Xerxes Five Million Men

[Aryaman2]

floofthegoof
You think it is reasonable to think the persians could field an army of 1 illion, so then why is that European countries in the Napoleonic period, for instance, could not? Why is that there is a long evolution from the small armies of the XV century that some historians have called military revolution, in which European countries painfully were adquiring the logistical and planning abilities to raise and keep on the field large armies, but the Persian empire had it so long before? I find that surprising.
As for the greek cities fielding 100.000 men , it is quite another thing. I doubt there could be as much as 100.000, but anyway, imagine Athens raise an army of 15.000 to march to Plataea to do battle there, they only need to ftake his arms, and a servant to carry them and something to eat for several days. In Medieval times 1-2 week campaigns, in which everybody took with themselves what they were going to eat was very common. But to organise an army in Asia from levies all around the empire, bring it together and move it a long travel away from your bases is quite another thing.
As for the "nations" themselves they are very unequal, Libya was basically desert, the Persian empire only dominated a small fringe of "India". They were nothing comparable to a Greek city general levy of citizens. They were just groups of followers raised by local chiefs under the command of the Satrapa, greek cities were able to mobilize a far larger percentage of thier population, that was one of the advantages of citizen organization.

[floofthegoof]

floofthegoof
You think it is reasonable to think the persians could field an army of 1 illion, so then why is that European countries in the Napoleonic period, for instance, could not?

I think it depends on what we mean by "army". Don't forget that this was in fact a gigantic failure. The Greeks had very little to do with the anhilation of Xerxes land army. It caved in under it's own weight. The greeks did kill Mardonius 300,000, but by then they were already weakened by hunger. Their only relief being the departure of the masses of dead weight, very few of whom actually made it home.

I think in Napoleonic times, generals had a better handle on the size of army that could actually be supported through a campaign. This is obviously not the case with Xerxes. H. mentions that they crossed the bridge at the Hellspont in 7 days under *whip*. This million men was likely a rabble of peasants herded together, with little thought of how to feed them other than 'lots of food for lots of men'. Nobody really did the math.

[Anonymous]

You think it is reasonable to think the persians could field an army of 1 illion, so then why is that European countries in the Napoleonic period, for instance, could not? Why is that there is a long evolution from the small armies of the XV century that some historians have called military revolution, in which European countries painfully were adquiring the logistical and planning abilities to raise and keep on the field large armies, but the Persian empire had it so long before?

Same reason the Indians were building huge and beautiful cities while the inhabitants of Northern Europe were just developing farming communities.
Same reason we took 2000 years after Hero to develop the steam turbine. We are constantly finding that ancient civilizations had reached stages of development that are only just coming back within our grasp. No modern metallurgist has yet been able to replicate the feat of Ancient Greek metalworkers in turning bronze over their shield rims without folds, cuts or creases. The Incas ruled a huge empire without horse transport.

[Felix]

This subject has been discussed before, and I would like to refer interested parties to this conversation: http://netsword.com/ubb/Forum4/HTML/000134.html and http://netsword.com/ubb/Forum4/HTML/000135.html . The context is medieval rather than ancient, but the mathematics are the same. Men and horses need food and water, and in the late 19th and 20th centuries army quartermasters worked out how much of each was needed per man and horse. The basic biology of men and horses hasn't changed much since Xerxes' time, so while 20th century figures might be off by a small fraction, they are a sound basis for calculation.

When considering the size of armies, it is worth remembering that the combined total of both sides in the largest battle of the Napoleonic Wars was about 500,000 (Leipzig, 1813). This is also about the size of the largest single force mustered in the Napoleonic Wars, the invading force that Napoleon launched into Russia in 1812. The Grand Armee was divided into three major groups marching along different axes, but even so, starvation played a major role in Napoleon's failure.

I see a "3:1" ratio has been brought up as a force needed to expect success. This is not the size of the total forces. It is a measure of the superior odds needed to attack successfully at a single point. Even then, it assumes the forces are comparable (in troop quality, gear, and without major advantage in terrain or fortification). "Three to One" has nothing to do with the overall size of armies. If you look at more modern warfare, for which reasonably good numbers are available, you will find few (if any!) major battles in either the Napoleonic Wars, the American Civil War, or the World Wars for which the attacking army was 300% stronger than the defense. What you more typically find is that the victors were three times as strong at the critical time and place, broke through the defense, and the rest of the line crumbled.

A simple calculation, by the way, on the length of Xerxes' army. Five million people, say each man or woman takes up 2 feet of a marching column, say they are 10 abreast - 5,000,000 x 2 /10 = 1,000,000 feet long. In miles (divide by 5280), this column is 189 miles long. This assumes perfect spacing and coordination of the march, no horses, no carts/wagons for baggage. For most armies, 20 miles a day was a good march - this column would take 10 days to march past a single point / bridge.

The numbers of Herodotus don't work. Even one-tenth the numbers strain credulity.

[floofthegoof]

...but Xerxes left Mardonius in Thessaly. He himself journeyed with all speed to the Hellespont and came in forty-five days to the passage for crossing, bringing back with him as good as none (if one may say so) of his host. Wherever and to whatever people they came, they seized and devoured its produce. If they found none, they would eat the grass of the field and strip the bark and pluck the leaves of the trees, garden and wild alike, leaving nothing--such was the degree of their starvation. Moreover, pestilence and dysentery broke out among them on their way, from which they died. Some who were sick Xerxes left behind, charging the cities to which he came in his march to care for them and nourish them, some in Thessaly and some in Siris of Paeonia and in Macedonia. In Siris he had left the sacred chariot of Zeus when he was marching to Hellas, but on his return he did not get it back again.

Disaster! This is the fate of the men who's only battle was at Thermopylae.

[floofthegoof]

For most armies, 20 miles a day was a good march - this column would take 10 days to march past a single point / bridge.

With a good whipping, it should take only 7 days according to Herodotus. :lol:

[Aryaman2]

Felix
many thanks for the links, I see we are basically in agreement

paulaallen
You picked some interesting examples, but I imagine you will agree that France in 1813 was far more advanced in general than Xerxes Persian Empire, yet the largest field army Napoleon could muster were 195.000 men at Leipzig, far away from Herodotus 1.7 million, so i find that simply impossible to believe.

So, let´s resume our proposals, 1) what are the numbers you propose, and 2) on what are based those numbers
as for me
1) I think the Persians were not in excess of 100.000
2) I based that number on the comparation with XVII century armies and their logistic problems

[floofthegoof]

You picked some interesting examples, but I imagine you will agree that France in 1813 was far more advanced in general than Xerxes Persian Empire, yet the largest field army Napoleon could muster were 195.000 men at Leipzig, far away from Herodotus 1.7 million, so i find that simply impossible to believe.

I agree that France in 1813 was more advanced, but I don't think that raw numbers are an indication of advancement. Napoleon was a very succesful general. Xerxes was not. Napoleon would have told Xerxes to give him 100,000 men to conquer Greece, and he would have done it.

So, let´s resume our proposals, 1) what are the numbers you propose, and 2) on what are based those numbers

I think the method of counting given by Herodotus would lead to considerable inflation of the numbers. I scale it back from 1.7 million to 1 million fighting men. The number must be large enough so that, though the Persians had allied with everyone north of Thessaly, they starved to death without more than a numerically insignificant battle. Mind you this isn't Russia in the wintertime, it's Greece! Quite known for a pleasant climate.

As for the followers and allies gained on the march, I think that the number should be very much lower that what was estimated by Herodotus. I would say that an additional 100,000 would be the maximum. Also, I think anyone who had a chance of survival in Greece, who had an ounce of courage, would have deserted rather than fight for a king who they probably hadn't even heard of before they were pressed into service, whos motivation consisted mainly of the whip. So there may have been less men with him at Thermopylae than in Asia.

I say one million total human beings in the land army.

[hoplite14gr]

I agree that France in 1813 was more advanced, but I don't think that raw numbers are an indication of advancement. Napoleon was a very succesful general. Xerxes was not. Napoleon would have told Xerxes to give him 100,000 men to conquer Greece, and he would have done it.

Not if he was fighting Alexander the Great.

So, let´s resume our proposals, 1) what are the numbers you propose, and 2) on what are based those numbers

I think the method of counting given by Herodotus would lead to considerable inflation of the numbers. I scale it back from 1.7 million to 1 million fighting men. The number must be large enough so that, though the Persians had allied with everyone north of Thessaly, they starved to death without more than a numerically insignificant battle. Mind you this isn't Russia in the wintertime, it's Greece! Quite known for a pleasant climate.

As for the followers and allies gained on the march, I think that the number should be very much lower that what was estimated by Herodotus. I would say that an additional 100,000 would be the maximum. Also, I think anyone who had a chance of survival in Greece, who had an ounce of courage, would have deserted rather than fight for a king who they probably hadn't even heard of before they were pressed into service, whos motivation consisted mainly of the whip. So there may have been less men with him at Thermopylae than in Asia.

I say one million total human beings in the land army.

Greece is pleasant but grain had to beimported from the Archaic to the Byzantine times Greece first time produced exactly the amount of grain that needed without imports in 1958.
That means that that Herodotus description of a starving Army is very likely.
Xerxes was used on the large plains of Asia and Egypt that is why raised a big Army.
I agree with Paul that we dont exactly know the real abilities of the civilazations of the time. North Africa was not so much of a Desert as we know it know. Modern Tynician deessert was once the fertile trees of Carthage according to archeologists. Cyrinaica and Tripolis in Lybya had more than 60000 people each. There were bronze age cities in the middle east with popluation arround 1000000. I cannot buy the 5 million number as I wrote before but 500000 even 600000 troops was possible to muster.
How many of them would be real soldiers thats another matter. How they would be fed another thing! Possibly most of them starved to death from miscalculation.

[Felix]

Two points about Napoleon's Russian Campaign:

He invaded in June; his retreat from Moscow began in October. He had lost the campaign before the winter began.

"Right from the beginning ill-health was to beset the mighty (Napoleon's) army. Diphtheria, dysentery and typhus, soon aggravated by malnutrition and semistarvation, would take a heavy toll. To cite one instance, the Bavarian Corps lost half its strength from sickness before it ever made contact with the enemy."

David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, "The Road to Moscow" pp. 758-9

[hoplite14gr]

Two points about Napoleon's Russian Campaign:

He invaded in June; his retreat from Moscow began in October. He had lost the campaign before the winter began.

"Right from the beginning ill-health was to beset the mighty (Napoleon's) army. Diphtheria, dysentery and typhus, soon aggravated by malnutrition and semistarvation, would take a heavy toll. To cite one instance, the Bavarian Corps lost half its strength from sickness before it ever made contact with the enemy."

David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, "The Road to Moscow" pp. 758-9

Same thing with Xerxes. He started in the spring and he retreated in winter.
Salamis happened in 22 September. He had to cross back through places that his army had devastated. Sickness must have been more terrible because thought the civilised Persians might have better standarts the rest of the barbarian hord is not likely to had them.
Xerxes personaly might even have used a boat or a barge to cover more distance. But his army huge by the stndarts of the era, might have collpaed the same way the Grand Armee in the frosen steppes. Even today temperatures in the mountain passes of central Greece get a 25 to 30 below zero and troops passing the Neurokopi area on the way to Helespond might faced -40. Last year Kato Nevokopi scored -39 in January.
Kind regards

[Anonymous]

I see a "3:1" ratio has been brought up as a force needed to expect success. This is not the size of the total forces.

I didn't say it was. If you remember, I merely used this as a rough guide for arriving at some idea of what MIGHT be considered unbeatable odds.

It is a measure of the superior odds needed to attack successfully at a single point.

In the context of my argument, this is not relevant. I'm familiar with the theory of "local superiority".

Even then, it assumes the forces are comparable (in troop quality, gear, and without major advantage in terrain or fortification).

As I said.

A simple calculation, by the way, on the length of Xerxes' army. Five million people, say each man or woman takes up 2 feet of a marching column, say they are 10 abreast - 5,000,000 x 2 /10 = 1,000,000 feet long. In miles (divide by 5280), this column is 189 miles long. This assumes perfect spacing and coordination of the march, no horses, no carts/wagons for baggage. For most armies, 20 miles a day was a good march - this column would take 10 days to march past a single point / bridge.

The numbers of Herodotus don't work. Even one-tenth the numbers strain credulity.[/quote]

Okay, but in my message, I'd already assumed that 5 million was wrong, and was trying to establish how wrong. Did you read the whole message? I think I asked whether people thought 300,000 to 500, 000 MIGHT be a possibility. Your references to Napoleon seem to suggest that you agree that they might. I see Stefanos has commented on Napoleon's Russian campaign already - I was about to write the same thing.

[Anonymous]

Oops! I see Felix was the originator of the response on Napoleon. My apologies, Felix. I see that Stefanos agrees with you on the main point, and points out that Greece, though pleasant, wasn't desperately fertile!

[Anonymous]

Napoleon was a very succesful general. Xerxes was not. Napoleon would have told Xerxes to give him 100,000 men to conquer Greece, and he would have done it.

I've no wish to be rude, Floof, but this sounds remarkably like bovine scatology to me! Napoleon came severely unstuck in Russia because HE PERSONALLY failed to provide for the worst-case scenario which he encountered. He repeatedly failed to defeat the British, simply because they were prepared to stand until the French broke themselves against them. As Wellington put it, "They came on in the same old way and we saw them off in the same old way" ( Yes, he did also say it was "a damned close-run thing"). Napoleon failed to do anything new. It strikes me the Ancient Greeks, in their attitude at Thermopylae, were just like the Brits and would have "seen off" a general like Napoleon in much the same way.
What evidence is there that Xerxes ( Or the ACTUAL strategist of his army) was not a successful general? This is not a sarcastic or rhetorical question - I don't know what his "track record" was but Mardonius did a fine job after Thermopylae and it seems like the Greeks ( as well as being brave and well-armed) were damned lucky that their silly squabbling didn't lead to disaster and that the two most important men in the Persian army were killed at Plataea.

[Felix]

My feeling is that 100,000 men, with assorted hangers-on, might have been achieved, provided that there were adequate naval resources and they were well organized. Armies of that general size could be assembled (i.e. the Romans at Cannae, the First Crusade later) for at least a limited period of time. Two hundred thousand soldiers is, I suspect, unrealistic. It is true the Persian Empire was vast, but it is also true that the army was being assembled at the far edge of the empire and marching into hostile territory. Gathering a huge force in the center of the empire was a lot easier - it would have saved the contingents from the farthest east maybe a 1000 mile march.

There are practical difficulties in even gathering that many soldiers. Arranging for different columns to arrive at the same point at the same time was a challenge even in the Napoleonic era. Marching and picking up contingents en route almost inevitably meant someone was sitting and waiting at a rendevous, either the main force or the additions. Sitting and waiting is not all that simple, since the army needs to be supported that whole time. Bernard Bachrach wrote eloquently on the problems that William the Bastard had when trying to invade England in 1066: http://www.deremilitari.org/RESOURCES/A ... hrach3.htm
William's army was undoubtedly much smaller than Xerxes' army, but merely the waste problem was substantial.

"As we have seen, horses eat and drink large amounts; however, they retain relatively little of what they consume. A horse each day produces on the average 4.5 lb. of feces and .56 gallons of urine per 100 lb. of body weight. Thus a horse weighing about 1,500 lb. would produce about 65-70 lb. of feces per day in a mixture that is about 75-80% liquid and an additional 8‑8.5 gallons of urine.44 These excretions, of course, are extremely dangerous to both the animals and the men whom they serve, especially when a military force is encamped for a lengthy period of time or is besieging an enemy stronghold. Urine, while not toxic in healthy animals or humans, does in the process of evaporation produce ammonia, which is highly detrimental to horses' hooves. Feces, by contrast, are highly toxic and if not adequately dealt with can lead to health problems of epidemic proportions. At Dives-sur-Mer, where William of Normandy encamped with some 2,000 to 3,000 war horses for at least a month, a mountain of from 3,600,000 to 5,400,000 lb. of horse feces and a river of from 480,000 to 720,000 gallons of horse urine had to be, and were, disposed of safely."

Having a force of even 3,000 cavalry stay in one place for a month is messy. hock: When you are assembling forces from Bactria, India, Ethiopia, all marching over unpaved roads, through mountains and across deserts (in some cases), delays are unavoidable and thus the problems of maintaining a force while waiting must be dealt with.