04-13-2019, 06:34 AM
Michael wrote:
as I understand it he and Gaius Laelius met.
I do not put any credence of Polybius having met with Laelius. It is more than likely an invention to give his work some authority. Remember, it is Polybius who claimed that he found Hannibal’s sea tablet giving the size of Hannibal’s army that arrived in Italy. But was it less than 20,000 men or 26,000 men as Polybius tells us on separate occasions. If this sea tablet supposedly left by Hannibal was highly detailed, as a historian Polybius failed to exploit its worth. All we end up with is Hannibal’s infantry at the Trebbia had over 20,000 men, over 10,000 cavalry, at Cannae, over 40,000 infantry, over 10,000 cavalry. In both battles, Hannibal is outnumbered two to one in infantry. At Cannae, 14 legions faced Hannibal, while two legions attacked the camp. The 14 legions at Cannae amount to 70,000 men. Polybius has 70,000 men killed, which indicates Polybius believed the whole 14 legions were killed. And yet he is rated as the most reliable historian. Even Plutarch provides an example of how bad Polybius’ military figures are for the Macedonian war.
A critical study needs to be undertaken in relation to the Second Punic War. All the contradictions need to be examined. It has never been done. Today, the masses of phd’s on the Roman army being produced are nothing but cut and paste jobs, with nothing original being presented. It gets worse. They get turned into books. There are good reviews about Christa Steinby’s book “Rome versus Carthage, the war at sea.” Steinby refers to Lazenby around 47 times. This is an old academic trick, when it becomes tricky to understand something in the primary sources, fall back to someone’s else’s theory that has been accepted by the masses. Another example is Gregory Daly’s book “Cannae: the Experience of Battle.” When it comes to explaining line relief, Daly falls back on Peter Connolly’s theory. It’s the easy way out, and informs the reader Daly has no idea. Gilliver’s book on the Roman Art of War, again falls back on someone else’s (and plenty of them) conclusions, that I had to question whether the author had their own concept about anything. It is not hard to understand why research into the Roman army is in a rut.
as I understand it he and Gaius Laelius met.
I do not put any credence of Polybius having met with Laelius. It is more than likely an invention to give his work some authority. Remember, it is Polybius who claimed that he found Hannibal’s sea tablet giving the size of Hannibal’s army that arrived in Italy. But was it less than 20,000 men or 26,000 men as Polybius tells us on separate occasions. If this sea tablet supposedly left by Hannibal was highly detailed, as a historian Polybius failed to exploit its worth. All we end up with is Hannibal’s infantry at the Trebbia had over 20,000 men, over 10,000 cavalry, at Cannae, over 40,000 infantry, over 10,000 cavalry. In both battles, Hannibal is outnumbered two to one in infantry. At Cannae, 14 legions faced Hannibal, while two legions attacked the camp. The 14 legions at Cannae amount to 70,000 men. Polybius has 70,000 men killed, which indicates Polybius believed the whole 14 legions were killed. And yet he is rated as the most reliable historian. Even Plutarch provides an example of how bad Polybius’ military figures are for the Macedonian war.
A critical study needs to be undertaken in relation to the Second Punic War. All the contradictions need to be examined. It has never been done. Today, the masses of phd’s on the Roman army being produced are nothing but cut and paste jobs, with nothing original being presented. It gets worse. They get turned into books. There are good reviews about Christa Steinby’s book “Rome versus Carthage, the war at sea.” Steinby refers to Lazenby around 47 times. This is an old academic trick, when it becomes tricky to understand something in the primary sources, fall back to someone’s else’s theory that has been accepted by the masses. Another example is Gregory Daly’s book “Cannae: the Experience of Battle.” When it comes to explaining line relief, Daly falls back on Peter Connolly’s theory. It’s the easy way out, and informs the reader Daly has no idea. Gilliver’s book on the Roman Art of War, again falls back on someone else’s (and plenty of them) conclusions, that I had to question whether the author had their own concept about anything. It is not hard to understand why research into the Roman army is in a rut.
