Quote:"Flamininus, seeing that his men could not sustain the charge of the phalanx, but that since his left was being forced back, some of them having already perished and others retreating slowly, his only hope of safety lay in his right, hastened to place himself in command there..." Pol 18.25:4
Clearly, the Roman left was crushed. If you stop exaggerating, I will too. Deal?
I rarely exaggerate, Bryan and when I do I usually make it clear...
"The charge was made with great violence and loud shouting on both sides: for both advancing parties raised their war cry, while those who were not actually engaged shouted encouragement to those that were; and the result was a scene of the wildest excitement, terrible in the last degree. Philip's right wing came off brilliantly in the encounter, for they were charging down hill and were superior in weight, and their arms were far more suited for the actual conditions of the struggle"
"Seeing that his men were unable to stand the charge of the phalanx, and that his left wing was losing ground, some having already fallen and the rest slowly retiring, but that hopes of saving himself still remained on the right"
Do you see Polybius give any hopes to the Roman left or does he present it defeated? Is this the description of some draw? The Roman legionary line that stood against Philip's phalanx was unequivocally defeated and the battle was still won...
Quote:Macedon wrote: Just make a list of the battles in which the Republican Romans defeated a Greek phalanx face to face and then make one of battles which they simply won.
Roman Battles against Macedonian Style Phalanx:
Heraclea (Pyrrhic War) - Cant find the actual source but secondary sources indicate the Romans performed well against the Phalanx but lost due to elephants.
Asculum (Pyrrhic War) - Romans kicked the crap out of Pyrrhus' army but lost due to elephants and cavalry. Fought hard enough against the phalanx and other forces that the term "Pyrrhic Victory" is coined. (Source: Plutarch, Life of Pyrrhus: 21)
Beneventum (Pyrrhic War) - Roman infantry destroys Pyrrhus' best units (source is unclear about which one but my guess is Macedonian phalanx but they could be mentioning the Samnites for all we know). (Source, Plutarch, Life of Pyrrhus:25, Dionysius of Halicarnassus)
Cynoscephalae (2nd Macedonian War) - As stated above, the Roman retreated against the Macedonian left. Roman right shattered Macedonian left, 20 maniples peal off and route the rest of the Macedonian army. Where were the Macedonian reserves while this was happening? (source, Polybius, 18. 25)
Magnesia - Phalanx is interspersed with elephants yet somehow the Roman infantry beats them. (Source Livy 37.42)
Pydna - Already discussed that one in my earlier posts. Phalanx soundly beaten by the Romans after encountering bad terrain. (source Plutarch: Life of Aemilius
Pyrrhus's phalanx was never defeated by the Romans. Not in the probably two battles of Asculum, not even in the two actions at Beneventum. Hard pressed in some instances? Maybe, but it was never defeated and, although there are no extensive descriptions of the battles, you should know that even at Beneventum, it was the Romans who fled towards their camps and Pyrrhus lost the battle when his elephants, who had attacked the Roman palisade charged their own lines in frenzy, while at the first action, Manius defeated the van of Pyrrhus' marching column as it approached from a night march.
At Cynoscephalae, it is clear that the phalanx defeated the legionary line face to face and lost the battle when it was surrounded. What reserves and what does this have to do with anything?
At Magnesia, the Roman legions were defeated by Antiochos while the battle was won by the auxiliaries under Eumenes. The phalanx retreated orderly in squares with the Romans unable and unwilling to do harm by frontal attack. Again the Romans defeated them indirectly when the elephants were put to flight.
As I hope you can see yourself, there is not a single example in your list, apart possibly by Pydna, as I have already stated, of a Roman legion frontally attacking a Macedonian phalanx and defeating it.
Quote:Not always, especially against the Romans. I guess the Gods favored Italy over Greece. Check the above sources.
Did so.
Quote:What I mean by rigid is: deficient in or devoid of flexibility. As in, the Macedonian phalanx was inflexible when compared to certain other military forces, such as the Romans. Which I and Polybius both seem to agree with. But this is an opinion on both Polybius and my end.
Actually this is not the opinion of Polybius. It is only yours. According to Polybius, the Macedonian phalanx is unbeatable as long as it retains its cohesion. Polybius, as I, supports that because a war cannot rest on the chances of the phalanx alone, the Roman overall system was superior.
Quote:You mean like the dozen or so examples of personal initiative and bravery by centurions that Caesar describes in his Commentaries? Was his plan to execute them by weighing them down with crowns, torques and gold and silver coin?
Is suddenly Caesar a part of our scope? Then yes... by choking them to death with golden chains... Anyways, I have many many examples and quotes on this but I will not compile an answer to that. If you think that the Romans encouraged single action or action outside the Roman line let it be so.
Macedon wrote: Imagine someone trying to form an opinion on the Romans having abandoned the thyreos for a buckler
Quote:But I thought Romans carried a scutum? 8-) The word buckler is the anglicized version of the French word "bouclier", meaning shield. As for as I know, the word is commonly used to refer to a shield with a central grip, mostly small parrying shields. If your going to fault the translator of the Polybius line for choosing to use buckler, you are just as guilty for using a Greek word to describe a Roman (Latin) piece of military equipment, though they are almost the same thing.
No, the thyreos of the Romans is adequately described-defined in the Greek sources and the correct Greek term is thyreos. However, you are not wrong in that the Greeks of course would name some Roman things inappropriately although this is not a part of the issue. It is us who have to interpret them correctly. If you think that reading translations provides you with all the information you need, you are welcome to believe so. My argument, that many misunderstandings occur because of inadequate translations still stands.
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Quote:Franceso wrote:
Polybios says that the centurio prior led the right side of the maniple, while the centurio posterior the left one.
I don’t remember Polybius stating the centurion prior and the centurion posterior. Isn’t it the senior centurion and the junior centurion? And what evidence is there for a prior and posterior century for this period when facing the Macedonian phalanx?
Steven
I checked out the quote: Polybious use the term "the first elected" (pròtos airetheis). Anyway wath I meant is that centurions led a portion of maniple, not a single century.
With all due respect Mark, from my dealings with you I have placed you in the dismissive basket, along with many others. You could save yourself some grief and conform to traditional thinking because history has shown us the road followed by original thinkers is the most difficult to travel because traditionalist make it that way.............
Stephen - well said and I take it on the chin.
However, whilst I may certainly think many of your arguments are far too complicated and perhaps even border on the 'silly' - mainly because I am almost always of the opinion that military things are normally far more simplistic.....
Be assured, however, that I do not dismiss. For you may, contrary to what my brain tells me, be right - the relative paucity, perspective of the writers and the great gaps in our knowledge of details we might like to know (like in this discussion) show that the 'sources' do not say everything.
When I post that 'little thesis' I will most certainly welcome your comments and counter arguments.
@all interested parties...summarising the Polybius section referenced:
- he notes the superiority of the phalanx in all situations, but then says the Romans always beat it. Whilst possible, I think that Macedon has provided more than enough references to note that that summary isn't entirely correct
- that his detail on the tactical deployment and fighting style of the phalanx is completely accurate and confirmed in great detail, with confirming other sources, and reinforces it's great 'fighting power'
- than the apparent Roman fighting style of the individual soldier should stand no hope whatsoever against the Maecdonian-style of phalanx
- and that the reason the phalanx is beaten is that it is so fundamentally weak in cohesion that almost anything but flat and level ground renders it so ineffective that the superbly trained Roman soldier will take it apart, individually or together with his chums because the Roman system is more flexible (use of reserves, multiple lines and the manipular tactic) - noting, however, that he does not detail the Roman system in anything like that for the 'Greek'
I have no problem with what Polybius says - it is all completely believable and coherent. What I wish to point out is that I do not think Polybius says anywhere near enough to entirely explain how the Romans actually fought - and that's where we have to use our own brains; especially given the facts that go against what Polybius does say - that the phalanx was always beaten by the Romans.
So - I would still appreciate any pointers to sources that actually tell us how the Romans actually fight in the century/maniple style - for I don't think there are any?
I will also note that the sources we have are normally written either by people who will have had a 'General's perspective' or the more distant one of the academic. It is only in the last 100 years that 'Officers/Generals' have been trained as soldiers - prior to that (certainly over 2,000 years) Generals were appointed to command directly, with no experience at all of fighting in the line. I very much doubt if Polybius ever spoke to anyone below the rank of Tribune. Soldiers were very much 'Plebs' - I think we forget that sometimes in our more (supposedly) enlightened times.
I really wish that someone had observed the fighting in sufficient detail - but I don't think they ever did. Please, please, point me at a source that describes Roman infantry fighting at that level - or charging cavalry in the other thread. Between us we may improve our understanding.
But please - let's not go down the route of - 'the sources don't say it, therefore it never happened'. That's just silly.
Mark wrote:
However, whilst I may certainly think many of your arguments are far too complicated and perhaps even border on the 'silly' - mainly because I am almost always of the opinion that military things are normally far more simplistic.....
It may seem silly to us, but the Romans took it very seriously. And as for simplicity, you and many others on this group have a far more complex Roman military organisation than my research shows. All my drills and methods of line replacement are so simply that new levies can be trained to do them in a couple of hours…if that. Everything about the Roman system is based on simplicity as Cicero makes clear:
"With the Greeks geometry was regarded with the utmost respect, and consequently none were held in greater honour than mathematicians, but we Romans have delimited the size of this art to the practical purposes of measuring and calculating."
Another point is everyone takes reference from all time periods and then tries to impose this information onto another time period to get an understanding of the Roman legion. I do get a giggle watching you guys mix and match your references concerning the legion’s organisation. Let me ask you a question, when do the primary sources start mentioning prior and posterior centuries?
Mark wrote:
When I post that 'little thesis' I will most certainly welcome your comments and counter arguments.
To prove you are incorrect I would have to provide more of my research which I am no longer willing to do. What I have provided in the past has not been acknowledged so there is no point. However, I am curious as to why members still keep going back to the Cavalry, Cohorts and Whatever Goes posting long after it has finished.
Mark wrote:
But please - let's not go down the route of - 'the sources don't say it, therefore it never happened'. That's just silly
I’ve had to put up with this also. The sources don’t tell us the Roman social system is Pythagorean based but I can prove it beyond any doubt over and over and over again. Most of the information is starring people in the eyes. As Professor Ridley said about my work “it’s hidden by its simplicity.”
Macedon wrote: Maybe, but it was never defeated and, although there are no extensive descriptions of the battles, you should know that even at Beneventum, it was the Romans who fled towards their camps and Pyrrhus lost the battle when his elephants, who had attacked the Roman palisade charged their own lines in frenzy, while at the first action, Manius defeated the van of Pyrrhus' marching column as it approached from a night march.
"Manius, however, since the sacrifices were propitious and the crisis forced action upon him, led his forces out and attacked the foremost of the enemy, and after routing these, put their whole army to flight, so that many of them fell and some of their elephants were left behind and captured. 4 This victory brought Manius down into the plain to give battle; here, after an engagement in the open, he routed the enemy at some points, but at one was overwhelmed by the elephants and driven back upon his camp, where he was obliged to call upon the guards" Plut. Life of Pyyrhus, 25
To me, this says that the first part of the battle at Beneventum resulted in the routing of Pyrrhus' entire army, starting with his vanguard. Afterwards, in the second part, the Romans were driven back by the elephants, not the phalanx. After which, the elephants attacked their own lines, resulting in a complete route of Pyrrhus' forces.
Macedon wrote: According to Polybius, the Macedonian phalanx is unbeatable as long as it retains its cohesion.
"What then is the reason of the Roman success, and what is it that defeats the purpose of those who use the phalanx? 2 It is because in war the time and place of action is uncertain and the phalanx has only one time and one place in which it can perform its peculiar service. 3 Now, if the enemy were obliged to adapt themselves to the times and places required by the phalanx when a decisive battle was impending, those who use the phalanx would in all probability, for the reasons I stated above, always get the better of their enemies; 4 but if it is not only possible but easy to avoid its onset why should one any longer dread an attack of a body so constituted? 5 Again, it is acknowledged that the phalanx requires level and clear ground with no obstacles such as ditches, clefts, clumps of trees, ridges and water courses, 6 all of which are sufficient to impede and break up such a formation. Every one would also acknowledge that it is almost impossible except in very rare cases to find spaces of say twenty stades or even more in length with no such obstacles. 8 But even if we assume it to be possible, supposing those who are fighting against us refuse to meet us on such ground, but force round sacking the cities and devastating the territory of our allies, what is the use of such a formation? 9 For by remaining on the ground that suits it, not only is it incapable of helping its friends but cannot even ensure its own safety. 10 For the arrival of supplies will easily be prevented by the enemy, when they have undisturbed command of the open country. 11 But if the phalanx leaves the ground proper to it and attempts any action, it will be easily overcome by the enemy. 12 And again, if it is decided to engage the enemy on level ground, but instead of availing ourselves of our total force when the phalanx has its one opportunity for charging, we keep out of action even a small portion of it at the moment of the shock, it is easy to tell what will happen from what the Romans always do at present" Pol 18.31
Macedon wrote: Is suddenly Caesar a part of our scope?
If you can bring up Arrian, I can mention Caesar...Besides, what other source specifically mentions centurions by name?
Macedon wrote: If you think that the Romans encouraged single action or action outside the Roman line let it be so.
Encouraged openly? Not always. One Consul executed his own son for fighting in single combat. But others awarded such initiative. Above all, the Romans respected bravery and virtus. How did that work in real life? If you break ranks for some action and it succeeds, you are honored. If you fail, you are punished. Just like today's military organizations, where it is commonly believed that there is a fine line between being given an award for bravery verse receiving a court martial. I recommend you read Ross Cowan's For the Glory of Rome.
Antiochus wrote: Another point is everyone takes reference from all time periods and then tries to impose this information onto another time period to get an understanding of the Roman legion. I do get a giggle watching you guys mix and match your references concerning the legion’s organisation. Let me ask you a question, when do the primary sources start mentioning prior and posterior centuries?
Ding ding ding, we have us a winner. The Republican era Roman army was a conscript citizen army. Every fit male citizen had to serve 16 years in the infantry or 10 years in the cavalry, including those of the Senatorial ranks. Rarely is training ever mentioned. Scipio Africanus, Scipio Aemilianus, Q. Caecilius Metellus, Gaius Marius and P. Rutilius Rufus. As far as I can tell, these are the ONLY Consuls of the mid Republic period that were mentioned in the sources, out of all the many others Consuls who commanded armies, who actually bothered to institute training in their armies. The fact that the sources go out of there way to mention it is indicative that the Roman didn't put that much of an emphasis on training. Notice the names I provided, all but two are still widely known as great war leaders who also used innovative tactics to win. Also notice that Scipio Aemilianus was the grandson of Scipio Africanus; both Marius and Rutlius Rufus served with Scipio Aemilianus in Spain and both were legates under Caecilius Metellus. Oh, and Sulla initially served under Marius. And Marius was Caesar's uncle. There seems to be some sort of pattern here. Interesting...
Since the average Roman army didn't spend months or even weeks training their armies, and seemed to include no training once the campaign season started, their tactics had to have been simple and quick to learn. Coupled with bravery, discipline and virtus, along with manpower to replace armies lost through incompetent leadership, that is why the Romans always won. It was only in the first century BC, when legions where under arms for a full 16 years before discharged en mass, and then later after Augustus' reforms, when legions were permanent, that the Romans truly had a professional military. Before that, nope. Just a conscript army of farmers.
Quote:.............. Let me ask you a question, when do the primary sources start mentioning prior and posterior centuries?
................
To the best of my knowledge I don't think the 'primary' (written a la Polybius - who otherwise mentions right & left) sources do mention them by that name, but what we have from the Imperial period is a listing of the ranks of the 6-century cohorts in the legions as well as tombstone evidence. In both cases the ranks seem to indicate a clear harking back to the Republican era in nomenclature (hastati, principes, triarii/pilus coupled with prior & posterior).
For my part, that naming and the way I have always understood (and more recently through thinking here have re-confirmed to myself) all, together, make perfect sense for what I now fairly firmly believe make up the manipular tactics:
- two centuries (hand, like the standard-tops), each able of individual control within a maniple pairing - used tactically together forming their part of manipular tactics
- where the rear century (from marching and deploying whilst still in open order 1 pace/3ft apart) is then able to manoeuvre on the battlefield to the left of the prior and so form an unbroken 'line'
- I do believe that the infantry in those centuries will resist a charge (particularly when talking about opposing a pike phalanx) by forming their own shield-to-shield 'phalanx' and then by the pair of centurions working together will manipulate their centuries to help break up the cohesion of the phalanx opposing them, until the well shielded and stabbing/slicing soldiers are past the pikes
- I do believe the Romans would often stand to receive a pike-phalanx charge, for any forward movements by the phalanx at the time of first contact could be well exploited to break up the cohesion earlier, just like we know from later accounts dealing with the Celtic (sic) types, they did the same and also used pila volleys to help
Nothing in the re-reading of this element of Polybius has changed that view, I'm afraid and if anyone can still please point me at a source that clearly conflicts then I'd love to be corrected.
Would you believe that I even re-saw the last episode of 'Spartacus' just a little while ago. Whilst I have taken issue with many of the things in the 3-series, it has been entertaining. But in the last episode, whilst the CG-views of the Roman forces at a distance look odd and the plastic segmentata is a bit sad - in the close-ups where they are shield-to-shield and we even saw a moment of a possible style of rotating ranks - it did look rather right to me! :wink: I think they were actually well advised for that bit - and no, it wasn't me....... :lol:
Mark wrote
- where the rear century (from marching and deploying whilst still in open order 1 pace/3ft apart) is then able to manoeuvre on the battlefield to the left of the prior and so form an unbroken 'line'
This is the famous Keppie's hypothesis, which doesn't persuade me due to my restrictive interpretation of centuries's role... anyway our idea of the manipular sistem is pretty similar: You say that the maniple was initially deployed in a deeper formation( prior century forward, posterior century behind), then it enlarged its frontage moving on the left the posterior century. I say the maniple was initially deployed in a deep close formation (12-8 ranks), then it enlarged its frontage by opening ranks and arranging an open formation (12-8 ranks); this formation could then be transformed in close one with 6-4 ranks....
But you think maniples only fought in close order formations. I would like to point your attention on the follwing quote by Caesar " Laxare manipulos iussit, quo facilius gladis uti possent " ( He ordered to enlarge maniples, so that they colud easily use the swords). How do you explain this passage? ( No polemic aim in this question )
antiochus wrote: Another point is everyone takes reference from all time periods and then tries to impose this information onto another time period to get an understanding of the Roman legion. I do get a giggle watching you guys mix and match your references concerning the legion’s organisation. Let me ask you a question, when do the primary sources start mentioning prior and posterior centuries?
We take references from all time periods because- I think- this is the only way to find a coherent system and because the manipular component of the Roman Army didn' t change at least until the end of III century ( but this is another story, an there is also a thread on the argument)
Quote:.............
This is the famous Keppie's hypothesis, which doesn't persuade me due to my restrictive interpretation of centuries's role... anyway our idea of the manipular sistem is pretty similar: You say that the maniple was initially deployed in a deeper formation( prior century forward, posterior century behind), then it enlarged its frontage moving on the left the posterior century. I say the maniple was initially deployed in a deep close formation (12-8 ranks), then it enlarged its frontage by opening ranks and arranging an open formation (12-8 ranks); this formation could then be transformed in close one with 6-4 ranks....
I did look at the links that Macedon had kindly provided in the second post to your thread last week - and just re-looked at them again, but none of them seemed to take me to 'Keppie'. If you can tell me where I can find that, I would be grateful. For my part, some of the things there I agreed with and some I didn't (for example, with no intent otherwise, I didn't agree with Bryan's idea that the the pilus/principes/hastati distinctions remained and held any significance beyond the seniority within a cohort now we were in the Late Republic and soldiers were now commonly armed and armoured from central state sources).
I do believe the pair of centuries were intimately part of the concept of the maniple - in fact I would go as far as to say that it was an integral part of an entire concept: pair of Consuls; pair of legions; pairs of Socii legions; pairs of centuries. In fact, I have always believed that the entire manipular concept was based around the intimate co-operation between the two centuries - buddy-buddy writ large. I will go as far as to say that I see no reason this didn't continue right through the Late Republic and into the Imperial age too - no reason to change.
On that basis, I therefore do see the 'posterior' century being 'behind' initially and on the left when lined up - and in that 'quincunx' in between.
Quote:But you think maniples only fought in close order formations. I would like to point your attention on the following quote by Caesar " Laxare manipulos iussit, quo facilius gladis uti possent " ( He ordered to enlarge maniples, so that they could easily use the swords). How do you explain this passage? ( No polemic aim in this question )
............
Ahh, no not "only" - I think the maniples/centuries fought shield-to-shield to resist the phalanx and at any time it was necessary to 'hold the line'; but opening up to 1 pace (the length of the swordarm) apart (just like we do in normal drill today and for 100's of years (if not 1,000s!)) is a normal part of their drill too and could certainly be used if the situation warranted. To really think that through I would appreciate the actual reference to that portion of Caesar's Commentaries (I assume), so that I can see the context, before seeing if I can fit that into my view/theory - or whether that is indeed a reference that I've been seeking that can de-bunk it.
In matter of Lawrence Keppie: he explain this idea in his book "The making of Roman Army". I don't know if it is available on the web, but it is pretty famous, so you should be able to find it in an accademic library...
The idea of the survival of a (real) distinction between hastati principi and pilani is interesting... a good starting point could be to find the text of the Rutilia Rufa law, wich introduced the gladiatorial training for soldiers (105 BC)... I think this two things are connected.
The actual reference is II,25,2 De Bello Gallico.
Mark wrote Ahh, no not "only" - I think the maniples/centuries fought shield-to-shield to resist the phalanx and at any time it was necessary to 'hold the line'; but opening up to 1 pace (the length of the swordarm) apart (just like we do in normal drill today and for 100's of years (if not 1,000s!)) is a normal part of their drill too and could certainly be used if the situation warranted.
For the point about Rutlius Rufus, it wasn't a law he enacted, it was something that he just did, as Consul and commander of an "inexperienced" consular army poised to fight against the Cimbri-Teutonic forces, who thus far had crushed the Romans in multiple battles.
As an aside, it probably began a tradition of more standardized training among legionary forces as it was picked up by Marius, and by extension, Sulla, who served as legate and military tribune in his army, by Pompey, who served in similar armies in the Socii War and as a Propraetor and Proconsul under Sulla, by Caesar, who was Marius' nephew and who served in Sulla's armies, and others. Successful generals ordered the training, lesser ones simply assumed their men "knew" how to fight. Having the experience of serving in a good army, under good leadership, probably dramatically increased the likelihood that at a later time, that Roman would lead successful armies.
Interested factoid: When Marius was elected Consul again in 104, he discharged his African army and took command of Rutilius Rufus' army, as it was better disciplined (and probably better trained for the infantry intensive battle sure to come against the barbarians). Another factor was that the legions in question had originally been formed in 111 BC, seven years before, and were due to be disbanded after Triumphing. No doubt, many of those from the African army volunteered to join Marius' new army, for patriotic reasons.
See Valerius Maximus 2.3.2. and Frontinus 4.2.2.
Mark,
What happens to the width of any military formations when this happens? opening up to 1 pace (the length of the swordarm) apart (just like we do in normal drill today and for 100's of years (if not 1,000s!)
Does it get wider, like I mentioned in the last thread?
(Hint, it does)
But the technique is anachronistic anyway. It is just one method of widening the ranks.
Thanks for the reference, it is much better to read in context - just done. So, and with reference to Bryan's bit below - let's make sure....
Quote:.................
What happens to the width of any military formations when this happens? opening up to 1 pace (the length of the swordarm) apart (just like we do in normal drill today and for 100's of years (if not 1,000s!)
Does it get wider, like I mentioned in the last thread?
(Hint, it does)
But the technique is anachronistic anyway. It is just one method of widening the ranks.
I quite understand your point and I can only say - not necessarily. For I wasn't, whilst it could be done, suggesting that suddenly increasing the frontage individually (as indeed I argued before) is a normal manoeuvre at all. For, for the same reason I so constructed that original drawing/picture - frontage is the most important aspect of deployment. Failing to keep such a frontage can presage disaster. So, given that you have already set a unit's frontage and others are now next to you, then you cannot easily 'expand'. You can certainly, however, open up to the rear and even withdraw every second file/contubernium to achieve the same spacing should that be needed. Certainly a more open order than that I believe they mostly fought is needed to cast pila/lancea.
In the case of the relevant passage in Caesar's Gallic Wars, I think the most important point is that the legion in question (12th) is already extremely "hard pressed", all the "standards collected in one place" and the soldiers are "crowded and a hindrance to themselves" (and thus less able to use their weapons). What Caesar then orders and makes happen himself (due to the loss of lots of the legion officers) and with "no reserves" to call upon, orders the standards to be carried forwards and to extend the companies (maniples). Some soldiers are indeed already leaving.
Given this legion was being attacked from the front and flanks, it therefore seems to me that the maniples have been forced together and posterior centuries are now behind and, when you add losses and desertions, the frontage is contracting; let alone the press of the enemy starts to prevent easy movement and this is the reason the standards are closer together - bearing in mind that, across the battlefield, it is the standards that indicate the location of the sub-units. So, having re-taken the initiative he requires the maniples to fight back out and re-extend to the normal centuries side-by-side deployment, thus re-widening the frontage and shoring up the flanks. Effectively pushing out of the boxed in situation the Romans had found themselves in and allowing the shields and swords to get back to their jobs.
Now, I'm obviously having to read in things to suggest that, but again we have to. But it's suggested as a real possible detailing that may have happened - whilst using concepts already stated.
TBH - whilst being in a more 'open' order (in fact it's the normal 'close' order of today) is possible and I am sure was a part of marching and movements; whether's it's against a pike phalanx; barbarian types swinging swords; or cavalry - then I'm fairly sure shield-to-shield makes the most sense. Anything else makes the soldiers' formation weak and fairly vulnerable.
Mark Hygate wrote: I quite understand your point and I can only say - not necessarily. For I wasn't, whilst it could be done, suggesting that suddenly increasing the frontage individually (as indeed I argued before) is a normal manoeuvre at all. For, for the same reason I so constructed that original drawing/picture - frontage is the most important aspect of deployment. Failing to keep such a frontage can presage disaster. So, given that you have already set a unit's frontage and others are now next to you, then you cannot easily 'expand'.
I don't get it, you presented a method for increasing the frontage of a unit and the distance between men that entails pushing off your mate's shoulders with your extended arm. I've seen this drill done once or twice and it does extend the width of the rank in question. If you have a a line (phalanx) of maniples, with centuries on line, with men spaced shield to shield, as you say they must have fought against nearly every enemy, this technique, that YOU provided, would not work because there is no where for anyone to move to. It would only work if gaps existed between units as Polybius and others state. I said earlier that I believe gaps were utilized between maniples fighting on the battle line. This space, in between units, could be utilized by said maniples to extent their frontage. Its just one method though.
Mark Hygate wrote: Given this legion was being attacked from the front and flanks, it therefore seems to me that the maniples have been forced together and posterior centuries are now behind and, when you add losses and desertions, the frontage is contracting; let alone the press of the enemy starts to prevent easy movement and this is the reason the standards are closer together - bearing in mind that, across the battlefield, it is the standards that indicate the location of the sub-units. So, having re-taken the initiative he requires the maniples to fight back out and re-extend to the normal centuries side-by-side deployment, thus re-widening the frontage and shoring up the flanks. Effectively pushing out of the boxed in situation the Romans had found themselves in and allowing the shields and swords to get back to their jobs.
Now, I'm obviously having to read in things to suggest that, but again we have to.
Yes you are and maybe you shouldn't. Why does everything need to be so complicated?
Situation: The 12th Legion is in trouble. Unit cohesion is lost, leaders are dead, the men are too close to fight effectively, things are looking bad. Caesar shows up, motivates his men by exposing himself and calling them by name, tells them to open the maniples, ie. get some room from one another so they can fight properly with scutum and gladius, and then he orders the standard bearers forward, implying a general advance, since the men must follow the standards. Adding in anything about posterior centuries that somehow went from side to side, then front to back again after their centurions became casualties and then back to side by side, all while having no unit cohesion (ie. standard bearers clustered together, men follow the standard). The Fog of War is bad enough, why make it worse by adding components that only add to confusion?
Mark Hygate wrote: whilst being in a more 'open' order (in fact it's the normal 'close' order of today) is possible and I am sure was a part of marching and movements; whether's it's against a pike phalanx; barbarian types swinging swords; or cavalry - then I'm fairly sure shield-to-shield makes the most sense. Anything else makes the soldiers' formation weak and fairly vulnerable.
So you need open order to march but not to fight? Republican Roman Reenactor Marching/Fighting
Notice the the 3rd picture on the right? Can you maneuver a 15 lb shield like this if your mates shield is nearly touching yours when the both of you are in the guard position like the 2nd picture? If not, you're too close! What about backstepping? Sidestepping? And every other foot movement necessary to fight with that type of shield and sword? You can't due that properly if you are touching shields, in my opinion.
I asked you this before. At what battles did the Roman infantry simply stand there and let the enemy attack them, without advancing at all?
Mark wrote: but what we have from the Imperial period is a listing of the ranks of the 6-century cohorts in the legions as well as tombstone evidence. In both cases the ranks seem to indicate a clear harking back to the Republican era in nomenclature (hastati, principes, triarii/pilus coupled with prior & posterior).
The problem you are facing Mark and one I faced years back is the prior and posterior century arrangements of the republic are different to the prior and posterior arrangement of the centuries during the Imperial period because both periods have a completely different deployment arrangements.
Mark wrote: two centuries (hand, like the standard-tops), each able of individual control within a maniple pairing - used tactically together forming their part of manipular tactics - where the rear century (from marching and deploying whilst still in open order 1 pace/3ft apart) is then able to manoeuvre on the battlefield to the left of the prior and so form an unbroken 'line'
And you claimed I was making the Roman legion complex. Your tactic requires the posterior century to conduct a 90 degree facing turn (left or right) then move out to cover the gap in the line and when aligned, must halt so the posterior century can again conduct another 90 degree facing turn so as to face the gap, and finally the posterior century has to move up into the gap. This gives a total of six commands (turn, move, halt, turn, move, halt). Come on Mark, as Bryan stated, their farm boys…so it needs to be very simple. He’s my interpretation of Polybius’ legion with gaps in the line. It is called the Serra formation (saw) which is taken from Gellius’ list of the seven Roman battle formations. I picked Serra because it seemed obvious.
Working from right to left, maniples 5 and 6 are the directing maniples and are used to co-ordinate the rest of the line. Also notice how the flanks remain symmetrical as opposed to the impractical quincunx formation. In regard to the hastati and principes you have 6 maniples forward and four maniples held back. The 6 maniples forward and the 4 maniples back produce the ratio 3:2 which funny enough is the Pythagorean ratio for the perfect fifth, which I will add is what Rome is built on. To fill the gaps I have to get my farm boys to move forward. So there are two commands (move and halt) versus your six commands (turn, move, halt, turn, move, halt). Now at this stage of the battle the enemy turn up with a bunch of elephants. However, our commander is not fussed because he knows what to do and he knows the simple training regarding drill given to his farm boys can be carried out without confusion. To create lanes from the Serra formation, of the four maniples held back, and working from right to left, maniple two moves to the right flank and takes up position behind maniple one. At the same time, maniple four also moves to the right and takes up position behind maniple three. Maniple nine moves to the left flank and takes up position behind maniple 10, while maniple seven moves to the left and takes up position directly behind maniple eight. This manoeuvre does mean the farm boys need to know how to conduct a facing turn and how to move. So in all four commands (turn, move, halt, turn).
Mark wrote: I didn't agree with Bryan's idea that the pilus/principes/hastati distinctions remained and held any significance beyond the seniority within a cohort now we were in the Late Republic and soldiers were now commonly armed and armoured from central state sources).
On one hand Mark in order to support your thesis you say things don’t change with the Roman army then on the other dismiss the old traditions. How about if both you and Bryan are right? The names pilus/principes/hastati etc are to define seniority for centurions, but I also have the legion for the late republic also defined by age. So a hastatus centurion is still like the old days commanding the younger soldiers. Let’s not forget that Caesar takes the youngest men from the front line of his army and the oldest men to guard the camp. He can’t do this without having age classifications for the legion.
Please look back - for I didn't suggest that the spacing out by an arm's length was just to the side - but to the rear (as well). For matching comfortably you do indeed space out. However, for shorter distances and under great control (the battlefield and on parade) you can indeed march shoulder to shoulder, but you need space behind so you don't trample on each other. Please see the attached picture...
I found that picture of the Republican re-enactor very nice - but I will point out that the third picture shows an extreme movement of the shield that is rather over-exaggerated. Such a movement would indeed be very disconcerting to the solder to his immediate left and wouldn't be done. What would be done is small variations of the second picture, for all that is required is for a small space to be created and the sword to stab outwards.
Indeed I have come to realise that I have perhaps always had a different view to the way the Romans fought - unless I have mis-understood. The Roman primary-weapon is the shield. The shield creates the opportunity to use the sword. I think that all the pictures we now have in our heads of gladiators and knights and cavaliers and samurai fighting individual duels have twisted our perceptions. The Greeks, the Macedonians (phalanx evolution) and the Romans all fought close up. Forget individual martial prowess (many barbarian tribes downfall) - the close-order lines of the ancient world are to exploit the strengths and weaknesses of the armaments they have. They are efficient killing machines - not vehicles for individual sword-play. Anyone who fought with big gaps to each side would die easily - from those exposed sides.
For the Romans it's - punch shield - stab/thrust - return - over and over until tired - replace with fresh rank or fresh century/maniple. Very simple and very effective.
To answer your last two points and reiterate a third - you do need to space out to left and right to permit transition - but this is done by withdrawing a file and perhaps not all the way. No, I wouldn't dream of moving a 15lb shield that much - as I described above; small distances only. Battles that show the Romans waiting to receive charges:
- well just above this extract of Polybius at Cynoscephalae where the Romans receive the phalanx-charge (bearing in mind that phalanxes charge at the walk to preserve the formation) and no one would be stupid enough to charge an unbroken line of sharp points (Poly 18.25)
- and Caesar's first battle against the Helvetii (Gallic Wars I.24-25) where he waits to receive the Helvetii; then unleashes pila-volleys (pila are close-range weapons, but the hill would help); and only then do the Romans charge. (I only looked quickly)
Why are the prior/posterior deployments of the centuries different between the periods? I've never come across anything that suggests that - please point me. In addition, I believe there is only the one reference in Ceasar's commentaries that suggests that a 4-3-3 cohort deployment was used instead of the otherwise normal legion in 3 lines which could easily have been preserved if they chose to. Whilst cohorts were now regularly used, the only thing I find a bit odd in that particular formation is that it was not 4-4-2 - for then at least the 2nd line units could cover the same frontage - as was done previously.
Simple marching is complex? I assure you, from personal experience, that I could get a group of 120-160 teenage cadets to roughly perform those moves in much less than an afternoon. Teenagers who are often un-cordinated to boot, but can do turn-move-halt-turn-move-halt very easily. Moreover, the posterior century move left move forward to make the line, whilst being able to move back and assume any intermediate position (just like in the original picture that I shall re-post here) allows any of the Zama-like evolutions we like to interpret. I would also go as far as to say that the middle deployment of my picture is much more a 'quincunx' than yours - let alone I think your saw-tooth isn't what he meant. Saw-tooth is just like the sort of thing I've alluded to in disrupting the phalanx - advance the Prior century a pace or two, or the posterior back a pace or two - or both - and then advance and retreat in those pairs across the line - and that's the actions of a saw - sawing at the phalanx-line to disrupt and destroy it.
I didn't mention age - but equipment. It is a digression, but there are sufficient references in many sources (cf Gallic Wars 8.17) to a 'lighter infantry' in the Roman legions to suggest that the velites of the Early Republic may well have remained in the century/maniple/cohort structure of the Late Republic (and possibly still the younger members who are more nimble); let alone the differently armed soldiers of Josephus' guard troops withdrawn from the legions; and the later references to lanciarii in the Late Army. All may represent no change in actual overall structure.
In order for the maniples of the cohorts to fight side-by-side as opposed to in separate lines (if that is what happened), then no, I would expect the centuries to keep the men they had trained and that all would become experienced so that each cohort didn't have a weaker left than right.
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