzu are of a much more pragmatic nature than anything I've read from ancient Rome. Most of the famous Roman generals seemed to believe that battles are won by courage and force of will, since it worked for them so well.

Concepts such as 'knowing when to fight, and when not to fight' were deemed absurd in Rome, and derided even when restraint was necessary. I think the Chinese generals would make the Romans pay heavily for any mistakes.

I agree that the pragmatic approach to warfare is very powerful; and in a limited war is likely to be successful. It might be a limitation in a more "total" war, should such a thing have occured. Under conditions of a more total war, pragmatism might be trumped by fanatical devotion to a cause. This is one idea that Carthage, for one case, never quite understood until too late - compromise doesn't work with a foe whose goal is your total destruction. A number of Chinese adages assume, for example, that the enemy army and country might be readily assimilated into your empire. This was true among the various Warring states; but outsiders like Romans would have been a different matter.

[Eleatic Guest]

Leuctra (371 BC) -> Leuthen 1757 : Oblique battle order

Cannae (216 BC) -> Tannenberg 1914 : battle of encirclement and annihilation

Two of the most brilliant victories of (early) modern warfare, all-time classics of warfare, were inspired, if not outright copies of classical precursors. Both introduced military concepts which are still taught at military schools. And in both cases, Friedrich the Great and Hindenburg stated expressis verbis their inspiration by the tactics of Epameinondas respectively Hannibal. And these tactics were soon incorporated also in the Roman military corpus (Zama 202 BC, e.g.).

In contrast, Sun Tsu's views were of a rather basic binary logic: Attack if you are more numerous, evade the enemy if you are less so..hardly the stuff which lets a seasoned general drop his mouth in awe. If Hannibal had heeded that advice by the way, there would have been no Cannae...In fact, the extensive application of Chinese indirect tactics (evading, ambushing, bribing, harassing) as propagated in Sun Tsu's writings may have been a contributing factor to the extraordinary lenght of the Warring States period (480s-221 BC), a period which saw over 2 centuries of continous warfare with little shifts in the overall power balance.

A more direct approach, a systematic search for decisive battles like the Romans were known for, could have well turned out more effective than the perennial use of Condottiere tactics.

[Felix]

We are sailing into deep waters, now.

We do have late Roman military works that discuss strategy, and the precepts of Vegetius and Maurice do not articulate a battle-seeking strategy. Their emphasis is very much like the thoughts of Sun Tzu - fight only when you are sure of winning, it is best to win a war without battles, cause dissension among the enemy, and manipulate logistics (starve the enemy) in order to win. Chest-thumping heroics are not part of the strategic plan. These ideas may seem simple, but the reiterated need to emphasize them in both the East and the West suggests that many generals found these concepts difficult to swallow. Evading a superior enemy force sounds easy, but it looks cowardly or dishonorable, and may sacrifice valuable territory or important religious/cultural sites to enemy looting.

Of course (I can always argue both sides) dramatic battles do not always win the war. Leuctra was fairly decisive, but Leuthen didn't knock Austria out of the 7 Year's War, and Carthage lost in spite of Cannae, and Germany lost despite Tannenberg.

[Felix]

In point of fact, Cannae is a fine example of what happens when you go seeking a battle, and your enemy Hannibal decides to oblige you. :twisted:

Delaying worked much better for Rome against the son of Hamilcar Barca.

[floofthegoof]

Leuctra (371 BC) -> Leuthen 1757 : Oblique battle order

Cannae (216 BC) -> Tannenberg 1914 : battle of encirclement and annihilation

Two of the most brilliant victories of (early) modern warfare, all-time classics of warfare, were inspired, if not outright copies of classical precursors. Both introduced military concepts which are still taught at military schools. And in both cases, Friedrich the Great and Hindenburg stated expressis verbis their inspiration by the tactics of Epameinondas respectively Hannibal. And these tactics were soon incorporated also in the Roman military corpus (Zama 202 BC, e.g.).

In contrast, Sun Tsu's views were of a rather basic binary logic: Attack if you are more numerous, evade the enemy if you are less so..hardly the stuff which lets a seasoned general drop his mouth in awe. If Hannibal had heeded that advice by the way, there would have been no Cannae...In fact, the extensive application of Chinese indirect tactics (evading, ambushing, bribing, harassing) as propagated in Sun Tsu's writings may have been a contributing factor to the extraordinary lenght of the Warring States period (480s-221 BC), a period which saw over 2 centuries of continous warfare with little shifts in the overall power balance.

A more direct approach, a systematic search for decisive battles like the Romans were known for, could have well turned out more effective than the perennial use of Condottiere tactics.

I will never be convinced that Hannibal's victory at Cannae was much more than random chance. There are so many things that could have happened beyond anyone's control that would have changed everything. War itself is very random and unpredictable, and this must be taken into account by any commander. One might argue that generalship is the art of removing elements of chance. Marching with a small army that deep into enemy territory with no hope of reinforcement or supply was beyond rash. Don't tell me Hannibal knew what he was doing. If Hannibal "knew his enemy" as Sun Tzu would advise, we wouldn't be discussing this on RomanArmyTalk, but CarthagoArmyTalk! People always like to forget that Hannibal LOST the war! The war which he greatly overstepped his authority to start in the first place! That's not military genius. Gambling with the continued existence of your country like that is just reckless.

It would be unfair to say that Roman generalship was always unpragmatic, it's just that pragmatism didn't gain alot of political points in Roman minds. Nobody talks about the guy who *really* saved the Romans from Hannibal, Quintus Fabius Maximus. Poor Pompey! If he had only listened to his own advice! Why fight Caesar when his enemy was facing certain starvation and surrender? I too would go mad if I threw the dice like that and LOST when no dice throwing was even necessary!

Against the Han, I can easily see the Romans suffering a Cannae or a Carrhae or worse. Trusting in their gods and casting the die, as Romans liked to do, can work against you as well as for you. Nobody knows that as well as Hannibal I imagine!

In the long run, I favor the Romans for the reasons I stated earlier, but as pragmatic as the chinese tend to be, I also can't put it past them to maintain peaceful relations. It would simply not be like them to have the ambition of conquering Rome. If some Roman(Crassus) had some design on conquering china, I doubt it would come to much. Who says that they have to have all out war anyway?

[Felix]

This is a digression, but I must say that I think Hannibal's basic strategy was perfectly sound, if you accept that Rome and Carthage could not co-exist. If war was inevitable (which I suspect it was), then Carthage had already tried and lost a naval strategy, and lost Sicily to boot, so there was no convenient forward base to use. Carthage couldn't count on outnumbering the Romans, given the geography of North Africa vs. Italy; and a defensive strategy based on solely defending the Carthaginian homeland was by definition passive and ultimately futile. Taking the war to Italy was better; and could not be done by a maritime route. This means crossing the Alps.

Hannibal count hardly count on numerical superiority, given he was invading the Roman heartland; so a smaller qualitatively superior army was logical. He wouldn't have any logistical advantage either; so victory by winning a series of battles was a logical strategy. Rome was fortunate in having Fabius, even though he was under lot of pressure to win a battlefield victory against Hannibal, he resisted this pressure.

Enough of Han-nibal, back to the Han.

[floofthegoof]

This is a digression, but I must say that I think Hannibal's basic strategy was perfectly sound, if you accept that Rome and Carthage could not co-exist. If war was inevitable (which I suspect it was), then Carthage had already tried and lost a naval strategy, and lost Sicily to boot, so there was no convenient forward base to use. Carthage couldn't count on outnumbering the Romans, given the geography of North Africa vs. Italy; and a defensive strategy based on solely defending the Carthaginian homeland was by definition passive and ultimately futile. Taking the war to Italy was better; and could not be done by a maritime route. This means crossing the Alps.

Hannibal count hardly count on numerical superiority, given he was invading the Roman heartland; so a smaller qualitatively superior army was logical. He wouldn't have any logistical advantage either; so victory by winning a series of battles was a logical strategy. Rome was fortunate in having Fabius, even though he was under lot of pressure to win a battlefield victory against Hannibal, he resisted this pressure.

Enough of Han-nibal, back to the Han.

Perhaps it is a mistake for me to assume that Hannibal's desire was to act in the interest of his country, in which case his actions would be too risky to contemplate. For a young man who want's to be his generation's 'Alexander', I suppose he just can't wait forever to start his conquest.