02-18-2013, 03:08 AM
What we commonly call shock cavalry tactics in pitched battles has nothing to do with what we often fantasize about, that is thousands of iron-clad horsemen clashing with a bang into massed lines of infantry... That armored cavalry would, on occasions, charge (that is advance towards at any speed) against infantry is undoubted. That the horses would normally effectively fall upon a dense line of stationary men arranged as a wall, is very doubtful.
The question here is :
Was charging with cavalry into massed lines of densely arranged men who kept their cohesion up to and over the point of impact considered a viable tactic in pitched battles?
In my opinion it was not and was usually avoided.
However, this does not mean that charging TOWARDS infantry was also not a viable tactic. Especially in much later times (in ancient times such accounts are extremely rare), cavalry would indeed charge towards infantry but this does not mean that it charged INTO them. It did and hoped that the footmen set against them would falter and thus present the gaps necessary for a horse to truly gallop or trot into the infantry formation. Most armies would not have a large number of well-trained, well-equipped footmen who would psychologically and to a man withstand the psychological pressure of such a sight. Most would of course not flee but should some break the shield-wall presented to the horses by changing the angle they held their shields, by trying to push through the ranks in fear, by not paying attention to their relative position to the men next to them, by casualties or even disorder inflicted by the missiles of the cavalry, then the horses would have no problem to ride "into" the infantry line. I am not a really experienced rider but I saw that a horse has no problem to gallop into a gap that is only inches wider than its body width. Of course it would not gallop into an obstacle but I many times (trying to see how close I could get it to pass) had my feet actually hit both obstacles, on the left and right, while the horse galloped through.
Thus cavalry charges (into infantry masses) could be effective against :
1. infantry that did not perform a synaspismos
2. infantry that could not keep its synaspismos for any reason (inexperience/fear/whatever else)
But when there were well-trained footmen in the enemy army, men who fought in phalanx and not in some open formation (not necessary skirmish/diesparmeni taxi), cavalry would normally:
1. charge and retreat when it was clear that the enemy would not falter or with limited melee action in the few places where the infantry did not manage to keep cohesion (thus we have medieval accounts of multiple charges)
2. not charge
3. wait for the right moment when an enemy infantry formation would fall into disorder because of any reason.
Very revealing information we can find in the Byzantine manuals where the cataphracts are urged to not be afraid to charge against (not necessarily into) infantry. Admittedly among the heaviest armored horsemen the cataphracts were ordered to attack infantry which clearly showed that this was a viable tactic BUT they were afraid, which also clearly shows that it was not considered safe.
However, and this is the gist of my position, although cavalry could under circumstances indeed charge into massed infantry lines, it was not considered a safe tactic by militarily organized nations to use against militarily organized nations. In ancient times, such charges were even more uncommon.
Regarding chariots, according to the Greek sources, there were two different types in the east. The scythed and those of the "Libyan" (or "Trojan" IIRC) type. The latter acted in skirmish as platforms for missile troops while the former were indeed used against enemy infantry massed formations. Their effectiveness rested in the same principals with those of the cavalry. IF the infantry kept its cohesion, their effectiveness was minimal (-of course in a line 500 or more meters long "keeping cohesion" did not mean through the whole length of the line, maybe in one or two spots some kind of problem would indeed be created and the horses would charge into them-). There is no pitched battle account where the scythed chariots really won the day. BUT, in all these battles, the fear exists. This means that against less organized, experienced and well-trained infantry, like that of Asian nations against which it was supposed to be normally used, it could really make the difference, building up their fame. I guess that for every major battle we know of against Greeks and Romans, the Persians fought 10 against their own Asiatic neighbors, tribes etc, where the scythed chariots cut their way through faltering and fleeing lines of panicked men,exactly as for every major battle, there would be 100 examples of minor incidents or less massive battles, where the cavalry charge would really smash faltering and fleeing infantry of less organized/experienced opponents.
In all, tactics should not be viewed only in terms of the few, really big battles we can study. It is naive to believe that shock cavalry and chariots were useless because in 10-20 battles they could accomplish little when used in a certain way. These arms and tactics existed because they were useful in the broader sense of war and battle. However, it is equally naive to suggest that because they existed they were as useful, when thus tactically used, in such battles too. Exactly like terrain, numbers, the composition of the army, its level of experience and training etc would make certain tactics more or less appropriate.
The question here is :
Was charging with cavalry into massed lines of densely arranged men who kept their cohesion up to and over the point of impact considered a viable tactic in pitched battles?
In my opinion it was not and was usually avoided.
However, this does not mean that charging TOWARDS infantry was also not a viable tactic. Especially in much later times (in ancient times such accounts are extremely rare), cavalry would indeed charge towards infantry but this does not mean that it charged INTO them. It did and hoped that the footmen set against them would falter and thus present the gaps necessary for a horse to truly gallop or trot into the infantry formation. Most armies would not have a large number of well-trained, well-equipped footmen who would psychologically and to a man withstand the psychological pressure of such a sight. Most would of course not flee but should some break the shield-wall presented to the horses by changing the angle they held their shields, by trying to push through the ranks in fear, by not paying attention to their relative position to the men next to them, by casualties or even disorder inflicted by the missiles of the cavalry, then the horses would have no problem to ride "into" the infantry line. I am not a really experienced rider but I saw that a horse has no problem to gallop into a gap that is only inches wider than its body width. Of course it would not gallop into an obstacle but I many times (trying to see how close I could get it to pass) had my feet actually hit both obstacles, on the left and right, while the horse galloped through.
Thus cavalry charges (into infantry masses) could be effective against :
1. infantry that did not perform a synaspismos
2. infantry that could not keep its synaspismos for any reason (inexperience/fear/whatever else)
But when there were well-trained footmen in the enemy army, men who fought in phalanx and not in some open formation (not necessary skirmish/diesparmeni taxi), cavalry would normally:
1. charge and retreat when it was clear that the enemy would not falter or with limited melee action in the few places where the infantry did not manage to keep cohesion (thus we have medieval accounts of multiple charges)
2. not charge
3. wait for the right moment when an enemy infantry formation would fall into disorder because of any reason.
Very revealing information we can find in the Byzantine manuals where the cataphracts are urged to not be afraid to charge against (not necessarily into) infantry. Admittedly among the heaviest armored horsemen the cataphracts were ordered to attack infantry which clearly showed that this was a viable tactic BUT they were afraid, which also clearly shows that it was not considered safe.
However, and this is the gist of my position, although cavalry could under circumstances indeed charge into massed infantry lines, it was not considered a safe tactic by militarily organized nations to use against militarily organized nations. In ancient times, such charges were even more uncommon.
Regarding chariots, according to the Greek sources, there were two different types in the east. The scythed and those of the "Libyan" (or "Trojan" IIRC) type. The latter acted in skirmish as platforms for missile troops while the former were indeed used against enemy infantry massed formations. Their effectiveness rested in the same principals with those of the cavalry. IF the infantry kept its cohesion, their effectiveness was minimal (-of course in a line 500 or more meters long "keeping cohesion" did not mean through the whole length of the line, maybe in one or two spots some kind of problem would indeed be created and the horses would charge into them-). There is no pitched battle account where the scythed chariots really won the day. BUT, in all these battles, the fear exists. This means that against less organized, experienced and well-trained infantry, like that of Asian nations against which it was supposed to be normally used, it could really make the difference, building up their fame. I guess that for every major battle we know of against Greeks and Romans, the Persians fought 10 against their own Asiatic neighbors, tribes etc, where the scythed chariots cut their way through faltering and fleeing lines of panicked men,exactly as for every major battle, there would be 100 examples of minor incidents or less massive battles, where the cavalry charge would really smash faltering and fleeing infantry of less organized/experienced opponents.
In all, tactics should not be viewed only in terms of the few, really big battles we can study. It is naive to believe that shock cavalry and chariots were useless because in 10-20 battles they could accomplish little when used in a certain way. These arms and tactics existed because they were useful in the broader sense of war and battle. However, it is equally naive to suggest that because they existed they were as useful, when thus tactically used, in such battles too. Exactly like terrain, numbers, the composition of the army, its level of experience and training etc would make certain tactics more or less appropriate.
