11-01-2014, 01:54 PM
The battle of Turin in AD312 is well known for two reasons: it was the first major clash between Constantine and the army of Maxentius, and it featured the first documented use of clibanarii cavalry by the Romans. The battle is described in two sources, both panegyrics, one from AD313 and the other from AD321. Despite the rhetorical flourishes of the panegyric form, both descriptions were given close to the date of the battle and (particularly in the case of the first) probably in the presence of the participants.
So, can we use the details in these panegyrics to get some idea of what actually might have happened in the battle?
First, here are the relevant excerpts. For context, Constantine has just invaded Italy over the Alps, probably in the early summer of AD312, and after storming the walled city of Segusio (Susa) he is marching east down the valley of the Doria river towards Turin:
1. Panegyric XII (Trier, AD313)
"...a little later in the area around Turin you fought another battle… The enemy were not widely spread out in a disorganised manner so that they were easily cut down while dispersed, but their battle line was arrayed in the form of a wedge with their flanks extending downhill to the rear, and if you had eagerly joined battle with them at the outset, they would have turned [reflexa] and surrounded your men as they were engaged with fighting.
But since you foresaw this you sent men ahead on both sides to obstruct them and, at the same time, if there were any lurking in ambush, to drive them out; you yourself, when the stubborn point of the enemy’s formation had been driven back and their whole line turned to flight, advanced and effected a slaughter whose magnitude was proportionate to the numbers which reinforced their battle line. They were routed and cut down right up to the walls of Turin, and when they reached the gates already fastened by the inhabitants they closed them off as well by the mass of their bodies."
2. Panegyric IV (Rome, AD321)
"…Behold, a harder battle awaits him now as he comes to the people of Turin... So many soldiers filled the open plain that he who saw them arrayed would not fault their confidence. What a spectacle that is said to have been! How terrible! How dreadful to see horse and men alike enclosed in a covering of iron! [description of the clibanarii follows]...
You yourself take over the mailed cavalry, where the greatest strength of the opposing battle line lay (Catafractos equites, in quibus maximum steterat pugnae robur, ipse tibi sumis). Their training for combat is to preserve the course of their assault after they have crashed into the opposing line, and since they are invulnerable they resolutely break through whatever is set against them.But you, most prudent Emperor, who knew all the ways of fighting, got assistance from your ingenuity: that it is safest to elude those whom it is most difficult to withstand... By drawing your lines apart you induce an enemy attack which cannot be reversed; next by leading your lines back together you hem in the men whom you admit to your game. It did them no good to press forward, since your men purposely gave way; iron's rigidity did not allow a change in direction for pursuit.
Thus our men assailed those who were delivered to them with clubs equipped with heavy iron knobs which wore out an invulnerable enemy with their beating, and when they were inflicted especially on their heads they forced those whom these blows had confused to tumble down. Then they began to fall headlong, to slide down backward, to totter half-dead or dying to be held fast by their saddles, to lie entangled in the confused slaughter of horses, which in unbridled pain, when their vulnerable points had been discovered, cast their riders everywhere."
The first question might concern the location of the battle. Despite the name, it's clear that the battle did not happen at Turin itself, but some way west; the first panegyric mentions a hill slope, and the plain of Turin is noticeably flat! M.A. Levi, in 1934 (La Campagna di Costantino nell'Italia settentrionale - my thanks to Ross Cowan for this paper) placed the battle in the area of modern Rivoli, where a line of hilly ground rises from the south to cut the line of the road from Susa.
This is possible, but why would the Maxentian commander draw up his troops with 'their flanks extending downhill'? Nixon and Rodger (In Praise of Later Roman Emperors) suggest that this was a ruse to disguise the numbers of his troops. This seems plausible - if the wedge of clibanarii in the centre were placed on a hill crest or ridge, with the flanking infantry on the reverse slope, anyone approaching would see only the armoured cavalry and bulk their line towards the centre to oppose them; the flanks could then swing around (reflexa) and engulf the enemy in a forceps manoeuvre.
A couple of miles west of Rivoli there is a suitable ridge, running east-west and approximately parallel with the line of the old Roman road from Susa. The northern slope is gentle, running right down to the river, and suitable for a cavalry charge. The southern slope is much steeper, and would effectively conceal the flanking troops from anyone approaching from the direction of Susa. So I would place the battle here:
[attachment=11089]Turin3.jpg[/attachment]
Turin is around twelve miles east of this position: not too far for the fugitives from the battle.
Second question: how large were the armies? Zosimus (Nova Historia II) gives a very accurate-seeming figure for the whole campaign of 98,000 men for Constantine and 188,000 for Maxentius. This is at odds with Panegyric XII, which claims that Maxentius had 100,000 men and Constantine 'even fewer' than 40,000, only a quarter of his total army with the rest remaining on the Rhine.
Eusebius (Vita Constantini) mentions that Constantine arrived at Rome having defeated 'the first, second and third divisions of the tyrant's forces'. This implies that Maxentius too had divided his total army into four, with one division each (perhaps) at Turin, Verona and maybe Aquileia to guard the Alpine passes, and a strong reserve close to Rome.
If we divide Zosimus's figure by four, therefore, we get 24,500 for Constantine and 47,000 - or 25,000 if we use the figure from Panegyric XII - for each of Maxentius's divisions. The Turin division was probably the weakest, however, as an attack was anticipated from Licinius in the east. So the opposing sides could have been about equal.
Third, and most importantly - what happened during the battle? If we assume that the hypothesis above is correct, and that Maxentius's commander placed his clibanarii on the ridge with flanking troops on the reverse slope, that side at least is fairly clear. What about Constantine?
Panegyric XII says that the emperor "sent men ahead on both sides to obstruct [Maxentius's troops] and, at the same time, if there were any lurking in ambush, to drive them out." This suggests that Constantine, appraised of his opponent's strategem, widened his own lines and sent detachments forward up the ridge to engage the flanking men and prevent them moving into the forceps. Fair enough... So the battle plan might look a bit like this:
[attachment=11090]Turin4.jpg[/attachment]
But Panegyric IV has the vague statement that Constantine 'took over' (or 'took on'?) the catafractos equites in the centre of the line: this apparently refers to the Maxentian clibanarii. But was Constantine opposing the enemy cavalry by placing his own (lighter?) cavalry at the centre? The orator addresses (the absent) Constantine himself: "you, most prudent Emperor, who knew all the ways of fighting, got assistance from your ingenuity."
What 'ingenuity' was this? The orator claims that the Constantinian lines were deliberately opened to allow the charging clibanarii through: "by drawing your lines apart you induce an enemy attack which cannot be reversed; next by leading your lines back together you hem in the men whom you admit to your game. It did them no good to press forward, since your men purposely gave way..." This might have been a diplomatic fiction to cover a genuine breaking of the line, of course!
It is possible, however, that Constantine (who 'knew all the ways of fighting') was adopting a tactic previously used by Aurelian against Palmyrene clibanarii fifty years before (described, troublingly, only in Zosimus!), of using lighter cavalry to draw the heavy cavalry into an impetuous pursuit or charge, and then swinging a strong infantry force into their path to break their charge, with men armed with clubs to knock down the stalled clibanarii.
So were the club-armed troops infantry or cavalry? If Constantine had placed his own cavalry in the centre, then had them feign flight from the charging clibanarii, only to reveal (perhaps) a formation of solid infantry behind them, then cavalry armed with clubs swinging back around the flanks of the clibanarii as their charge faltered would be quite effective.
Alternatively, Constantine could have placed his infantry in the centre (a more usual tactic, I would guess), and ordered them to open lanes as the clibanarii wedge approached. If a strong second line remained firm, the Maxentian cavalry would be trapped with infantry on three sides; unable to turn, the clibanarii would be vulnerable to men on foot with (longer!) clubs...
It's frustrating that Nazarius (the orator of Panegyric IV) isn't clearer what he means by this tactic, as the two interpretations shift the battle from a cavalry fight to a direct cavalry v infantry conflict.
Either way, once the impetus of the clibanarii had been broken and "the stubborn point of the enemy’s formation had been driven back", the rest of the Maxentian troops seem to have given way and fled for the false sanctuary of Turin's walls.
Anyway, that's the best impression I can come up with of this particular battle. If anyone has any contrary interpretations, or suggestions of amendments, I'd be very interested in your comments!
- Nathan
So, can we use the details in these panegyrics to get some idea of what actually might have happened in the battle?
First, here are the relevant excerpts. For context, Constantine has just invaded Italy over the Alps, probably in the early summer of AD312, and after storming the walled city of Segusio (Susa) he is marching east down the valley of the Doria river towards Turin:
1. Panegyric XII (Trier, AD313)
"...a little later in the area around Turin you fought another battle… The enemy were not widely spread out in a disorganised manner so that they were easily cut down while dispersed, but their battle line was arrayed in the form of a wedge with their flanks extending downhill to the rear, and if you had eagerly joined battle with them at the outset, they would have turned [reflexa] and surrounded your men as they were engaged with fighting.
But since you foresaw this you sent men ahead on both sides to obstruct them and, at the same time, if there were any lurking in ambush, to drive them out; you yourself, when the stubborn point of the enemy’s formation had been driven back and their whole line turned to flight, advanced and effected a slaughter whose magnitude was proportionate to the numbers which reinforced their battle line. They were routed and cut down right up to the walls of Turin, and when they reached the gates already fastened by the inhabitants they closed them off as well by the mass of their bodies."
2. Panegyric IV (Rome, AD321)
"…Behold, a harder battle awaits him now as he comes to the people of Turin... So many soldiers filled the open plain that he who saw them arrayed would not fault their confidence. What a spectacle that is said to have been! How terrible! How dreadful to see horse and men alike enclosed in a covering of iron! [description of the clibanarii follows]...
You yourself take over the mailed cavalry, where the greatest strength of the opposing battle line lay (Catafractos equites, in quibus maximum steterat pugnae robur, ipse tibi sumis). Their training for combat is to preserve the course of their assault after they have crashed into the opposing line, and since they are invulnerable they resolutely break through whatever is set against them.But you, most prudent Emperor, who knew all the ways of fighting, got assistance from your ingenuity: that it is safest to elude those whom it is most difficult to withstand... By drawing your lines apart you induce an enemy attack which cannot be reversed; next by leading your lines back together you hem in the men whom you admit to your game. It did them no good to press forward, since your men purposely gave way; iron's rigidity did not allow a change in direction for pursuit.
Thus our men assailed those who were delivered to them with clubs equipped with heavy iron knobs which wore out an invulnerable enemy with their beating, and when they were inflicted especially on their heads they forced those whom these blows had confused to tumble down. Then they began to fall headlong, to slide down backward, to totter half-dead or dying to be held fast by their saddles, to lie entangled in the confused slaughter of horses, which in unbridled pain, when their vulnerable points had been discovered, cast their riders everywhere."
The first question might concern the location of the battle. Despite the name, it's clear that the battle did not happen at Turin itself, but some way west; the first panegyric mentions a hill slope, and the plain of Turin is noticeably flat! M.A. Levi, in 1934 (La Campagna di Costantino nell'Italia settentrionale - my thanks to Ross Cowan for this paper) placed the battle in the area of modern Rivoli, where a line of hilly ground rises from the south to cut the line of the road from Susa.
This is possible, but why would the Maxentian commander draw up his troops with 'their flanks extending downhill'? Nixon and Rodger (In Praise of Later Roman Emperors) suggest that this was a ruse to disguise the numbers of his troops. This seems plausible - if the wedge of clibanarii in the centre were placed on a hill crest or ridge, with the flanking infantry on the reverse slope, anyone approaching would see only the armoured cavalry and bulk their line towards the centre to oppose them; the flanks could then swing around (reflexa) and engulf the enemy in a forceps manoeuvre.
A couple of miles west of Rivoli there is a suitable ridge, running east-west and approximately parallel with the line of the old Roman road from Susa. The northern slope is gentle, running right down to the river, and suitable for a cavalry charge. The southern slope is much steeper, and would effectively conceal the flanking troops from anyone approaching from the direction of Susa. So I would place the battle here:
[attachment=11089]Turin3.jpg[/attachment]
Turin is around twelve miles east of this position: not too far for the fugitives from the battle.
Second question: how large were the armies? Zosimus (Nova Historia II) gives a very accurate-seeming figure for the whole campaign of 98,000 men for Constantine and 188,000 for Maxentius. This is at odds with Panegyric XII, which claims that Maxentius had 100,000 men and Constantine 'even fewer' than 40,000, only a quarter of his total army with the rest remaining on the Rhine.
Eusebius (Vita Constantini) mentions that Constantine arrived at Rome having defeated 'the first, second and third divisions of the tyrant's forces'. This implies that Maxentius too had divided his total army into four, with one division each (perhaps) at Turin, Verona and maybe Aquileia to guard the Alpine passes, and a strong reserve close to Rome.
If we divide Zosimus's figure by four, therefore, we get 24,500 for Constantine and 47,000 - or 25,000 if we use the figure from Panegyric XII - for each of Maxentius's divisions. The Turin division was probably the weakest, however, as an attack was anticipated from Licinius in the east. So the opposing sides could have been about equal.
Third, and most importantly - what happened during the battle? If we assume that the hypothesis above is correct, and that Maxentius's commander placed his clibanarii on the ridge with flanking troops on the reverse slope, that side at least is fairly clear. What about Constantine?
Panegyric XII says that the emperor "sent men ahead on both sides to obstruct [Maxentius's troops] and, at the same time, if there were any lurking in ambush, to drive them out." This suggests that Constantine, appraised of his opponent's strategem, widened his own lines and sent detachments forward up the ridge to engage the flanking men and prevent them moving into the forceps. Fair enough... So the battle plan might look a bit like this:
[attachment=11090]Turin4.jpg[/attachment]
But Panegyric IV has the vague statement that Constantine 'took over' (or 'took on'?) the catafractos equites in the centre of the line: this apparently refers to the Maxentian clibanarii. But was Constantine opposing the enemy cavalry by placing his own (lighter?) cavalry at the centre? The orator addresses (the absent) Constantine himself: "you, most prudent Emperor, who knew all the ways of fighting, got assistance from your ingenuity."
What 'ingenuity' was this? The orator claims that the Constantinian lines were deliberately opened to allow the charging clibanarii through: "by drawing your lines apart you induce an enemy attack which cannot be reversed; next by leading your lines back together you hem in the men whom you admit to your game. It did them no good to press forward, since your men purposely gave way..." This might have been a diplomatic fiction to cover a genuine breaking of the line, of course!
It is possible, however, that Constantine (who 'knew all the ways of fighting') was adopting a tactic previously used by Aurelian against Palmyrene clibanarii fifty years before (described, troublingly, only in Zosimus!), of using lighter cavalry to draw the heavy cavalry into an impetuous pursuit or charge, and then swinging a strong infantry force into their path to break their charge, with men armed with clubs to knock down the stalled clibanarii.
So were the club-armed troops infantry or cavalry? If Constantine had placed his own cavalry in the centre, then had them feign flight from the charging clibanarii, only to reveal (perhaps) a formation of solid infantry behind them, then cavalry armed with clubs swinging back around the flanks of the clibanarii as their charge faltered would be quite effective.
Alternatively, Constantine could have placed his infantry in the centre (a more usual tactic, I would guess), and ordered them to open lanes as the clibanarii wedge approached. If a strong second line remained firm, the Maxentian cavalry would be trapped with infantry on three sides; unable to turn, the clibanarii would be vulnerable to men on foot with (longer!) clubs...
It's frustrating that Nazarius (the orator of Panegyric IV) isn't clearer what he means by this tactic, as the two interpretations shift the battle from a cavalry fight to a direct cavalry v infantry conflict.
Either way, once the impetus of the clibanarii had been broken and "the stubborn point of the enemy’s formation had been driven back", the rest of the Maxentian troops seem to have given way and fled for the false sanctuary of Turin's walls.
Anyway, that's the best impression I can come up with of this particular battle. If anyone has any contrary interpretations, or suggestions of amendments, I'd be very interested in your comments!
- Nathan
Nathan Ross
