06-16-2014, 08:43 AM
Quote:I think approximately 7 legions accompanied Crassus on his expedition and three of those were the Syrian legions he was entitled to as the governor of Roman Syria. So he probably had to raise 3 or 4 legions from scratch. As one of the Triumvirs he would have had a hostile Senate to deal with so he would probably have had to finance a large portion of the equipping of his army himself. There must have been a bit of scouring and looting of temples for arms and armour as well as veterans' settlements for recruits or any unwanted available arms, armourers would have been in short supply and high demand and therefore very expensive so maybe the' old moneylender' in Crassus thought cheap is quick and best. I don't think there were as many 'fabricae' or armanents workshops scattered around in late Republican times like in the Late Empire & if there were they would already be pretty busy.- There are several assumptions here, that are not backed-up by our sources and sometimes even the contrary is true.
It seems to me that Crassus totally underestimated the Parthians and was equipping his army for a massive looting expedition rather than a military one, as he chose the direct route down the Euphrates rather than through Armenia whose king offered him extra troops and more importantly cavalry. Poor equipment and manpower, maybe a lack of quality officers and centurions, and superior weapons and tactics from the Parthians, bad tactics and some inept leadership from Crassus. A toxic recipe for defeat and disaster.[/align]
1) Actually we do not know how many new legions Crassus had to recruit and how many of them were seasoned troops. Senate was partly hostile to Crassus, but on the other hand the other triumvires supported his campaign. Certainly we know that there were veterans from Pompey's army with Crassus, so although there were many rookie soldiers in his army, there surely was a backbone of experienced soldiers, centurions and officers (I don't have access to my literature now, so I will provide source for this later).
2) Poor armour - this is just your assumption. I would say the defensive equipment of the Romans worked quite well with regard to the circumstances and especially against the Parthian arrows. The Parthians had the best conditions for shooting one can imagine. Given the very low numbers of light, long-range troops and cavalry regiments in Crassus army, they could shoot from short distances. They were able to encircle the Roman army, so they could shoot from different angles at the same times, which means that it was more difficult for the Romans to defend (you can hold your shield in one direction only. Due to their high mobility (and very low mobility of the Romans) they could choose when and where they will attack - the initiative was totally on their side. They could shoot on the Roman formation under these great conditions for a very long time (probably up to 7 hours). The Parthians showered the legionaries with a very high number of arrows. I have calculated that some 270 000 arrows is the minimum number of arrows fired on the Romans during the main battle (ie. not counting the retreat during next days). But the real number was very, very probably much higher. Personally I think that some number between 500 000 - 1 000 000 arrows is most probable. See also previous post of Michael Kerr about Farrokh's estimate. Although his calculations are a bit problematic they can also provide a hint about what the Romans had to face. In spite of all this the number of casualties to the arrows in the main battle was probably not that high - according to my calculations and estimates they were between some 5500 and 12000 dead and wounded (to a similar estimate came A. Günther, who has 6-7000 casualties in the main battle - see Günther, A.: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Kriege zwischen Römern und Parthern, Berlin, 1922, p. 36, note 3).
Given the almost perfect conditions the Parthians had, the number of arrows fired and the number of probable casualties, it seems to me pretty obvious, that the reports of Cassius Dio and Plutarch are exaggerated and the Roman shields and armour did a good job. Surely most of the missiles were blocked by the large shields. However, given the long time the Romans had to spend under the terrific barrage of Parthian arrows coming form more angles, many arrows must have reached past the shields and these must have been blocked by chain-mail. Just for your information, there is no mention in our sources about the Romans forming a testudo, although it is possible that they may have used it at least partly. This is confirmed by a description of later battles of the Romans under Mark Antony with the Parthians, where the legionaries formed a testudo and thus withstood similar attacks of Parthian horse archers (Front. Strat. II. 3. 15; see also Cass. Dio XLIX. 29–30; Plut. Antonius 45 and 49). So - yes, the Parthian arrows could sometimes pierce Roman shields or chain-mail armours (as Plutarch and Cassius Dio claim), but even at Carrhae this did not happen often or regularly. The true disaster for the Romans happened during the next days during their retreat. This is where the Roman army virtually ceased to exist. Everybody, who wants to know how I came to the above estimated numbers and all my reasoning with citations of primary and secondary sources, please check my article I mentioned in one of my previous posts in this tread.
Greetings
Alexandr
