06-28-2014, 02:52 PM
Quote:If you have no wish to re-read or debate the 'steps' I used to set out my stall in that other thread - then that's kind of difficult.
Two things:
- Please give me a reasonable explanation of another practicable formation that the triarii could form, that allows them to perform their function (that they would act as a reserve and line behind which the army could reform or reorganize and/or to carry out a controlled retreat - that is not a (practicably) phalanx-like 200x3 contiguous formation (for each legion - side-by-side). For that defines the frontage of a legion.....
- which leads to a comfortable idea that the hastati or principes to the front are most probably 6-deep (8 with velites and others later if that's relevant)) - given the general consensus (and I am under the same belief) that contubernia form files in similar way to the Greeks (sic) before and that their sub-units are double the size.
Given the structure of the detailed Polybian legion - that's the basis of my train of deduction. If you fundamentally don't agree with it (and I would certainly like to debate), then that's fine. For me it's the triarii (and the apparent fact that they always number 600) that has become key.
What happens if there are only 47 men in a triari maniple instead of the paper strength 60? How do they form then? Or did legions often go into battle with their full compliment? There would never be 60 men in a triari maniple exept maybe on the first day it formed. Also you keep bringing up centuries and Polybius who never used that term. It wasn't until later writings that evidence emerges of a subunit called a century.
You're making a broad assumption that there is a consensus that contubernia fought in files. We've discussed this already in this thread and zero evidence exists to prove that. In fact most historians who written books that I've read, as well postings from RAT archives, state the consensus is the opposite of your theory. Please provide some evidence of contubernia serving as files, in the form of something substantiated.
Furthermore, there was no standard Greek tactical system as there wasn't a unified Greece. If you picked three hellenic city states at random each would probably have its own way of fighting that varied substantially from the next. The phalanx of the Spartans was different than the phalanx of the Athenians, lets alone the Thebans or Macedonians (pre Philip II). And thats not even with the assumption that the Romans went out and copied some Greek city state's military system which also there is no evidence of. By the time of Polybius, I don't think any Greek city states were still fighting in the old hoplite style and during the time when Rome commonly interacted with them (war), the Greeks weren't using hoplite methods. The Romans borrowed near nothing tactics wise from the Hellenic armies they faced, minus an appreciation for elephants and the benefit of fortifying a marching camp.
The frontage of a legion is dictated by many factors including terrain and the enemy. Look at pharsalus as an example. In order for Caesar's understrength cohorts to equal Pompey's, Caesar's ranks were four deep to Pompey's ten.
What historical or archaeological evidence do you have for your theories? You seem to mostly be using Polybius but then discounting him at every turn when his writings disagree with your theories. Your desire to find a standardized battle template might be flawed, as the legions were never standardized. Even legions existing during the same time periods differed in tactics.
"The manner of fighting of those soldiers was to run forward with great impetuosity and boldly take a post, and not to keep their ranks strictly, but to fight in small scattered parties: if hard pressed they thought it no disgrace to retire and give up the post, being accustomed to this manner of fighting among the Lusitanians and other barbarous nations; for it commonly happens that soldiers are strongly influenced by the customs of those countries in which they have spent much time. This method, however, alarmed our men, who were not used to such a description of warfare. For they imagined that they were about to be surrounded on their exposed flank by the single men who ran forward from their ranks; and they thought it their duty to keep their ranks, and not to quit their colors, nor, without good reason to give up the post which they had taken. Accordingly, when the advanced guard gave way, the legion which was stationed on that wing did not keep its ground, but retreated to the next hill."
Caesar DBC, 1.44
