Quincunx and Keppie\'s hypothesis

[Cesco]

During battles were the gaps between maniples maintained or maybe the centuria posterior moved to the prior's left (Keppie)? Are there any proof to support these hypothesis?

[Macedon]

You might want to look at older discussions on that issue. For starters look at this and this.

[Macedon]

You might want to look for older discussions on this issue, use the "search" app. For starters look at this and this.

[antiochus]

By following the conventional quincunx formation illustrated below, the problem with this arrangement is the deployment of the legion is not symmetrical. In order to close the gaps in each acies and still conform to Polybius’ description that the first centurion commanded the right half of the maniple and the second centurion commanded the left, would require the hastati and triarii posterior centuries to move to the left in order to eliminate the overlap.

However, to achieve the same results with the principes; the movement direction of the posterior centuries and the placement of the centurions has to be reversed. To have the prior centurion remain commanding the right half of the maniple and to eliminate the overlaps with the hastati and triarii, each senior principes centurion would have to command the posterior century and the junior centurion the prior century. In this manner, the senior centurion is on the left and not the right.

[attachment=7225]TraditionalQuincuxMovementcopy.jpg[/attachment]


It is possible Polybius did not concern himself with the reverse arrangements of the principes because no such reverse arrangement existed. If this is the case, then the conventional interpretation of the quincunx formation requires further scrutiny.

[Flavivs Aetivs]

Wouldn't it make more sense to have the first line take the brunt of the attack and fall back into the gaps in the second line? It would work especially well if the first line was used as a delay so the second and third lines could gain composure or an advantageous position.

[Cesco]

Another manouvre to close the gaps could be the following: in his account of military training Vegetius speaks (I.26) about the duplication of an acies ( in this case the acies is simply a rank of soldiers ) by a " simplex acies " ( a single rank ) and the development of an " acies quadrata " . the simplex and the duplex acies should have a twice wide front... so forming an acies quadrata could open the gaps; on the other hand forming a simplex acies( rank ) should close the gap. In other words the entire maniple could form an acie quadrata, doubling the ranks, or deploy an acies simplex( or duplex ),doubling the front and closing the gaps...

[Cesco]

Wouldn't it make more sense to have the first line take the brunt of the attack and fall back into the gaps in the second line? It would work especially well if the first line was used as a delay so the second and third lines could gain composure or an advantageous position.

the problem is : were gaps mantained during the melee :???: according to this account of Polybios they were closed :15. 14.3 ...

[Flavivs Aetivs]

Well, what I meant was that when the first line fell back it would close the gaps in the second line, if the formation was staggered.

[Cesco]

This is an interesting possibility... Honestly I don' t know if the romans always used the same battle drill or if they adapted the maniples to the circumstances. But wath if the maniples of hastati principi and triari were arranged in a single line ( like the final stage at Zama) ? They should have closed the gaps ....

[Bryan]

I highly recommend anyone interested in the idea of gaps/intervals in the Roman fighting lines to read Michael Taylor's paper Roman Infantry Tactics in the Mid-Republic: A Reassessment. Good luck trying to find an electronic copy, though.

From the excerpt on Acadamia.edu:
This article explores two questions about the tactical mechanics of the Roman manipular legion. Firstly, what frontages did the Roman legion field in set-piece battle? Given that Hellenistic forces deployed in standardized formations, the length of Hellenistic infantry lines can be used to calculate the opposing Roman formation. This in turn permits consideration of the nature and tactical function of the gaps between the maniples. The paper deduces that Roman legions presented fronts between 320 and 570 meters in five set-piece battles. The range of frontages suggests that modest inter-manipular gaps were maintained even when the heavy infantry lines clashed

In summary, Taylor provides some pretty interesting theories about individual spacing between men, depth/ranks of units, total numbers, etc., of both Roman army units (citizen and allied foot), as well as Rome's enemy. The Romans fought with gaps within their units, just as Polybius states.

Francesco wrote:
the problem is : were gaps mantained during the melee ??: according to this account of Polybios they were closed :15. 14.3 ...

Can you provide the text for your Polybius quote about closing the gaps? I read my translated online copy and it only mentions Scipio Africanus' redeployment of the lines during a lull in the Battle of Zama against Hannibal.

The ideas of gaps/intervals is interesting but unfortunately primary sources are never consistent or detailed enough to prove or disprove the theory. It's all conjecture and opinion. But I think they existed...
(see the first thread Macedon posted above but ignore everything I wrote about depth and history/use of cohorts. I've since realized that my earlier theories were wrong)

[Mark Hygate]

Moved....

[Cesco]

To Brayan: "However Scipio caused the wounded to be carried to the rear, and the hastati to be recalled from the pursuit by the sound of a bugle, and drew them up where they were in advance of the ground on which the fighting had taken place, opposite the enemy's centre. He then ordered the principes and triarii to take close order, and, threading their way through the corpses, to deploy into line with the hastati on either flank. When they had surmounted the obstacles and got into line with the hastati, the two lines charged each other with the greatest fire and fury.Being nearly equal in numbers, spirit, courage, and arms, the battle was for a long time undecided, the men in their obstinate valour falling dead without giving way a step"... Indeed from this quote i can only suppose the gaps were closed by the principi and triari " taking close order". The battle was very long and i don't believe that a simple acies could resist a long time with gaps. But this is only a speculation.
The more i think to keppie's hypothesis the more I'm doubious about it:I have find no evidence to prove a tactical role of centuriae,while the tactical unit was ( only ? ) the maniple. Maybe the centuria didn' t even exist on the battlefield... so IF the gaps were closed it was the maniple to manouvre ( maybe lining up the men as described by Vegetius I.26 in order to doubling the front or the number of ranks...)
Anyway thanks for the advice! I'll try to find the paper. by the same autor i'd like to report "Roman Soldiers in Open Order: Polybius 18.30 and the Visual Evidence" and regarding intra-manipoular manouvres mentioned above:"http://www.academia.edu/727113/_Not_so_different_individual_fighting_techniques_and_small_unit_tactics_of_Roman_and_Iberian_armies_ by Fernando Quesada Sanz

[Macedon]

Battlefield tactics should, in my opinion, be approached in a more holistic way than most researchers do. When discussing gaps in the Roman army of any era one has to take into account the data we have on gaps in other armies (or times). The same applies to all other discussions like how gaps were closed, how lines were extended etc etc. Attacks of a battle-line with sizable gaps among relatively small units were an acceptable tactic called in Greek "speiridon" or attack by "orthioi lochoi". We have very good examples, mostly in Greek armies such as the 10,000 and of Antigonus at Selassia. Less detailed examples we have regarding a lot of armies like the Romans, the Lusitanians, the Illyrians etc. We have accounts of rear lines (boethos) receiving a retreating/fleeing front line (promachos) as a tactic with the men of the latter retreating through sizable gaps in the Roman/Byzantine manuals with much detail as to how these gaps were formed, their size, how they could be made invisible to the enemy, how the retreating men should be checked and reorganized. An advice here should be to always have in mind when an account is about infantry and when about cavalry. In all, most of the thoughts I read here have been implemented in the past and one should study how they worked before trying to apply them as a theory to instances we, unfortunately, have little details on. The peculiarity of the Roman system, especially in the pre-Caesarian times is stressed again and again by the authors but their accounts are generally, and unfortunately, ignored, since this peculiarity is usually linked with a system that allowed the maniples/cohorts to somehow more easily retreat and still keep their cohesion, order instead of being used in an unbeatable offensive thrust, which is the most common notion linked with the Romans.

@ Mark, What kind of march does your image depict? It is not a battle-array is it?

[Mark Hygate]

Moved.....

[Cesco]

We have accounts of rear lines (boethos) receiving a retreating/fleeing front line (promachos) as a tactic with the men of the latter retreating through sizable gaps in the Roman/Byzantine manuals with much detail as to how these gaps were formed, their size, how they could be made invisible to the enemy, how the retreating men should be checked and reorganized.

Are these manuals available on the web? I would be very gratefull if you could give me some informations!