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Revisiting Zama
#31
Internet humor from the far side of the pond....

https://www.theguardian.com/science/2019...book-event
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#32
Oh no, another Michael. Perhaps we can call Mr Taylor "New Michael"....

And I'm certain the stele with the inscription of Scipio's defeat of Hannibal's army at Zama is reposing in Area 51.
Paralus|Michael Park

Ἐπὶ τοὺς πατέρας, ὦ κακαὶ κεφαλαί, τοὺς μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου τὰ ὅλα κατειργασμένους

Wicked men, you are sinning against your fathers, who conquered the whole world under Philip and Alexander!

Academia.edu
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#33
Paralus Wrote:And I'm certain the stele with the inscription of Scipio's defeat of Hannibal's army at Zama is reposing in Area 51.

In Area 51 you will find Noah's Ark, and a tablet saying that Pythagoras designed the Roman social and military system for a period of 1,200 years.
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#34
Gentlemen and all Michaels,

Rather than a trip to Nevada, we should perhaps all meet up in the Siliana valley, Tunisia and really revisit Zama!

I posted a reference earlier to it, but has anyone here read Duncan Ross` book, Kbor Klib and the battle of Zama ?
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#35
Steven James Wrote:In Area 51 you will find Noah's Ark, and a tablet saying that Pythagoras designed the Roman social and military system for a period of 1,200 years.

An unfortunate juxtaposition, perhaps, given that Noah's Ark is mythical!
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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#36
Renatus Wrote:
Quote:An unfortunate juxtaposition, perhaps, given that Noah's Ark is mythical!

That depends on the beliefs of the reader. Many people of the Christian faith believe in Noah's Ark.

[attachment=14978 Wrote:Michael J. Taylor]
Internet humor from the far side of the pond....

https://www.theguardian.com/science/2019...book-event


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#37
Steven James Wrote:
Renatus Wrote:
Quote:An unfortunate juxtaposition, perhaps, given that Noah's Ark is mythical!

That depends on the beliefs of the reader. Many people of the Christian faith believe in Noah's Ark.

And some people (perhaps the same?) believe the Earth is flat but I wouldn't couple a theory in which I had faith with their ideas.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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#38
Renatus Wrote:And some people (perhaps the same?) believe the Earth is flat but I wouldn't couple a theory in which I had faith with their ideas.

It was a light hearted reply, with no real serious intent.
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#39
Phew, that's a relief!
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
#40
Revisiting Zama once more, but concerning the three spies.

Steven James earlier mentioned the three spies caught by Valerius Laevinus in Frontinus...

Frontinus Book 4 VII. On Sundry Maxims and Devices
7 The consul [Publius] Valerius Laevinus, having caught a spy within his camp, and having entire confidence in his own forces, ordered the man to be led around, observing that, for the sake of terrifying the enemy, his army was open to inspection by the spies of the enemy, as often as they wished.Well, there appear to be some interesting links between the three spies story and Lucius Cincius Alimentus.

Well, there appear to be some interesting links between the three spies story and Lucius Cincius Alimentus.
Lucius Cincius Alimentus was a subordinate officer of Marcus Valerius Laevinus`, Publius` grandson's command in Sicily between 211 and 208 BC.

Alimentus had been captured by Hannibal in 208 BC, but he was no ordinary prisoner. His claim (in Livy 21.38) to have conversed with Hannibal seems within reason considering his status in the Roman military, but it would be most doubtful that he would have accompanied Hannibal on his march to Zama in 202. So, where might Alimentus have gathered information for events in the Zama campaign? On his release, after the final peace treaty terms had been agreed to and the delegates to Rome had returned to Africa, I think it most likely that he met and had discussions with Scipio and also his subordinate officers from April (this was six months after the battle of Zama and enough time to get their version of events right) to their arrival in Rome in May-June of 201 BC and Scipio`s Triumph.

But with regard to the three spies; it's quite probable that the story of three spies before the battle of Heraclea was either already an element in the Valerii family oral history, or Alimentus added later it to flatter his old commanding officer's grandfather, Publius Valerius Laevinus; an attempt to soften the blow of the family member's defeat at the hands of Pyrrhus.
Alimentus may have been the first to add the three spies episode to history of the Zama campaign.

History tends to grow in the telling, and the versions of Publius Valerius Laevinus` stratagem used against Pyrrhus vary quite considerably between authors over three hundred years or so.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus(60-7 BC), in Romans Antiquities, 19 excerpt 9, 10 has Laevinus parade the army to demonstrate Roman strength to Pyrrhus` captured spy. Writing after Livy, Sextus Julius Frontinus (c. 40 – 103 AD) says that Laevinus had a spy led around the camp. Plutarch (46 - 120 AD), in his Parallel Lives, Pyrrhus, 16.3-4 does not mention enemy spies or scouts - it is quite a different account. In Plutarch, Pyrrhus observes the enemy camp and their movements and his confidence is dented by their apparent good order. Cassius Dio (155 – 235 AD) in his Roman History, 9 fr. 13 tells us that Pyrrhus and Laevinus exchanged letters and the Laevinus catches some of Pyrrhus` scouts to send a message back to Pyrrhus with news that he has more troops than Pyrrhus.
All these versions though, have Pyrrhus` confidence checked by the Roman's readiness for battle and/or a numerical advantage and these are all ultimately based upon Herodotus` account of the three Greek spies in Sardis in 481 BC.

Herodotus on the Greek Spies in Sardes
[7.146] [The Greek spies] arrived in Sardes and found out all they could about the king's army, but were caught in the process, questioned by the Persian army commanders and condemned to death. But when Xerxes was told that they were about to be executed, he disapproved of his generals' decision and sent men from his bodyguard with orders to get hold of the three spies, if they were still alive, and bring them before him. As the sentence had not yet been carried out, this was done; the spies were brought to the king, who, having satisfied himself about the reason for their presence in Sardes, instructed his guards to take them round and let them see the whole army, infantry and cavalry, and then, when they were satisfied that they had seen everything, to let them go without molestation to whatever country they pleased.
[7.147] After giving this order, he explained the purpose of it by pointing out that, if the spies had been executed, the Greeks would not have been able to learn in good time how incalculably great the Persian strength was - and the killing of three men would not have done the enemy much harm; but if, on the other hand, the spies returned home, he was confident that their report on the magnitude of the Persian power would induce the Greeks to surrender their liberty before the actual invasion took place, so that there would be no need to go to the trouble of fighting a war at all.
(https://www.livius.org/sources/content/h...in-sardes/)
Conversely, most of the accounts that describe the three spies episode in the lead up to the battle of Zama are essentially the same, but with the one notable exception, that in Polybius` version, with Scipio knowing that Massinissa will be joining his army soon, has the captured spies taken on a tour of his camp and in appearing to be weak in cavalry he deceives Hannibal, goading him to giving battle on the following day.

Polybius must have known that the three spies had been borrowed from Herodotus, and was probably aware of it re-appearing in Alimentus with respect to Laevinus and Pyrrhus, but he decided to re-use it once more anyhow in order to make a meeting between Hannibal and Scipio and the great battle of Zama appear more credible.

With the cavalry battle of Zama (the one described by both Appian and Cassius Dio) followed by the great battle of Zama it would have appeared odd that Hannibal had then decided to engage Scipio knowing that his cavalry were at a disadvantage; the three spies story allowed Polybius to explain Hannibal's surprise in finding out that Massinissa had reinforced Scipio.

It seems very probable to me at least, that Alimentus` history of the Zama campaign included the three spies episode; it must have been close to original, being a show of strength, it may have been a repeat of Marcus Valerius Laevinus` story of his grandfather, Publius Valerius Laevinus, who allegedly managed to undermine Pyrrhus` confidence before the battle of Heraclea.
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#41
At present I am sifting through all the information relating to Baecula and Ilipa. This was followed by comparing all the similar events between the two battles. Some of the events that occurred at these battles are also repeated in other battles set in Iberia during the Second Punic War, so a lot of rehashed history is being retrograded left right and centre. Basically Baecula and Ilipa are one and the same. Someone wanted to break the battle into two so as to give Scipio the credit of defeating Hasdrubal Barca. Appian clearly states at Baecula it was Hasdrubal Gisgo that was defeated. All the evidence supports Appian.

However, Appian is not off the hook by a long shot. His account of the placement of the Roman cavalry at Zama behind the infantry, due to the Roman cavalry not being accustomed to elephants, is then contradicted by Appian having the Roman cavalry charged down the elephants lanes in a bid to defeat the elephants. At Cannae, Appian has Hannibal extend his cavalry thereby forcing the Romans to extend their cavalry to a dangerous thinness. Livy is adamant there was no room for manoeuvre at Cannae for the Roman cavalry. Appian has confused his battles. The two incidents do not belong to those battles, but a little investigation can reveal which battles they rightfully belong. Therefore, Appian’s mistakes are mana from heaven.

In truth I cannot blame Appian, or any other ancient historian. The problem would seem to be is they are all working from very conflicting sources, with some sources following the propaganda version of Rome’s history and others historical sources. For the Iberian war, Appian stands strong and follows a more historical narrative. However, when it comes to the big issues such as Zama, he tends to follow the historical account but also tries to mesh this with the propaganda version, or the popular pop culture tradition. Basically, the propaganda version of Roman history begins with the reign of the kings and ends around the Gallic wars. I recommend Michael that you study the Gallic wars from 204 BC to 193 BC. Many of the battles are replications especially Mago’s battle. Putting the elephants aside, then compare many of these battles with Zama.

My new insights into the Roman cavalry doctrine for selecting the guard cavalry has continued to yield more insights. The number of velites allocated to a squadron I originally had wrong. The numbers I had were based on numbers in the primary sources which were a red-herring, and a lesson not to take the numbers at face value. I made the mistake because I failed to follow through with the standard procedures I have learnt to apply to any of the data. The original number of velites to cavalry I had was a fraction, which was wrong, and a warning sign. The relation between the centuries in the legion was also a fraction. So the new figure works well and abides by the rules of the extraordinarii doctrine (no surprises there).

Unfortunately, most of the reading public have no idea that the Second Punic War is riddled with relentless contradiction. That is because no modern historian has bothered to expose it. Far too many have just followed the Polybian narrative. Polybius never tells us what happened to the dictator appointed after the Roman defeat at Cannae. Three other ancient historians, those rated by academic as less trustworthy write that in 216 BC, the dictator’s camp was overrun by Hannibal’s army. In 212 BC, we have another consular army defeated by Hannibal, which is explained away in Livy as being a rabble army of volunteers. Whoever Livy’s source is has a definite trademark and also numbers the legions with the light infantry omitted. This source interests me. So two legions equals 8,000 men, and one legion 4,000 men. Polybius uses this source and adds the 1,200 velites, thereby ending up with a legion of 5,200 men. My sixth sense says Fabius Pictor, but senses are not evidence.
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#42
(08-15-2019, 05:58 AM)Steven James Wrote: Thanks Steven, I will look into those Gallic wars.


At present I am sifting through all the information relating to Baecula and Ilipa. This was followed by comparing all the similar events between the two battles. Some of the events that occurred at these battles are also repeated in other battles set in Iberia during the Second Punic War, so a lot of rehashed history is being retrograded left right and centre. Basically Baecula and Ilipa are one and the same. Someone wanted to break the battle into two so as to give Scipio the credit of defeating Hasdrubal Barca. Appian clearly states at Baecula it was Hasdrubal Gisgo that was defeated. All the evidence supports Appian.

However, Appian is not off the hook by a long shot. His account of the placement of the Roman cavalry at Zama behind the infantry, due to the Roman cavalry not being accustomed to elephants, is then contradicted by Appian having the Roman cavalry charged down the elephants lanes in a bid to defeat the elephants. At Cannae, Appian has Hannibal extend his cavalry thereby forcing the Romans to extend their cavalry to a dangerous thinness. Livy is adamant there was no room for manoeuvre at Cannae for the Roman cavalry. Appian has confused his battles. The two incidents do not belong to those battles, but a little investigation can reveal which battles they rightfully belong. Therefore, Appian’s mistakes are mana from heaven.

In truth I cannot blame Appian, or any other ancient historian. The problem would seem to be is they are all working from very conflicting sources, with some sources following the propaganda version of Rome’s history and others historical sources. For the Iberian war, Appian stands strong and follows a more historical narrative. However, when it comes to the big issues such as Zama, he tends to follow the historical account but also tries to mesh this with the propaganda version, or the popular pop culture tradition. Basically, the propaganda version of Roman history begins with the reign of the kings and ends around the Gallic wars. I recommend Michael that you study the Gallic wars from 204 BC to 193 BC. Many of the battles are replications especially Mago’s battle. Putting the elephants aside, then compare many of these battles with Zama.

My new insights into the Roman cavalry doctrine for selecting the guard cavalry has continued to yield more insights. The number of velites allocated to a squadron I originally had wrong. The numbers I had were based on numbers in the primary sources which were a red-herring, and a lesson not to take the numbers at face value. I made the mistake because I failed to follow through with the standard procedures I have learnt to apply to any of the data. The original number of velites to cavalry I had was a fraction, which was wrong, and a warning sign. The relation between the centuries in the legion was also a fraction. So the new figure works well and abides by the rules of the extraordinarii doctrine (no surprises there).

Unfortunately, most of the reading public have no idea that the Second Punic War is riddled with relentless contradiction. That is because no modern historian has bothered to expose it. Far too many have just followed the Polybian narrative. Polybius never tells us what happened to the dictator appointed after the Roman defeat at Cannae. Three other ancient historians, those rated by academic as less trustworthy write that in 216 BC, the dictator’s camp was overrun by Hannibal’s army. In 212 BC, we have another consular army defeated by Hannibal, which is explained away in Livy as being a rabble army of volunteers. Whoever Livy’s source is has a definite trademark and also numbers the legions with the light infantry omitted. This source interests me. So two legions equals 8,000 men, and one legion 4,000 men. Polybius uses this source and adds the 1,200 velites, thereby ending up with a legion of 5,200 men. My sixth sense says Fabius Pictor, but senses are not evidence.

In revisiting Zama again, I thought that I would post about two of Scipio`s subordinate commanders, Quintus Minucius Thermus and Gnaeus Octavius. My apologies in advance for any repetitions here of points made previously !
Two of the actions that appear to be missing from Polybius` account of the campaign of 202 BC are Thermus` capture of an equipment train immediately after the cavalry battle as described by Appian (Punic Wars 8.36) and Gnaeus Octavius` action against Vermina in December 202, two months after the great battle of Zama which is in Livy (30.36).

These omissions by Polybius are intriguing because Quintus Minucius Thermus and Gnaeus Octavius are mentioned frequently in Appian`s account of the Zama campaign and during the battle of Zama itself, but for some reason or reasons these battles were left out of Polybius` history. I will attempt to explain why I believe that they appear in the histories of Appian and Livy, but are not to be found Polybius and also the differences in Livy and Appian; why Appian leaves Octavius out and why Livy may have chosen not to include Thermus.
If we know why these events were included or omitted in the histories, we may then be on the way to a better understanding of the campaign of 202 BC.

Thermus and Octavius were probably the most senior officers in Scipio`s command structure (Scipio`s Quaestor, Gaius Laelius was probably younger than Thermus and Octavius, he lived until 160 BC) and it is reasonable to believe that they could potentially have played more important parts than Polybius gave them credit for.


Quintus Minucius Thermus
Livy does not mention the capture of a supply train prior to Zama, but instead he mentions Q. Minucius Thermus and Manlius Acilius Glabrio (both as plebeian tribunes, not military ones) in their support of Scipio`s authority in Africa in 201 BC (Livy 30.40). There is perhaps an element of historical license here, as Livy may have deprived Thermus of a victory in Africa, but he did report him as playing a political role in the war. To Livy, making changes to the personnel in his history to suit circumstances could be viewed as legitimate.
For example, Livy had already replaced Lucius Sergius with the more highly respected Roman, Marcus Servilius in the delegation of officers to Carthage in 203 BC. Sergius, an ancestor of the rebellious Lucius Sergius Catilina, was not to be given an honourable mention here; to do so would be an embarrassment. Marcus Servilius was not in Africa in 203, at that time he held the position of magister equitum.

The texts that relate to the substitution of Sergius:
"He, therefore, at once appointed as legates Lucius Sergius, Lucius Baebius, and Lucius Fabius, and dispatched them to confer with the Carthaginians about what had occurred and at the same time to inform them that the Roman people had ratified the treaty:.." (Polybius 15.1)
"He at once sent L. Baebius, M. Servilius and L. Fabius to Carthage to protest. As they were in danger of ill-treatment from the mob and saw that they might be prevented from returning, they requested the magistrates who had protected them from violence to send ships to escort them." (Livy 30.25).

The question is whether Q. Minucius Thermus could have left his commission in Africa late in 201, in time to be elected as a plebeian tribune in January of 201 (when traditionally elections had been held) or if he taken a new post by April 201? I think it is unlikely, but the important point to note is that Livy had followed Polybius in omitting Thermus` action from his account of the campaign. Polybius did this because it conflicted with his adaptation of Herodotus` three spies story to explain Hannibal's otherwise inexplicable decision to give battle with a disadvantage in cavalry.

Gnaeus Octavius
Why did Appian not include Gnaeus Octavius` battle against Vermina?
One might think that Appian could have believed that the battle was a fabrication, suspecting that Livy, being on friendly terms with Augustus, included it to honour his distant ancestor Gnaeus; Gaius Octavius, Gnaeus` brother was Augustus (Octavian's) great grandfather. But then the whole account probably came via Valerius Antias and so pre-dated the rise to power of the Julio-Claudian families, so that was not the reason for Appian omitting Octavius` action. Besides this, Octavius is mentioned throughout the north Africa campaigns by Polybius and so, it's not as if Livy had simply added a new character to the story in this case.

It`s more likely that Appian, knowing that Livy was quoting Valerius Antias and given Valerius` poor reputation may have been immediately suspicious that it was an earlier fabrication. There is indeed much in the battle account that causes doubt; Vermina`s force was; routed, then surrounded and all avenues of escape closed, but Vermina still escapes. There is also an unusual ratio of killed to captured in a situation where the enemy were trapped - the ratio seems to have been reversed.
"The action took place on December 17, and soon ended in the utter rout of the Numidians. As they were completely surrounded by the Roman cavalry all avenues of escape were closed; 15,000 were killed and 1200 taken prisoners, 1500 horses were also secured and 72 standards. The prince himself escaped with a few horsemen." (Livy 30.36)
To Appian, this may have appeared all too confused to be credible.

So was Octavius` battle a real event? Despite the confused account, a battle fought to defeat Vermina in December would explain the delay in Carthage accepting Scipio`s terms. Zama would have taken place two months earlier, in October of 202.

But as for the history, I suspect that Polybius chose to omit Octavius` action once he had accepted the source that made the battle of Zama the dramatic and decisive event of the campaign; including Octavius` victory would only dilute the effect of that dramatic end to the campaign and the entire war.

Livy added Gnaeus Octavius` action to the Polybian post-Zama narrative and later in his account of the official announcement in Rome of Carthage's defeat, at this public meeting Octavius was not mentioned, but the battle is understandably played down and presented as a much less important event compared to the defeat of Hannibal.

In his turn, Appian overlooked the battle described in Livy (and very likely other earlier authors` accounts of Octavius` battle too) because he had chosen to follow Polybius version and a grand finale to the campaign.


And so to the great battle of Zama and Thermus and Octavius` part in it. Appian mentions Thermus and Octavius twice in his Zama battle narrative, whereas both are absent from Polybius` Zama in which the only other Roman commander apart from Scipio mentioned is Gaius Laelius; this is a point of perspective which one is unable to ignore.

In Appian`s battle of Zama, Gaius Laelius commands the right of the Roman infantry, a position of honour of course but, he does not have an active role.
Appian`s description of the Roman commands at Zama may seem a little confused at first where in a separate sentence at the end of the paragraph that outlines the cavalry deployments (Punic Wars 9.41) he says; "Laelius commanded the right wing and Octavius the left." It is easy to misread this part, but the meaning is clear when later he writes about the fighting in which Laelius, Octavius and Thermus are all commanding infantry lines or reserves.
Reading like an after action report, the actions of the commanders in the infantry fight are described so comprehensively, that this information probably comes from an official source. It is either from Scipio`s memoirs or was contained in the history written by his son of the same name.
"The field being cleared of these beasts the battle was now waged by men and horses only. The Roman right wing, where Laelius commanded, put the opposing Numidians to flight, and Massinissa struck down their prince, Massathes, with a dart, but Hannibal quickly came to their rescue and restored the line of battle. On the left wing, where Octavius commanded and where the hostile Celts and Ligurians were stationed, a doubtful battle was going on. Scipio sent the tribune Thermus [Quintus Minucius Thermus.] thither with a reinforcement of picked men, but Hannibal, after rallying his left wing, flew to the assistance of the Ligurians and Celts, bringing up at the same time his second line of Carthaginians and Africans. Scipio, perceiving this, brought his second line in opposition." (Appian Punic Wars 9.44)
But in Polybius` battle the perspective changes, and Laelius shares with Massinissa the more active and decisive roles of returning to the battlefield and attacking the enemy`s rear. In Polybius (as we are mostly well aware) the infantry battle is described somewhat differently and without mention of any of the Roman sub-commanders.
This may have been the view from Gaius Laelius` perspective or his son's (also of the same name). Coincidentally his son was Scipio Amelianus` second in command at the destruction of Carthage in 148 BC and would have served with and been on friendly terms with Polybius.
Gaius Laelius Jnr. may have been the filter by which the actions of others (Thermus and Octavius) were excluded and his father's deeds were selected and magnified.
For example, Laelius may have told his son about his journey to Rome after Hannibal's defeat in October, but not witnessing Octavius` action which took place in December in his absence he did not mention it to him.
Polybius acknowledged Gaius Laelius Snr. as his trustworthy source for Scipio`s actions (Book 10.3), but I believe it is probably more likely that Laelius` son was Polybius` source of information about the battle and perhaps for the campaign too.
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#43
I feel I need to take something back; Livy did not bring Thermus on as a substitute for another tribune. It`s only a minor point, but I think that it`s right to fill in the gaps, and re-establish the roles of the minor players in the history of the Zama campaign. After a little refelction, I think it could have been possible that Minucius Thermus was sent home after Zama to fulfil a political role in Rome (to support Scipio`s continued command in Africa) and be in time for his election as a Plebeian Tribune (in January 201). It is quite probable too, that he was sent back to Rome with Gaius Laelius.
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#44
Michael wrote:
It is quite probable, that he was sent back to Rome with Gaius Laelius.

Yes possible, but also speculate. Does it solve anything about Zama being a fabrication? There are two versions of the Second Punic War in play, the historical account and the propaganda account. The propaganda account is the most dominant, in which Polybius, Livy and many others follow. Interlaced with the propaganda account is the historical account. Those minor ancient historians or those deemed unreliable by modern scholars have a tendency to try and balance both historical and propaganda accounts by rolling them into one. Some of those ancient historians branded as unreliable, produce a comment that for me is akin to splitting the atom. It may appear small and inconsequential, but the impact is far reaching.

I have also changed my methodology and have now used these contradictions as edit points. From the beginning of one edit point to the next edit points is cut from the narrative. The end result is still a coherence story. Those events cut from the narrative I have catalogued as being fabricated….until proven otherwise.

I have accumulated more contradictions relating to the African campaign of Scipio Africanus. And not just contradictions, the same event repeated elsewhere and the names changed. The bonus is, I have found events in Polybius that conform to the historical narrative. Because Polybius is contradicting himself, he has become my best witness. The propaganda version of the Second Punic War existed before the writings of Polybius, so I cannot point the finger at Polybius. The Roman propaganda version of their history begins with the reign of the kings and ends after the Second Punic War or possibly the Gallic War, in which Scipio Africanus played a part.

On other fronts, I have found, or I should say, had it thrown in my face, is how the Romans reinforced the legions to compensate for losses in the field. It relates to the old ascriptivi system of the early republic, now magnified (16 times) due to the massive availability of manpower between the early republic and the Third Macedonian War. It is a matter of reading the primary sources and forcing oneself to change the line of question. When I hit a problem I change my perception and the manner in how I interpret the material. I have to make myself change lanes and head in a new direction of questioning. The Romans are not like us. They have completely different way of using mathematics. Varro’s comment that the Romans doubled the size of a century but still called it a century should not be ignored. They do this on a regular basis.

In the Third Macedonian War, the Romans are shipping legions of 6,000 infantry, therefore they are naval legions, not land organised legions. To continually test every piece of data, I calculated the fleet need to transport a consular army of this size. The problem was the legion organisation ended with an odd number of ships. By switching to the fleet’s squadron organisation there was no problem. Livy and others claim a Roman squadron had 10 ships. And yet Polybius has the whole Roman fleet at Ecnomus in 256 BC consisting of 330 ships, organised into four legions or four squadrons. So for the Romans, when is a squadron a squadron? Again, we must go back to Varro. In his account of the naval battle of Ecnomus, Polybius gets confused with the fleet’s various organisations.

Also found the Roman fleet has a vexillation organisation. Not sure why it took so long to see it, as it was obvious looking at the deployment of a Roman fleet. One look at the organisation and the geometrical patterns it creates, which allows it to break into so many directions, you can see the Carthaginian plan of encirclement at Ecnomus was doomed from the start. A clear indication of this can be found in Livy’s (37 29-30) account of the engagement between a Roman fleet supported by the Rhodian and a Seleucid fleet in 190 BC. Livy writes:

“Leaving Eudamus to conduct his own operations, Aemilius led the way out of the harbour into the open sea, and meeting each ship as it came up, assigned its place in the line. Eudamus with his Rhodians remained along shore, in order that they might embark without confusion and each ship sail out as soon as it was ready. Thus the first line was formed under the praetor's eye, the Rhodians brought up the rear, and the combined fleet sailed out to sea in battle formation, as though the enemy were actually in sight…The king's fleet (Selucid), which was advancing in a long column, two ships abreast, also deployed into line and extended its left far enough to be able to envelop the Roman right. When Eudamus saw this, and realised that the Romans could not make their line equal in length to that of the enemy, and that their right would be enveloped, he speeded up his ships, which were by far the swiftest in the whole fleet, and after extending his line as far as the enemy's, placed his own vessel opposite to that of Polyxenidas.”

Here the Romans have merely advanced in their standard fleet formation. Eudamus did not realise that the Romans did not care if they were being surrounded. The Roman fleet organisation is designed to cope with this. Eudamus would have been better off staying behind the Roman formation. Livy further writes: “The Romans broke through the enemy's centre, and then working round they attacked from the rear the ships which were engaged with the Rhodians, and in a very short space of time Antiochus' centre and the ships of the left division were being surrounded and sunk.”

Ok, sorry rant over. Just getting excited about all the stuff I have been finding lately. Back to Zama, and that battle that never was.
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#45
It`s OK it`s not quite a rant, but that`s the title of another thread isn`t it Smile

I won`t object to your new stuff, some enthusiasm and curiousity is what we need here I believe.

I am focusing here on the little people in the campaign; after Cassius Dio`s time they are forgotten. However if we can account for their actions, motivations and movements at this time we will surely gain a better understanding of the events.
The actions of the minor characters in the story need to fit into the motivations and stratagies of their leaders.

Re. Thermus.
Appian has him actively taking part in the campaign in October 202 and then Livy has Quintus Minicius Thermus supporting Scipio in the Roman senate in spring of 201. The elections for the positions of Plebeian Tribunes would normally have taken place in January I believe. After having taken part in the fighting, Scipio felt it necessary to redeploy Thermus to Rome in order to support him politically. Scipio`s position there needed to be consolidated.
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