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turn-over, manpower, equilibrium, non-equilibrium
#1
The very nice thread on roman disasters set me thinking again. We have all read about crisis and challanges to roman manpower, organization, and culture in the different periods of roman history.<br>
<br>
Of corse what defines a "crisis" first requires defining the "norm". Has anyone studied whether what we think we know about the following are indeed consistent:<br>
- the number of legions and auxilliaries;<br>
- the population, roman and non;<br>
- the life expectancy of civilians;<br>
- the life expectancy of soldiers (length of service);<br>
- the draft rate.<br>
<br>
What am I drinving at?<br>
I am left surprised, still today after many many years, every time I think about the significant down sizing of the number of men at arms by Octavian/Augustus and then by how little the number of legions grew over the following three centuries. Evidently the advisors of Augustus did their homework very VERY well: they did an eccellent job in evaluating the amount of energy they could tap. The scheme was so sound that it broke down only during the fifty year nightmare of the third century, and even then it was solid enough to allow the army to hold out long enough to reorganize. The empire did not collapse, against all odds I might say!<br>
<br>
Or is this just another aspect of roman behaviour that cannot be explained by modern practical-mind-set analysis? Maybe the "mind"/"minds" behind the organization of the new imperial army of Augustus was/were not rational in any "modern" way. Maybe it just seems that way because of our natural tendency to project our way of thinking onto others. Ummm.... Unlikely<br>
<br>
<p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://pub45.ezboard.com/ugoffredo.showPublicProfile?language=EN>goffredo</A> at: 5/2/02 8:50:41 pm<br></i>
Jeffery Wyss
"Si vos es non secui of solutio tunc vos es secui of preciptate."
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#2
Salve,<br>
<br>
There could still have been considerable variation in army strength through changes in the strength of units. There is evidence for both understrength and overstrength units. By raising or lowering the number of men in individual formations army strength would have varied even if the number of units stayed the same. On the other hand creation of new units from detached troops seconded from existing formations may likewise disguise changes in army strength, increasing the number of military units while keeping the number of soldiers at a similar level. The auxiliary strength is thought to have been raised over the centuries to a greater degree than the legionary strength, but that estimate is based on the number of units attested in the sources rather than figures of manpower strength. Terms of service remained more or less the same, but troops are regularly recorded as serving beyond the legally stipulated norm for a variety of reasons, both voluntarily and enforced (eg hope of promotion or lack of funds to pay out retirement bonuses). Increases in legionary strength were in the principate usually connected with (projected) expanse of Roman territory, even if that did not always materialise. These could be the result of new levies, but in other cases such new legions were formed from detachments of existing units.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
Sander van Dorst <p></p><i></i>
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#3
Salve,<br>
<br>
Army size and imperial budget were obviously closely linked. Since the military expenses - primarily consisting of pay, donatives and retirement grants rather than acquisition of new weapons systems and munitions as nowadays - formed the largest part of the government's budget, an increase in the number of troops under arms would have required additional sources of income for the treasury to bear the extra costs. Civil wars frequently resulted in frantic expansion of the number of soldiers, but to some extent the effects were alleviated by the losses incurred and the temporary nature of part of these levies. Due to the rather disorganised nature of imperial finances during the principate, increasing revenue was difficult. The major expansion of army strength under Diocletianus was accompanied by a massive reform of the taxation system which involved a more detailed assesment and better organised use of the empire's available resources. Earlier attempts at increasing revenue to pay for increasing army costs had resulted in massive devaluation of the currency and increased reliance on taxation in kind and outright requisitioning. Increased efficiency in extraction of wealth came at a price though with impoverishment of certain areas and segments of the population. Those parts of the empire where barbarian raids were more frequent and which saw more military activity with its accompanying economic damage (requisitioning, extortion, plunder etc) suffered under the increased tax burden while other areas which were safer prospered despite increased taxation. The elite was more succesful at resisting and evading taxation efforts and devolving responsibilities onto others, resulting in the decline of the city decurionate.<br>
<br>
Some related reading material<br>
<br>
Duncan-Jones, R., <i> Money and government in the Roman empire</i> (Cambridge 1994) 300p.<br>
MacMullen, R., 'How big was the Roman Army?' in: <i> Klio</i> 62 (1980), 451- 460.<br>
MacMullen, R., 'The Roman emperor's army costs' in: <i> Latomus</i> 43 (1984), 571-580.<br>
Scheidel, W., 'Inschriftenstatistik und die Frage des Rekrutierungsalter römischer Soldaten' in: <i> Chiron</i> 22 (1992), 281-297.<br>
Scheidel, W., 'Rekruten und Überlebende: die demographische Struktur der römischen Legionen in der Prinzipatszeit' in: <i> Klio</i> 77 (1995), 232-254.<br>
Scheidel, W., <i> Measuring sex, age and death in the Roman empire: explorations<br>
in Ancient Demography. Journal of Roman Archaeology, Supplementary Series</i> 21 (1996) 184p. Review<br>
Treadgold, W., <i> Byzantium and its army 284-1081</i> (Stanford 1995) 249p.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
Sander van Dorst<br>
<p></p><i></i>
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#4
I also like "The Roman Army" by Brian Campbell, 1994 Rutledge, London/N.Y., ISBN 0-415-07173-9<br>
<br>
One point he makes is: "the annual cost of the legions, auxilia, and navy in the early first century AD may have amounted to more than 400 million sesterces". (page 21) This book has very good points, backed up with writings of the people who were there at the time, (or not to much later, like Vegetius). <br>
<br>
There are many references to the recruitment, manpower requirements and retirement, which could add information to your quest for the answers. <p>"Just before class started, I looked in the big book where all the world's history is written, and it said...." Neil J. Hackett, PhD ancient history, professor OSU, 1987</p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://pub45.ezboard.com/ucaiusfabius.showPublicProfile?language=EN>Caius Fabius</A> <IMG HEIGHT=10 WIDTH=10 SRC="http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ROMANISROMANORVM/files/C%20Fabius%201988b.jpg" BORDER=0> at: 5/4/02 3:42:35 am<br></i>
Caius Fabius Maior
Charles Foxtrot
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