Thread Rating:
  • 0 Vote(s) - 0 Average
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4
  • 5
"in pace recepti"?
#1
I hope someone can help me with this. In a discussion about the article on the Kalkriese battlefield, which I posted here a few days ago, one member of Germanic-L is arguing that it wasn't Cherusci tribesmen who attacked Varus but Cherusci auxiliaries. This poster is a very knowledgeable person who has researched this battle for many years but, as much as I respect her, I think she has something of a modern political agenda with this argument.<br>
<br>
The defeat of Varus has been used by modern German nationalists as a political fable for about 200 years and was certainly used by the Nazis for their perverted nationalist ends. In this view, Arminius was a noble young Aryan hero, who roused and united the tribes against the Roman aggressors and, through splendid racial purity and proto-National Socialist ardour, defeated the invaders and cleansed the Fatherland.<br>
<br>
This is, of course, pure nonsense. There was no concept of a 'German people' in Arminius' time and his army consisted of (most) of the Cherusci and a couple of their neighbouring tribes - there's no evidence it was a broad pan-tribal alliance. Iris, the poster mentioned above, goes further however. She argues that the most likely motivation for the uprising was the fact that Cheruscian auxilia serving with Arminius in Pannonia had not been paid donatives they felt were due to them. The warriors who attacked Varus, therefore, were not people determined to throw off the shackles of Roman rule, but actually mutineers and Arminius wasn't a tribal chieftain but simply a traitor to his Roman commanders. She goes further to argue that the battle wasn't a battle at all, but simply a massacre and even compares it to the civilian massacres in Rwanda and to the Holocaust.<br>
<br>
To my way of thinking, all this is bordering on politically correct revisionism. To reject the Nazi/nationalist myths of brave Aryan heroes is one thing, but to pretend the whole uprising was simply a mutiny (and that the Romans were defenceless peaceniks on a nature walk who were mugged by muderous traitorous auxiliaries) is going rather too far in the other direction.<br>
<br>
One of her arguments is that the young men of the Cherusci would <i> all</i> have been trained Roman auxiliaries who had been drilled and organised into units and were still in Roman service when they attacked Varus' column. She bases this on the fact that, after an uprising of the Cherusci against the governor Marcus Vinicius in 1-4 AD the Cherusci are reported to be a subjected people "in pace recepti". Iris says this was a technical term which meant "the 'iuventus', i.e. all young men fit for military service were disarmed first and then organized in auxiliary cohorts and posted in camps with young native nobles and Roman officers being their commanders and trained Roman field officers being their 'drill-sargeants' "<br>
<br>
Leaving aside the fact that her theory about unpaid donatives is conjecture at best, I find it strange that none of the Roman sources mention that the Cherusci attacking Varus were all trained auxiliaries. Does the term "in pace recepti" mean precisely what she says it does, or is this a slightly overdefinite interpretation?<br>
<br>
Excuse the length of the preamble to this question, but any comments or assistance will be very welcome. <p>Tim O'Neill / Thiudareiks Flavius<BR>
<P>
Visit Clades Variana - Home of the Varus Film Project<br>

</p><i></i>
Tim ONeill / Thiudareiks Flavius /Thiudareiks Gunthigg

HISTORY FOR ATHEISTS - New Atheists Getting History Wrong
Reply
#2
Hi I will read carefully the exchange of ideas and info in this debate. I am learning from you guys and will be initially passive. We all know that Arminius was in the Roman Army and it is plausible that he convinced parts of his german auxilliaries to go on the german side. I can even imagine that Arminius' role was not simply that of a coordinator of different tribes or sub-tribes but that he also "tuned" the german performance with info on roman tactics (i.e. he did't simply tell the germans where to dig trenches and make mud traps or what ever). So it is plausible that a certain number of german auxilliaries (cherusci) played an active role. But from what I gather reading it doesn't seem they all (whole units) openly turned against the romans. So I agree with you that your friend is maybe pushing her position is little too far (to imagine the romans on an innocent picknic in the woods is perverse even to a pro-roman like me). Her doubts and alternative viewpoints sound interesting but in my mind they ADD and do not contradict, unless pushed too far, the overall picture of a very complex situation and an unstable germany that the romans were far from pacifying. Ciao for now<br>
<br>
<br>
<p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://pub45.ezboard.com/ugoffredo.showPublicProfile?language=EN>goffredo</A> at: 6/11/01 11:45:42 am<br></i>
Jeffery Wyss
"Si vos es non secui of solutio tunc vos es secui of preciptate."
Reply
#3
Salve,<br>
<br>
In my opinion there is nothing that precludes a person being both a Roman officer and traitor to his superiors and being a tribal leader as well. Arminius was not unique in combining both functions, for another example of an auxiliary officer cum tribal leader one can point to Iulius Civilis. Both could exert authority as part of the Roman military hierarchy and as tribal leaders from important families. The argument of auxiliaries revolting (in part) because of rewards due, but not provided reminds strongly of the Batavian grudges, who wished higher pay and an increase in the number of horsemen for their units for their services rendered.<br>
<br>
Regarding the definition of <i> receptio</i> and <i> deditio</i> etc I would have to look up some literature. Auxiliary units however consisted of a wide range of troop types (regulars and irregulars, allies, mercenaries, POW's short timers and long serving troops) and do not appear to have been as standardised at the start of the principate as they were to become later on. Their use and organisation at this date appears to be a range of <i> ad hoc</i> measures.<br>
<br>
An important difference with the victims Rwanda and of the KZ would be that the Roman army being ambushed consisted mostly of trained and armed troops, though there would certainly be unarmed civilians with the army train. The soldiers had the means to defend themselves.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
Sander van Dorst <p></p><i></i>
Reply
#4
It occurred to me that the defeats Germanics inflicted on Arminius must NOT have been very serious because when Arminius had to fight against Marobodus years later he came out victorious while the later spent the rest of his life in Ravenna and probably suffered greatly from the humid heat in the summer! The romans managed to keep the germans divided but that seems to be about it! Roman punitive expeditions could at best make superficial damage. Cheers<br>
<br>
p.s. I think the story of Caecina-vs-Arminius battle is also very nice. The Germans and Arminius' creativeness almost pulled it off again but it must also be said that the romans behaved very well too. They got themselves into a trap again, but once out of the marshes onto more solid ground they repulsed and broke the final german attack quite admirably. The troops of Caecina saw the bones of Varus' legionaries too? If yes I wonder what went through the minds of those fellows before the final attack. Considering the confidence of the germans and the fear of the romans - the Varus disaster was in the minds of everyone as an incentive for one side and a terrible handicap for the other - I admire the stand of Caecina's soldiers. Their training and resolve saved the day, in the best tradition!<br>
<br>
<br>
<p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://pub45.ezboard.com/ugoffredo.showPublicProfile?language=EN>goffredo</A> at: 7/10/01 3:18:37 pm<br></i>
Jeffery Wyss
"Si vos es non secui of solutio tunc vos es secui of preciptate."
Reply
#5
I think the difference between the situations in the cases of Caecina and Varus was that in the latter case Arminius was able to keep his warriors under control, while in the former they gave in to their impulse to loot the Roman baggage - giving the Romans time to regroup and fight their way out. In the Varus Battle the Romans abandoned their baggage - partially because it slowed them down but also because they probably suspected the Cherusci would stop to do some looting. In a similar situation against Caecina, Arminius wasn't able to restrain his men.<br>
<br>
In both situations the Romans tried to get into a position where they could fight back against the Germans from a position where they could take advantage of their superior weaponry and tactics. In Caecina's case he succeeded and escaped the trap. Varus failed. Perhaps Varus' experience was in Caecina's mind at the time - Tacitus certainly hints at this - though there was some luck involved as well.<br>
<br>
A lack of discipline was certainly something Arminius had to contend with. Overconfidence was another. He argued that they should let Caecina break camp and then hit them again while they were trying to withdraw - a tactic which had worked against Varus. His uncle, however, thought they were strong enough to assault the camp, which turned out to be a mistake. The democratic nature of the Germanic leadership, where a chief could determine the course of the battle if his tactics got more support from the warriors than those of the war leader, was another weakness of the Germanic forces.<br>
<br>
Cheers, <p>Tim O'Neill / Thiudareiks Flavius<BR>
<P>
Visit Clades Variana - Home of the Varus Film Project<br>

</p><i></i>
Tim ONeill / Thiudareiks Flavius /Thiudareiks Gunthigg

HISTORY FOR ATHEISTS - New Atheists Getting History Wrong
Reply
#6
Salve,<br>
<br>
Part of the problem with fighting Germanic peoples was that Roman victories achieved little results in the long term. Any treaties concluded were good only as long as both parties agreeing on them stayed alive and in power. On the death of the Roman commander and or the Germanic leader the agreements became null and void. The loose social structure made such arrangements very hard to enforce. When there was another leader who felt not bound by a treaty he could reopen hostilities. This was confounded by the fact that war leaders formed ad hoc confederacies of those willing to fight and should one part come to terms after a defeat, the other components of such Germanic armies might not feel obliged to honour those at all.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
Sander van Dorst <p></p><i></i>
Reply


Possibly Related Threads…
Thread Author Replies Views Last Post
  An argument for the pace and not the cubit Mark Hygate 109 16,146 01-11-2014, 04:26 PM
Last Post: Mark Hygate

Forum Jump: