battle of Cannae

[marco]

I don't know a lot about roman.

I've reed that romans legions were slaughtered during battle of Cannae. There were about 50 000 legionnary killed during this battle.
Legionary were well trained, well equiped and protected by helmets and cuirrass.
How such a defeat was possible?
Do you know others batlles were roman were defetead?

Thanks

[Jona Lendering]

The Roman defeat at Cannae is usually ascribed to two factors: the Carthaginian commander Hannibal's brilliancy (and the traditional way of thinking of the Roman commanders), and the fact that the Roman army was somewhat inexperienced. At the Ticinus, the Trebia, and the Trasimene Lake, the Romans had already lost many soldiers; part of the legions at Cannae were recruits.

Other defeats: there's a long list. Except for the three ones I just mentioned, the Allia (against Gallic invaders), the Caudine Forks (against the Samnites), at Heracles and Asculum (against Pyrrhus), are important. The First Punic War offered a lot of setbacks, and after Cannae, a brief selection might include the Spanish wars, the war against the Cimbri and Teutones, Gergovia (Caesar against the Gauls), the Teutoburg Forrest (against Germanic tribesmen), and Adrianopel (late Antiquity).

[Matthew Amt]

Ave!

First thing to point out is that the Roman army went through a LOT of change over the centuries. During the Punic Wars, it was a citizen army, disbanded in the fall and re-formed each spring by drafting qualified citizens. All citizens with property were eligible for duty, and might get picked repeatedly over several years, or have a few years off until their next service. They provided their own equipment on a strict system based on wealth. So the legionaries at Cannae were not full-time professionals, even though they had some training and seem to have been reasonably well-disciplined.

This is much different from the professional full-time army of the late Republic and Empire, where men served 16 or 20 or 25 years in permanent units. But even they were not invulnerable! There are numerous accounts of Roman armies being defeated, usually ascribed to the commander screwing up, or simply fighting when he should not have.

Cannae is complex, indeed, but Hannibal was a genius at getting the Romans to do what he wanted so that he could exploit weaknesses. He knew his cavalry was superior but that his infantry was not as good as the Roman legions. So he bowed his infantry line forward in the center and put his cavalry on the wings. The legions pushed forward just fine, in fact they figured they were winning, and had pushed the bowed line back into a bulge in the other direction. But Hannibal's cavalry had swept the Roman horsemen off the flanks by that point and came back to hit the legions in the rear. Hannibal also had his best infantry near the flanks, and they turned inwards on the advancing Romans as well. It was a classic double-envelopement, and the legions, in technical terms, were toast.

There was a lot less armor on those early legionaries. Wealthier men wore a shirt of mail (lorica hamata), but the rest had a small round or square breastplate called a pectoral. By the end of the Republic, we believe the professional legionaries all had mail (though there is evidence that some were unarmored), and mail was used alongside the lorica segmentata in the Empire. Armor isn't much good if your army is surrounded and routed, but it's still good stuff to have in most circumstances!

A great basic book on the evolution of the Roman army is Peter Connlly's "Greece and Rome at War". Keep on reading, and keep asking questions!

Valete,

Matthew/Quintus, Leg.XX

[John M McDermott]

Cannae is a battle that has been studied and whose results have been attempted to be emulated by virtually every commander since. Game designers find it virtually impossible to simulate, because the answer always seems to be for the Romans to simply face outboard and breakout.

I have come to believe that the reason for the Roman defeat lies with a catastrophic collapse that occurred when the Romans became densely packed. Modern studies show that densely packed crowds are subject to a sort of tidal wave of collapse when one or two individuals in the crowd fall down, triggering a massive collapse of individuals who are tightly packed together. There are videos of this phenomena occurring at rock concerts.

The Romans at Cannae actually contributed to this by forming 8 legions or their equivalent in a very narrow space and then rolling forward, one rank pressing on the other. Hannibal seems to have recognized this vulnerability by his choice of ground and the way he reacted to the Roman tactic.

[Jona Lendering]

Modern studies show that densely packed crowds are subject to a sort of tidal wave of collapse when one or two individuals in the crowd fall down, triggering a massive collapse of individuals who are tightly packed together.

This sounds very plausible and reminds me of Alexander's battle of Issus in 333, where "heaps of bodies" are mentioned in our sources. Do you, by any chance, have a reference to the studies you refer to?

[Felix]

I believe game designers have trouble with Cannae because much of the impact of the double envelopment was psychological, not physical. The crowding was undoubtedly a problem - accounts of battlefield disasters like this occurred speak of men not having enough room to use their weapons. I think another part of the equation was the panicking and disorienting effect of being attacked on all sides. The history of war has many examples of a flank or rear attack causing a disproportionate amount of panic among the outflanked troops. This effect was greater when the troops actually fought in tightly aligned formations, unlike modern warfare. As the exception that shows the rule, the Gloucestershire regiment in the British army was unique in being allowed to wear its badges on the front and back of their headgear. They were awarded this singular honor because, in a battle of the Napoleonic Wars, they were outflanked; instead of cracking, the rear ranks did in fact turn around and start firing in the opposite direction. This maneuver, which is simple in game terms, was extraordinarily difficult to pull off in actual combat.

[Pompeius Minus]

I like the "too densely packed" explanation as well.

Inexperienced troops tend to become passive and bunch together under fire, and I assume it's the same for soldiers under attack from edged weapons. Maybe the Roman officers ended up as powerless as the people you see at the front of those videos from rock concert that someone mentioned, who are yelling at those in the rear to BACK UP and STOP PUSHING but without much effect. I guess the stampede for the exits shown in other mass panic videos (e.g. from football stadiums) could also provide insights into what happened in battles sometimes.

As for games, one of the few advantages boardgames still have over computer games is that you can add special rules to cover situations like Cannae. Computer games could do this too, but they'd need a scriptable or programmable artificial intelligence (AI). The relatively small advantages of adding that feature compared to the huge difficulties of testing and debugging it is probably why game designers stay away from it.

Getting the AI right, and especially issues like pathing (where the computer constantly has to calculate movement paths and collisions for loads of units), is very difficult and greatly underappreciated by computer game players who just expect it to magically "work".

[floofthegoof]

From reading Livy last year, I get the impression that it was a common Carthaginian tactic to use strong flanks to press against the enemy from both sides.

Also, and forgive me if my memory is hazy on this, the Roman Commander, Varro I believe was his name, had no military experience whatsoever. He was a loud mouthed politician who poured heavy criticism on the consul Fabius?(something starting with F) for taking a cautious approach to dealing with hannibal. Fabius wanted to follow Hannibal and prevent his resupply, so as not to fall victim to his strategems and present a constant threat to him. At Varro's instigation, the Romans lost patience with Fabius, confusing his caution with cowardice.

[John M McDermott]

The Roman battle plan called for 8 massed legions to steamroller the Carthaginians along a very narrow front. Hannibal took advantage of this by having his center give way gradually drawing in the Romans and also encouraging a funneling effect. The African troops then pressed in on the flanks, further compressing the Roman formation, which was only doing what it was ordered to do-plow forward. Then the cavalry attacked the rear.

The British example was also mirrored by a Prussian regiment. When attacked on both sides, it simply faced in both directions and fought in both directions. Why, then, didn't the Romans do this? We know that the Romans were well trained and disciplined. We know that they were capable of improvisation in the heat of battle. Why not at Cannae? They outnumbered the Carthaginian line. Why didn't they just punch through what must have been a thin Carthginian front and escape or exploit? Or, why not just fight like the British and Prussians and eventually repel all attacks? The answer, I believe, lies in the Roman battle plan, Hannibal's reaction to it, and how both contributed to a densely packed Roman Army that suffered a catastophic collapse.

The study I referred to was shown on a History Channel show about Agincourt.

[Jona Lendering]

The study I referred to was shown on a History Channel show about Agincourt.

I think it must be the similar to the shockwave that is described by John Keegan in his account of Agincourt, who mentions what happens to a line of policemen when they have to face a horse gone wild. The story is included in The Face of Battle (1972 or something). Thanks.

[John M McDermott]

On that particular program they had a video of a rock concert where this phenomena occurred. Several thousand people fell over in about 1.5 seconds.

[Quintius Clavus]

I have an excellent book on Cannae, written as an analysis of what happened and possibly why taking its methodology from John Keegan's "Face of Battle". It's by Gregory Daly.
First, I take issue with many historians blaming Varro for the disaster. That army was there to fight Hannibal. At some point in time, they were going to have to face him. Varro was not a "civilian politician". During that period, if you made it to Consul, you certainly had military experience and command experience as well. I believe military service was a requirement to hold oneself out for elective office at that time during the Republic. He has suffered from the fact that ultimately the Scipionic faction came out ahead, and they controlled what became history - I am particularly referring to Scipio Aemelianus, who was Polybius' patron, he was both an Aemelius (by birth) and a Scipio (by adoption). They were determined to turn the blame away from the other Consul, who died in the battle, on foot, thus sacrificing his ability to see above the fighting. Also, Varro likely got swept up in the panic of the Italian cavalry, once most of the horses were running, Varro couldn't break free of the crowd. Both of that year's consuls (Varro and Aemelius Paulus) were commanding on the flanks, with the newer legions and the cavalry. And, Varro is the one who rallied the survivors. The Senate, appropriately voted him "thanks" for not dispairing. Daly believes that many of the survivors who were rallied had, in fact, escaped from the batllefield, itself. Most of the troops left in the two camps surrendered the next day. Toward the end, the Carthaginians must have been too tired to chase after those Roman troops who managed to break through and run; they may have been in fairly small groups. Also, the Numidians may have still been off chasing the Roman and Italian cavalry and thus not available to hunt the fugitives from the infantry.
In point of fact the Romans massing in the depth they did was an attempt to put into practice lessons learned from the Battle of Trebia, in which the massed legions in the center were able to break through the thin Carthaginian line and escape.
My copy of the book, which came out a few years ago, is unfortunately in a box. I will state from memory that the author does lend heavy weight to psychological factors in the collapse of the Roman army.
He theorizes that the cavalry attacks in the rear of the Roman army were so effective because the light troops had been withdrawn to a point behind the triarii. Their age, being very young, and their lack of armor, caused them to panic when Hasdrubal's cavalry charged them. They ran the only direction they could, into the triarii, who were still facing forward, and throwing their ranks into chaos.
One final comment, as I could go on all day (or night), Hannibal's double envelopment at Cannae was a "passive" double envelopment. He drew the legions in, then, once they were jammed together and only concerned with what was going on to the front, he turned his flanking units and with them and the cavalry, "slammed the door" shut on the Romans. Also, the newest legions (and Italian allies) were on the flanks, with the veteran troops from the previous year's consuls in the center (the previous year's consuls commanded the center).
Again, I could go on and on and on.... Most of the attempts since Cannae, to recreate its effect in other battles, were "active" double envelopments, with the army doing the eveloping going forward to engage the enemy flanks and rear, rather than drawing the enemy in - a trap set in plain sight is what Hannibal accomplished.

Marcus Quintius Clavus/Quinton Johansen

[hoplite14gr]

I think the leaders lack of military experience and his overconfidence wrecked havoc. He could have aided his cavalry with the light troops like the Greek hammippoi or the Gallic-German horse-runners and he did not.
He could have used his numbers advantage to extend his flank and try press his advantage there. He could have placed more reserves.
Instead he thought just to "hammer" the enemy "ruble" who simply evade the force of the blow and "choped-off" the handle of the "hammer"!
In most table wargames I tried the same trick no matter what the game system and the Carhedonians would loose. If you support the roman cavalry or extend your line you always have better chances.
Kind regards

[floofthegoof]

Livy does speak derisively regarding Varro's experience in military affairs, but I can't remember the exact words. It's possible that the Scipio connection could be at play, but Livy seems to want to deride Varro's exuberance in favor of the previous consul's(Fabius? Is that the right name?) caution.

Often in History, military commanders who win great battles are attributed with a certain amount of genius that maybe isn't there. There's that saying, 'no plan survives contact with the enemy'. In my mind, the results of Cannae depend on the action of the Romans. I don't think any military planner draws up a plan that requires particular behavior by a numerically superior enemy. I think Hannibal really dodged a bullet here, I bet his personal escape route was heavy in his mind for much of the battle, and that his victory shocked him as much as anyone else.

Throw a rock as far as you can, and whatever it hits say 'Yep, that's what I was aiming for.' You will be considered a genius rock thrower.

[NightHunter24]

Avete omnes!

I would have to agree with Quintus Clavus' statement when it comes to putting the all blame on Varro.

You know? Who knows what was going through these leaders' minds when they were issuing orders or in the middle of retreat. In the heat of battle there are not too many that can keep their cool. It takes both, a good army and a good general(tactician) to bring an army to victory. Examples of this would be Alexander...Caesar...Hannibal, etc. We can theorize what could have been the outcome IF...

All in all I'd have to say that Cannae was one of the worse military disasters to occur to the Roman military (besides Cahrrae and Adrianople).

Just some humble thoughts.

Regards,
NH24