05-28-2013, 10:09 PM
Some remarks and personal opinions:
1. The Macedonian phalanx lost a number of major battles against the Romans but only once did it have a problem frontally and that was at Pydna, possibly after it was outflanked by the Romans, which at least added to its confusion, if it was not the main reason. At Cynoscephalae for example, the phalanx had no problem crushing the Romans and at Magnesia it certainly was not defeated while the Romans did gain both victories through other means. Historically, the Roman system proved inferior to the phalanx of Greek armies on the battleground as line against line and superior in its resilience and general tactical value. This is what Polybius is describing. Do not think that it was easy to break a phalanx just because the ground was not as even as a soccer field. This tactic was invented, employed and proved superior first and foremost in the rough land of Greece, rougher even than that in Italy and more than once performed efficiently if not admirably well in what would be considered unfavorable terrain (Selassia, Granicus, Issus, etc).
2. Polybius and others often describe the Romans as a "phalanx". Many times when you read about a "Roman line" in the translations, the Greek text reads "phalanx".
3. The Romans are attested to have fought both in close and in open order. Since you tend to include in your discussion later descriptions, you all know of the close ordered formations employed against the Parthians, for example, as well as at Cannae and Heracleion per Polybius.
4. To me a cuneus is most possibly a kind of column rather than always a wedge, so, yes, what Frontinus is describing to me resembles what Bryan supports. However, he specifically states the reason why he thinks that Paulus chose this formation and to me he is describing something that he thought was not a regular offensive tactic against the Macedonian phalanx but one that facilitated retreat.
5. Regarding open order, I personally support that it was the preferred density to employ when the Romans wanted to fight defensively. It allowed them to more easily retreat in front of an advancing enemy, which is (as I have supported in another of Mark's threads) the peculiarity of the Roman system as described in the sources. This tactical withdrawal is what Paulus also did in Pydna. There is no reason to assume that the Romans had no experience in fighting in close order. They would use both when each one offered more advantages.
6. Frontinus' account of the cavalry braking the sarissas is, to my view, a "myth". Something like that would have been documented by others too and would have been imitated. I just cannot see the possibility of any substantial number of horsemen galloping between two battle-lines which in most places would be anyways engaged as I do not see it possible to do any serious damage to the 5 rows of sarissas projecting from the phalanx to different lengths anyways. On the other hand I can see horses suffering from stabs.
7. One more thing to keep in mind is that the Romans fought with absolute discipline. It was forbidden to run before their first rank or to leave their position in the line and the penalty to such offenses was death. If you guys read the battle of Pydna very carefully, you will see that the Romans did not view it as a normal, acceptable tactic to just pour in any small gap in the Macedonian line. They only did so, when Paulus rode along the ranks ordering them to do so. Their standard order was to keep their cohesion, their posts, their lines and, at the time, tactically retreat in front of the enemy.
8. A well-trained phalanx was not "rigid" on the battlefield. There is a misunderstanding here. It was more rigid than the Roman formation because it needed order to be effective, while the Romans could run away and still have a chance to survive, because the Romans could more effectively be used in an irregular manner. However, on the battlefield, they could act in smaller units, they could march oblique, they could break in multiple phalanxes and join again, they could tactically also retreat and advance, form squares, open up lanes for friendly and enemy troops to pass through then close them up again etc, etc. A good phalanx could "dance" on the battlefield, but on the battlefield only.
9. MGL is also correct in saying that when we read about" pushing", "forcefully pushing" etc in battle-accounts of Greek authors, they almost never describe physical pushing. The relevant Greek words (usually "otheo" and "biazo") are used as the verbs "push" and "force" are used in English.
- In all, the Romans at the time of the Macedonian wars had an army that was on the whole more effective in the demands of a campaign. However, this has nothing to do with the phalanx vs Roman line comparison itself.
1. The Macedonian phalanx lost a number of major battles against the Romans but only once did it have a problem frontally and that was at Pydna, possibly after it was outflanked by the Romans, which at least added to its confusion, if it was not the main reason. At Cynoscephalae for example, the phalanx had no problem crushing the Romans and at Magnesia it certainly was not defeated while the Romans did gain both victories through other means. Historically, the Roman system proved inferior to the phalanx of Greek armies on the battleground as line against line and superior in its resilience and general tactical value. This is what Polybius is describing. Do not think that it was easy to break a phalanx just because the ground was not as even as a soccer field. This tactic was invented, employed and proved superior first and foremost in the rough land of Greece, rougher even than that in Italy and more than once performed efficiently if not admirably well in what would be considered unfavorable terrain (Selassia, Granicus, Issus, etc).
2. Polybius and others often describe the Romans as a "phalanx". Many times when you read about a "Roman line" in the translations, the Greek text reads "phalanx".
3. The Romans are attested to have fought both in close and in open order. Since you tend to include in your discussion later descriptions, you all know of the close ordered formations employed against the Parthians, for example, as well as at Cannae and Heracleion per Polybius.
4. To me a cuneus is most possibly a kind of column rather than always a wedge, so, yes, what Frontinus is describing to me resembles what Bryan supports. However, he specifically states the reason why he thinks that Paulus chose this formation and to me he is describing something that he thought was not a regular offensive tactic against the Macedonian phalanx but one that facilitated retreat.
5. Regarding open order, I personally support that it was the preferred density to employ when the Romans wanted to fight defensively. It allowed them to more easily retreat in front of an advancing enemy, which is (as I have supported in another of Mark's threads) the peculiarity of the Roman system as described in the sources. This tactical withdrawal is what Paulus also did in Pydna. There is no reason to assume that the Romans had no experience in fighting in close order. They would use both when each one offered more advantages.
6. Frontinus' account of the cavalry braking the sarissas is, to my view, a "myth". Something like that would have been documented by others too and would have been imitated. I just cannot see the possibility of any substantial number of horsemen galloping between two battle-lines which in most places would be anyways engaged as I do not see it possible to do any serious damage to the 5 rows of sarissas projecting from the phalanx to different lengths anyways. On the other hand I can see horses suffering from stabs.
7. One more thing to keep in mind is that the Romans fought with absolute discipline. It was forbidden to run before their first rank or to leave their position in the line and the penalty to such offenses was death. If you guys read the battle of Pydna very carefully, you will see that the Romans did not view it as a normal, acceptable tactic to just pour in any small gap in the Macedonian line. They only did so, when Paulus rode along the ranks ordering them to do so. Their standard order was to keep their cohesion, their posts, their lines and, at the time, tactically retreat in front of the enemy.
8. A well-trained phalanx was not "rigid" on the battlefield. There is a misunderstanding here. It was more rigid than the Roman formation because it needed order to be effective, while the Romans could run away and still have a chance to survive, because the Romans could more effectively be used in an irregular manner. However, on the battlefield, they could act in smaller units, they could march oblique, they could break in multiple phalanxes and join again, they could tactically also retreat and advance, form squares, open up lanes for friendly and enemy troops to pass through then close them up again etc, etc. A good phalanx could "dance" on the battlefield, but on the battlefield only.
9. MGL is also correct in saying that when we read about" pushing", "forcefully pushing" etc in battle-accounts of Greek authors, they almost never describe physical pushing. The relevant Greek words (usually "otheo" and "biazo") are used as the verbs "push" and "force" are used in English.
- In all, the Romans at the time of the Macedonian wars had an army that was on the whole more effective in the demands of a campaign. However, this has nothing to do with the phalanx vs Roman line comparison itself.
