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third century crises
#1
I have always been interested in the 3rd century AD because it must have been a terrible period. The empire survived at a great price. I have always been extremely impressed by the vigor that the Romans and their provincials showed in fighting back what seemed like terrible odds: two fronts, the Goths and the Sassanians, not to speak of the constant civil wars that, in terms of draining resources, was actually a third front that kept constantly opening behind the back of an emperor on campaign! Those emperors that took the title (in some cases they got stuck with it), knew the great risks involved. Almost all of them died violently and knew that they would. Many had great military talent (Galerius, Claudius II, Aurelian, Carus, Diocletian). Great personalities perfect for those terrible times. I wish there was more interest in the period between the death of Alexander Severus and the coming of Diocletian. In many ways things (economy, values, politics, art) were changed forever and the world took a new turn. Some historians start telling the Medieval world with the end of the reign of Diocletian. This is a Roman Army forum and the army certainly changed in many ways although there was certainly a great deal of continuity. I once had a lively a lengthy discussion with Sander about this on another forum. He stresses continuity in the Army while in many exterior and maybe not very profound ways the army of the fourth century looks different. I don't want to reopen that specific discussion, but I would be very pleased and interested to see questions, discussions and contributions concerning the Roman Army during those years. Maybe it can get some of you that are experts in High Empire Legionary equipment and problematics to tune into what happened later. <p></p><i></i>
Jeffery Wyss
"Si vos es non secui of solutio tunc vos es secui of preciptate."
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#2
Salve,<br>
<br>
The third century is also one of my pet subjects, reason why I gave you such a hard time on the other forum. It is a much neglected century with many works simply skipping this period and going from the high empire to the fourth century as if there was nothing in between.<br>
<br>
Stephenson's <i> Roman infantry equipment. The later empire</i> is a rare publication focusing on the army of the third century. I am still writing a review of it and I will post that somewhere next week. It is a good book, though since the subject has my special attention my review is getting drawn out to include a short sketch of the development of the third century army.<br>
<br>
Vale,<br>
<br>
Sander van Dorst <p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://pub45.ezboard.com/bromanarmytalk.showLocalUserPublicProfile?login=sandervandorst>Sander van Dorst</A> at: 4/12/01 7:47:48 am<br></i>
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#3
Salve,<br>
<br>
Let's kick off the third century CE army discussion with the following subject: the decrease in size of the legion. A <i> legio</i> in the first centuries of the principate was a large formation with an establishment strength of some 5000-6000 soldiers. However at some point around the end of the third and start of the fourth century the size of some units termed <i> legio</i> started to deviate from this previous standard size. The introduction of this change is debated in modern studies with some preferring an early date, mainly based on the fortress housing <i> legio</i> IV <i> Martia</i> at Lejjun, others suggesting a date later in the reign of Diocletianus or Constantine. The base at Lejjun is indeed considerably smaller than that of the <i> castra</i> of the principate, offering space for only 20 to 25% of an earlier legion and thus indicating according to some a reduction in legionary establishment strength to a comparable level. However to what extent may this issue be clouded by variation in deployment strategies in which the same unit would be stationed at multiple bases rather than concentrated at a single garrison? There are indications that some of the formations created later than IV <i> Martia</i> had an organisational pattern similar to the earlier large formations with an organisation in <i> cohortes</i> and centurial titles identical to those of the principate and a similar establishment strength. Does this indicate that the old style organisation prevailed until tetrarchic times at least or should one consider the possibility that new legions were created according to varying patterns in the later half of the third century already?<br>
<br>
Vale,<br>
<br>
Sander van Dorst <p></p><i></i>
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#4
Hi Sander. I imagine you are the only person on this forum that is also an expert on the late army. I am certainly very interested in this topic but, at best, I can only summarize what I read and try to be critical on very general terms. From what I gather the increasing use of vexillations made smaller forces the norm rather than the exception and the trend got to the point that instituting a new large "legion" would have been simply nonsensical, as it would be broken up immediately anyway. I imagine that, even though the trend towards smaller forces was set much earlier (the northern wars of Marcus were rarely large set battles), the continuous crisis of the third century probably kept the Romans from seriously tinkering with the organization of the army. Any real re-organizing probably needed calmer times! The confusion of changing command structure etc. would have been dangerous as things were already hectic. In addition the continuity of the existing legions with commanders coming up through the ranks probably helped a great deal in those difficult times and it would have been counterproductive to change then and there. Only when Diocletian succeeded in politically stablizing the turning-of-the-tide could the experience accumulated over decades (50 years if not more) be institutionalized in some form. But even then, from what I gathered, it seems the real changes started with Constantine. The mobile armies of the third century were somewhat an improvised necessity and indeed Diocletian actually re-introduced a defense strategy that counted once again on the territorial defense at, if not beyond, the borders. Instead Constantine institutionalized mobile armies as entities tied to the emperor and not to the territory; the defence of the perimeter and the people living in depth was no longer the priority. This then, inevitably, brought on the tendency to accept as a matter of fact the penetration of the perimeter, as the enemy would be intercepted and destroyed later, within roman territory, by making use of good roman roads and strongholds stocked with supplies (etc etc). The creation of these mobile armies was a consequence of 150 years of using smaller forces against a northern enemy that rarely assembled together for a set piece battle. The smaller groupings could handle better the flexible scenarios that put so much stress on the 5000 man legion. But the long term price was a loss of cohesion. The cohesion was still there on paper, but in fact it had slowly erroded away. <p></p><i></i>
Jeffery Wyss
"Si vos es non secui of solutio tunc vos es secui of preciptate."
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#5
Salve,<br>
<br>
From my side it is also mostly summarising what I have read and trying to reconciliate conflicting evidence and interpretations into a workable model.<br>
<br>
The date of introduction of the small legion is difficult to pinpoint. It may have started before Diocletianus if one accepts the possibility that the presently known stations of I <i> Illyricorum</i> and IV <i> Martia</i> are indeed the only bases for these units. However the <i> Notitia Dignitatum</i> and the Panoplis papyrus with the various detachments of II {i]Traiana[/i] seem to indicate that some <i> legiones</i> were spread out over several bases as well as furnishing a field army detachment which seems to warrant a more cautious approach to allow for other detachments of these very units at as yet unknown locations.<br>
<br>
Vegetius's statement that the legions of <i> Ioviani</i> and <i> Herculiani</i> were raised 6000 man strong apiece comes from a dubious source, though it cannot be discarded perse. These Diocletianic legions were apparently both serving as field army elite forces attached to the imperial <i> comitatus</i> as well as serving as border forces in one of the newly created provinces. Thus it seems that these new units were from the start already divided between several detachments which may have had only the loosest of attachments outside the common title.<br>
<br>
In addition the <i> legio</i> I <i> Noricorum</i> appears to have been created by brigading existing auxiliary units into a larger formation and some other fourth century legions seem to have been formed from auxiliary units.<br>
<br>
Existing field army vexillations appear to have led a life alone from their parent formations with some field army units belonging to different emperor's armies than their original units. The application of the title <i> legio</i> rather than <i> vexillatio</i> to such units in the fourth century appears to have merely recognised the existing state of affairs.<br>
<br>
There is an interesting article by Tomlin in R.J. Brewer's <i> Roman fortresses and their legions</i> (a paperback issue of which has recently been published) on the late Roman legions.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
Sander van Dorst <p></p><i></i>
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#6
Salve,<br>
<br>
Though I consider Luttwak's <i> Grand strategy</i> essential reading, the model proposed remains a simplified and therefore much clearer and understandable representation of reality. His division of the three types of grand strategy not only according to their nature, but chronologically as well to some extent disguises the fact that elements of his models can be found outside the periods concerned. The defence in depth of the third century and later seems to have been replaced with a return to a preclusive defence when deemed possible and / or necessary. Both systems could also operate at the same time in deifferent parts of the empire, with provinces where troops had been withdrawn to other sectors adopting the passive defence in depth and other areas seeing a concentration of forces for attacks, retaliatory or not, into the <i> barbaricum</i>. To some extent this is recognised in Luttwak by ascribing a shallow defence in depth to Diocletianus, though at other moments in the fourth century evidence for a similar return to a more preclusive type of defence appear. Priorities thus appear to have shifted from time to time. Though Hadrianus found it necessary to destroy the bridge over the Danube built by Traianus to prevent its use as an easy invasion route by an enemy, the late Roman army built bridges linking the empire with the <i> barbaricum</i> (eg at Cologne), indicating a confident and aggressive attitude. Such permanent bridges as well as the establishment of fortified bridgeheads for secure landing of ship borne troops are signs of a strategy that emphasized operations in enemy territory, even if defence in depth was adopted at other times.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
Sander van Dorst <p></p><i></i>
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#7
I think there is merit to the simplistic theory, if one keeps in mind, as you point out, that anticipations and returns were there through out. The merit is that it shows a temporal evolution, a tendency to go in a direction. Inspite of contingencies that in various periods made the Romans behave as they did in other periods (there aren't many options so we shouldn't be suprised we recognise them in different eras), the tendency was towards a growing incapacity to project a positive pressure outside the Limes. In the fourth century there were still attacks into enemy territory. But it was definitely lost by the beginning of the fifth when the Romans gave up destroying the barbarians that had settled in roman territory. <p></p><i></i>
Jeffery Wyss
"Si vos es non secui of solutio tunc vos es secui of preciptate."
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#8
Salve,<br>
<br>
You are right of course about the general trend. Defence in depth is certainly the norm whereas the return to more preclusive defence strategies occurred when political stability lessened the need for an emperor to have large field armies at his immediate disposal at all times, most notably during the reign of Diocletianus.<br>
<br>
The development of the field armies has led to varying interpretations of their function. Some regard them as a means to better combat the type of enemy attacks made on Roman territory, others have preferred the view that they primarily served as the emperor's means to guard against usurpation (however since many coups were made precisely by field army officers one gets the impression that they defeated their purpose in that respect). Though of course both considerations could have had a role in the process of establishing the field armies without excluding the other, what factor do you consider to have outweighed the other, the purpose of defence against barbarian invasions or that of safeguarding the imperial position?<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
Sander van Dorst <p></p><i></i>
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#9
I think that the necessity to face non-roman enemies was always the dominating factor but the political problems inside were a serious factor that contributed to the inability to deal with the "real" enemy. The fact that so many emperors were killed by "friends" (coups) makes me think that facing other roman armies was a necessity, but it really wasn't an independent evolutionary shaping force. (Note!The destruction of an antagonist roman army wasn't really the goal; many battles were NOT to the bloody end but only until one of the leaders broke or was killed in a coup). The tendency towards field armies became dominant when there was a difficulty to hold the frontier and the civil wars simply made things more difficult. Holding a frontier and defending the population is an objective problem that can only be solved if one can control the movements of the enemy outside and does not give them the initiative. But how much can one control the enemy on the other side of the frontier? To keep the initiative takes a lot of positive pressure from inside the empire to be able project force -real and apparent- outside. On the other hand controlling the forces inside an empire is in principle something that a leader or leading class can hope for, unless there is a spiral towards self-destruction like what happened in the third century. Preclusive defence is the best policy and a healthy empire will always attempt to adopt it. <p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://pub45.ezboard.com/ugoffredo.showPublicProfile?language=EN>goffredo</A> at: 5/3/01 3:00:47 pm<br></i>
Jeffery Wyss
"Si vos es non secui of solutio tunc vos es secui of preciptate."
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#10
Salve,<br>
<br>
After one of the contenders for the imperial purple died his forces would generally be taken back into service with usually only officers being purged. The army rank and file was generally not very interested in politics per se, which seems more to have been a matter for the officers. Despite this the attrition caused by the internecine warfare so characteristic of the third and fourth century could still result in significant casualties among the regulars (reason to put Gothic federates in the front and do the dying) which were hard to replace.<br>
<br>
The foreign enemies indeed do appear to have clearly gotten priority. Diocletianus and his collegues at least ignored the usurpation in Britain until their forces had their hands free to deal with the problem. Victories over foreign enemies brought more prestige than over other Romans (there is certainly no Romanicus Maximus in imperial titles).<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
Sander van Dorst <p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://pub45.ezboard.com/bromanarmytalk.showLocalUserPublicProfile?login=sandervandorst>Sander van Dorst</A> at: 4/27/01 12:58:32 pm<br></i>
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#11
Salve Jeff,<br>
<br>
After a while of quiet on the third century it is time to start another topic. What are your thoughts on the army reforms of Gallienus? Some modern authors ascribe to him a large increase of the legionary cavalry and the formation of distinct cavalry armies. Others doubt the introduction of a structure as described for the <i> antiqua legio</i> in Vegetius and maintain that Gallienus changed the deployment and organisation of cavalry units more than introducing a radically new independent battle cavalry.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
Sander van Dorst <p></p><i></i>
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#12
In a hurry this morning, but one thing can be said quickly. The tinkering that Gallienus did must not have been superficial or a simple extension of pre-existing arrangements because many of the following emperors were mobile army (cavalry) commanders! The changes he made, that were in many ways only temporary, were spectacular enough as to spot light the careers of many important figures there after. <p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://pub45.ezboard.com/ugoffredo.showPublicProfile?language=EN>goffredo</A> at: 6/9/01 12:00:43 pm<br></i>
Jeffery Wyss
"Si vos es non secui of solutio tunc vos es secui of preciptate."
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#13
Salve,<br>
<br>
Picked up this title on the third century last weekend:<br>
<br>
P. Southern, <i> The Roman empire from Severus to Constantine</i> (London 2001) ISBN 0415239443<br>
<br>
Good read, though I had some minor criticisms, for instance regarding the legions raised by Diocletianus which at least in part seem to have been of the old large pattern than the small 1000 strong type.<br>
<br>
In another thread on OT you raised the subject of continuation and revival of Roman military practices in later centuries. This title stresses the strong Roman influence on Frankish warfare:<br>
<br>
B.S. Bachrach, <i> Early Carolingian warfare</i> (Philadelphia 2001) ISBN 0-8122-3533-9.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
Sander van Dorst <p></p><i></i>
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