Cavalry and chariots against infantry

[Domen]

I think reading Muslim and Christian accounts of Crusader cavalry charges can lead to some interesting conclusions. And I am sure some of them are available in English (especially those Christian ones, but some of the Muslim ones as well). For a good start - two quotations from the book titled "The Crusades: Islamic perspectives" by Carole Hillenbrand:


http://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Th...edir_esc=y


Both excerpts are from the account of Ibn al-Athir regarding the battle of Hattin in 1187:

After the count’s departure, the Franks were on the point of capitulating. The Muslims had set fire to the dry grass, and the wind was blowing the smoke into the eyes of the knights. Assailed by thirst, flames, and smoke, by the summer heat and the fires of combat, the Franks were unable to go on. But they believed they could avoid death only by confronting it. They launched attacks so violent that the Muslims were about to give way. Nevertheless, with each assault the Franks suffered heavy losses and their numbers diminished. The Muslims gained possession of the True Cross. For the Franls, this was the heaviest of losses, for it was on this cross, they claim, that the Messiah, peace be upon him, was crucified

When the king of the Franks [Guy] was on the hill with that band, they made a formidable charge against the Muslims facing them, so that they drove them back to my father [Saladin]. I looked towards him and he was overcome by grief and his complexion pale. He took hold of his beard and advanced, crying out "Give the lie to the Devil!" The Muslims rallied, returned to the fight and climbed the hill. When I saw that the Franks withdrew, pursued by the Muslims, I shouted for joy, "We have beaten them!" But the Franks rallied and charged again like the first time and drove the Muslims back to my father. He acted as he had done on the first occasion and the Muslims turned upon the Franks and drove them back to the hill. I again shouted, "We have beaten them!" but my father rounded on me and said, "Be quiet! We have not beaten them until that tent [Guy's] falls." As he was speaking to me, the tent fell. The sultan dismounted, prostrated himself in thanks to God Almighty and wept for joy.

However - once again not much is written regarding technical and tactical details.

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As a practical note:

If we want to understand how relatively common or uncommon it is for cavalry to defeat infantry or infantry to defeat cavalry, then it helps to decide on specific sources [such as all the battle descriptions in Ammianus] and then tally up the references both to cavalry defeating infantry and to infantry defeating cavalry, and then to expand this by adding additional sources [such as all the battle descriptions in Procopius] and keep tallying up the references both ways.

But what should be taken into account in such statistical comparisons - are numbers.

People often quote examples of infantry beating seriously outnumbered cavalry, as supposed proofs of superiority of infantry over cavalry. However, they forget that cavalry was overhelmingly outnumbered in these battles. It is a fact that cavalry usually had smaller numbers than infantry - and despite having smaller numbers, often managed to defeat infantry. On the other hand, this fact (the numerical inferiority of the victors) is not underlined as well. So often facts are presented in a bad, biased light for cavalry in Anglo-American works. They do not underline the numerical inferiority of cavalry - neither when it comes to its victories, nor its defeats.

Of course there are also examples of infantry being numerically inferior (and either winning or losing). In such cases, the main justification for infantry getting slaughtered, is usually their small number. So why is small number not a good enough justification for cavalry defeats?

Another issue is that it is not going to be easy to isolate just combats of only infantry vs only cavalry. That's because in most battles and even single engagements, clashes and combats of those battles, neither cavalry nor infantry fought unsupported. Usually cavalry is supported by other arms (like infantry or artillery) and infantry is supported by other arms (like cavalry or artillery) and they cooperate on the battlefield, or prepare favourable combat conditions for each other.

[Timianus]

Forgive me if I missed this, but are you discussing full frontal charges or charges from the flanks/rear? I am assuming (perhaps incorrectly) that this would make a difference, as there would be less "long pointy bits" facing the animals.

[Marja]

But what should be taken into account in such statistical comparisons - are numbers.

People often quote examples of infantry beating seriously outnumbered cavalry, as supposed proofs of superiority of infantry over cavalry. However, they forget that cavalry was overhelmingly outnumbered in these battles. It is a fact that cavalry usually had smaller numbers than infantry - and despite having smaller numbers, often managed to defeat infantry. On the other hand, this fact (the numerical inferiority of the victors) is not underlined as well. So often facts are presented in a bad, biased light for cavalry in Anglo-American works. They do not underline the numerical inferiority of cavalry - neither when it comes to its victories, nor its defeats.

Of course there are also examples of infantry being numerically inferior (and either winning or losing). In such cases, the main justification for infantry getting slaughtered, is usually their small number. So why is small number not a good enough justification for cavalry defeats?

Another issue is that it is not going to be easy to isolate just combats of only infantry vs only cavalry. That's because in most battles and even single engagements, clashes and combats of those battles, neither cavalry nor infantry fought unsupported. Usually cavalry is supported by other arms (like infantry or artillery) and infantry is supported by other arms (like cavalry or artillery) and they cooperate on the battlefield, or prepare favourable combat conditions for each other.

Reliable numbers are hard to find. But even without reliable numbers this can say a lot.

I don't suggest counting a entire battle as one data point, unless it is a small skirmish, instead taking individual actions out of each battle account, and only counting those actions which refer to infantry units against cavalry or cavalry units against infantry, as opposed to the mixed ones.

[ValentinianVictrix]

Did no one bother either look at the link I put up for the Rance paper on exactly this topic or even bother reading the paper itself? There are a number of historical examples from the Roman and Byzantine period where infantry were able to beat off cavalry of all types. I would urge the posters here to at leeast have a look at that paper.

[Domen]

I don't suggest counting a entire battle as one data point, unless it is a small skirmish, instead taking individual actions out of each battle account, and only counting those actions which refer to infantry units against cavalry or cavalry units against infantry, as opposed to the mixed ones.

Even if you take individual actions, they were often carried out by combined arms rather than by just cavalry or just infantry. Often cavalry could not win without infantry support - and inversely.

At Vienna in 1683 it was infantry and engineers who inundated Ottoman trenches, removed anti-cavalry obstacles from the foreground and prepared the ground for the subsequent, decisive shock cavalry charge (spearheaded by Polish husaria). Without hard work of those engineers and infantry, terrain would not be suitable for such a massive cavalry charge (one of the biggest charges in history).

Apart from numbers also terrain (whether favourable for cavalry or for infantry) and presence or lack of field fortifications and anti-cavalry obstacles should be taken into account.

Western historiography often does not bother to mention such conditions. In many battles which are given as textbook examples of infantry beating off cavalry, they were the most important factors:

Bannockburn - swampy terrain + cavalry was attacked by infantry shiltroms while crossing a river (before it could reform into a battle array and carry out an organized charge or fight in an organized way).

Crecy - the English had prepared in advance strong defensive positions, surrounded by palisades, ditches, wires and pitfalls. In front of their positions also Krähenfuß (caltrops) were scattered:

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kr%C3%A4henfu%C3%9F

Caltrop:



Courtrai - infantry formation was protected by 2 streams (Groeninge Beek & Grote Bek) 2,5-3 m wide and 1,5 m deep each, with swampy banks. On eastern banks of both streams infantry digged numerous pitfalls before the battle, which were concealed with branches & ground. Also ditches were digged. Some of them were filled with water from the Lys river (so they turned into moats). Left wing of infantry position was further protected by stone walls of the Groeninge monastery & right flank was covered by Lage Vijver (moat of the town of Courtrai). Behind the Flamand formation was the river, so attack from the rear was impossible (but so was retreat in case of failure).

Infantry was deployed close enough behind Groeninge Beek & Grote Bek so that cavalry - after crossing these streams - was not able to reform and carry out organized charge again (not enough space).

Courtrai was thus hardly an open field, pitched battle (just like Crecy). It was defence in prepared position with numerous both natural & man-made obstacles protecting infantry. Yet cavalry lost only ca. 700 casualties in this battle (while it carried out multiple charges vs a strong force numbering thousands of infantry) - which shows that charging even such a mighty fortification was not suicidal.

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As you can see the above given examples of Crecy or Courtrai, were hardly examples of pitched battles in the open field. In both those battles infantry defences were strengthened by sophisticated and extensive earthworks, field fortifications, obstacles, traps, etc. - prepared in advance before the battles (and it surely took long time and a lot of effort to prepare such defensive works).

And infantry vs cavalry clash at Bannockburn, was also not an example of an organized clash in the open field, but rather an unexpected assault or ambush of infantry against unprepared cavalrymen who were during the process of crossing the river, in swampy terrain unfavourable for cavalry.

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Regarding the tactics of Late Medieval cavalry.

In the 15th century (and also already since at least the 2nd half of the 14th century) cavalry in Central and Eastern Europe was organized in mixed units consisting of both heavy shock cavalry, and missile support cavalry. The former ones were called lancers, the latter ones - shooters.

Those mixed units of lancers and shooters, often fought in wedge-column formations.

Two detailed examples of units (banners) deployed in wedge-column formations are provided by Albrecht Achilles in his "Unterricht" ("Instructions") from 1477 (a Brandenburgian source).

According to Achilles - a 400 strong unit (banner) in a wedge-column formation looked like this - at the front, there was a wedge numbering 5 rows. In the 1st row of a wedge there were just 3 horsemen, in the 2nd row - 5, then 7, 9 and 11. In total a wedge consisted of 35 horsemen. In the last row of a wedge, there was a standard-bearer who carried the unit's flag (aka banner). Behind the wedge the rest of the unit was deployed in a column with 33 rows, 11 horsemen in each row:



Wedge of each banner always consisted of the best lancers with heaviest armor and best close-combat equipment. Column consisted of lighter shooters (in its central part) and remaining heavy lancers (on both sides). So lighter troops were protected from all sides by heavier troops. Shooters could attack enemy from distance using their crossbows even when unit was on the move (shooting above heads of lancers in front of them using the technique of clout shooting aka shower shooting). Best-equipped & armored horsemen from the wedge were the striking power, shock power of a banner in charge and in melee. So units deployed in a wedge-column formation, while charging the enemy, were relying on: a) firepower of crossbows from the center of its formation to "soften" enemy units with their fire before the clash, and on: b) striking power of heavy lancers, mainly those finest ones from the wedge.

Wedge-column formation was most likely used by both Polish and Teutonic armies in the battle of Grunwald 1410. A translated excerpt from the book "Grunwald 1410" by Andrzej Nadolski, page 75:

"(...) We have many sources indicating that a wedge-column formation was indeed applied, both by Teutonic and Polish-Lithuanian army. Jan Dlugosz in his account of the battle of Grunwald mentions on the Polish side so called "ahead-banner" knights ("antesignani"), undoubtedly referring to those elite lancers deployed "in a wedge", so standing in front of a banner ("ante signum"), which was placed in the last row of a wedge or maybe even in the first row of a column. We also know, that in the first line of the Krakow banner there were only 9, of the Goncza banner - 5, and of the Court banner - 4 knights, which proves, that those banners must have been deployed in deep formations and which precisely corresponds to the detailed description of Brandenburgian banners quoted above. Also in Lithuanian banners "in the middle stood warriors on smaller horses and worse armed, who were surrounded by others on better horses and better armed." Individual banners were keeping the density of their formation, but between one and another banner usually considerable interspace was maintained. Finally Teutonic sources describing wartime operations in 1409 mention a knight named Janke Błock, who "died fighting in a Spitz". From other sources we know, that in Medieval German military terminology "spitz" ("Spitz") was a term used to name a wedge preceding a column of a banner. (...)"

Term "banner" was used to describe both a flag (a standard), and a unit (usually few hundred men).

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Coming back to Medieval victories of infantry over cavalry:

Another Medieval example of infantry defeating cavalry - is the forgotten battle of the Rondsen Lake (Polish: Jezioro Rządzkie; German: Rondesner See) in 1243.

In that battle the army of the Polish duchy of Gdansk supported by Prussian-Lithuanian reinforcements, under command of Duke of Gdansk Świętopełk II, defeated the army of the Teutonic Order under Marschall Berlewin von Freiberg.

Świętopełk used light infantry of his Prussian-Lithuanian allies to lure Teutonic cavalry into his hidden main body of infantry. Teutonic cavalry charged & routed his Prussian-Lithuanian allied infantry (it was a faked retreat though) but then fell right into his hidden troops (in a forest) and got defeated.

Order's Marschall Berlewin von Freiberg, former Order's Marschall Dietrich von Bernheim and as many as 400 Teutonic soldiers were killed in this battle.

However - as you can read above - it was also not an open-field, regular battle, but once again surprise effect, deceit, ambush and favourable terrain decided the outcome.

A similar tactics (luring cavalry into hidden infantry) was used by Germanic forces in the battle of Strasbourg in 357 AD against Roman clibanarii. Germanic infantry was hidden in long grass between Germanic cavalry - clibanarii charged Germanic cavalry and were repulsed by that cavalry with support of ambush of Germanic spearmen hidden between the ranks of their cavalry.

[Dan Howard]

Sean, perhaps I am mistaken, but this gave me the impression that you start with writing a battle narrative, and then evolve a model of how it worked. If you really work that way, I implore you to desist. Read battle narratives, yes, but starting with writing them yourself, no, don't do it, because then you have already tied yourself down before you have even started.

IMO the approach that Sean outlined is the only sensible way to handle this subject.

[Macedon]

Peter, your posts are informative and interesting but I think that you digress too much from the OP. Maybe you should start a topic specifically about the Polish hussars?

[Domen]

Lance-wielding cavalry was efficient versus infantry also in the 19th century.

A good example is the destruction of Colborne's brigade by Polish lancers at Albuera in 1811:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_A...7s_brigade

Casualty ratio was 1:10 - 130 for the lancers and 1300 for the infantry they defeated.

The Vistula Lancers were also known as the "Lancers of Hell" among the British.

[Macedon]

Yes, but I hoped they would have to do with the OP, not general information. I still think it is a very interesting issue, this is why I think we should start a thread where you can present all this information. Even mods should not digress too much...

[ValentinianVictrix]

'A similar tactics (luring cavalry into hidden infantry) was used by Germanic forces in the battle of Strasbourg in 357 AD against Roman clibanarii. Germanic infantry was hidden in long grass between Germanic cavalry - clibanarii charged Germanic cavalry and were repulsed by that cavalry with support of ambush of Germanic spearmen hidden between the ranks of their cavalry.'

I'm afraid your getting a bit confused on that particular battle account. There were Allemanni in ambush, off to the Allemanni armies right flank where there was some marchy ground near the river. A portion of the Allemanni were hiding there but were flushed out after the Roman General commanding the Roman left flank suspected the Allemanni were hiding there. The Allemanni had a practice of mixing 'light' infantry with their cavalry to support them and thats what they did at Strasburg, it was nothing to do with Germanic infantry hiding in ambush in the grass!

Julian managed to rally the Roman right wing cavalry, which included his Clibanarii, and they returned to the fray, probably at the moment the Allemani routed and joined in with the pursuit.

[Sean Manning]

Sean Manning wrote:
I suggest that the first step is to write battle narratives at the traditional big-picture level, and then to perform a Face of Battle analysis of the mechanics of these big events to understand how they could have worked.

Sean, perhaps I am mistaken, but this gave me the impression that you start with writing a battle narrative, and then evolve a model of how it worked. If you really work that way, I implore you to desist. Read battle narratives, yes, but starting with writing them yourself, no, don't do it, because then you have already tied yourself down before you have even started.

No, let me give an example. Most narratives of a well-documented battle written by careful scholars only differ in the details. For example, my master's work is on the organization, recruitment, and logistics of the revolt of Cyrus the Younger. The battle of Cunaxa is essentially irrelevant, but I need to give a brief account for readers who are not familiar with it. I therefore at one or two places describe in a few hundred words the key facts about that battle, the things which it is not possible to differ much about, such as “Cyrus saw his brother and charged him and a confused cavalry fight broke out. In the dust and confusion, Artaxerxes was wounded and Cyrus and his closest companions were killed.” These two sentences beg many questions- Why did Cyrus charge? How did the cavalry fight? Who wounded Artaxerxes? Who killed Cyrus? - but we can be quite confident of everything in them. A narrative at this level can suggest incidents that deserve further study at a low level. This was Keegan's approach to his three battles in The Face of Battle; each chapter starts with a narrative in 'rough strokes' which is then broken down into stages and incidents for detailed analysis.

[Domen]

Some cavalry vs infantry collision models:



So this actually confirms my point of view - in each case at least the first 4 ranks of infantry (and in some cases all ranks) are smashed by cavalry. But please note that in their model the horse is only 330 kg heavy (and its speed is only 40 km/h). And they also wrote:

"The mass of horse and rider is deliberately slightly underestimated, as we do not have reliable data on the size of horses used by Roman cavalry."

While as I have read, late Medieval combat horses were often even over 800 kg heavy.

And 330 kg is surely way too low (not "slightly") for Roman horses (even though they were certainly not as heavy as late Medieval ones). 500 - 600+ kg would be more realistic for Roman horses. Even nowadays an average adult horse is 550 - 650 kg heavy, according to this website:

http://zapytaj.onet.pl/Category/010,009/...kon__.html

330 kg is a normal weight but for a pony - not for a horse! I don't think that Roman cavalry used ponies in battles. So actually this model suffers from serious bias - too small mass and speed of horse compared to mass & speed of real combat horses. Thus kinetic energy of a charging horse from their model is not as large as kinetic energy of a real charging horse (especially Medieval one). Heavier and faster horse would inflict even more damage (i.e. smash more ranks of foot soldiers) than horse from their model.

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On the other hand - it is possible there are also some other flaws in this model (apart from underestimated mass of horses), which work in favour of infantry, on the other hand.

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And here such an interesting article:

"Saddle, Lance and Stirrup. An Examination of the Mechanics of Shock Combat and the Development of Shock Tactics":

http://www.classicalfencing.com/articles/shock.php

A discussion regarding shock charges without saddles and stirrups (the final conclusion was that saddles and stirrups were not absolutely necessary for shock cavalry, although surely made their work easier):

http://forums.totalwar.org/vb/showthread...t-stirrups

Regarding how animals are - supposedly - too intelligent to be forced to do suicidal things: :whistle:



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A video showing modern horses - so horses far from being trained to do such things (unlike combat horses from the past) - ramming solid objects and plunging into crowd:

http://animal.discovery.com/tv-shows/unt...-crowd.htm

This video also gives us some idea how shock charges of chariots could look like.

More videos:

A horse ramming a definitely solid, wooden object:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=pla...r3VxnS42vQ#!

Another one - horse tramples oncoming car:

http://www.break.com/index/horse-trample...g-car.html

And here spectator run over by horse:

http://www.break.com/index/spectator-run...horse.html

Horse slams into starting gate:

http://www.break.com/index/horse-slams-i...-gate.html

Horse runs into fence (on its own, without any encouragement):

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aOXmruNJjQE

And next one:

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-05-08/ho...ce/2708746

And horse goes "crowd surfing":

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=pla...RvxtwDsUHc

Horse crashes into fence:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=pla...fVS6nmZWho#!

And also (but not so spectacular as some of the previous ones):

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7qROBbfeT...=fvwp&NR=1

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Regarding the famous charge against squares at Waterloo:

At Waterloo in that failed charge there was 10500 infantry vs 3500 French cavalry - a 3 to 1 ratio in favour of infantry. There were 4 infantry brigades (Ompteda, Kielmannsegge, von Kruse, Sir Halkett) versus 26 cavalry squadrons. Numbers counted basing on:

http://napolun.com/mirror/napoleonistyka...ERLOO.html

Ompteda - 2.087
Kielmannsegge - 3.315
von Kruse - 2.841
Sir Halkett - 2.274

Total of 10500 infantry.

And 26 squadrons of cavalry = 3500 (average Napoleon's cavalry squadron at Waterloo - 135).

A 3 to 1 numerical superiority. And infantry squares suffered heavy losses while repulsing that cavalry (for example V Line Btn. KGL under Mjr. Schroeder which was part of Ompteda's brigade lost 93% of soldiers in the battle of Waterloo - surely large part of them lost during that charge).

Entire brigade of von Kielmannsegge lost 45% of soldiers in the battle of Waterloo.

[Thomas Aagaard]

Crecy - the English had prepared in advance strong defensive positions, surrounded by palisades, ditches, wires and pitfalls. In front of their positions also Krähenfuß (caltrops) were scattered:

Iam not sure I agree.
Pits to break the legs of the horses, yes. (they can be made with a sword)
But Digging ditches takes time and require tools... I don't believe the english had the tools or the time for it... (not something I have read about before anyway)
I would like to read about this. (need to be in english.)


numbers:
If 1000 peasants with pikes beat 100 men-at-arms you could say its only because of numbers...
But iam pretty sure that the cost of training and equipping the 100 maa is fare bigger than the cost of the 1000 pikemen.

In stead of just talking numbers: Looking at the cost might be a better way to compare two forces.

And how much food do the pikemen (and the needed support) eat compared to 100 maa, their 300+? horses, their squires and servants...
I don't know. But that is another way to do the comparison.

[Domen]

In stead of just talking numbers: Looking at the cost might be a better way to compare two forces.

And how much food do the pikemen (and the needed support) eat compared to 100 maa, their 300+? horses, their squires and servants...

Of course that the high cost is the disadvantage of cavalry compared to infantry. Nobody is denying the fact, that cavalry, especially elite cavalry, usually costs more to maintain than infantry.

High costs of service (but mainly costs carried by those who served - as costs carried by the State Treasury were relatively low compared to costs carried by soldiers themselves) was precisely the main reason for the decline of Polish-Lithuanian winged hussars. Economic decline of the Polish-Lithuanian state and wartime devastation (which caused pauperization of its population - especially of so called "middle gentry" - a social group that was the most important and the most valuable source of recruits for this cavalry formation) caused the rapid decline of the number of potential recruits.

Economic decline was also caused by decline of demand for Polish grain in Western Europe. Producing and exporting grain to Western Europe was the main source of income for large part of Polish "middle gentry".

Pauperization of the "middle gentry" caused the fact, that the number of people willing to carry the costs of service in this prestigious and elite formation (but not so well-paid - costs of service were often much higher than the soldier's pay received from the State Treasury for this service) decreased.

Later - since about late 1670s - the quality of training (especially of unit training - individual training remained on relatively high level, due to the very nature and habits of Polish gentry, who loved horsemanship) and the quality of manpower in husaria also started to decline. More and more Rotamasters (who were very rich people, "owners" and at the same time commanders of hussar units - who financed them together with the State Treasury, covering some of the costs of service of individual soldiers) were appointing substitutes for serving as commanders of their units, rather than serving personally (while at the beginning of the 17th century personal service of Rotamasters within their units on the battlefield was a rule, not an exception like by the end of this century). Also the proportion of NCOs (companions) to "privates" in husaria units was distorted - percentage of NCOs was decreasing.

John III Sobieski was the last hetman (and later king) who made all efforts to maintain high combat value of hussars (he cared for quality of manpower in this formation, organized numerous excercises for his army, etc.). His reign was the "Silver Era" - "the Silver Autumn" of hussars. After his death - the decline became even more rapid. In mid-18th century (1750s) hussars were called "funeral cavalry" (due to the fact that they were used mainly for parades, including ones organized to honour the dead).

Shortly later (in the 1770s) husaria was disbanded completely and transformed into light cavalry.

Sorry for OT about the husaria again - but it is a good example of expensive cavalry.

[Marja]

Okay, so a solid wall of people isn't solid enough to stop a horse. and if so, then locked shields won't stop a horse. I think it does depend on the spears to stop the horses.

Some later Byzantine manuals describe the use of menavlia (?) or very sturdy spears to stop a charge. Eric McGreer discusses this in *Sowing the Dragon's Teeth.* If I remember correctly, the first technique placed a single row of infantry with menavlia (?) at some distance from the main body, but gradually the number of infantry with the weapons increased and they were to put themselves immediately before the first rank of the other infantry.

I still think infantry had the advantage in a frontal fight, and was at a disadvantage otherwise, but I guess we have ruled out a lot of the speculation.