Tactical Change in the Late Republic

[Michael J. Taylor]

A draft paper of my thoughts concerning tactical change in the Late Roman Republic (i.e. maniples to cohorts) is posted for a Session on academia.edu. As always, I would be thrilled to hear critiques from RAT!

https://www.academia.edu/22819197/Tactic...from_Italy

[Steven James]

“The fragments of Cornelius Sisenna, a military man who died in 67 BC, reference both maniples and cohorts.”
 
Michael, could you elaborate on this reference? Does it have a reference number and where can I find it?
 
I would like to provide feedback. However, my forthright attitude or getting straight to the point can come across as being blunt. It’s up to you.

[Steven James]

As there are no page numbers I cannot provide page numbers to refer to.
 
MT: “Note that Scipio Cornelius (cos. 218), himself tried to block Hannibal in Transalpine Gaul with a mere two legions.”
 
After failing to prevent Hannibal from crossing the Rhone, Cornelius Scipio ordered his brother Cneius Scipio with the greater part of his army to continue on to Iberia. Cornelius Scipio with a small force sailed for Genoa with the intention of defending Italy with the Roman army already stationed in the Po valley. (Livy 21 32), (21 40), (Polybius 3 49) On his arrival at Pisa, Cornelius Scipio took over command of the legions of the praetor Atilius and Manlius. (Livy (21 39), (Polybius (3 56 5) Appian writes that Publius Cornelius Scipio “sent Manlius and Atilius, who were conducting the war against the Boii, back to Rome, on the ground that they had no right to command when a consul was present, and taking their forces drew them up for battle.” (Appian Hannibalic War 7 2 5)
 
Livy has Manlius in command of two Roman legions, 600 Roman cavalry, 10,000 allied infantry and 1000 allied cavalry for a total of 19,600 men, which does not approximate to a mere two legions. With a praetor commanding two legions, Scipio had command of four legions or one consular army. See my paper attached A Selective Investigation of Livy’s Military Campaigns.
 
MT: “Plut. Mar. 25.4 puts Marius’ army at 32,000. Two 6200 legions (in keeping with Festus 435 L, Brunt 1971: 687), along with somewhat larger allied wings, would account for this number.”
 
I could argue that the 32,000 men consisted of six legions each of 5,000 men accompanied by 2,000 cavalry. Someone else could argue for something completely different. I think it is better if you cannot provide an accurate breakdown of the 32,000 men based on army, legion and unit sizes given in the primary sources for this period, I would be inclined to omit it.
 
MT: “Emergency recruitment from amongst the proletariat had a long and venerable tradition.”
 
True, but I think what the primary sources are saying is that it was now done on a permanent basis and in larger numbers.
 
MT: “Even Caesar, in command of a firmly cohortal force, slips into describing the battle-line in terms of the archaic maniples.” Later you write that “Caesar still at times thinks in terms of maniples…Some of this may have to do with the fact that Caesar is a competent prose stylist, mixing up cohort and maniple for the sake of variation.” Later again you state: “but I am included to believe that Caesar was using the traditional marching pattern of three columns of maniples, only that these for him formed ready frontages of cohorts that could burst (inruperunt) into the German camp.”
 
I have interpreted the first two references to mean Caesar is using the term maniple in an anachronistic manner, meaning there was no maniple organization within the legion, but then the third reference refers to the maniples as being traditional, so does that mean Caesar’s legions were organised into maniples. I’m also open to the fact I have misinterpreted what is written.
 
MT: “The earliest recorded use of the word “cohort” is Polybius, referring to Scipio’s complex maneuvers at Ilipa.”
 
There are twenty-one examples of the term cohort in Livy’s books two to five and sixteen examples in Dionysius’ books eight to eleven, and all occurring well before 210 BC. You do not address this thereby leaving you open to being accused of cherry picking. If you believe such references to a cohort before 210 BC as being anachronistic, then I believe you have a duty to prove it.
 
MT: “The transition to a cohortal structure was therefore a gradual event, with conservative commanders still sticking to manipular deployment even as they grasped the utility of the cohort.”
 
If Livy and Dionysius are right, which I am convinced they are about cohorts existing before 210 BC, then the transition to cohort was no gradual event. Why can’t you examine the history of the cohort from when the term first appeared in Livy and Dionysius rather than starting with Polybius 210 BC?
 
Also Gellius tells us that a legion had ten cohorts, thirty maniples and sixty centuries, so why should the maniple be replaced by the cohort, when maniples make cohorts, and centuries make maniples? Also your reference to the fragments of Cornelius Sisenna of 67 BC referencing to both maniples and cohorts supports Gellius.
 
MT: “The legions had nothing in between the six military tribunes, who functioned as staff officers with no specific tactical responsibility, and the prior centurions who commanded individual maniples.”
 
The notion military tribunes had no specific tactical responsibility is a favourite of academics. So why have them at all? And why as Polybius states, have six of them to a legion? Seems pointless! In the old days under Romulus a military tribune commanded ten centuries. If a legion had sixty centuries and following Polybius had six military tribunes, this would mean that a military tribune commanded ten centuries. Should I ignore this coincidence between Romulus and Polybius? As there are thirty maniples in a legion, this would mean a military tribune commanded five maniples, which consist of ten centuries. So if military tribunes have no tactical responsibilities, then why does the number of military tribunes allocated to a legion divisible by the number of centuries and maniples in a legion?
 
In 325 BC, at Imbrinium, when the Roman cavalry failed to break the Samnite line after several charges, Lucius Cominius, a military tribune, took of the horses’ bridles and spurred the horses on so hard that they broke the Samnites on a broad front. Livy (8 30)
 
During the battle of Tifernum in 297 BC, the consul Quintus Fabius Maximus in a bid to break the Samnite line, ordered two military tribunes (Maximus and Marcus Valerius) from the first line to take command of the cavalry and with them, charge the Samnite line. Livy (10 14)
 
In Livy’s account of the battle between Marcellus and Hannibal in 209 BC, during the battle, Hannibal moved his elephants up to the front line, in response, the military tribune Gaius Decimius Flavus ordered the first maniple of hastati to throw their missiles at the elephants. Livy (27 14)
 
Seems to me the above military tribunes have been allocated “specific tactical responsibilities.”
 
MT: “The earliest Italian cohort described in Livy consisted of 570 men from Praeneste (which presumably could be subdivided into 150 velites, 150 hastati and principes, 60 triarii, and a turma of 50 cavalrymen) commanded by a local praetor.”
 
One could argue that as a garrison force, why would they have any cavalry present?
 
MT: “Livy in fact refers to four cohorts of extraordinarii fighting in Liguria in the 170s.” Livy 4.27.3.
 
As I stated in the vexillation posting, the allies provided two vexallations towards the extraordinarii, with a vexillation consisting of two cohorts. And here we have four cohorts of extraordinarii. The numbers tell the truth.
 
MT: “Other descriptions of legionary organization in the 80s—Plutarch, Appian and Velleius---imply the cohort had become the fundamental building block of the legion by the end of the Social War.”
 
I don’t believe they are implying anything. Also implying is not evidence, and more in line with wishful thinking.
 
MT: “It would in fact be quite dubious if a cohort only presented a front of two centuries in battle.”
 
I see nothing dubious about a cohort having a frontage of two centuries. In the three battle line arrangement, this would have each battle line consisting of twenty centuries. By allowing each century a minimum frontage of ten men, the legion would have a frontage of 200 men (600 feet).
 
MT: “If this were the case, the standard triplex acies of the Late Republican period, with a legion fronted with four cohorts, would present a mere six centuries to the enemy, in contrast to the Polybian legion with its front of twenty centuries.”
 
How can you mathematically have four cohorts with a frontage of six centuries? Six centuries divided by four cohorts equals one point five. If you end up with a fraction and then round the fraction your using the wrong numbers because the Roman army does not work in fractions.
 
MT: “For a manipular legion in the time of Polybius, each line of hastati, principes and triarii marched in parallel columns in situations where contact with the enemy was expected.”
 
Polybius gives two marching descriptions and the one you are referring to is when the army was moving through open ground. Your diagrams has the enemy north of the Roman units and it is easy for the Roman hastati, principes and triarii in parallel column to wheel and face the enemy with the hastati forming the first line, the principes the second line and the triarii the third line, as it should be. The example you have used is the easiest of all deployments and it avoids meeting Polybius’ other criteria.
 
Polybius also states the Roman army can confront the enemy from whatever side he appears. So if the enemy attacks on the Roman right, in your interpretation of parallel columns, the triarii are the first line, the principes the second line and the hastati form the third line. Polybius also states that “from whatever side the side the enemy appears...and by one movement the infantry is placed in order of battle, except that the hastati may have to wheel around the others.”
 
Now in your deployment of the hastati, principes and triarii, with the enemy attacking from the east, it is the hastati and principes that must wheel around the front of the triarii so as to form the traditional battle order of hastati in the first line, principes in the second line and triarii in the third line. Polybius does not mention the principes being required to wheel. At this point your theory is not holding up.
 
Also you have not shown how the army manoeuvres in relation to the baggage trains, which Polybius describes as being interspersed between the bodies of troops. Polybius also states that “by one movement the infantry is placed in order of battle.” So even with the baggage trains it takes one movement to be in order of battle. In support of this is Tacitus’ claim (Annals 2 16) that the Roman army was arranged so that the order of march could come to a halt in line of battle.
 
Your example does not fully comply with Polybius because you have not fully investigated the placement of the baggage trains and the army being attacked in all directions, and being able to form battle line in one movement. This is the challenge, using all of Polybius and not selective parts. Some could say this is not important, but it would strengthen your case and also, it can show that your case may be faulty as it cannot tick all of Polybius’ boxes.
 
MT: “Thus, I would suggest that the triplex acies of 4/3/3 cohorts, perhaps the most common formation in Caesar, had it genesis in a way of hastily forming up the Italian ala in the vanguard of the army.”
 
What if the 4/3/3 arrangement was a one off deployment due to exceptional circumstances? At Ilerda, Caesar had five legions as did the Pompeians and both deployed in a restrictive space. The difference between them was the additional Pompeian auxiliary infantry. The Pompeians deployed each legion in the 5/2 array, basically two lines of cohorts with the auxiliary infantry acting as the third line. Caesar could not deploy his five legions in the 5/2 arrangement as he would have no troops (a third line) to combat the third line of auxiliary infantry. So in response to the unusual situation, Caesar did something different that would give him a third line. What I found is Caesar changed the placement of the cohort standards.
 
MT: “It is important to note that in this context that the cohort is not actually being deployed by Scipio as a tactical unit. Rather, the three maniples forming either side of the extreme flank (the hastati, princepes and triarii) had simply become the vanguard as they turned.”
 
At Ilipa Polybius does not identify who the three maniples are that made a cohort. At Zama Polybius (15 13) mentions the hastati being organised into cohorts. So maybe at Ilipa it was three maniples of hastati doing the outflanking.
 
I can’t accept many aspects of your theory relating to the Italians and the cohort. At Lake Regillus the Latin army is mentioned as having maniples and maniples are also mentioned in Tacitus, Ammianus and the HE. The primary sources are telling us the maniple did not replace the cohort. The maniple was an integral part of the cohort, so how could the maniple replace the cohort when as already stated, centuries made maniples and maniples made cohorts. And by following this, I had no problem understanding the army numbers given for the battle of Pharsalus.

[Michael J. Taylor]

Thanks for the comments! 

[Steven James]

I forgot to say your reference to Livy 4 27 3 should be changed to 40 27 3.

[Steven James]

Michael, there is a discussion on your paper “Roman Infantry Tactics in the Mid-Republic: An Reassessment,” on the SOA forum.
 
http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=2057.0
 

It is a wargaming forum, but at least it provides feedback, which is more than I can say for this forum.