11-21-2017, 05:46 PM
Of all the sources on this subject this is the story I've patched together. Like it or hate it, I don't care.
After years of service under another consul/pro-consul in Africa as his legate, Marius won the consulship in 107 BC, largely appealing to his personal martial ability and emphasizing his superiority over the aristocracy (Plutarch and Sallust). He didn't win by appealing to the poor, their votes mattered not at all. The turmoil of the Late Republic wasn't rich vs poor, it was Senatorial class vs everyone else. Marius won the election by winning over the Equestrian Order and the centuries of the 1st Class, because it was their votes that mattered and truly won elections. There is a reason that Sulla culled the Equestrian Order during his proscriptions, because besides a few aristocratic leaders it was the Equestrians who were the chief rivals to the power of the Senatorial elite who wanted supreme power in Rome.
After assuming the consulship Marius used a law written by an allied people's tribune, the Lex Manlia, which didn't specifically revoke any command but did allow a sitting consul to pick their own command, which stripped Q. Caecilius Metellus' of his Pro-consular command of Africa Province and with it the leadership in the war against Jugurtha (Plutarch and Sallust). This law also seems to be reason Marius continued running for Consul during the Cimbri war. He didn't have the popularity or temerity to get himself made Dictator, had he not won elections each year there was little doubt he'd lose his pro-consular command to a sitting consul.
In 107 BC there was already an army in Africa, a consular army originally levied by the consul L. Calpurnius Bestia in 111 BC (Sallust). That army was then taken over by Sp. Postumius Albinus (Sallust). After the loss at Suthul by the brother of Spurius, Q. Caecilius Metellus assumed command of that army as Consul and reinforced the losses it had sustained with a state endorsed supplementum draft levy (Sallust). The following year Metellus had his command prolonged by being made pro-consul of Africa.
Marius, because of the deceitful means in which he had achieved command, as the Caecilii Metelli, despite being Plebeians, were one of the most powerful families in Rome, had requested to levy a fresh army but was denied by the Senate (Plutarch and Sallust). Marius then requested a formal state endorsed supplementum, that too was denied by the Senate(Sallust). So Marius resorted to calling for volunteers (Sallust).
Previously, this had been done by quite a few commanders. I believe both Scipio Africanus and Scipio Aemilianus both brought large amounts of client "friends"/volunteers with them when both assumed command of much depleted armies in Spain during the 2nd Punic War and the Siege of Numantia (Livy). Thus there was no Senatorial restrictions on Romans volunteering to serve, the Senate could only prevent them from being conscripted in the normal Dillectus/Supplementum or could deny them additional funding, though that doesn't always seemed to have mattered.
Volunteers would have no doubt flocked to Marius, he promised a quick victory and was very popular with the non-Senatorial class. Using his own initiative it seems that for his volunteer supplementum he invited the Capite Censi to show up too. Of the whole Marius raised 5,000 Roman volunteers, which included an unknown number of propertied and propertyless Romans, to reinforce his two Roman legions in Africa, bringing them up beyond full strength. There is nothing to describe any drafts of Latin/Italian Socii equivalent for infantry to replace those lost in battle, not a small amount, the Socii lost an entire cohort in a treacherous encounter at Vaga, and Metellus suffered heavy casualties at Muthul, Zama, and likely the nasty siege at Thala (Sallust). Marius did, through his quaestor Sulla, recruit a large reinforcement draft from the Italians in the form of additional cavalry (Sallust).
It seems that once Marius opened the door to enlist the propertyless, and after they performed well in battle in subsequent wars, other consuls and praetors calling for Dillectus and Supplementum afterwards began doing it too. Previously, thanks to Ti. Gracchus, the wealth requirements to be included in Class V were so low that there is really no way that the state wasn't at least partially funding the arming of these men, at least subsidizing the cost if not outright buying and issuing them arms and armor. So there would not have been much in the difference between levying a very poor 5th Class Roman and a member of the Capite Censi in terms of payment, only the moral points remained. One, the capite censi would not have been raised with any sort of martial tradition or training, unless they'd lost their money during late childhood, thus they wouldn't make good soldiers. This is likely why the Late Republic saw so much of a new emphasis placed on individual skills like sword fighting, commanders could no longer assume their recruits knew how to fight. Two, the idea prevailed in most city state militia systems that those with no property had nothing to defend that they would properly motivate them in war. But that assumes that property back home was the only motivation to fight hard and well. Marius proved that was false as did other generals afterwards, even Philip II of Macedonia proved that wrong.
Though the internet and Wikipedia say differently (though never able to provide proof), Marius never levied full legions with capite censi. To really drive home the point of how incorrect much of the word on Marius' recruitment reform was, in Marius' career he never actually levied his own legions, period. He always assumed command over legions that had previously been levied (Jugurthine War, Cimbri War, and Social War). After assuming command of the African consular army to fight the Jugurthine War he discharged that army in 104 BC after they Triumphed, they would later be allotted land by the agrarian laws of Saturninus in 103 BC. In 104 BC, consul again Marius took over the consular army of his predecessor, P. Rutilius Rufus who'd levied and trained a superb army in 105 BC (Frontinus). Marius likely reinforced that army with loyal evocatii from his African veterans but that's just conjecture. After they defeated the Cimbri Horde in 101 BC they too were discharged, then acting as veterans and allied with Marius and Saturninus, they were heavily involved in the mob actions that led to the Saturninus Affair in 100 BC. During the Social War, Marius served as a Legate and then upon the death in battle of the consul, he took command of that army as pro-consul until he was rendered unfit for command from poor health.
After years of service under another consul/pro-consul in Africa as his legate, Marius won the consulship in 107 BC, largely appealing to his personal martial ability and emphasizing his superiority over the aristocracy (Plutarch and Sallust). He didn't win by appealing to the poor, their votes mattered not at all. The turmoil of the Late Republic wasn't rich vs poor, it was Senatorial class vs everyone else. Marius won the election by winning over the Equestrian Order and the centuries of the 1st Class, because it was their votes that mattered and truly won elections. There is a reason that Sulla culled the Equestrian Order during his proscriptions, because besides a few aristocratic leaders it was the Equestrians who were the chief rivals to the power of the Senatorial elite who wanted supreme power in Rome.
After assuming the consulship Marius used a law written by an allied people's tribune, the Lex Manlia, which didn't specifically revoke any command but did allow a sitting consul to pick their own command, which stripped Q. Caecilius Metellus' of his Pro-consular command of Africa Province and with it the leadership in the war against Jugurtha (Plutarch and Sallust). This law also seems to be reason Marius continued running for Consul during the Cimbri war. He didn't have the popularity or temerity to get himself made Dictator, had he not won elections each year there was little doubt he'd lose his pro-consular command to a sitting consul.
In 107 BC there was already an army in Africa, a consular army originally levied by the consul L. Calpurnius Bestia in 111 BC (Sallust). That army was then taken over by Sp. Postumius Albinus (Sallust). After the loss at Suthul by the brother of Spurius, Q. Caecilius Metellus assumed command of that army as Consul and reinforced the losses it had sustained with a state endorsed supplementum draft levy (Sallust). The following year Metellus had his command prolonged by being made pro-consul of Africa.
Marius, because of the deceitful means in which he had achieved command, as the Caecilii Metelli, despite being Plebeians, were one of the most powerful families in Rome, had requested to levy a fresh army but was denied by the Senate (Plutarch and Sallust). Marius then requested a formal state endorsed supplementum, that too was denied by the Senate(Sallust). So Marius resorted to calling for volunteers (Sallust).
Previously, this had been done by quite a few commanders. I believe both Scipio Africanus and Scipio Aemilianus both brought large amounts of client "friends"/volunteers with them when both assumed command of much depleted armies in Spain during the 2nd Punic War and the Siege of Numantia (Livy). Thus there was no Senatorial restrictions on Romans volunteering to serve, the Senate could only prevent them from being conscripted in the normal Dillectus/Supplementum or could deny them additional funding, though that doesn't always seemed to have mattered.
Volunteers would have no doubt flocked to Marius, he promised a quick victory and was very popular with the non-Senatorial class. Using his own initiative it seems that for his volunteer supplementum he invited the Capite Censi to show up too. Of the whole Marius raised 5,000 Roman volunteers, which included an unknown number of propertied and propertyless Romans, to reinforce his two Roman legions in Africa, bringing them up beyond full strength. There is nothing to describe any drafts of Latin/Italian Socii equivalent for infantry to replace those lost in battle, not a small amount, the Socii lost an entire cohort in a treacherous encounter at Vaga, and Metellus suffered heavy casualties at Muthul, Zama, and likely the nasty siege at Thala (Sallust). Marius did, through his quaestor Sulla, recruit a large reinforcement draft from the Italians in the form of additional cavalry (Sallust).
It seems that once Marius opened the door to enlist the propertyless, and after they performed well in battle in subsequent wars, other consuls and praetors calling for Dillectus and Supplementum afterwards began doing it too. Previously, thanks to Ti. Gracchus, the wealth requirements to be included in Class V were so low that there is really no way that the state wasn't at least partially funding the arming of these men, at least subsidizing the cost if not outright buying and issuing them arms and armor. So there would not have been much in the difference between levying a very poor 5th Class Roman and a member of the Capite Censi in terms of payment, only the moral points remained. One, the capite censi would not have been raised with any sort of martial tradition or training, unless they'd lost their money during late childhood, thus they wouldn't make good soldiers. This is likely why the Late Republic saw so much of a new emphasis placed on individual skills like sword fighting, commanders could no longer assume their recruits knew how to fight. Two, the idea prevailed in most city state militia systems that those with no property had nothing to defend that they would properly motivate them in war. But that assumes that property back home was the only motivation to fight hard and well. Marius proved that was false as did other generals afterwards, even Philip II of Macedonia proved that wrong.
Though the internet and Wikipedia say differently (though never able to provide proof), Marius never levied full legions with capite censi. To really drive home the point of how incorrect much of the word on Marius' recruitment reform was, in Marius' career he never actually levied his own legions, period. He always assumed command over legions that had previously been levied (Jugurthine War, Cimbri War, and Social War). After assuming command of the African consular army to fight the Jugurthine War he discharged that army in 104 BC after they Triumphed, they would later be allotted land by the agrarian laws of Saturninus in 103 BC. In 104 BC, consul again Marius took over the consular army of his predecessor, P. Rutilius Rufus who'd levied and trained a superb army in 105 BC (Frontinus). Marius likely reinforced that army with loyal evocatii from his African veterans but that's just conjecture. After they defeated the Cimbri Horde in 101 BC they too were discharged, then acting as veterans and allied with Marius and Saturninus, they were heavily involved in the mob actions that led to the Saturninus Affair in 100 BC. During the Social War, Marius served as a Legate and then upon the death in battle of the consul, he took command of that army as pro-consul until he was rendered unfit for command from poor health.
